87-003078RX The Citrus Hill Manufacturing Company vs. Department Of Citrus
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, December 9, 1987.


View Dockets  
Summary: Rule which prohibited the petitioner to include the word ""juice"" on its products exceeds agency's delegated authority.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8THE CITRUS HILL MANUFACTURING )

13COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation , )

18)

19Petitioner , )

21)

22vs. ) CASE NO. 87-3078RX

27)

28STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT )

33OF CITRUS , )

36)

37Respondent. )

39________________________________)

40FINAL ORDER

42Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held before Diane D.

53Tremor, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, on

63September 24, 1987, in Lakeland, Florida. The issue for determination in this

75proceeding is whether the Department of Citrus' Rule 20-66.001(4), Florida

85Administrative Code, which prohibits the word "juice" from appearing in labels

96for diluted citrus products, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated

106legislative authority.

108APPEARANCES

109For Petitioner : Peter J. Winders and

116James J. Kennedy, III

120Carlton, Fields, Ward,

123Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler & Kent, P.A.

129One Harbor Place

132Post Office Box 3239

136Tampa, Florida 33601

139and

140Karl S. Steinmanis, Esquire

144One Proctor and Gamble Plaza

149Cincinnati, Ohio 45292-3315

152For Respondent : J. Hardin Peterson, Jr., Esquire

160Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews,

164Brandon & Mann, P.A.

168Post Office Drawer BS

172Lakeland, Florida 33802

175and

176Kristen C. Chadwell, Esquire

180General Counsel

182Department of Citrus

185Post Office Box 148

189Lakeland, Florida 33802-0148

192INTRODUCTION

193Pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, petitioner, The Citrus Hill

203Manufacturing Company, seeks an administrative determination of the validity of

213Rule 20-66.001(4), Florida Administrative Code. This proceeding was

221consolidated for hearing purposes with Division of Administrative Hearing's Case

231No. 87-1611, bearing the same caption, which concerns the issue of whether the

244terms of Rule 20-66.001(4) may be applied to petitioner's citrus fruit products

256in Florida. The latter proceeding is the subject of a separate Recommended

268Order entered on this same date.

274In support of its position that the challenged rule constitutes an invalid

286exercise of delegated legislative authority, petitioner presented the testimony

295of Charles Anthony Parsons, the manager of purchases for Citrus Hill

306Manufacturing Company (Citrus Hill); Richard J. Coomes, the regulatory affairs

316manager for the beverage products division of Proctor and Gamble; and Joseph

328Ottaviani, a vice-president and regional manager with Burke Marketing Research.

338Petitioners' Exhibits 1, 2 6 and 7 were received into evidence.

349The respondent, Department of Citrus, presented the testimony of Douglas

359Hoffer, the former marketing director with the Department of Citrus, and Dr.

371Poonam Mittal, a market research coordinator with the Department of Citrus. The

383respondent's Exhibits A through D were received into evidence.

392Official notice was taken of the documents listed in Hearing Officer's

403Exhibit 1. Subsequent to the hearing, both parties submitted proposed orders.

414To the extent that the parties' proposed findings of fact are not included in

428this Final Order, they are rejected for the reasons set forth in the Appendix

442hereto.

443FINDINGS OF FACT

446Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the

457hearing, the following relevant facts are found:

4641. Citrus Hill Manufacturing Company (Citrus Hill) is a wholly owned

475subsidiary of Proctor and Gamble. Citrus Hill is in the business of producing,

488manufacturing, packaging and distributing citrus products throughout the United

497States. It's main product has been "Select" orange juice which is 100 percent

510orange juice. Its principal manufacturing facility is located in Frostproof,

520Florida. While Citrus Hill has four other manufacturing sites outside the State

532of Florida, its Florida plant is the only facility for manufacturing frozen

544products. While it can produce chilled products at its plants located outside

556Florida, Citrus Hill's Florida plant is necessary to supply the demand for its

569chilled products on a national basis.

5752. In an effort to expand its market, Citrus Hill developed three products

588which it produces and packs at its plant in Frostproof, Florida. These products

601are and have been labeled as follows:

608(a) "Lite Citrus Hill Orange Juice Beverage - 60 percent Orange

619Juice,"

620(b) "Lite Citrus Hill Grapefruit Juice Beverage - 45 percent

630Grapefruit Juice," and

633(c) "Plus Calcium Citrus Hill, Calcium Fortified Grapefruit Juice

642Beverage - 60 percent Grapefruit Juice." The "lite" beverages are reduced

653calorie diluted juice beverages with the addition of Nutrasweet. The third

664product is a diluted grapefruit juice beverage fortified with calcium.

6743. By a letter dated March 19, 1987, the Department of Citrus ordered

687Citrus Hill to change its diluted citrus products labels and informed Citrus

699Hill that the Department would enforce Rule 20-66.001(4), Florida Administrative

709Code. That rule provides

"713Labels for diluted citrus products

718shall not include the word "juice" in

725the name of the product."

7304. As noted above, Citrus Hill markets and sells its product line

742throughout the United States. It desires to utilize the names of its diluted

755juice products as indicated in paragraph two above for three reasons. First,

767Citrus Hill believes that its labeling is in compliance with federal law.

779Second, it believes that a product name which includes the word "juice" more

792fully informs the consumer of the nature of the product because it is more

806exact, descriptive and less ambiguous than any name not using the word "juice",

819such as "drink", "ade", or "beverage". Third, Citrus Hill fears that if it were

834unable to disclose through its product name that the product is primarily a

847juice product, it would be placed at a competitive disadvantage in the national

860marketplace where non-Florida producers of similar products would not be bound

871by the challenged Rule's ban on the use of the word "juice" in the name of

887diluted juice products. While Citrus Hill could move its packaging facilities

898outside the state and utilize two product labels (one for Florida shipment and

911one for the non-Florida market), this alternative would be extremely expensive

922and would constitute a "distribution nightmare." Many distributors and large

932retail grocery stores work in multi-state regions and may not be willing to

945segregate and keep track of petitioner's different product labels for shipment

956in Florida and in non-Florida states.

9625. No other state in the United States prohibits the word "juice" in the

976labeling of diluted citrus juice products.

9826. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the subject of proper labeling of

996diluted fruit juice beverages was under discussion by both the Florida

1007Department of Citrus and the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under

1019the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The FDA ultimately rejected the proposal of

1032prohibiting the word "juice" from the name of any product that was not 100

1046percent pure juice, and also rejected the approach of defining different

1057products through "standards of identity." This latter method of labeling

1067products would have defined a product as "ades" only if containing more than 10

1081percent, but less than 20 percent, juice, and various other category names based

1094upon the percentage of fruit juice contained in the product. The prohibition

1106against the word "juice" and the "standards of identity" proposals for the

1118labeling of diluted juice products were rejected by the FDA in favor of a common

1133or usual name approach, with a percent declaration of any characterizing

1144ingredient.

11457. The pertinent federal regulations addressing the labeling of food

1155products are contained in 21 C.F.R. Chapter 1. The more general regulation

1167appears in 21 C.F.R. 102.5(a) and (b), and states, in pertinent part, as

1180follows:

1181Section 102.5 General Principles.

1185(a) The common or usual name of a

1193food . . . shall accurately identify

1200or describe, in as simple and

1206direct terms as possible, the basic

1212nature of the food or its

1218characterizing properties or

1221ingredients. The name shall be

1226uniform among all identical or

1231similar products and may not be

1237confusingly similar to the name of

1243any other food that is not reasonably

1250encompassed within the same name.

1255Each class or subclass of food shall

1262be given its own common or usual name

1270that states, in clear terms, what it

1277is in a way that distinguishes it

1284from different foods.

1287(b) The common or usual name of a

1295food shall include the percentage(s)

1300of any characterizing ingredient(s)

1304or component(s) when the . . .

1311component(s) . . . has a material

1318bearing on . . . consumer acceptance

1325or when the labeling . . . may

1333otherwise create an erroneous

1337impression that such . . .

1343component(s) is present in an amount

1349greater than is actually the case.

1355The following requirements shall

1359apply unless modified by a specific

1365regulation in Subpart B of this part.

1372(1) The percentage of a

1377characterizing ingredient or

1380component shall be declared on the

1386basis of its quantity in the finished

1393product. . . .

1397(2) The percentage of a

1402characterizing ingredient or

1405component shall be declared-by the

1410words "containing (or contains) ---

1415percent (or percent) ---" . . . with the

1424first blank filled in with the

1430percentage expressed as a whole

1435number not greater than the actual

1441percentage of the ingredient or

1446component named and the second blank

1452filled in with the common or usual

1459name of the ingredient or component.

14658. The FDA has also promulgated regulations dealing with the labeling of

1477specific nonstandardized foods, including diluted orange juice beverages and

1486diluted fruit or vegetable juice beverages other than diluted orange juice

1497beverages. With respect to diluted orange juice beverages, 21 C.F.R. Section

1508102.32 provides as follows:

1512102.32. Diluted Orange Juice Beverages.

1517(a) The common or usual name of a non-

1526carbonated beverage containing less than

1531100 percent and more than 0 percent

1538orange juice shall be as follows:

1544(1) A descriptive name for the product

1551meeting the requirements of Section

1556102.5(a) (e.g., diluted orange juice

1561beverage or another descriptive phrase),

1566and

1567(2) A statement of the percent of each

1575juice contained in the beverage in the

1582manner set forth in Section 102.5(b)(2).

1588The percent of the juice shall be declared

1596in 5 percent increments, expressed as a

1603multiple of five not greater than the

1610actual percentage of orange juice in the

1617product, except that the percent of

1623orange juice in products containing more

1629than 0 percent but less than 5-percent

1636orange juice shall be declared in the

1643statement as "less than 5" percent.

1649Diluted fruit or vegetable juice beverages other than diluted orange juice

1660beverages are the subject of 21 C.F.R. Section 102.33, 1/ which provides as

1673follows:

1674102.33 Diluted fruit or vegetable juice

1680beverages other than diluted orange juice

1686beverages.

1687(a) The common or usual name of a non-

1696carbonated beverage containing less than

1701100 percent and more than zero percent

1708fruit or vegetable juice(s), other than

1714only orange juice, shall be as follows:

1721(1) A descriptive name meeting the

1727requirements of Section 102.5(a)(e.g.,

"1731diluted grape juice beverage", "grape

1736juice drink", or another descriptive

1741phrase) and

1743(2) A statement of the percent of each

1751juice contained in the beverage in the

1758manner set forth in Section 102.5(b)(2).

1764The percent of the juice shall be

1771declared in five percent increments,

1776expressed as a multiple of five not

1783greater than the actual percentage of

1789juice in the beverage except that the

1796percentage of any juice in beverages

1802containing more than zero percent but

1808less than 5 percent of that juice shall

1816be declared in the statement as "less

1823than 5" percent.

18269. The Department of Citrus has conducted two consumer surveys for the

1838purpose of determining whether the word "juice" in a product name of a diluted

1852citrus juice product is confusing or misleading. The Drossler study was

1863conducted in 1972, and concluded that consumers are confused by the word

"1875juice." However, that conclusion appears to be founded on the premise that the

1888only proper use of the word "juice" is in the technical sense of "100 percent

1903pure juice." In other words, what was measured in the survey was the consumer's

1917failure to use the word "juice" in a limited sense to mean "100 percent pure

1932juice." The surveyed consumer was asked to look at several products, and then

1945state "what kind of product is this?" The products viewed consisted of several

1958different dairy products and a citrus beverage. If the consumer used the word

"1971juice" to describe the kind of product pointed to, he was treated as being

1985confused if the product was less than 100 percent juice. No follow-up questions

1998were asked concerning the consumer's understanding of the content of the

2009product. The Chelsea study was conducted at the request of the Department of

2022Citrus in 1987. It, too, concludes that there would be less consumer confusion

2035if the word "juice" were eliminated from products comprised of less than 100

2048percent pure citrus juice. However, there was evidence that this study

2059attempted to address too many issues, including consumer preferences, and that

"2070question contamination" could well have occurred. This refers to the

2080intentional or unintentional biasing of the interviewees by the ordering or

2091phraseology of the questions asked. Both the Burke study and the Chelsea study

2104indicate that consumers are not confused by a beverage label using the word

2117juice in the product name when it is accompanied by the declaration of the

2131percentage of juice contained in the product.

213810. The Burke study was conducted on behalf of the petitioner in 1987.

2151After conducting interviews of 1200 people from all age groups in six different

2164cities throughout the United States, it concluded that there was no significant

2176difference in consumer confusion between the use of the word "juice" and

"2188beverage" in the product name when the percentage of citrus juice content is

2201indicated on the label. In other words, whether the label identified the

2213product as a "juice beverage" or a "beverage", the respondents were able to

2226determine the amount of actual juice contained in the product.

2236CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

223911. As a producer, manufacturer, packager and distributor of citrus

2249products and diluted citrus beverages in Florida and throughout the United

2260States, the Citrus Hill Manufacturing Company is substantially affected by a

2271rule governing the label contents of its products. Petitioner thus has

2282standing, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, to seek an

2292administrative determination of the invalidity of Rule 20-66.001(4), Florida

2301Administrative Code, which prohibits the word "juice" from appearing on the

2312label of any diluted citrus product manufactured or labeled in Florida.

232312. Petitioner challenges the validity of Rule 20-66.001(4) on many

2333grounds. Several of the grounds raised are constitutional in nature (such as

2345violations of the United States' Constitution's Supremacy Clause, Commerce

2354Clause and Equal Protection Clause), and may not properly be ruled upon by a

2368Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings in a rule challenge

2380to an existing rule. Petitioner also contends that the challenged rule is an

2393invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it conflicts with

2403the respondent's statutory grant of authority, it is not an appropriate

2414regulatory measure to achieve the statutory goals and it bears no rational

2426relationship to the purposes and goals of the Florida Citrus Code.

243713. The respondent Department of Citrus urges that the challenged rule is

2449reasonable, rational and is within its statutory authority. It is further urged

2461that the federal rules are neither mandatory, preemptive or repugnant to

2472Florida's rule on the labeling of diluted citrus products.

248114. The legislature recognized that the citrus crop is the major

2492agricultural enterprise in Florida and enacted the Florida Citrus Code to

2503protect health and welfare and to stabilize and protect the citrus industry.

2515Section 601.02(1), Florida Statutes. Other purposes for the enactment of the

2526Citrus Code include the protection and enhancement of the quality and reputation

2538of Florida citrus fruit in domestic and foreign markets, the stabilization of

2550the citrus industry, the protection of the public against fraud, deception and

2562financial loss through unscrupulous practices and haphazard methods of

2571processing and marketing, and the promotion of the general welfare of the citrus

2584industry. Section 601.02(3) ,(5) and (6), Florida Statutes.

259215. To effectuate the purposes and intent of the Citrus Code, the

2604Legislature bestowed upon the Department of Citrus broad rulemaking authority in

2615order to exercise and perform its duties under Chapter 601. See Section

2627601.10(1), Florida Statutes. With regard to the labeling of citrus fruit

2638products, the Department was delegated the authority to prescribe rules or

2649regulations

2650provided, however, that no standard,

2655regulation, rule, or order under this

2661section which is repugnant to any

2667requirement made mandatory under

2671federal law or regulations shall apply

2677to citrus fruit . . . products . . .

2687which are being shipped from this

2693state in interstate commerce . . .

2700Section 601.11, Florida Statutes. That same section goes on to provide that the

2713Department's regulations, rules and orders with regard to the marking of citrus

2725fruit products

2727shall, when not inconsistent with

2732state or federal law, have the force

2739and effect of law.

274316. It is the respondent's position in this proceeding that the federal

2755rules regarding the general labeling of foods and the specific labeling of

2767diluted fruit juice beverages are not mandatory and are thus not preemptive of

2780Florida rulemaking on the same subject. Whether those portions of the federal

2792rules are or are not preemptive, thus rendering the inconsistent Florida rule on

2805the subject invalid as a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States

2819Constitution, is not and need not be determined in this proceeding. The

2831enabling statute, and the law sought to be implemented by Rule 20-66.001(4),

2843prohibits rules repugnant to mandatory requirements of federal rules, and also

2854prohibits rules which are inconsistent with federal law. It was not necessary

2866for the Legislature to instruct the Department of Citrus that it could not

2879violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States. The

2891legislative intent is clear. The Department was given authority to adopt rules

2903not repugnant to requirements made mandatory under federal law or regulations

2914and not inconsistent with federal law. Section 601.11, Florida Statutes.

292417. There can be no doubt that both the general and the more specific

2938federal regulations regarding the labeling of food and beverage products are

2949mandatory. The federal regulations with respect to the labeling of food

2960products proclaim that the common or usual name of a food "shall" accurately

2973identify or describe the basic nature of the food and "shall" include the

2986percentage of any characterizing ingredient. 21 C.F.R. Section 102.5(a) and

2996(b). With respect to the labeling of diluted orange juice products, the federal

3009rule proclaims that the name "shall be" a descriptive name for the product

3022meeting the requirements of Section 102.5(a) and a statement of the percent of

3035each juice contained in the beverage. 21 C.F.R. Section 102.32. The labeling

3047of diluted juice beverages other than orange juice is similarly prescribed in

3059mandatory terms in 21 C.F.R. Section 102.33.

306618. The Florida rule banning the word "juice" from the labeling of diluted

3079citrus products is both repugnant to and inconsistent with the federal rules.

3091Where the general federal rule requires a common or usual name, in as simple and

3106direct terms as possible, along with the percentage declaration of any

3117characterizing ingredient; the Florida rule would prohibit both the common name

3128and a percentage declaration. Likewise, the more specific federal rules

3138pertaining to diluted juice beverages require both a descriptive name for the

3150product and a statement of the percent of each "juice" contained in the product.

3164It would be impossible to comply with these federal requirements without

3175utilizing the word "juice." Thus, the Department's Rule 20-66.001(4) is both

3186repugnant to and inconsistent with the federal regulations set forth in 21

3198C.F.R. 102.5(a) and (b), 102.32 and 102.33.

320519. An agency has no inherent authority, but has only those powers granted

3218by statute. Administrative regulations must be consistent with the statutes

3228under which they are promulgated, and they may not add to, amend or repeal the

3243statute. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. The Florida

3253Psychiatric Society, Inc., et al., 382 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980), nor can

3267an administrative rule enlarge, modify or contravene the provisions of a

3278statute. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. McTigue, 387

3289So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1980). A rule which is so directly repugnant to and

3304inconsistent with the federal regulations on the same subject clearly

3314contravenes the legislative delegation of authority to the Department to adopt

3325rules regarding the marking and labeling of citrus products. As such, the

3337challenged rule constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

3346authority.

334720. Even if there were no federal regulations concerning the labeling of

3359foods and diluted citrus juice products, the rule in question does not appear to

3373be reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation. The purposes

3385of the Citrus Code are to both protect and promote the citrus industry and to

3400protect consumers from fraud or other deceptive practices. The petitioner in

3411this proceeding has demonstrated that Citrus Hill, a Florida producer, packager

3422and distributor of Florida citrus products in Florida and throughout the United

3434States, would be severely disadvantaged economically and competitively if it

3444were not able to include the word "juice" or list the percentage thereof, in its

3459products containing less than 100 percent pure citrus juice. The studies

3470performed on behalf of the Department of Citrus indicated a consumer preference

3482for products containing "juice." No other state prohibits the word "juice" from

3494appearing on labels for diluted citrus fruit beverages. The federal law on the

3507subject, as discussed above, requires the word "juice" to appear on the labels

3520of diluted fruit juice beverages. By severely limiting the competitive strength

3531of national distributors operating out of Florida, the challenged rule does not

"3543stabilize and protect the-citrus industry of the state" (Section 601.02(1)),

3553nor does it "promote the general welfare of the Florida citrus industry"

3565(Section 601.02(6)). There was no evidence presented by the Department that the

3577availability of diluted citrus juice beverages in the marketplace would

3587adversely affect the sale of Florida citrus fruit.

359521. A further purpose of the Citrus Code is the protection of consumers.

3608It is difficult to imagine how the listing of a beverage by the common name of

3624the fruit juice contained therein, together with a statement of the actual

3636percentage of such fruit juice contained therein, could be more informative,

3647truthful or accurate. Certainly, a label containing such information could not

3658be considered an "unscrupulous practice" or a "haphazard method of marketing."

3669See Section 601.02(5), Florida Statutes. The challenged rule requires the

3679choosing of an arbitrary word other than "juice," such as "drink," "ade or

3692beverage," without denoting any attributes of the product. This requirement

3702does not accurately or completely describe the product offered for sale and thus

3715does not protect the public against fraud, deception or financial loss. See

3727Section 601.02(5), Florida Statutes. Indeed, where the characterizing

3735ingredient in a product is citrus juice, it would be false and misleading to

3749label the product as a "beverage," "ade" or "drink" without any designation of

3762its citrus "juice" content. By communicating less information to consumers

3772about the product offered for sale, the challenged rule prohibiting the word

"3784juice" for diluted citrus fruit products frustrates the legislative purpose of

3795protecting consumers from unscrupulous practices, and bears no rational

3804relationship to any other statutory provision of the Florida Citrus Code.

381522. Even if the Department or the State of Florida has some interest in

3829promoting products containing 100 percent pure Florida citrus juice (a fact not

3841proven at the hearing), it has no power to prohibit the manufacture or sale of

3856diluted juice products. It may not discourage the production and sale of

3868diluted products by requiring potentially misleading or non-descriptive labeling

3877or by requiring the labeling of a product in a manner which is inconsistent and

3892in conflict with federal regulations.

389723. It is interesting to note, though not dispositive of the issue of

3910whether the challenged rule is an invalid exercise of legislative authority,

3921that the challenged portion of the rule conflicts with the remaining portions of

3934Rule 20-66.001. Subsection (1) of Rule 20-66.001 requires that all Florida

3945processed citrus products be labeled in compliance with established Florida

3955standards and any other applicable "Federal food labeling requirements or

3965regulations. Labeling may include any truthful and non-misleading qualifying

3974adjectives." Subsection (2) of Rule 20-66.001 provides that where no Florida

3985standards have been established, the label

3991shall bear a factual and descriptive

3997product name and shall include a

4003statement in immediate conjunction

4007with the product name which fully and

4014truthfully describes the product and

4019its ingredients.

4021And, subsection (3) of Rule 20-66.004 requires that labels for unsweetened

4032single strength and concentrated citrus juices prominently show that the product

4043is 100 percent juice. To single out diluted citrus products for a different

4056manner of labeling which is not descriptive of the product or its ingredients

4069conflicts with the remaining portions of the rule and finds no statutory

4081support. In addition, any alleged "confusion" on the part of consumers should

4093be cured by the regulatory requirement set forth in Rule 20-66.001(3) that

4105single strength products be labeled "100 percent."

411224. In summary, it is concluded that subsection (4) of Rule 20-66.001,

4124Florida Administrative Code, conflicts with and exceeds the authority delegated

4134to the Department of Citrus by the legislature and bears no rational

4146relationship to the stated purposes for the enactment of the Florida Citrus

4158Code.

4159FINAL ORDER

4161Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it

4174is ORDERED that Rule 20-66.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an

4184invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

4190DONE and ORDERED this of 9th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee,

4202Florida.

4203___________________________________

4204DIANE D. TREMOR

4207Hearing Officer

4209Division of Administrative Hearings

4213The Oakland Building

42162009 Apalachee Parkway

4219Tallahassee, Florida 32301

4222(904)488-9675

4223Filed with the Clerk of the

4229Division of Administrative Hearings

4233this 9th day of December, 1987.

4239ENDNOTE

42401/ Apparently, enforcement of 21 C.F.R. Section 102.33 has been stayed by the

4253FDA, and the agency has requested comments on the rule.

4263APPENDIX

4264(Case No. 87-3078RX)

4267The proposed findings of fact submitted by both parties have been fully

4279considered and are included and/or incorporated herein, except as noted below:

4290Petitioner:

4291Many of the Petitioner's proposed

4296findings of fact constitute legal

4301conclusions or legal argument. As such,

4307they have not been incorporated into

4313this Order's Findings of Fact, but have

4320been considered or included in the

4326Conclusions of Law.

4329Respondent:

4330B. Rejected as contrary to the evidence.

4337C. Accepted with regard to the Department's

4344intent, but rejected as to the Rule's

4351effect.

4352D. Rejected as contrary to the evidence.

4359COPIES FURNISHED:

4361Peter J. Winders and

4365James J. Kennedy, III

4369Carlton, Fields, Ward,

4372Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler &

4376Kent, P.A.

4378One Harbor Place

4381Post Office Box 3239

4385Tampa, Florida 33601

4388Karl S. Steinmanis, Esquire

4392One Proctor and Gamble Plaza

4397Cincinnati, Ohio 45292-3315

4400J. Hardin Peterson, Jr., Esquire

4405Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews,

4409Brandon & Mann, P.A.

4413Post Office Drawer BS

4417Lakeland, Florida 33802

4420Kristen C. Chadwell, Esquire

4424General Counsel

4426Department of Citrus

4429Post Office Box 148

4433Lakeland, Florida 33802-0148

4436Dan L. Gunter, Executive Director

4441Department of Citrus

4444Post Office Box 148

4448Lakeland, Florida 33802-0148

4451Liz Cloud, Chief

4454Bureau of Administrative Code

44581802 The Capitol

4461Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

4464Carroll Webb, Executive Director

4468Administrative Procedures

4470Committee

4471120 Holland Building

4474Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

4477NOTICE OF JUDICIAL RIGHTS

4481A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED, TO

4494JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW

4503PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE SUCH

4514PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE

4528AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY,

4540ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

4553FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT

4566WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF

4581RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 12/09/1987
Proceedings: DOAH Final Order
PDF:
Date: 12/09/1987
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 12/09/1987
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held September 24, 1987). CASE CLOSED.

Case Information

Judge:
DIANE D. TREMOR
Date Filed:
07/13/1987
Date Assignment:
07/24/1987
Last Docket Entry:
12/09/1987
Location:
Lakeland, Florida
District:
Middle
Agency:
Department of Citrus
Suffix:
RX
 

Related DOAH Cases(s) (2):

Related Florida Statute(s) (5):

Related Florida Rule(s) (1):