07-004432
Hillsborough County vs.
Department Of Juvenile Justice
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, March 10, 2008.
Recommended Order on Monday, March 10, 2008.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, )
11)
12Petitioner, )
14)
15vs. ) Case No. 07-4432
20)
21DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, )
26)
27Respondent. )
29)
30RECOMMENDED ORDER
32Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Daniel Manry conducted the
40final hearing of this case for the Division of Administrative
50Hearings (DOAH) on December 12, 2007, in Tampa, Florida.
59APPEARANCES
60For Petitioner: Stephen M. Todd, Esquire
66Hillsborough County Attorneys Office
70Post Office Box 1110
74Tampa, Florida 33601
77For Respondent: Brian Berkowitz, Esquire
82Department of Juvenile Justice
86Knight Building, Room 312V
902737 Centerview Drive
93Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
96STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
100The issue is whether Respondent assessed Petitioner for
108secure juvenile detention care for the 2007-2008 fiscal year in
118a manner that implements Section 985.686, Florida Statutes
126(2007), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 63G-1. 1
134PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
136By letter dated August 29, 2007, Respondent notified
144Petitioner of proposed agency action to deny Petitioner's
152protest of Respondent's calculation of utilization days in the
161assessment imposed for the 2007-2008 fiscal year. Petitioner
169requested an administrative hearing, and Respondent referred the
177matter to DOAH to assign an ALJ to conduct the hearing.
188At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of two
197witnesses and submitted three exhibits for admission into
205evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of one witness and
214submitted three exhibits.
217After the hearing, Petitioner submitted one late-filed
224exhibit on December 24, 2007. Respondent was suppose to file a
235fourth exhibit after the hearing, but never filed the exhibit.
245The identity of the witnesses and exhibits and the rulings
255regarding each are reported in the one-volume Transcript of the
265hearing filed with DOAH on January 28, 2008. The ALJ granted
276Respondent's unopposed request for extension of time to file
285proposed recommended orders (PRO). Petitioner and Respondent
292timely filed their PROs on February 11, 2008.
300FINDINGS OF FACT
3031. Respondent is the state agency responsible for
311administering the cost sharing requirements in Section 985.686
319for juvenile detention care. Petitioner is a non-fiscally
327constrained county 2 subject to the statutory cost sharing
336requirements.
3372. The statutory requirements for funding juvenile
344detention in the state guide the findings in this proceeding.
354Subsection 985.686(1) requires Petitioner and Respondent to
361share the costs of "financial support" for "detention care" for
371juveniles who reside in Hillsborough County, Florida (the
379County), and are held in detention centers operated by
388Respondent.
3893. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay the
397costs of detention care "for the period of time" prior to final
409court disposition (predisposition care). Respondent must pay
416the costs of detention care on or after final court disposition
427(post-disposition care).
4294. Detention care is defined in Subsection 985.686(2)(a)
437to mean secure detention. Secure detention is defined in
446Subsection 985.03(18)(a), for the purposes of Chapter 985, to
455include custody "prior to" adjudication or disposition as well
464as custody after adjudication but "prior to" placement. 3
4735. The term "placement" is not defined by statute or rule.
484However, secure detention centers are legally unavailable to
492circuit courts for post-disposition placement. Post-disposition
498care of juveniles in a secure detention center is generally
508limited to juveniles who are waiting for residential placement.
5176. The trier-of-fact construes the reference to placement
525in Subsection 985.03(18)(a) to mean residential placement.
532Secure detention includes custody in a detention center for both
542predisposition and post-disposition care. Predisposition care
548occurs prior to adjudication or final disposition. Post-
556disposition care occurs after adjudication or disposition but
564prior to residential placement.
5687. Post-disposition care also includes custody in a
576detention center after final disposition but prior to release.
585Although this type of post-disposition care comprises a small
594proportion of total post-disposition care, references to
601post-disposition care in this Recommended Order include care
609after final disposition for: juveniles waiting for residential
617placement and juveniles waiting for release.
6238. Juveniles are not supposed to remain in detention
632centers very long after final disposition while they wait for
642residential placement. However, juveniles with exceptional
648needs, such as mental health needs, may remain in detention
658centers for a longer period of time due to the limited
669availability of appropriate residential placement facilities.
6759. Approximately 2,057 secure detention beds exist
683statewide. The operating cost for each bed is the same whether
694the bed is used for predisposition or post-disposition care.
70310. The operating cost for a secure detention bed may
713increase if the detention center exceeds capacity because of
722overtime expenses, temporary staffing, and other temporary
729costs. Although only two secure detention centers did not
738exceed capacity at some time during the previous year, secure
748detention utilization in the same year averaged approximately
75689 percent of capacity.
76011. The Legislature funds the cost of juvenile detention
769care through an annual appropriation. Appropriations from 2002
777forward have historically allocated approximately 11 percent of
785the cost of detention care to Respondent and approximately
79489 percent to the counties.
79912. The total appropriation for the 2007-2008 fiscal year
808was $125,327,667. The Legislature allocated $30,860,924 to the
820state and $101,628,064 to the counties. Negative amounts in
831certain categories brought the net appropriation to
838$125,327,667.
84113. The Legislature pays the state's share of juvenile
850detention costs from general revenue. However, the
"857appropriation" for the counties' share of detention costs is
866actually an account payable. Pursuant to Subsection 985.686(6),
874Petitioner must make monthly payments into a state trust fund
884for its share of statewide predisposition detention costs.
89214. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Respondent to develop
899an accounts payable system to allocate to the counties the costs
910of secure detention for predisposition care. Pursuant to
918Subsection 985.686(5), Respondent administers the account
924payable system through a system of prospective assessment and
933retroactive reconciliation.
93515. Prospective assessments at the outset of a year are
945based on actual costs from the previous year. Subsection
954985.686(5) requires Petitioner to pay the prospective assessment
962monthly and requires Respondent to complete an annual
970reconciliation at the end of the year to determine whether
980actual costs during the year were more or less than the
991prospective assessment. Sometime after the end of each fiscal
1000year, Respondent either credits or debits Petitioner for any
1009differences between the prospective assessment and actual costs
1017determined in the annual reconciliation.
102216. Subsection 985.686(3) requires Petitioner to pay for
1030the costs of secure detention in the County for the "period of
1042time" juveniles are in predisposition care. No statute or rule
1052expressly defines the phrase "period of time."
105917. Subsection 985.686(10) authorizes Respondent to adopt
1066rules to administer Section 985.686. Rule 63G-1.004(1)(c)
1073implicitly defines the statutory reference to a "period of time"
1083in predisposition care to mean "service days."
109018. Other provisions in Rule 63G-1.004 prescribe the
1098methodology to be used in calculating Petitioner's share of the
1108costs for predisposition care. Respondent must first identify
1116all juveniles in predisposition care based upon usage during the
1126preceding fiscal year. Second, Respondent must match each
1134placement record with the corresponding identification code.
1141Third, Respondent must calculate the "service days" in
1149predisposition care. Finally, Respondent must divide the number
1157of "service days" Petitioner used for predisposition care in the
1167County by the service days used by all counties to determine the
1179percentage of the counties' costs for predisposition care that
1188Petitioner owes.
119019. Petitioner disputes the methodology Respondent uses to
1198determine the amount Petitioner owes for predisposition care in
1207the County. However, that dispute is the subject of a companion
1218case identified by DOAH Case No. 07-4398 and is beyond the scope
1230of this proceeding.
123320. The dispute in this proceeding is limited to
1242Respondent's determination of the service days that Respondent
1250allocated to Petitioner for predisposition care in the County.
1259The term "service days" is not defined by statute or rule.
127021. Respondent defines service days to mean "utilization"
1278days. Utilization days are not synonymous with calendar days.
128722. Utilization days correspond more closely to the number
1296of juveniles in secure detention. If for example, 10 juveniles
1306utilize one detention center during any part of a day,
131610 utilization days have occurred during one calendar day.
132523. A secure detention center may be utilized
1333simultaneously by juveniles in predisposition care and juveniles
1341in post-disposition care (dual-use occupancy). If the 10
1349utilization days in the preceding example were to include equal
1359dual-use occupancy, Respondent would count five utilization days
1367for predisposition care and five utilization days for
1375post-disposition care.
137724. The 10 juveniles in the preceding example may not
1387occupy a detention center for an entire calendar day. The five
1398juveniles in predisposition care may occupy the center for only
1408part of a calendar day and five more juveniles may receive
1419predisposition care for the remainder of the day. In that
1429example, Respondent would allocate 10 utilization days to
1437Petitioner for predisposition care during that calendar day and
1446only five utilization days to the state for a total of
145715 utilization days.
146025. Respondent determined there were 709,251 utilization
1468days for pre and post-disposition care in the state for the year
1480in issue. Respondent allocated 579,409 utilization days to the
1490counties' predisposition care and 129,842 utilization days to
1499the state for post-disposition care. Respondent allocated
150647,714 utilization days to Petitioner and, after reconciliation,
1515reduced that number to 47,214.
152126. Petitioner claims the correct number of utilization
1529days is 31,008. Respondent allegedly misallocated 16,206
1538utilization days for predisposition care by Petitioner.
154527. Respondent identifies the 16,206 utilization days in
1554nine categories. The categories and corresponding number of
1562days that Petitioner challenges are: contempt of court (327),
1571detention order (3,005), interstate compacts (1), pick up orders
1581(12,267), prosecution previously deferred (28), transfer from
1589another county awaiting commitment beds (444), violation of
1597after care (10), violation of community control (79), and
1606violation of probation (45).
161028. Subsection 985.686(6) requires Respondent to calculate
1617the monthly assessment against Petitioner with input from the
1626County. Respondent allowed input from the counties during
1634rulemaking workshops but has thwarted virtually any input from
1643the County during the annual processes of calculating
1651assessments and reconciliation.
165429. Respondent classifies each of the nine challenged
1662categories as predisposition care. However, the data that
1670Respondent provides to the County each year does not include
1680final disposition dates.
168330. The omission of disposition dates from the information
1692that Respondent provides to Petitioner effectively thwarts the
1700County's ability to provide meaningful input into the
1708calculations that Respondent performs pursuant to Subsection
1715985.686(6). The absence of disposition dates precludes the
1723County from independently auditing, or challenging, the
1730assessments that Respondent calculates pursuant to Subsection
1737985.686(6). The absence of disposition dates also deprives the
1746trier-of-fact of a basis for resolving the dispute over the nine
1757categories of utilization days that Respondent determined were
1765predisposition care.
176731. Respondent claims the allegation of misclassification
1774is a challenge to agency policy that is not subject to the due
1787process requirements prescribed in Chapter 120. To the
1795contrary, the allegation raises a disputed issue of fact over
1805the correct disposition date, and that issue is not infused with
1816agency policy or agency expertise.
182132. The correct disposition date can be determined through
1830conventional means of proof, including public records. Although
1838Respondent presumably uses that information to determine a
1846disposition date, Respondent does not make the information
1854available to the County.
185833. Even if a determination of the disposition date were
1868solely a policy issue, it is not exempt from the due process
1880requirements prescribed in Subsection 120.57(1). One of the
1888principal purposes of a proceeding conducted pursuant to
1896Subsection 120.57(1) (a 120.57 proceeding) is to encourage
1904responsible agency policymaking.
190734. During this proceeding, Respondent did not explicate,
1915by conventional methods of proof, any intelligible standards
1923that guide the exercise of agency discretion in classifying the
1933nine challenged categories of utilization days as predisposition
1941days. Nor did Respondent explicate any evidential predicate to
1950support a finding that the classification is infused with agency
1960expertise and entitled to great deference. The only standards
1969that Respondent articulated during the evidentiary hearing is
1977that agency employees exercise discretion pursuant to
1984instructions from agency management.
198835. Respondent also considers open charges against
1995juveniles as a basis for distinguishing predisposition
2002utilization days from post-disposition utilization days. If,
2009for example, a juvenile is in secure detention awaiting
2018placement after final disposition of one charge but has another
2028open charge, Respondent classifies that utilization day as
2036predisposition care.
203836. The trier-of-fact finds that secure detention after
2046final disposition, but before residential placement for the
2054charge adjudicated, is post-dispositional care. The record does
2062not disclose how many, if any, of the 47,215 utilization days
2074allocated to Petitioner involve open charges.
208037. Respondent did not explicate any intelligible
2087standards to guide the exercise of agency discretion in using
2097open charges as a basis for distinguishing predisposition
2105utilization days from post-disposition utilization days. Nor
2112did Respondent explicate an evidentiary basis to support a
2121finding that the relevant classification is infused with either
2130agency expertise or agency policy and entitled to deference.
213938. Petitioner acknowledges that some of the nine
2147categories require final disposition before a juvenile can be
2156placed in secure detention prior to residential placement. For
2165example, data identification codes for offenses such as contempt
2174of court, detention orders, pick up orders, prosecution
2182previously deferred, violation of after care, violation of
2190community control, and violation of probation require a final
2199disposition. The omission of a final disposition date from the
2209data available to Petitioner deprives Petitioner of the ability
2218to provide input to Respondent to correct the assessments that
2228Respondent calculates pursuant to Subsection 985.686(6).
2234CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
223739. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and subject
2246matter in this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1). DOAH
2255provided the parties with adequate notice of the final hearing.
226540. The burden of proof is on the party asserting the
2276affirmative of an issue. Florida Department of Transportation
2284v. J.W.C. Company, Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981);
2296Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services , 348
2305So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The proposed agency action is
2317to assess Petitioner for predisposition care in the County.
2326Respondent asserts the affirmative of that issue and must prove
2336by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed assessment
2346should become final agency action.
235141. Regardless of whether Respondent or Petitioner has the
2360burden of proof, a preponderance of the evidence shows that
2370Respondent did not calculate the proposed assessment with input
2379from Petitioner in violation of Subsection 985.686(6).
2386Respondent unilaterally calculates utilization days without
2392disclosing disposition dates to Petitioner and without
2399disclosing intelligible standards for the exercise of agency
2407discretion in distinguishing predisposition utilization days
2413from post-disposition utilization days.
241742. The fact-finder must resolve conflicts in the evidence
2426and decide an issue one way or the other. Dunham v. Highlands
2438County School Board , 652 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995);
2450Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of
2458Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco , 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st
2469DCA 1985); Department of Professional Regulation v. Wagner , 405
2478So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The trier-of-fact resolved
2489the evidential conflict in favor of Petitioner. The fact-finder
2498is the sole arbiter of credibility. Bejarano v. State,
2507Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation ,
2514901 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Hoover, M.D. v. Agency
2527for Health Care Administration , 676 So. 2d 1380, 1384 (Fla. 3d
2538DCA 1996); Goss v. District School Board of St. Johns County ,
2549601 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
255843. The record evidence does not set forth a reasonable
2568basis for finding that an interpretation of terms such as
"2578disposition date," "period of time," "days," "service days,"
2586and "utilization days" require special agency insight or
2594expertise. Petitioner did not articulate any underlying
2601technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Johnston,
2609M.D. v Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical
2618Examiners , 456 So. 2d 939, 943-944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
262844. Respondent's interpretation of the statutory
2634requirement in Subsection 985.686(6) to calculate assessments
2641with input from the County is clearly erroneous. The omission
2651of disposition dates in the information available to the County
2661deprives the County of any meaningful input within the meaning
2671of Subsection 985.686(6). The failure to explicate by
2679conventional methods of proof any intelligible standards to
2687guide agency discretion also deprives the County of meaningful
2696input in violation of Subsection 985.686(6). McDonald v. Dept.
2705of Banking and Finance , 346 So. 2d 569, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
271845. Respondent's determination that challenges to
2724disposition dates are challenges to agency policy is clearly
2733erroneous. Disposition dates are public record and not infused
2742with agency policy or expertise. Disposition dates are factual
2751issues within the exclusive province of the trier-of-fact.
275946. Respondent does not provide the County with sufficient
2768information to determine what part, if any, of the 15,599
2779utilization days classified as predisposition care for pick-up
2787orders (12,267), contempt of court (327), and detention orders
2797(3,005) are duplicative. Subsection 985.101, for example,
2805authorizes a court to issue a pick-up order when a juvenile
2816fails to appear in court. A detention order for secure
2826detention pursuant to a pick-up order may not exceed 72 hours
2837unless the court conducts a contempt proceeding, pursuant to the
2847due process requirements prescribed in Section 985.037, and
2855finds the juvenile presents a substantial risk of not appearing
2865at a subsequent hearing. A.K. v. Dobuler , 951 So. 2d 989, 991
2877(Fla. 3d DCA 2007); A.M.W. v. Portsey , 714 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d
2890DCA 1998); W.N. v. Fryer , 572 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
2903Any utilization after 72 hours must be pursuant to a final
2914disposition of the pick-up order, contempt of court, or
2923detention order and is properly classified as post-disposition
2931care.
293247. If challenges to disposition dates were challenges to
2941agency policy, Respondent incorrectly concludes that challenges
2948to agency policy are beyond the scope of a 120.57 proceeding. 4
2960Department of General Services v. Willis , 344 So. 2d 580, 592
2971(Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In Willis the court explained:
2980We are accustomed to think that the
2987principal use of hearings is to develop
2994records for "adjudicatory" or "quasi-
2999judicial" decisions. (Citations omitted)
3003That was the limited role of administrative
3010hearings in years past, when the "universe
3017of administrative law was hierarchical, with
3023the judiciary at its apex." (Footnote
3029omitted) [The current] administrative
3033process . . . recognizes that a hearing
3041independently serves the public interest by
3047providing a forum to expose, inform and
3054challenge agency policy and discretion.
3059Willis , 344 So. 2d at 591.
306548. An ALJ conducting a 120.57 proceeding is not limited
3075to making findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ has
3087the additional duty of serving the public interest by
3096encouraging responsible agency policymaking.
3100[T]he [ALJ] does not merely find the facts
3108and supply the law, as would a court. The
3117[ALJ] "independently serves the public
3122interest by providing a forum to expose,
3129inform and challenge agency policy and
3135discretion." (Citations omitted)
3138McDonald , 346 So. 2d at 580-583.
314449. The requirements for responsible agency policymaking
3151are not defined by statute, rule, or case law. At a minimum,
3163however, an ALJ should not recommend that the agency issue a
3174final order which is subject to mandatory remand pursuant to
3184Subsection 120.68(7).
318650. Subsection 1120.68(7), in relevant part, requires a
3194reviewing court to remand a final order of an agency if the
3206exercise of agency discretion violates a constitutional or
3214statutory provision. To avoid remand, the exercise of agency
3223discretion sanctioned in the final order must not violate the
3233separation of powers doctrine. Fla. Const. , Art. II, § 3.
324351. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits an
3251executive agency, including either Respondent or DOAH, from
3259exercising legislative power to modify, enlarge, or amend a
3268statute. The separation of powers doctrine encompasses two
3276prohibitions. No branch of government may encroach upon the
3285powers of another, and no branch may delegate its power to
3296another branch. The second prohibition is the non-delegation
3304doctrine. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F , 589 So. 2d
3318260, 264-266 (Fla. 1991).
332252. The non-delegation doctrine prohibits the Legislature
3329from delegating legislative authority to an agency of the
3338executive branch. Chiles , 589 So. 2d at 264-266. The
3347administration of legislative programs by executive agencies,
3354including Respondent and DOAH, must be pursuant to minimal
3363standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to statutory
3371terms enacted by the Legislature and implemented in the agency's
3381rules. Chiles , 589 So. 2d at 264-266.
338853. The Legislature may authorize administrative agencies
3395to interpret, but never to alter statutes. Carver v. State of
3406Florida, Division of Retirement , 848 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 1st
3417DCA 2003) (citing Cortes v. State Board of Regents , 655 So. 2d
3429132, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). If Rule 63G-1.004 were deemed to
3441authorize the exercise of agency discretion at issue in this
3451proceeding, a literal conflict between the Rule and a statute
3461must be resolved in favor of the statute in order to preserve
3473the validity of the Rule. 5 Willette v. Air Products and Bassett
3485and Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of
3494Workers' Compensation , 700 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
3505In Willette , the court wrote:
3510Executive branch rulemaking is authorized in
3516furtherance of, not in opposition to,
3522legislative policy. Just as a court cannot
3529give effect to a statute (or administrative
3536rule) in a manner repugnant to a
3543constitutional provision, so a duly
3548promulgated rule, although "presumptively
3552valid until invalidated in a section 120.56
3559rule challenge [citations omitted]," must
3564give way in judicial proceedings to any
3571contradictory statute that applies.
3575Id .
357754. An administrative agency has statutory authority to
3585adopt only those rules that implement or interpret the specific
3595powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. § 120.52(8).
3605An agency cannot implement by non-rule policy agency discretion
3614that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the agency from
3624implementing by rule.
3627RECOMMENDATION
3628Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
3637of Law, it is
3641RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order assessing
3649Petitioner for the costs of predisposition care in the County
3659using utilization days determined in accordance with this
3667Recommended Order and meaningful input from the County.
3675DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2008, in
3685Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
3689S
3690DANIEL MANRY
3692Administrative Law Judge
3695Division of Administrative Hearings
3699The DeSoto Building
37021230 Apalachee Parkway
3705Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
3708(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
3712Fax Filing (850) 921-6847
3716www.doah.state.fl.us
3717Filed with the Clerk of the
3723Division of Administrative Hearings
3727this 10th day of March, 2008.
3733ENDNOTES
37341/ References to subsections, sections, and chapters are to
3743Florida Statutes (2007) unless otherwise stated. References to
3751rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative
3760Code in effect on the date of the hearing.
37692/ A non-fiscally constrained county is one that is not a
3780fiscally constrained county defined in Subsection 985.686(2)(b)
3787as a county within a rural area of critical economic concern.
37983/ Rule 63G-1.002(6) defines secure detention in substantially
3806the same manner as Subsection 985.03(18)(a).
38124/ Agency policy is non-rule policy if it does not satisfy the
3824definition of a rule in Subsection 120.52(15). Agency policy is
3834an un-adopted rule, within the meaning of Subsections 120.56(4)
3843and 120.57(1)(e), if it satisfies the definition of a rule in
3854Subsection 120.52(15) but has not been promulgated in accordance
3863with the rulemaking requirements prescribed in Section 120.54
3871(an un-promulgated rule). See , "The Scarecrow in McDonald's
3879Farm: A Fairy Tale About Administrative Law," Fla. Bar. J. ,
3889No. 3 (March 1999).
38935/ Petitioner does not allege that Rule 63G-1.004 amends,
3902enlarges, or modifies Section 985.686 within the meaning of
3911Subsections 120.52(8), 120.56(3), and 120.68(7)(e)4. The issue
3918is whether the methodology adopted by Respondent either deviates
3927from the rule or interprets the rule in a manner that
3938effectively amends the rule.
3942COPIES FURNISHED :
3945Stephen M. Todd, Esquire
3949Hillsborough County Attorneys Office
3953Post Office Box 1110
3957Tampa, Florida 33601
3960Brian Berkowitz, Esquire
3963Department of Juvenile Justice
3967Knight Building, Room 312V
39712737 Centerview Drive
3974Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
3977Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary
3981Department of Juvenile Justice
3985Knight Building
39872737 Centerview Drive
3990Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
3993Jennifer Parker, General Counsel
3997Department of Juvenile Justice
4001Knight Building
40032737 Centerview Drive
4006Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
4009NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
4015All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
402515 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
4036to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that
4047will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 03/10/2008
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/08/2008
- Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time (proposed recommended orders to be filed by February 11, 2008).
- PDF:
- Date: 02/06/2008
- Proceedings: Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
- Date: 01/28/2008
- Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/24/2007
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Exhibit 4 (exhibit not available for viewing).
- Date: 12/12/2007
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/10/2007
- Proceedings: Third Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to Hearing date).
- PDF:
- Date: 12/10/2007
- Proceedings: Petitioner`s Memorandum of Law Regarding Burden of Ultimate Persuasion (Burden of Proof) and Burden of Going Forward with the Evidence (Burden of Production) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/16/2007
- Proceedings: Second Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12 and 13, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to Dates and hearing location).
- Date: 10/15/2007
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Pre-Hearing Conference Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/12/2007
- Proceedings: Amended Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12 through 14, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL; amended as to dates).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/10/2007
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 12, 2007; 9:30 a.m.; Tampa, FL).
Case Information
- Judge:
- DANIEL MANRY
- Date Filed:
- 09/26/2007
- Date Assignment:
- 09/26/2007
- Last Docket Entry:
- 06/06/2008
- Location:
- Tampa, Florida
- District:
- Middle
- Agency:
- Department of Juvenile Justice
Counsels
-
Brian D. Berkowitz, General Counsel
Address of Record -
Stephen M. Todd, Esquire
Address of Record -
Stephen M Todd, Esquire
Address of Record