18-000811 Department Of Elder Affairs, Office Of Public And Professional Guardians vs. Elizabeth Seldon Savitt
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Friday, December 21, 2018.


View Dockets  
Summary: Respondent, a public guardian, did not have a conflict of interest with her husband, a probate judge, or his colleague. OPPG failed to prove the allegations of the Amended Complaint.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS,

12OFFICE OF PUBLIC AND

16PROFESSIONAL GUARDIANS,

18Petitioner,

19vs. Case No. 18 - 0811

25ELIZABETH SELDON SAVITT,

28Respondent.

29_______________________________/

30RECOMMENDED ORDER

32Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was

40conducted before Administrative Law Judge Mary Li Creasy in West

50Palm Beach , Florida, on September 5 through 7 , 2018.

59APPEARANCES

60For Petitioner: Michael McKeon, Esq uire

66Department of Elder Affairs

704040 Esplanade Way

73Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7000

78For Respondent: Ellen S. Morris, Esq uire

85Elder Law Associates , P . A .

927284 West Palmetto Park Road, Suite 101

99Boca Raton, Florida 33433

103STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S

108Whether Respondent, a professional guardian ("PG") , engaged

117in the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative

125Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

134PREL IMINARY STATEMENT

137On February 14, 2018, the Department of Elder Affairs,

146Office of the Public and Professional Guardian ("OPPG") filed an

158Administrative Complaint with the Division of Administrative

165Hearings ("DOAH") alleging that Petitioner, Elizabeth Sel don

175Savitt, violated various provisi ons of chapter 744, Florida

184Statutes , which governs the appointment and conduct of public

193guardians, and seeking suspension or revocation of her PG

202registration.

203The matter was initially set for final hearing April 25

213th rough 27, 2018. The parties jointly sought, and were granted,

224a continuance of the final hearing until July 26 and 27, 2018.

236The parties filed a second motion for continuance , which wa s

247granted , and the matter was re set for September 5 through 7,

2592018. On August 29, 2018, OPPG filed a Motion for Leave to Amend

272Complaint and C ontinue Final Hearing . The amendment was not

283opposed , but the continuation w as opposed by Petitioner. The

293m otion to amend was granted and the motion to continue the

305hearing was den ied. The final hearing took place as scheduled on

317September 5 through 7, 2018, on the Amended Administrative

326Complaint ("Amended Complaint").

331OPPG presented five witnesses: Petitioner; Anthony

337Palmieri, inspector from the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Palm

348Beach County ("Circuit Court"); Twyla Sketchly, Esquire, expert

358in guardianship and probate law; Sheri Hazeltine, Esquire; and

367the Honorable Stephen Cohen (retired), expert in guardianship

375matters and court monitor for the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

386Pet itioner's Exhibits 1 through 14 and 16 were admitted.

396Respondent presented two witnesses: the Honorable Martin H.

404Colin (retired), Respondent's husband; and Amy B. Bellar,

412Esquire, an expert in guardianship matters. Respondent's

419Composite Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted.

426The four - volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed

437with DOAH on September 27, 2018. Both parties requested, and

447were granted, an extension of time within which to file their

458proposed recommended orders, which were taken into co nsideration

467in the drafting of this Recommended Order.

474Except as otherwise indicated, citations to Florida Statutes

482or rules of the Florida Administrative Code refer to the versions

493in effect at the time of the alleged violations.

502FINDING S OF FACT

5061. OPPG was statutorily created , effective March 10, 2016,

515and charged with oversight of registered professional guardians

523in Florida, including, but not limited to, "[ e]stablishing

532disciplinary proceedings, conducting hearings, and taking

538administrative action pursuant to chapter 120 . " Prior to that

548time, the oversight of PGs was the province of the circuit courts

560in which they were appointed.

5652. PGs are appointed by the court to serve as legal

576decision - makers for persons determined incapacitated by the cou rt

587(commonly referred to as " wards " ) , who are unable to make

598decisions that affect their health, safety, and well - being. PG s

610are fiduciaries entrusted with the care of the wards that they

621serve, and , as such , have an implied duty to act in good faith.

634T he p roper conduct and management of guardianship cases requires

645that guardians must be independent and impartial.

6523. PGs appear in court on behalf of their ward through an

664attorney hired by the PG. In order to be appointed as a PG for a

679particular ward, th e PG is required to file an application with

691the court. Respondent used the services of attorneys Sherry

700Hazeltine and Ellen Morris to represent her in guardianship and

710guardian advocate 1/ cases.

7144. Prior to becoming a PG, Respondent worked with the

724elde rly and had a strong interest in serving children with

735disabilities and their families. In 2010, Respondent took the

744requisite 40 Î hour course, passed an exam, and applied for and was

757granted registration as a PG for Palm Beach County.

7665. Since 2010, Re spondent acted as a PG or guardian

777advocate who was paid for her services, except for cases in which

789she agreed to serve pro bono. For any case in which Respondent

801sought compensation as a PG, her billing statement was reviewed

811by a case manager, the Circ uit C ourt's auditor, and then was

824approved by the judge assigned to the case.

8326. In 2012, prior to the enactment of the statute creating

843the OPPG for purposes of overseeing PGs, the Circuit Court

853Clerk's Division of Inspector General ("IG"), Investigator

862Anthony Palmieri, began an investigation of Respondent and her

871practices as a PG. Mr. Palmieri believed Respondent had a

881conflict of intere st serving as a PG in the same d ivision in

895which her husband, Martin H. Colin, served as a judge.

9057. Mr. Palmieri also examined Respondent's friendship with

913her husband's colleague, Judge David French, who presided over

922some of Respondent's cases. Mr. Palmieri also investigated

930Respondent's practice of taking retainers before se r vices were

940rendered in some of her gu ardianship cases.

9488. On December 8, 2017, Mr. Palmieri provided his

957Investigation Report ("Report") concerning Respondent to OPPG.

966The Report served as a basis for drafting the Complaint and

977Amended Complaint in this matter. At no time prior to the

988in itiation of this action by OPPG against Respondent was she

999notified that the IG's office was concerned about any of her

1010practices as a PG.

1014Possible Conflict of Interest -- Judge Colin

10219. At all times material hereto, Respondent was married to

1031then Circuit C ourt Judge Martin H. Colin, who served in the South

1044County C ourthouse in the Probate and Guardianship Division until

10542015, when he transferred to the Circuit Civil Division. Judge

1064Colin retired in 2016.

106810. When Respondent became a PG serving in Palm Bea ch

1079County, Judge Colin raised the issue of a possible conflict of

1090interest, or appearance of a conflict, with his Chief Judge,

1100Judge Peter Blanc. Judge Blanc told Judge Colin that there would

1111be no conflict, or appearance of conflict, as long as he did no t

1125handle Respondent's cases. Further, if any other Circuit Court

1134judge was concerned about a conflict, or perceived conflict, with

1144Respondent serving as a PG in one of their cases, they could

1156recuse themselves.

115811. The Probate and Guardianship Division o f the Circuit

1168Court handles one of the largest guardianship dockets in Florida.

1178Employees in the Clerk's Office were made aware of the marital

1189relationship between Judge Colin and Respondent, and avoided

1197assigning cases involving Respondent as the PG to J udge Colin.

1208If Respondent entered into an existing case which was previously

1218assigned to Judge Colin, he internally transferred the case to

1228another judge. 2 /

123212. Judge Colin had no role in appointing Respondent to

1242guardianship cases. Generally the family or the attorney

1250representing the ward designates who they would like to use as a

1262guardian. Prior to the implementation of a random "wheel"

1271process in guardianship cases in 2016, it was up to the judge to

1284designate a PG if one was not designated by the pa rty or their

1298lawyer. No evidence was presented that Judge Colin designated

1307Respondent as a PG for any cases in which he presided.

131813. Like the other Circuit Court judges, Judge Colin

1327periodically served as the "duty judge" for purposes of signing

1337routine orders when the presiding judges in cases were

1346unavailable. In this capacity, Judge Colin signed between two to

1356four thousands orders in guardianship and probate cases between

13652010, when Respondent became a PG, and 2015, when he changed

1376divisions.

137714. O PPG makes much of the fact that over this time, Judge

1390Colin signed seven orders in cases in which Respondent served as

1401the PG. The Amended Complaint , paragraph 12 , alleges that,

" 1410Respondent failed to take any action to have Judge Colin removed

1421as the judg e formally assigned to guardianship and/or guardian

1431advocacy cases to which she was appointed. " However, neither

1440Respondent nor Judge Colin had any control of which orders he was

1452tasked to sign as duty judge.

145815. Two of the seven orders presented by OP PG do not

1470contain Respondent's name as an individual to be served with a

1481copy of the order. Although Attorney Hazeltine's name appears on

1491the service list for these orders, Attorney Hazeltine represented

1500other PGs in addition to Respondent. Seeing Attorn ey Hazeltine's

1510name alone would be insufficient to alert Judge Colin to his

1521wife's involvement in a case. Further, all of these orders were

1532on routine, uncontested matters. Judge Colin convincingly

1539testified that had he been aware of his wife's involveme nt in any

1552of these cases, he would not have signed the order to avoid any

1565appearance of impropriety.

156816. The Amended Complaint repeatedly asserts that

1575Respondent failed to disclose "the conflict of interest inherent

1584in her relationship to Judge Colin." R espondent denies that

1594there is any inherent conflict due to her marital relationship

1604with Judge Colin. Both Judge Colin and Respondent testified that

1614at no time was any conflict or potential conflict brought to

1625their attention by any litigants, lawyers, o ther judges, or the

1636IG's office.

163817. However, it is undeniable t hat there would be at

1649minimum an appearance of a conflict if Judge Colin presided over

1660cases to which Respondent was assigned as a PG. As explained by

1672OPPG's experts, Attorney Sketchly and J udge Cohen, the marital

1682privilege protects communications between spouses. If Judge

1689Colin presided over Respondent's cases as a PG, they could have

1700ex - parte c ommunications that would not be discoverable. It is

1712possible that they could discuss the merits of the guardianship

1722case , as well as the fee petition of Respondent as the PG.

173418. In fact, this potential for conflict was discussed in

1744Baez v. Koelemij , 960 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), a case

1758in which Judge Colin was directed to be removed on a motion for

1771disqualification because the movant's op posing counsel also

1779represented Judge Colin's then - girlfriend, Respondent. Noting

1787that the judicial canons did not require the disclosure by Judge

1798Colin of his relationship with Respondent because they w ere not a

1810spouse or a relative of the third degree, the court ruled, " the

1822mere fact that neither the canon nor the rule require

1832disqualification or disclosure where the opposing counsel

1839represented a "girlfriend" of a judge, disqualification is still

1848appro priate where a reasonable litigant would have a well -

1859grounded fear of not receiving a fair trial.

186719. While the judicial canons do not apply to PGs, as a

1879fiduciary, PGs have a duty of independence and impartiality.

1888Because of this special role between th e PG and ward, the PG

1901should disclose any relationship that creates a conflict or

1910potential conflict of interest. Disclosure must include mate rial

1919facts sufficient to allow a ward, a residual beneficiary, the

1929court, or any other interested party, to make an informed

1939decision regarding the appearance of conflict.

194520. Respondent completed an application for appointment in

1953every case for which she served as a PG or guardian advocate. In

1966response to the application form ' s request to identify spouse,

1977Responde nt answered, "Martin H. Colin." According to Respondent,

1986this disclosure was sufficient because the lawyers in the case

1996and the courthouse staff were aware of her marriage to Judge

2007Colin, and the wards were too incapacitated to read or understand

2018the appl ication.

202121. However, this simple identification of Judge Colin by

2030his proper name was insufficient to put the ward, their family

2041members, out - of - county lawyers, or other interested persons on

2053notice of the potential conflict. Respondent should have

2061id entified her spouse as Judge Martin H. Colin, of the Circuit

2073Court, Probate and Guardianship Division.

207822. Significantly, no evidence was presented during the

2086final hearing to demonstrate that Respondent benefited from this

2095failure to adequately disclose her marriage to Judge Colin, or

2105that her wards or other interested parties were in any way

2116harmed. However, failure to adequately disclose a conflict, or

2125appearance of conflict, erodes the public's confidence in the

2134guardianship system.

2136Possible Conflict of Interest -- Judge French

214323. Prior to Respondent's becoming a PG in 2010, she

2153developed a friendship with her husband's colleague,

2160Judge French, and his then wife. Judge French also served in the

2172Probate and Guardianship Division of the Circuit Cou rt.

218124. Respondent and her husband vacationed as the guests of

2191Judge French and his wife on one occasion for a weekend, sometime

2203between 2006 and 2008. The couples also planned a cruise

2213together that did not happen. No other evidence was presented

2223regarding whether Judge French and Respondent socialized on any

2232other occasion. Respondent testified she did not socialize with

2241Judge French.

224325. The fact that Respondent and Judge French traveled

2252together one time does not demonstrate a conflict or potential

2262conflict of interest. Accordingly, Respondent had no obligation

2270to disclose a social friendship that she did not believe would

2281pose a conflict. Importantly, although Judge French presided

2289over cases in which Respondent served as a PG or guardi an

2301advocate, at no time did he feel he had to remove himself, or

2314otherwise transfer, a case in which Respondent was the PG.

2324Presumably, Judge French believed that despite this social

2332relationship, he could remain impartial and that his relationship

2341with R espondent did not create a conflict or the appearance of a

2354conflict.

2355Improper Taking of Retainers by Respondent

236126. PGs have a special relationship with their wards. As a

2372fiduciary, they have a duty of loyalty and an obligation to at

2384all time s act i n the best interests of their wards, and not for

2399personal gain. See § 744.361, Fla. Stat. PGs are prohibited

2409from borrowing money from their wards. See § 744.454, Fla. Stat.

2420S ec tion 744.108 mandates that guardianship fees must be approved

2431by the court prior to payment. Subsection (1) specifica lly

2441recognizes that a guardian " is entitled to a reasonable fee for

2452services rendered and reimbursement for costs incurred on behalf

2461of the ward. " (emphasis added). This language is in the past

2472tense, and does no t make any allowance for payment of advance

2484fees or retainers.

248727. According to Attorney Sketchly, Judge Cohen, and

2495Mr. Palmieri, PGs normally prepare periodic bills showing

2503services rendered and the amount of time spent which are

2513submitted to the co urt. After a bill is reviewed by a case

2526manager and the court auditor, it is then submitted to the

2537presiding judge for approval. Only after the bill is approved by

2548the court can fees be paid to the PG.

255728. Attorney Sketchly, Judge Cohen, and Mr. Pa lmieri , in

2567their combined decades of experience, were not aware of any PGs

2578in Florida taking fees prior to court approval. Respondent's

2587expert, Attorney Amy Beller, also testified that it is never

2597permissible for a PG to take a loan from a ward's estate.

260929. In three cases between April 2012 and July 2015, 3/

2620Respondent, acting as a PG or guardian advocate, requested and

2630received "retainers" 4/ for future anticipated services, without

2638prior court authorization. Two retainers were taken in the

2647amounts of $1,000.00, and one was take n in the amount of

2660$2,500.00. Respondent had no set business practice to establish

2670on which cases retainers would be sought or for what amount.

2681Respondent had no written retainer agreements with her clients.

2690Respondent test ified she did this occasionally when she

2699anticipated there would be a lot of work up front on the case.

271230. The retainers charged by Respondent were reflected as a

2722credit on the bills submitted to the Circuit Court for approval.

2733No notation was co ntained on the bill as to when the retainer was

2747collected. Respondent did not recall whether the retainers were

2756collected prior to her appointment as PG or before services were

2767provided. The bills for these cases in which retainers were

2777taken were ultima tely approved by the Circuit Court.

278631. Section 744.446(2) provides that:

2791(2) Unless prior approval is obtained by

2798court order, or unless such relationship

2804existed prior to appointment of the guardian

2811and is disclosed to the court in the petition

2820for appointment of guardian, a guardian may

2827not:

2828(a) Have any interest, financial or

2834otherwise, direct or indirect, in any

2840business transaction or activity with the

2846guardianship;

2847(b) Acquire an ownership, possessory,

2852security, or other pecunia ry interest adverse

2859to the ward[.]

286232. By taking money fr om the ward prior to providing any

2874services and prior to court approval, Respondent created a

2883conflict of interest. Once Respondent took a retainer from her

2893client, she then had a financial interest at stake in seeing her

2905fees were approved.

290833. Att orney Sketchly explained that these retainers

2916appeared to be loans to Respondent. The round numbers, randomly

2926taken as "retainers," without any billing prior to the taking of

2937the retainer, or court authorization, suggest Respondent used

"2945retainers" becaus e she needed the money. This constitutes a

2955breach of fiduciary duty, is contrary to the best interests of

2966the ward, and creates a financial interest in the guardianship,

2976whi ch are prohibited by section 744.446 . By using retainers,

2987Respondent abused her p ower as a guardian.

2995CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

29983 4 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and

3010the parties to this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569 and

3020120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2018).

302435. As of March 10, 2016, OPPG was created and given

3035overs ight responsibilities for all professional guardians. See

3043§ 744.2001 , Fla. Stat .

304836. In this case, OPPG seeks to revoke Respondent's

3057registration as a PG and potentially affect RespondentÓs

3065livelihood. As such, OPPG has the burden of proving its

3075allegat ions with clear and convincing evidence. See Ferris v.

3085Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1987)(establishing clear

3094and convincing evidence standard for license revocation

3101proceedings).

310237. "Clear and convincing evidence" means that the evidence

3111must b e found to be credible, the facts to which the witnesses

3124testify must be distinctly remembered, the testimony must be

3133precise and explicit, and the witnesses must be lacking in

3143confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such

3156weight that i t produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm

3171belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the

3182allegations sought to be established. Slomowitz v. Walker , 429

3191So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

319938. OPPG ' s specific allegations are con tained in the

3210Amended Complaint . This tribunal may consider only the

3219allegations in the Amended Complaint because predicating

3226disciplinary action against a licensee on conduct never alleged

3235in an administrative complaint , or some comparable pleading ,

3243viol ates the Administrative Procedure Act. Cottrill v. Dep't of

3253Ins. , 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Similarly, due

3265process requires that only the allegations in an administrative

3274complaint may be considered in imposing disciplinary sanctions.

3282M atters not charged in an administrative action cannot be

3292considered as violations. See Chrysler v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. ,

3302627 So. 2d 31, 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Klein v. DepÓt of Bus. &

3317ProfÓl Reg. , 625 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

332739. In the introduct ory paragraphs of the Amended

3336Complaint, Petitioner alleges, " Section 744.20041, Florida

3342Statutes, provides that a professional guardian is subject to

3351disciplinary action by Petitioner for failing to perform any

3360statutory or legal obligation placed upon a professional

3368guardian. " In the " Wherefore " clause of the Amended Complaint,

3377OPPG seeks the imposition of penalties against Respondent

3385afforded by section 744.20041 .

3390The Application of the 2016 Statute to Respondent ' s Pre - 2016

3403Conduct Does Not Constitute a n Unconstitutional Ex Post Facto Law

341440. All of the improper conduct alleged in the Amended

3424Complaint occurred prior to the creati on of the OPPG and the

3436March 201 6 effe ctive date of sections 744.2001 through 744. 20041.

3448As such, Respondent alleges that t his is a violation of her due

3461process rights as an impermissible ex post facto law , which

3471deprives her of life, liberty, or property, based on conduct

3481occurring before the effective date of the prohibition.

348941. Substantive statutes are presumed to ap ply

3497prospectively, absent a demonstrated legislative intent to the

3505contrary. In determining whether the Legislature intended that a

3514statutory provision be applied retroactively, courts examine both

3522the statute's plain language and the Legislature's purpos e for

3532enacting it. Landgraf v. Usi Film Products , 511 U.S. 244,

3542114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed 2d 299 (1994). The Legislature

3554expressed no intent regarding the retroactive application of

3562sections 744.2001 through 744.20041.

356642. However, this "presump tion" does not apply when the

3576statute applies a new jurisdictional rule or procedural rule.

3585Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually "takes away no

3595substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear

3606the case." Landgraf v. Usi Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114

3618S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed 2d 299 (1994) ( citing Hallowell v. Commons ,

36322 39 U.S. 506, 508 - 509, 60 L. Ed. 409, 36 S. Ct. 202 (1916) ) .

3650Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary

3659conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after

3670the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of

3682the rule at trial retroactive. Miller v. Florida , 482 U.S. 423,

3693433, 96 L. Ed 2d 351, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1997); Landgraf , 511 U.S.

3707at 275.

370943. Secti ons 744.2001 through 744.20041 constitute new

3717jurisdictional and procedural rules. Pursuant to both common law

3726and chapter 744, guardians have long had a fiduciary

3735responsibility to their wards that prohibits acting in any manner

3745contrary to their wards' best interests. The Amended Complaint

3754charges Respondent for violating statutes in effect prior to

3763Respondent becoming a PG. Sections 744.2001 through 744.20041

3771only ch ange oversight of PGs from the Circuit C ourt to the OPPG,

3785and provide new remedies for PGs who violate chapter 744.

379544 . In Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety &

3806Motor Vehichles , 985 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (Fla. 2008), the Florida

3817Supreme Court discussed whether the retroactive application of

3825enhanced penalties constitutes an unconst itutional ex post facto

3834law:

3835Both the United States and Florida

3841Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws.

3847See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; art. I, § 10,

3858Fla. Const. The United States Supreme Court

3865has defined an ex post facto law as one that

3875(a) op erates re trospectively, and

3881(b) "make[s] innocent acts criminal, alter[s]

3887the nature of the offense, or increase[s] the

3895punishment." Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S.

390137, 46, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30

3912(1990); accord Cal. Dep't of Corr. v.

3919Morales , 514 U.S. 4 99, 506 n.3, 115 S. Ct.

39291597, 131 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1995) ("After

3938Coll ins, the focus of the ex post facto

3947inquiry is not on whether a legislative

3954change produces some ambiguous sort of

3960'disadvantage,' . . . but on whether any such

3970change alters the definition of criminal

3976conduct or increases the penalty by which a

3984crime is punishable."). Thus, the

3990prohibition on ex post facto laws applies

3997only to criminal or penal provisions.

400345 . The Lescher c ourt utilized the seven factor test

4014enunciated in Hudson v. United States , 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct.

4026488, 139 L. Ed 2d 450 (1997), to determine whether the statutory

4038scheme at issue constituted a civil penalty or criminal

4047punishment. Under Hudson , the first step in th e analysis is to

4059ascertain the L egislature's int ent, and then to determine the

4070effect of the statute under the following seven factors:

4079(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an

4085affi rmati ve disability or restraint;

4091(2) whether it has historicall y been regarded

4099as a punishment ; (3) whether it comes into

4107pl a y only on a finding of scienter ;

4116(4) whether its operation will promote the

4123traditional aims of punishment -- retribution

4129and deterrence ; (5) whether the behavior to

4136which it applies is already a crime;

4143( 6) whether an alternative purpose to which

4151it may rat ionally be connected is assignable

4159for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive

4167in relation to the alternative purpose

4173assigned.

41744 6 . Chapter 744 regulates guardianship proceedings and OPPG

4184was created for the purpose of overseeing all public and

4194professi onal guardians. In section 744.1012, the Legislature

4202clearly expressed its intent:

4206(3) By recognizing that every individual has

4213unique needs and differing abilities, i t is

4221the purpose of this act to promote the public

4230welfare by establishing a system that permits

4237incapacitated persons to participate as fully

4243as possible in all decisions af fecting them;

4251that assists such persons in meeting the

4258essential requirements for their physical

4263health and safety, in protecting their

4269rights, in managing their financial

4274resources, and in developing or regaining

4280their abilities to the maximum extent

4286poss ible; and that accomplishes these

4292objectives through providing, in each case,

4298the form of assistance that least interferes

4305with the legal capacity of a person to act in

4315her or his own behalf. This act shall be

4324liberally construed to accomplish this

4329purpos e.

4331* * *

4334( 5) Through the establishment of the Office

4342of Public and Professional Guardians, the

4348Legislature intends to permit the

4353establishment of offices of public guardians

4359for the purpose of providing guardianship

4365services for incapacitated pe rsons when no

4372private guardian is available.

437647 . It is apparent that by enacting chapter 744, the

4387Legislature intended to protect the public through a system of

4397guardianship for the benefit of the most vulnerable citizens.

4406Application of the Hudso n Factors

441248 . This intent controls absent "the clearest of proof" to

4423transform what has been denominated as a civil remedy into a

4434criminal penalty. Lescher ,985 So. 2d at 1082. T o determine

4445whether the "clearest of proof" negates the Legislature's i ntent

4455to create a civil remedy, the seven Hudson factors must be

4466applied . Two overriding principle s govern this analysis: first,

4476no one factor sh ould be considered controlling; and second, the

4487statute is evaluated on its face, not on the character of the

4499actual sanctions imposed. Hudson , 522 U.S. at 101 (quoting and

4509disavowing United States v. Halper , 490 U.S. 435, 447, 109 S. Ct.

45211892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989)).

45281. Affirmative Disability or Restraint

453349 . The first factor is whether the sanct ion involves an

4545affirmative disability or restraint. Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 - 100.

4556S ection 744.20041 does not impose an affirmative disability as

4566the Supreme Court has applied this factor. See Smith v. Doe , 538

4578U.S. 84, 100, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003)

4591(concluding that a state's sex offender registration statute

"4599impose[d] no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the

4609punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative

4617disability or restraint" and its "obligations are less harsh than

4627the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be

4638nonpunitive"); see also Hudson , 522 U.S. at 496 (concluding that

4649a bar to working in the banking industry was not an affirmative

4661disability or restraint "as tha t term is normally understood").

467250 . In Lescher , the Florida Supreme Court examined whether

4682the application of a statute, which eliminated the availability

4691of a hardship license to those who lost their driver 's licenses,

4703enacted after the p laintiff's DUI criminal co nviction, could be

4714retroactively applied. The court stated:

4719The loss of one's driving privilege is

4726inconvenient. In fact, we have recognized

4732that the revocation of one's driver's license

4739constitutes a substantial hardship.

4743Nevertheless, the loss of the driving

4749privilege is not an affirmative disability.

4755If the requirement to register as a sexual

4763offender, the loss of the ability to practice

4771in a chosen profession, the termination of

4778Social Security benefits, and the denial of

4785other federal benefits such as food stamps do

4793not constitute an affirmative disability or

4799restraint, then neither does the inability to

4806apply for a hardship license after one's

4813driver's license has been permanently

4818revoked .

4820Lescher , 985 So. 2d at 1083.

482651 . Similarly, although the revocation of the PG

4835registration carries the "sting of punishment," and may affect

4844one's income, it does not resemble the punishment of

4853imprisonment. The loss of the privilege of serving as a PG is

4865not an affirmative disability.

48692. The Historic al View

487452 . The second factor of the Hudson analysis is whether the

4886sanction has historically been regarded as a punishment. Florida

4895courts have upheld as civil other regulatory remedies that

4904deprive individuals of the enjoyment of certain licensed

4912privileges. See , e.g. , State v. Bowling , 71 2 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d

4925DCA 1998) (holding that revocation of a contractor's license was a

4936civil sanction, not a criminal punishment, and did not bar

4946criminal prosecution for fraud in violation of the Double

4955Jeopard y Clause); Rowe v. Ag . for Health Care Admin. , 714 So. 2d

49691108, 1110 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding no ex post facto violation

4981where a dentist's participation as a Medicaid provider was

4990terminated upon his criminal conviction based on a statute

4999enacted to pro tect the public but "did not increase the penalty"

5011for the crimes); Borrego v. Ag . for Health Care Admin. , 675 So.

50242d 666, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that "[i]n Florida, the

5036license to practice medicine is considered a privilege granted by

5046the soverei gn" and the state's suspension of appellant's license

5056following a criminal fraud conviction under a statute intended

5065for public protection did not v iolate the double jeopardy bar);

5076and Lescher , 985 So. 2d at 1084 ( driver's license revocation and

5088the unavai lability of a hardship license for persons with four

5099DUI convictions have not bee n viewed as criminal punishment).

510953 . Florida courts have held that a licensed privilege may

5120reasonably be regulated. The purpose of suspension or revocation

5129of such a privilege is not to punish the offender, but to protect

5142the public.

51443. Scienter

514654 . The third factor is whether the sanction comes into

5157play only on a finding of scienter. See Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 -

5171100. T he registration revocation statute, s ection 744.20041 ,

5180does not contain a scienter element.

51864. Punishment and Deterrence

519055 . The fourth factor is whether operation of the

5200disciplinary and registration revocation statute will promote the

5208traditional aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence. See

5216Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 - 100. Section 744.20014 provides for

5227increasing penalties for the PG based upon the severity of the

5238violations. As such, t his provision may, to some degree, serve

5249as a deterrent. This provision, however, also serve s the

5259Legislature's stated purpose of protecting its most vulnerable

5267citizens. That the statute at issue may serve a deterr ent

5278purpose does not automatically render it criminal punishment. As

5287the Supreme Court warned in Hudson , the "mere prese nce of this

5299[deterrent] purpose is insufficient to render a sanction

5307criminal, as deterrence 'may serve civil as well as criminal

5317goals.'" Hudson , 522 U.S. at 105 .

53245. Criminal Behavior

532756 . The fifth factor is whether the behavior to which the

5339statut es apply is also a crime. See Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 - 100.

5354Section 744.20041 subjects a PG to disciplinary action by the

5364OPPG for failing to perform statutory or legal obligations.

5373Obviously removing assets from a ward's estate without

5381authorization coul d constitute theft or embezzlement. That the

5390conduct addressed by the statutes is also criminal, however, also

5400is insufficient to make the civil remedy of license revocation

5410criminally punitive. See Hudson , 522 U.S. at 104 (a monetary

5420penalty and employm ent debarment are not criminally punitive

5429merely because the conduct on which the sanctions were based is

5440also a crime).

54436. Alternative Purpose

544657 . The sixth factor is whether an alternative purpose , to

5457which the sanction may rationally be conn ected , is assignable for

5468it. See Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 - 100. In other words, does PG

5482registration revocation serve a legitimate governmenta l purpose

5490other than punishment? As explained earlier, the Legislature has

5499expressly stated the purpose behind cha pter 744 is " to promote

5510the public welfare by establishing a system that permits

5519incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in all

5529decisions affecting them; that assists such persons in meeting

5538the essential requirements for their physical h ealth and safety,

5548in protecting their rights, in managing their financial

5556resources ." The system created by section 744.20041 of

5565increasing disciplinary penalties, up to and including

5572registration revocation , is rationally related to that regulatory

5580purpo se. It protect s the public by restricting the practice of

5592PGs who display disregard for the best interests of their wards.

56037. Relationship of Restriction to Purpose

560958 . The seventh and final factor is whether the sanction

5620appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose

5628assigned. See Hudson , 522 U.S. at 99 - 100. T he restriction here ,

5641registration revocation, is not excessive in relationship to the

5650statute's purpose of protecting the public. Incapacitated

5657persons are clearly more susce ptible to harm from a PG who has a

5671pattern of disregarding statutory or legal obligations. Thus,

5679the increasing penalties, up to permanent revocation , are a

5688measured and legitimate exercise of the Legislature's power to

5697protect the public.

570059 . Of th e seven factors reviewed, none support

5710Respondent's claim that the statute is in effect so punitive that

5721it constitute s criminal punishment. Accordingly, use of the

5730statutory scheme contained in section 744.20041 to punish the

5739actions of Respondent occurr ing prior to its enactment in March

57502016, does not constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

576060 . Based on this analysis, it is appropriate to examine

5771whether OPPG proved the counts of the Amended Complaint by clear

5782and convincing evidence.

5785Co unt I -- Violation of Section 744 .309(3) (Judge Colin)

579661 . Count I alleges a violation of Florida Statute

5806744.309(3) , which provides that, " the court may not appoint a

5816guardian in any other circumstance in which a conflict of

5826interest may occur." OPPG alleges that Respondent had a conflict

5836of interest by virtue of her marriage to Judge Colin; that she

5848failed to adequately disclose this purported conflict of interest

5857and that as a result, she was " ineligible for appointment in

5868cases wherein Judge Colin was also involved. "

587562 . T he obvious defect in Petitioner' s argument is tha t

5888this provision of section 744.309(3) applies only to judges.

5897Only judges appoint guardians. This statutory provision only

5905proscribes certain guardian appointments by a judg e . This action

5916is a disciplinary action against Respondent, not her husband.

5925Thus, with out even going into the merit s on the conflict of

5938interest issue, this statutory section, on it s face , cannot be

5949used to find a violation by Respondent .

595763 . Whil e pursuant to section 744.309(3) a court may not

5969appoint a guardian who meets the definition of a "disqualified

5979person," OPPG failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing

5988evidence that Respondent ever had a conflict of interest or

5998appearance of a conflict of interest. No evidence was presented

6008showing that Respondent was ever appointed to any guardianship

6017case by her husband, Judge Colin.

602364 . While it is true Respondent should have disclosed, in

6034detail, her spouse's position as a sitting judge in th e Probate

6046and Guardianship Division, her failure to disclose was of no

6056consequence because Judge Colin and the courthouse staff

6064studiously avoided Judge Colin's involvement in any of

6072Respondent's PG cases. At most, Judge Colin, as duty judge,

6082inadvertentl y signed seven routine orders in cases in which

6092Respondent was, or would become, involved. As such, there is no

6103basis upon which to find Respondent violated section 744.309(3).

6112Count II -- Violation of Section 744.446 (Judge Colin )

612265 . Section 744.44 6, prohibits guardians with a conflict of

6133interest from benefiting from any such co nflict, unless approved

6143by the c ourt beforehand, and provides that "[i]t is essential to

6155the proper conduct and management of a guardianship that the

6165guardian be independent and impartial."

617066 . Count II alleges that Respondent failed to disclose her

6181conflict of interest " in cases where Judge Colin also presided"

6191and that she received compensation for these cases. As discussed

6201above, at no time did Judge Colin appoint R espondent to a case as

6215PG. As soon as Judge Colin discovered Respondent entered a

6225guardianship case in which he presided, he transferred the case

6235to another judge.

623867 . All fees received by Respondent were, in f act, reviewed

6250by a case manager and cou rt auditor, and then authorized for

6262payment by a judge other than Judge Colin. As such, OPPG failed

6274to meet its burden of proof as to Count II.

6284Count III -- Violation of Section 744.309(3) (Judge French)

629368 . As discussed above, section 744.309(3) only proscribes

6302judges from making certain guardianship appointments . This

6310action is a disciplinary action against Respondent, not

6318Judge French . Although Judge French did appoint Respondent to

6328guardianship cases, there was no clear and convincing evidence

6337th at a conflict existed between Respondent and Judge French by

6348virtue of her traveling with him and his spouse years before she

6360became a PG. OPPG failed to meet its burden as to Count III.

6373Count IV -- Violation of Section 744.446 (Judge French )

638369 . Beca use OPPG failed to demonstrate any conflict of

6394interest between Judge French and Respondent serving as PG in

6404cases for which he presided, there can be no showing that

6415Respondent improperly benefitted from those cases. OPPG failed

6423to meet its burden as to Count IV.

6431Count V -- Violation of Section 744.361(3) (Duty of Good Faith)

644270 . Count V charges Respondent with violation of Florida

6452Statute 744.361(3) , which states in its entirety , " the gu ardian

6462shall act in good faith." Respondent points out that thi s law

6474did not become effective until July 1, 2015, and the statute does

6486not define "good faith." However it is undisputed for centuries

6496that common law has applied a duty of good faith to a fiduciary

6509relationship. "Good faith" in this context obviously p revents a

6519PG from self - dealing or helping oneself to the ward's assets

6531without court authorization.

653471 . Amended Complaint , paragraph 58 , itemizes the ways in

6544which Respondent allegedly breached this duty. In specifying the

6553alleged bad faith, OPPG pr imarily relies on the alleged conflicts

6564with Judges Colin and French, which were not proven. See Amended

6575Complaint, paragraphs 58(a) , (b) , (c) , and (e)(which reference

6583conflicts with Judges Colin and French, and conflicts with

6592Respondent and the "judiciary, " but not between Respondent and

6601the ward).

660372 . Amended Complaint , paragraph 58(d) , includes an

6611ambiguous catch - all, charging Respondent with failing to act in

6622good faith by, " [c] ontinuing to serve as guardian or guardian

6633advocate in Palm Beach Count y on cases wherein statutes

6643pertaining to her suitability to receive such appointments were

6652violated ." As discussed in detail above, section 744.309(3)

6661imposes obligation on the court not to appoint disqualified

6670persons.

667173 . Arguably , section 744. 446(2) pertains to Respondent's

6680suitability because it provides:

6684The fiduciary relationship which exists

6689between the guardian and the ward may not be

6698used for the private gain of the guardian

6706other than the remuneration for fees and

6713expenses provided by la w . The guardian may

6722not incur any obligation on behalf of the

6730guardianship which conflicts with the proper

6736dis charge of the guardianÓs duties .

6743(emphasis added).

674574 . However, the Amended Complaint nowhere references

6753section 744.446(2). Nor does it reference section 744.454, which

6762prohibits a guardian from borrowing money from the ward.

6771Accordingly, the Administrative Complaint failed to provide

6778adequate notice to Respondent that her taking of retainers

6787without prior court approval of her fees, con stituted a breach of

6799the duty of good faith. Accordingly, OPPG failed to meet its

6810burden as to Count V.

6815Count V I -- Violation of Section 744.361(4) ( Contrary to Ward's

6827Interests )

682975 . Count VI charges Respondent with violating s ection

6839744.361(4), whic h provides that a guardian may not act in a

6851manner that is contrary to the ward's best interests under the

6862circumstances . There were no circumstances shown by Respondent

6871that justified the taking of retainers prior to court

6880authorization for the payment o f fees. It was clearly against

6891her wards' best interests.

689576 . Again, OPPG failed to properly plead its Amended

6905Complaint to include any reference to sections 744.446(2) or

6914744.454, resulting in Respondent not receiving notice that they

6923could serve a s a basis for this count. See Amended Complaint,

6935paragraphs 62(a) - (e). Accordingly, OPPG failed to meet its

6945burden as to Count VI.

6950Count VII -- Violation of Section 744.474(3)

695777 . Section 744.474(3) provides that a guardian is subject

6967to removal from a case, in addition to any other penalties

6978prescribed by law, if the guardian abuses his or her powers.

6989Arguably, Respondent abused her power as a guardian by taking

6999retainers without prior court approval of her fees. However,

7008nothing in th is section, o r section 744.2001 through 744. 20041

7020gives OPPG the authority to remove a guardian. That is the

7031exclusive purview of the circuit court which appointed the PG.

7041There is no basis upon which to charge Respond ent with a

7053violation of section 744.474(3).

7057Concl usion

705978 . Respondent had no conflict between herself and Judge

7069Colin because he did not appoint her or preside over her PG

7081cases. Respondent's marriage to a judge, sitting in the Probate

7091and Guardianship Division in which she practiced as a PG, crea ted

7103a potential conflict or appearance of conflict that should have

7113been more thoroughly disclosed. Fortunately, it did not result

7122in any benefit to Respondent. OPPG also failed to prove any

7133conflict, actual or perceived, between Respondent and Judge

7141Fre nch.

714379 . Respondent's use of retainers was both a breach of the

7155duty of good faith and not in the best interests of her wards.

7168However, in its first prosecution under sections 744.2001 through

7177744. 20041, OPPG failed to adequately plead these violati ons.

718780 . Significantly, no harm was demonstrated to the wards or

7198their families. All of Responde nt's fees were ultimately court -

7209approved. Although Respondent's actions, of failing to

7216adequately disclose her marriage to a then sitting Probate Judge,

7226and taking retainers not authorized by law, erode the public

7236confidence in the guardianship system, they are not actionable as

7246charged by the Amended Complaint.

7251RECOMMENDATION

7252Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

7262Law, it is RECOMMEND ED that the Department of Elder Affairs,

7273Office of Public and Professional Guardians, issue a final order

7283dismissing this case.

7286DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December , 2018 , in

7296Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

7300S

7301MA RY LI CREASY

7305Administrative Law Judge

7308Division of Administrative Hearings

7312The DeSoto Building

73151230 Apalachee Parkway

7318Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

7323(850) 488 - 9675

7327Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

7333www.doah.state.fl.us

7334Filed with the Clerk of the

7340Division of Adm inistrative Hearings

7345this 21st day of December , 2018 .

7352ENDNOTE S

73541/ A guardian is appointed in s ituations when a ward becomes

7366incapacitated to the extent that it is necessary for the

7376guardian's judgment to be substituted for the protection of the

7386ward an d the ward's assets. A guardian advocate is usually

7397appointed when the ward is born incapacitated and usually a

7407parent or relative serves as a guardian advocate. The

7416responsibilities to protect the ward's best interests are

7424identical.

74252 / OPPG contends that the "transfer" of Judge Colin's cases

7436involving Respondent, rather than recusal and reassignment,

7443violated the standing procedures of the court and allowed Judge

7453Colin to bypass the random re - assignment process to shift the

7465case to another judge at th e South County Courthouse. The

7476implication is that other judges in the same courthouse would

7486treat Respondent's cases more favorably. Judge Colin testified

7494it was up to the discretion of the individual judge whether to

7506transfer a case. OPPG presented no supporting evidence that the

7516practice of transfer somehow improperly benefited Respondent or

7524harmed her wards. Further, even assuming arguendo that this

7533practice was somehow improper, this proceeding is to examine the

7543conduct of Respondent as PG, not the conduct of Judge Colin.

75543/ These three cases include: In Re: Guardianship of Helen M.

7565O'Grady, Case No: 502012GA000016XXXXSB; In Re: Guardianship of

7573Carla Simmonds, Case No. 502014AG000327XXXXSB; and In Re:

7581Guardianship of Delores Thur, Case No. 50201 3AG000262XXXXSB.

75894/ A "true retainer" is money paid in advance of any services

7601rendered to have a professional available when needed. An

"7610evergreen retainer" is money paid in advance of services in the

7621expectation that the retainer will be used to pay t he bill. When

7634it is exhausted, the retainer is replenished to the original

7644amount in anticipation of additional billing. Respondent's

"7651retainers" do not appear to be either a true retainer or an

7663evergreen retainer because it was a one - time payment from a

7675family member, ward's trust, or ward's estate, later reflected as

7685an offset on the Petition for Order Authorizing Payment of

7695Compensation and Expenses of Guardian.

7700COPIES FURNISHED:

7702Ellen S. Morris, Esquire

7706Elder Law Associates, P.A.

77107284 West Palmetto Park Road , Suite 101

7717Boca Raton, Florida 33433

7721(eServed)

7722Michael McKeon, Esquire

7725Department of Elder Affairs

77294040 Esplanade Way

7732Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7000

7737(eServed)

7738Jeffrey Bragg, Secretary

7741Department of Elder Affairs

77454040 Espl anade Way, Suite 315

7751Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7000

7756(eServed)

7757Francis Carbone, General Counsel

7761Department of Elder Affairs

77654040 Esplanade Way, Suite 315I

7770Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7000

7775(eServed)

7776NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

7782All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

779215 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

7803to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

7814will issue the Final Order in this case.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2019
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2019
Proceedings: Agency Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/15/2019
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Filing of Exceptions to Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/16/2019
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Exceptions filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/21/2018
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 12/21/2018
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held September 5-7, 2018). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 12/21/2018
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 10/26/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/25/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/16/2018
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time.
PDF:
Date: 10/15/2018
Proceedings: Agreed Motion for Extension of Time for Parties' Submission of Proposed Recommended Orders filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2018
Proceedings: Order Granting Leave to Amend Administrative Complaint, Denying Continuance of Final Hearing and Denying Motion in Limine.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's Proposed Prehearing Statement filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2018
Proceedings: Motion in Limine filed.
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Date: 08/31/2018
Proceedings: Answer to Amended Administrative Complaint filed.
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Date: 08/29/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Pre-hearing Statement filed.
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Date: 08/29/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Witness and Exhibit Disclosures filed.
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Date: 08/29/2018
Proceedings: Amended Administrative Complaint filed.
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Date: 08/29/2018
Proceedings: Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Continue Final Hearing filed.
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Date: 08/28/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's Witness List filed.
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Date: 08/13/2018
Proceedings: Notice of Taking Videorecorded Depositions filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/28/2018
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing (hearing set for September 5 through 7, 2018; 9:00 a.m.; West Palm Beach, FL).
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Date: 06/22/2018
Proceedings: Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing filed.
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Date: 06/14/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Second Request for Production of Documents from Petitioner filed.
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Date: 06/14/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Respondent's First Request for Admissions filed.
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Date: 06/14/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Service of Responses to Respondent's First Interrogatories filed.
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Date: 05/11/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's First Request for Production of Documents to Petitioner filed.
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Date: 05/11/2018
Proceedings: First Request for Admissions to Petitioner filed.
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Date: 05/11/2018
Proceedings: Notice of Service of Respondent's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner filed.
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Date: 04/03/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Request for Production to Respondent filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/02/2018
Proceedings: Notice of Serving Answers to Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/02/2018
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing (hearing set for July 26 and 27, 2018; 9:00 a.m.; West Palm Beach, FL).
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Date: 03/29/2018
Proceedings: Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing filed.
Date: 03/21/2018
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Motion Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2018
Proceedings: Order on Respondent's Motion to Compel.
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion for Conference Call filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/15/2018
Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Conference Call filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/12/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Respondent's First Request for Production of Documents from Petitioner filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/22/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's First Request for Production to Respondent filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/22/2018
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Service of First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/22/2018
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 02/22/2018
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for April 25 through 27, 2018; 9:00 a.m.; West Palm Beach, FL).
PDF:
Date: 02/21/2018
Proceedings: Joint Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2018
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2018
Proceedings: Request for Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2018
Proceedings: Administrative Complaint filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2018
Proceedings: Referral Letter filed.

Case Information

Judge:
MARY LI CREASY
Date Filed:
02/14/2018
Date Assignment:
04/02/2018
Last Docket Entry:
03/21/2019
Location:
West Palm Beach, Florida
District:
Southern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN PART OR MODIFIED
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (12):

Related Florida Rule(s) (1):