07-004432 Hillsborough County vs. Department Of Juvenile Justice
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, March 10, 2008.


View Dockets  
Summary: Agency that assesses county for juvenile detention care based on calculation of utilization days without imput from the county must credit county for overcharge.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, )

11)

12Petitioner, )

14)

15vs. ) Case No. 07-4432

20)

21DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, )

26)

27Respondent. )

29)

30RECOMMENDED ORDER

32Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Daniel Manry conducted the

40final hearing of this case for the Division of Administrative

50Hearings (DOAH) on December 12, 2007, in Tampa, Florida.

59APPEARANCES

60For Petitioner: Stephen M. Todd, Esquire

66Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office

70Post Office Box 1110

74Tampa, Florida 33601

77For Respondent: Brian Berkowitz, Esquire

82Department of Juvenile Justice

86Knight Building, Room 312V

902737 Centerview Drive

93Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

96STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

100The issue is whether Respondent assessed Petitioner for

108secure juvenile detention care for the 2007-2008 fiscal year in

118a manner that implements Section 985.686, Florida Statutes

126(2007), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1. 1

134PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

136By letter dated August 29, 2007, Respondent notified

144Petitioner of proposed agency action to deny Petitioner's

152protest of Respondent's calculation of utilization days in the

161assessment imposed for the 2007-2008 fiscal year. Petitioner

169requested an administrative hearing, and Respondent referred the

177matter to DOAH to assign an ALJ to conduct the hearing.

188At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of two

197witnesses and submitted three exhibits for admission into

205evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of one witness and

214submitted three exhibits.

217After the hearing, Petitioner submitted one late-filed

224exhibit on December 24, 2007. Respondent was suppose to file a

235fourth exhibit after the hearing, but never filed the exhibit.

245The identity of the witnesses and exhibits and the rulings

255regarding each are reported in the one-volume Transcript of the

265hearing filed with DOAH on January 28, 2008. The ALJ granted

276Respondent's unopposed request for extension of time to file

285proposed recommended orders (PRO). Petitioner and Respondent

292timely filed their PROs on February 11, 2008.

300FINDINGS OF FACT

3031. Respondent is the state agency responsible for

311administering the cost sharing requirements in Section 985.686

319for juvenile detention care. Petitioner is a non-fiscally

327constrained county 2 subject to the statutory cost sharing

336requirements.

3372. The statutory requirements for funding juvenile

344detention in the state guide the findings in this proceeding.

354Subsection 985.686(1) requires Petitioner and Respondent to

361share the costs of "financial support" for "detention care" for

371juveniles who reside in Hillsborough County, Florida (the

379County), and are held in detention centers operated by

388Respondent.

3893. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay the

397costs of detention care "for the period of time" prior to final

409court disposition (predisposition care). Respondent must pay

416the costs of detention care on or after final court disposition

427(post-disposition care).

4294. Detention care is defined in Subsection 985.686(2)(a)

437to mean secure detention. Secure detention is defined in

446Subsection 985.03(18)(a), for the purposes of Chapter 985, to

455include custody "prior to" adjudication or disposition as well

464as custody after adjudication but "prior to" placement. 3

4735. The term "placement" is not defined by statute or rule.

484However, secure detention centers are legally unavailable to

492circuit courts for post-disposition placement. Post-disposition

498care of juveniles in a secure detention center is generally

508limited to juveniles who are waiting for residential placement.

5176. The trier-of-fact construes the reference to placement

525in Subsection 985.03(18)(a) to mean residential placement.

532Secure detention includes custody in a detention center for both

542predisposition and post-disposition care. Predisposition care

548occurs prior to adjudication or final disposition. Post-

556disposition care occurs after adjudication or disposition but

564prior to residential placement.

5687. Post-disposition care also includes custody in a

576detention center after final disposition but prior to release.

585Although this type of post-disposition care comprises a small

594proportion of total post-disposition care, references to

601post-disposition care in this Recommended Order include care

609after final disposition for: juveniles waiting for residential

617placement and juveniles waiting for release.

6238. Juveniles are not supposed to remain in detention

632centers very long after final disposition while they wait for

642residential placement. However, juveniles with exceptional

648needs, such as mental health needs, may remain in detention

658centers for a longer period of time due to the limited

669availability of appropriate residential placement facilities.

6759. Approximately 2,057 secure detention beds exist

683statewide. The operating cost for each bed is the same whether

694the bed is used for predisposition or post-disposition care.

70310. The operating cost for a secure detention bed may

713increase if the detention center exceeds capacity because of

722overtime expenses, temporary staffing, and other temporary

729costs. Although only two secure detention centers did not

738exceed capacity at some time during the previous year, secure

748detention utilization in the same year averaged approximately

75689 percent of capacity.

76011. The Legislature funds the cost of juvenile detention

769care through an annual appropriation. Appropriations from 2002

777forward have historically allocated approximately 11 percent of

785the cost of detention care to Respondent and approximately

79489 percent to the counties.

79912. The total appropriation for the 2007-2008 fiscal year

808was $125,327,667. The Legislature allocated $30,860,924 to the

820state and $101,628,064 to the counties. Negative amounts in

831certain categories brought the net appropriation to

838$125,327,667.

84113. The Legislature pays the state's share of juvenile

850detention costs from general revenue. However, the

"857appropriation" for the counties' share of detention costs is

866actually an account payable. Pursuant to Subsection 985.686(6),

874Petitioner must make monthly payments into a state trust fund

884for its share of statewide predisposition detention costs.

89214. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Respondent to develop

899an accounts payable system to allocate to the counties the costs

910of secure detention for predisposition care. Pursuant to

918Subsection 985.686(5), Respondent administers the account

924payable system through a system of prospective assessment and

933retroactive reconciliation.

93515. Prospective assessments at the outset of a year are

945based on actual costs from the previous year. Subsection

954985.686(5) requires Petitioner to pay the prospective assessment

962monthly and requires Respondent to complete an annual

970reconciliation at the end of the year to determine whether

980actual costs during the year were more or less than the

991prospective assessment. Sometime after the end of each fiscal

1000year, Respondent either credits or debits Petitioner for any

1009differences between the prospective assessment and actual costs

1017determined in the annual reconciliation.

102216. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay for

1030the costs of secure detention in the County for the "period of

1042time" juveniles are in predisposition care. No statute or rule

1052expressly defines the phrase "period of time."

105917. Subsection 985.686(10) authorizes Respondent to adopt

1066rules to administer Section 985.686. Rule 63G-1.004(1)(c)

1073implicitly defines the statutory reference to a "period of time"

1083in predisposition care to mean "service days."

109018. Other provisions in Rule 63G-1.004 prescribe the

1098methodology to be used in calculating Petitioner's share of the

1108costs for predisposition care. Respondent must first identify

1116all juveniles in predisposition care based upon usage during the

1126preceding fiscal year. Second, Respondent must match each

1134placement record with the corresponding identification code.

1141Third, Respondent must calculate the "service days" in

1149predisposition care. Finally, Respondent must divide the number

1157of "service days" Petitioner used for predisposition care in the

1167County by the service days used by all counties to determine the

1179percentage of the counties' costs for predisposition care that

1188Petitioner owes.

119019. Petitioner disputes the methodology Respondent uses to

1198determine the amount Petitioner owes for predisposition care in

1207the County. However, that dispute is the subject of a companion

1218case identified by DOAH Case No. 07-4398 and is beyond the scope

1230of this proceeding.

123320. The dispute in this proceeding is limited to

1242Respondent's determination of the service days that Respondent

1250allocated to Petitioner for predisposition care in the County.

1259The term "service days" is not defined by statute or rule.

127021. Respondent defines service days to mean "utilization"

1278days. Utilization days are not synonymous with calendar days.

128722. Utilization days correspond more closely to the number

1296of juveniles in secure detention. If for example, 10 juveniles

1306utilize one detention center during any part of a day,

131610 utilization days have occurred during one calendar day.

132523. A secure detention center may be utilized

1333simultaneously by juveniles in predisposition care and juveniles

1341in post-disposition care (dual-use occupancy). If the 10

1349utilization days in the preceding example were to include equal

1359dual-use occupancy, Respondent would count five utilization days

1367for predisposition care and five utilization days for

1375post-disposition care.

137724. The 10 juveniles in the preceding example may not

1387occupy a detention center for an entire calendar day. The five

1398juveniles in predisposition care may occupy the center for only

1408part of a calendar day and five more juveniles may receive

1419predisposition care for the remainder of the day. In that

1429example, Respondent would allocate 10 utilization days to

1437Petitioner for predisposition care during that calendar day and

1446only five utilization days to the state for a total of

145715 utilization days.

146025. Respondent determined there were 709,251 utilization

1468days for pre and post-disposition care in the state for the year

1480in issue. Respondent allocated 579,409 utilization days to the

1490counties' predisposition care and 129,842 utilization days to

1499the state for post-disposition care. Respondent allocated

150647,714 utilization days to Petitioner and, after reconciliation,

1515reduced that number to 47,214.

152126. Petitioner claims the correct number of utilization

1529days is 31,008. Respondent allegedly misallocated 16,206

1538utilization days for predisposition care by Petitioner.

154527. Respondent identifies the 16,206 utilization days in

1554nine categories. The categories and corresponding number of

1562days that Petitioner challenges are: contempt of court (327),

1571detention order (3,005), interstate compacts (1), pick up orders

1581(12,267), prosecution previously deferred (28), transfer from

1589another county awaiting commitment beds (444), violation of

1597after care (10), violation of community control (79), and

1606violation of probation (45).

161028. Subsection 985.686(6) requires Respondent to calculate

1617the monthly assessment against Petitioner with input from the

1626County. Respondent allowed input from the counties during

1634rulemaking workshops but has thwarted virtually any input from

1643the County during the annual processes of calculating

1651assessments and reconciliation.

165429. Respondent classifies each of the nine challenged

1662categories as predisposition care. However, the data that

1670Respondent provides to the County each year does not include

1680final disposition dates.

168330. The omission of disposition dates from the information

1692that Respondent provides to Petitioner effectively thwarts the

1700County's ability to provide meaningful input into the

1708calculations that Respondent performs pursuant to Subsection

1715985.686(6). The absence of disposition dates precludes the

1723County from independently auditing, or challenging, the

1730assessments that Respondent calculates pursuant to Subsection

1737985.686(6). The absence of disposition dates also deprives the

1746trier-of-fact of a basis for resolving the dispute over the nine

1757categories of utilization days that Respondent determined were

1765predisposition care.

176731. Respondent claims the allegation of misclassification

1774is a challenge to agency policy that is not subject to the due

1787process requirements prescribed in Chapter 120. To the

1795contrary, the allegation raises a disputed issue of fact over

1805the correct disposition date, and that issue is not infused with

1816agency policy or agency expertise.

182132. The correct disposition date can be determined through

1830conventional means of proof, including public records. Although

1838Respondent presumably uses that information to determine a

1846disposition date, Respondent does not make the information

1854available to the County.

185833. Even if a determination of the disposition date were

1868solely a policy issue, it is not exempt from the due process

1880requirements prescribed in Subsection 120.57(1). One of the

1888principal purposes of a proceeding conducted pursuant to

1896Subsection 120.57(1) (a 120.57 proceeding) is to encourage

1904responsible agency policymaking.

190734. During this proceeding, Respondent did not explicate,

1915by conventional methods of proof, any intelligible standards

1923that guide the exercise of agency discretion in classifying the

1933nine challenged categories of utilization days as predisposition

1941days. Nor did Respondent explicate any evidential predicate to

1950support a finding that the classification is infused with agency

1960expertise and entitled to great deference. The only standards

1969that Respondent articulated during the evidentiary hearing is

1977that agency employees exercise discretion pursuant to

1984instructions from agency management.

198835. Respondent also considers open charges against

1995juveniles as a basis for distinguishing predisposition

2002utilization days from post-disposition utilization days. If,

2009for example, a juvenile is in secure detention awaiting

2018placement after final disposition of one charge but has another

2028open charge, Respondent classifies that utilization day as

2036predisposition care.

203836. The trier-of-fact finds that secure detention after

2046final disposition, but before residential placement for the

2054charge adjudicated, is post-dispositional care. The record does

2062not disclose how many, if any, of the 47,215 utilization days

2074allocated to Petitioner involve open charges.

208037. Respondent did not explicate any intelligible

2087standards to guide the exercise of agency discretion in using

2097open charges as a basis for distinguishing predisposition

2105utilization days from post-disposition utilization days. Nor

2112did Respondent explicate an evidentiary basis to support a

2121finding that the relevant classification is infused with either

2130agency expertise or agency policy and entitled to deference.

213938. Petitioner acknowledges that some of the nine

2147categories require final disposition before a juvenile can be

2156placed in secure detention prior to residential placement. For

2165example, data identification codes for offenses such as contempt

2174of court, detention orders, pick up orders, prosecution

2182previously deferred, violation of after care, violation of

2190community control, and violation of probation require a final

2199disposition. The omission of a final disposition date from the

2209data available to Petitioner deprives Petitioner of the ability

2218to provide input to Respondent to correct the assessments that

2228Respondent calculates pursuant to Subsection 985.686(6).

2234CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

223739. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and subject

2246matter in this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1). DOAH

2255provided the parties with adequate notice of the final hearing.

226540. The burden of proof is on the party asserting the

2276affirmative of an issue. Florida Department of Transportation

2284v. J.W.C. Company, Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981);

2296Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services , 348

2305So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The proposed agency action is

2317to assess Petitioner for predisposition care in the County.

2326Respondent asserts the affirmative of that issue and must prove

2336by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed assessment

2346should become final agency action.

235141. Regardless of whether Respondent or Petitioner has the

2360burden of proof, a preponderance of the evidence shows that

2370Respondent did not calculate the proposed assessment with input

2379from Petitioner in violation of Subsection 985.686(6).

2386Respondent unilaterally calculates utilization days without

2392disclosing disposition dates to Petitioner and without

2399disclosing intelligible standards for the exercise of agency

2407discretion in distinguishing predisposition utilization days

2413from post-disposition utilization days.

241742. The fact-finder must resolve conflicts in the evidence

2426and decide an issue one way or the other. Dunham v. Highlands

2438County School Board , 652 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995);

2450Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of

2458Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco , 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st

2469DCA 1985); Department of Professional Regulation v. Wagner , 405

2478So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The trier-of-fact resolved

2489the evidential conflict in favor of Petitioner. The fact-finder

2498is the sole arbiter of credibility. Bejarano v. State,

2507Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation ,

2514901 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Hoover, M.D. v. Agency

2527for Health Care Administration , 676 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 3d

2538DCA 1996); Goss v. District School Board of St. Johns County ,

2549601 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

255843. The record evidence does not set forth a reasonable

2568basis for finding that an interpretation of terms such as

"2578disposition date," "period of time," "days," "service days,"

2586and "utilization days" require special agency insight or

2594expertise. Petitioner did not articulate any underlying

2601technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Johnston,

2609M.D. v Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical

2618Examiners , 456 So. 2d 939, 943-944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

262844. Respondent's interpretation of the statutory

2634requirement in Subsection 985.686(6) to calculate assessments

2641with input from the County is clearly erroneous. The omission

2651of disposition dates in the information available to the County

2661deprives the County of any meaningful input within the meaning

2671of Subsection 985.686(6). The failure to explicate by

2679conventional methods of proof any intelligible standards to

2687guide agency discretion also deprives the County of meaningful

2696input in violation of Subsection 985.686(6). McDonald v. Dept.

2705of Banking and Finance , 346 So. 2d 569, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

271845. Respondent's determination that challenges to

2724disposition dates are challenges to agency policy is clearly

2733erroneous. Disposition dates are public record and not infused

2742with agency policy or expertise. Disposition dates are factual

2751issues within the exclusive province of the trier-of-fact.

275946. Respondent does not provide the County with sufficient

2768information to determine what part, if any, of the 15,599

2779utilization days classified as predisposition care for pick-up

2787orders (12,267), contempt of court (327), and detention orders

2797(3,005) are duplicative. Subsection 985.101, for example,

2805authorizes a court to issue a pick-up order when a juvenile

2816fails to appear in court. A detention order for secure

2826detention pursuant to a pick-up order may not exceed 72 hours

2837unless the court conducts a contempt proceeding, pursuant to the

2847due process requirements prescribed in Section 985.037, and

2855finds the juvenile presents a substantial risk of not appearing

2865at a subsequent hearing. A.K. v. Dobuler , 951 So. 2d 989, 991

2877(Fla. 3d DCA 2007); A.M.W. v. Portsey , 714 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d

2890DCA 1998); W.N. v. Fryer , 572 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

2903Any utilization after 72 hours must be pursuant to a final

2914disposition of the pick-up order, contempt of court, or

2923detention order and is properly classified as post-disposition

2931care.

293247. If challenges to disposition dates were challenges to

2941agency policy, Respondent incorrectly concludes that challenges

2948to agency policy are beyond the scope of a 120.57 proceeding. 4

2960Department of General Services v. Willis , 344 So. 2d 580, 592

2971(Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In Willis the court explained:

2980We are accustomed to think that the

2987principal use of hearings is to develop

2994records for "adjudicatory" or "quasi-

2999judicial" decisions. (Citations omitted)

3003That was the limited role of administrative

3010hearings in years past, when the "universe

3017of administrative law was hierarchical, with

3023the judiciary at its apex." (Footnote

3029omitted) [The current] administrative

3033process . . . recognizes that a hearing

3041independently serves the public interest by

3047providing a forum to expose, inform and

3054challenge agency policy and discretion.

3059Willis , 344 So. 2d at 591.

306548. An ALJ conducting a 120.57 proceeding is not limited

3075to making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ has

3087the additional duty of serving the public interest by

3096encouraging responsible agency policymaking.

3100[T]he [ALJ] does not merely find the facts

3108and supply the law, as would a court. The

3117[ALJ] "independently serves the public

3122interest by providing a forum to expose,

3129inform and challenge agency policy and

3135discretion." (Citations omitted)

3138McDonald , 346 So. 2d at 580-583.

314449. The requirements for responsible agency policymaking

3151are not defined by statute, rule, or case law. At a minimum,

3163however, an ALJ should not recommend that the agency issue a

3174final order which is subject to mandatory remand pursuant to

3184Subsection 120.68(7).

318650. Subsection 1120.68(7), in relevant part, requires a

3194reviewing court to remand a final order of an agency if the

3206exercise of agency discretion violates a constitutional or

3214statutory provision. To avoid remand, the exercise of agency

3223discretion sanctioned in the final order must not violate the

3233separation of powers doctrine. Fla. Const. , Art. II, § 3.

324351. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits an

3251executive agency, including either Respondent or DOAH, from

3259exercising legislative power to modify, enlarge, or amend a

3268statute. The separation of powers doctrine encompasses two

3276prohibitions. No branch of government may encroach upon the

3285powers of another, and no branch may delegate its power to

3296another branch. The second prohibition is the non-delegation

3304doctrine. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F , 589 So. 2d

3318260, 264-266 (Fla. 1991).

332252. The non-delegation doctrine prohibits the Legislature

3329from delegating legislative authority to an agency of the

3338executive branch. Chiles , 589 So. 2d at 264-266. The

3347administration of legislative programs by executive agencies,

3354including Respondent and DOAH, must be pursuant to minimal

3363standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to statutory

3371terms enacted by the Legislature and implemented in the agency's

3381rules. Chiles , 589 So. 2d at 264-266.

338853. The Legislature may authorize administrative agencies

3395to interpret, but never to alter statutes. Carver v. State of

3406Florida, Division of Retirement , 848 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 1st

3417DCA 2003) (citing Cortes v. State Board of Regents , 655 So. 2d

3429132, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). If Rule 63G-1.004 were deemed to

3441authorize the exercise of agency discretion at issue in this

3451proceeding, a literal conflict between the Rule and a statute

3461must be resolved in favor of the statute in order to preserve

3473the validity of the Rule. 5 Willette v. Air Products and Bassett

3485and Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of

3494Workers' Compensation , 700 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

3505In Willette , the court wrote:

3510Executive branch rulemaking is authorized in

3516furtherance of, not in opposition to,

3522legislative policy. Just as a court cannot

3529give effect to a statute (or administrative

3536rule) in a manner repugnant to a

3543constitutional provision, so a duly

3548promulgated rule, although "presumptively

3552valid until invalidated in a section 120.56

3559rule challenge [citations omitted]," must

3564give way in judicial proceedings to any

3571contradictory statute that applies.

3575Id .

357754. An administrative agency has statutory authority to

3585adopt only those rules that implement or interpret the specific

3595powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. § 120.52(8).

3605An agency cannot implement by non-rule policy agency discretion

3614that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the agency from

3624implementing by rule.

3627RECOMMENDATION

3628Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

3637of Law, it is

3641RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order assessing

3649Petitioner for the costs of predisposition care in the County

3659using utilization days determined in accordance with this

3667Recommended Order and meaningful input from the County.

3675DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2008, in

3685Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

3689S

3690DANIEL MANRY

3692Administrative Law Judge

3695Division of Administrative Hearings

3699The DeSoto Building

37021230 Apalachee Parkway

3705Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

3708(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

3712Fax Filing (850) 921-6847

3716www.doah.state.fl.us

3717Filed with the Clerk of the

3723Division of Administrative Hearings

3727this 10th day of March, 2008.

3733ENDNOTES

37341/ References to subsections, sections, and chapters are to

3743Florida Statutes (2007) unless otherwise stated. References to

3751rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative

3760Code in effect on the date of the hearing.

37692/ A non-fiscally constrained county is one that is not a

3780fiscally constrained county defined in Subsection 985.686(2)(b)

3787as a county within a rural area of critical economic concern.

37983/ Rule 63G-1.002(6) defines secure detention in substantially

3806the same manner as Subsection 985.03(18)(a).

38124/ Agency policy is non-rule policy if it does not satisfy the

3824definition of a rule in Subsection 120.52(15). Agency policy is

3834an un-adopted rule, within the meaning of Subsections 120.56(4)

3843and 120.57(1)(e), if it satisfies the definition of a rule in

3854Subsection 120.52(15) but has not been promulgated in accordance

3863with the rulemaking requirements prescribed in Section 120.54

3871(an un-promulgated rule). See , "The Scarecrow in McDonald's

3879Farm: A Fairy Tale About Administrative Law," Fla. Bar. J. ,

3889No. 3 (March 1999).

38935/ Petitioner does not allege that Rule 63G-1.004 amends,

3902enlarges, or modifies Section 985.686 within the meaning of

3911Subsections 120.52(8), 120.56(3), and 120.68(7)(e)4. The issue

3918is whether the methodology adopted by Respondent either deviates

3927from the rule or interprets the rule in a manner that

3938effectively amends the rule.

3942COPIES FURNISHED :

3945Stephen M. Todd, Esquire

3949Hillsborough County Attorney’s Office

3953Post Office Box 1110

3957Tampa, Florida 33601

3960Brian Berkowitz, Esquire

3963Department of Juvenile Justice

3967Knight Building, Room 312V

39712737 Centerview Drive

3974Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

3977Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary

3981Department of Juvenile Justice

3985Knight Building

39872737 Centerview Drive

3990Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

3993Jennifer Parker, General Counsel

3997Department of Juvenile Justice

4001Knight Building

40032737 Centerview Drive

4006Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

4009NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

4015All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

402515 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

4036to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

4047will issue the Final Order in this case.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 06/06/2008
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/10/2008
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 03/10/2008
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held December 12, 2007). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 03/10/2008
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 02/11/2008
Proceedings: (Petitioner`s proposed) Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/11/2008
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/11/2008
Proceedings: Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/11/2008
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/08/2008
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time (proposed recommended orders to be filed by February 11, 2008).
PDF:
Date: 02/06/2008
Proceedings: Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Date: 01/28/2008
Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/24/2007
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Exhibit 4 (exhibit not available for viewing).
Date: 12/12/2007
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 12/10/2007
Proceedings: Third Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to Hearing date).
PDF:
Date: 12/10/2007
Proceedings: Petitioner`s Memorandum of Law Regarding Burden of Ultimate Persuasion (Burden of Proof) and Burden of Going Forward with the Evidence (Burden of Production) filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/05/2007
Proceedings: Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/16/2007
Proceedings: Second Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12 and 13, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to Dates and hearing location).
Date: 10/15/2007
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Pre-Hearing Conference Held.
PDF:
Date: 10/15/2007
Proceedings: Notice of Taking Depositions filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/12/2007
Proceedings: Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12 through 14, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to dates).
PDF:
Date: 10/10/2007
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 10/10/2007
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL).
PDF:
Date: 10/03/2007
Proceedings: Department of Juvenile Justice Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/26/2007
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 09/26/2007
Proceedings: Dentention Cost Dispute with Hillsborough County filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/26/2007
Proceedings: Amended Initiation of Proceedings Pursuant to 28-106.201, F.A.C. filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/26/2007
Proceedings: Agency referral filed.

Case Information

Judge:
DANIEL MANRY
Date Filed:
09/26/2007
Date Assignment:
09/26/2007
Last Docket Entry:
06/06/2008
Location:
Tampa, Florida
District:
Middle
Agency:
Department of Juvenile Justice
 

Counsels

Related DOAH Cases(s) (2):

Related Florida Statute(s) (10):

Related Florida Rule(s) (2):