92-001766 Blackshears Ii Aluminum, Inc. vs. Department Of Revenue
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 4, 1993.


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Summary: Dealer who collects taxes on nontaxable transactions has duty to remit those funds to the state.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8BLACKSHEARS II ALUMINUM,  )

13INC., )

15)

16Petitioner, )

18)

19vs. ) CASE NO. 92-1766

24)

25DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )

29)

30Respondent. )

32____________________________)

33RECOMMENDED ORDER

35The above matter came before the undersigned on June 4, 1992, on the

48parties' motions for partial summary adjudication. The parties were represented

58at hearing as follows:

62APPEARANCES

63For Petitioner: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

70315 South Calhoun Street

74Suite 500

76Tallahassee, FL 32301

79For Respondent: Joseph P. Mellichamp, III, Esquire

86Department of Legal Affairs

90The Capitol, Tax Section

94Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

97STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

101The issue is whether petitioner, a sales tax dealer, must pay taxes,

113interest and penalties for collecting sales taxes on certain nontaxable

123transactions and then failing to remit those funds to respondent.

133PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

135This matter began on January 7, 1992, when respondent, Department of

146Revenue (DOR), issued its notice of reconsideration advising petitioner,

155Blackshears II Aluminum, Inc., that a revised tax assessment was being issued

167against petitioner in the amount of $623,131.69. Although the notice addressed

179five issues, the only relevant issue here is respondent's determination that

190petitioner had collected sales taxes on certain nontaxable transactions and,

200absent evidence of refund assignments, petitioner was obligated to remit those

211funds to the state. On March 6, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for formal

225administrative hearing to contest the agency decision. In brief, petitioner

235contended that respondent had assessed taxes, interest and penalties in excess

246of its statutory authority. The matter was referred by respondent to the

258Division of Administrative Hearings on March 19, 1992, with a request that a

271Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a hearing. By notice of hearing dated

284June 2, 1992, a final hearing was scheduled on June 25 and 26, 1992, in Crystal

300River, Florida. Prior to the hearing, each party filed a motion for partial

313summary adjudication on the issue described above. Argument on the motions was

325heard on June 4, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. During the motion hearing, the

338parties agreed to continue the final hearing and have the matter abated while

351they attempted to settle the other four issues. On April 6, 1993, the parties

365filed a joint stipulation acknowledging that all factual issues had been

376resolved and that only one legal issue remained for determination. They agreed

388further that the undersigned could retain jurisdiction in this matter for the

400purpose of entering a Recommended Order on that issue. Accordingly, this

411Recommended Order deals with that issue and is the subject of the two pending

425motions.

426FINDINGS OF FACT

429Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings, filings, and

440stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined:

4501. On an undisclosed date, respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR),

460conducted an audit of petitioner, Blackshears II Aluminum, Inc. (Blackshears), a

471registered sales tax dealer located in Crystal River, Florida. The audit

482covered the period from June 1, 1985, through March 31, 1989. As a result of

497that audit, on December 27, 1989, DOR issued a notice of intent to make sales

512and use tax audit charges. After petitioner availed itself of various informal

524procedures, a notice of reconsideration (notice) was issued on January 7, 1992,

536imposing a final assessment of $623,131.69. This action prompted Blackshears to

548initiate this proceeding.

5512. Although the notice addressed five issues, only issue three is relevant

563to this proceeding. That issue is broadly defined in the notice as "whether

576taxes collected on nontaxable transactions are state funds." According to the

587notice, the issue should be answered in the affirmative because

597(e)very dealer in the State of Florida is an

606agent for the state in that it is their

615responsibility to collect and remit sales tax.

622Blackshears collected the funds in the name of

630the State of Florida and has presented no

638refund assignments from the purchasers to

644permit them to apply for refunds, therefore,

651the State of Florida is due the funds. If the

661Department were to permit the use of its name

670to unjustly enrich Blackshears, a continuing

676deception would occur.

6793. The parties agree that petitioner collected sales taxes on various

690transactions (real property contracts) during the audit period. Whether such

700transactions were subject to the sales tax is in dispute, but for purposes of

714resolving the issue presented here, the parties have agreed that the undersigned

726can assume that the transactions were nontaxable. It is further agreed that

738even though petitioner collected the taxes from its customers, it failed to

750remit them to the state, and it has likewise failed to furnish proof that it

765refunded those moneys to its customers. Accordingly, DOR's assessment seeks to

776collect those taxes together with interest and substantial penalties.

7854. The parties have also agreed that the portion of the total tax

798assessment attributable to real property contracts is $277,406.53. As of March

81029, 1993, the assessment totaled $636,570.37, after the accrual of interest and

823penalties. However, petitioner has paid to the state $16,180.19, for which it

836should receive credit.

8395. During the audit period, Rule 12A-1.014(6), Florida Administrative

848Code, was in effect and provided as follows:

856(6) Whenever a dealer credits a customer with

864tax on returned merchandise or for tax

871erroneously collected, he must refund such tax

878to his customer before his claim to the State

887for credit or refund will be approved.

894Under the terms of this rule, which interpreted the provisions of Chapter 212,

907Florida Statutes, any moneys erroneously collected by a dealer as taxes were to

920be remitted to the state. However, if the moneys were refunded to the customer,

934the dealer could then receive a refund of the moneys previously paid or a credit

949towards other taxes due.

953CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

9566. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject

967matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Subsections 120.57(1) and

977120.575(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

9807. Ordinarily, DOR's burden of proof is limited "to a showing that an

993assessment has been made against the taxpayer and the factual and legal grounds

1006upon which the applicable department made the assessment." Subsection

1015120.575(2), Florida Statutes. Assuming such a showing was made, petitioner

1025would then bear the burden of countering that showing and proving that the

1038assessment is incorrect. However, the burden of proof has only secondary

1049importance here since the parties have agreed that there are no factual matters

1062in dispute and that only a question of law must be decided. In addition, it is

1078noted that in resolving this legal issue, to the extent a construction of the

1092statutory law is required, those laws are to be construed strongly in favor of

1106the taxpayer and against the state, and that all ambiguities and doubts are to

1120be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Maas Brothers, Inc. v. Dickinson, 195

1133So.2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1967).

11388. Section 212.15, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part as follows:

1149212.15 Taxes declared state funds; penalties

1155for failure to remit taxes; due and delinquent

1163dates; judicial review.-

1166(1) The taxes imposed by this chapter shall

1174become state funds at the moment of collection

1182and shall for each month be due to the

1191department on the first day of the succeeding

1199month and delinquent on the 21st day of such

1208month. All returns postmarked after the 20th

1215day of such month are delinquent.

1221* * *

1224(4) All taxes collected under this chapter

1231shall be remitted to the department. . . .

1240DOR asserts that under the foregoing statute, once a dealer intentionally or

1252inadvertently collects taxes from its customers on nontaxable transactions,

1261those moneys immediately have the status of taxes, and unless evidence is shown

1274by the dealer that the moneys were refunded to the customers, they should be

1288timely remitted to the state. In response, petitioner generally contends that

1299since there was no tax imposed by law on the various transactions, there can be

1314no tax which is subject to assessment nor any obligation to remit moneys to the

1329state. It further contends that since penalties and interest under Chapter 212,

1341Florida Statutes, can only be assessed on a tax imposed by that chapter, there

1355can likewise be no proper assessment here for interest and penalties. It is

1368noted that the parties were unable to cite any final agency order or appellate

1382decision which deals squarely with this issue.

13899. The case of Department of Revenue v. Rudd, 545 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA

14041989) is helpful in resolving this issue. In Rudd, a DOR employee (Rudd) had

1418illegally authorized refunds of sales taxes which had not in fact been paid.

1431The refunds were made from general revenue funds in response to applications for

1444refunds filed by Rudd's co-conspirators. When DOR attempted to recover some of

1456those funds from Rudd pursuant to a jeopardy tax warrant, Rudd argued that funds

1470which were improperly refunded by DOR were not "taxes" within the meaning of

1483subsection 212.15(4) and thus DOR could not use jeopardy tax warrants as a

1496vehicle to retrieve general revenue funds. Rejecting that argument as having

"1507patent incongruities", and noting that it was "hardly surprising that the issue

1519has not been litigated", the court held that a more reasonable interpretation of

1532subsection 212.15(4) is that general revenue funds improperly refunded as taxes

1543should be accorded the status of a tax. Id. at 371, n.3. Applying that

1557rationale to the issue presented here, it is concluded that moneys collected as

1570a sales tax by a dealer on nontaxable transactions should likewise be accorded

1583the status of a tax under section 212.15. Therefore, when Blackshears

1594represented to its customers that taxes were due on certain transactions, and

1606collected those moneys, they became "state funds at the moment of collection"

1618and Blackshears had a duty to timely remit those funds to the state. To

1632conclude otherwise would place an unreasonable and illogical interpretation on

1642the law, reach a result that is contrary to the holding in Rudd, and allow a

1658dealer to collect taxes from his customers on nontaxable transactions, yet avoid

1670any responsibility of remitting those moneys to the state. The assessment

1681should accordingly be sustained.

168510. In reaching the above conclusion, the undersigned has given thoughtful

1696consideration to the arguments of petitioner, one of which merits further

1707discussion. Petitioner points out that effective July 1, 1991, the legislature

1718enacted Section 213.756, Florida Statutes, which provides as follows:

1727Funds collected are state tax funds. - Funds

1735collected from a purchaser under the

1741representation that they are taxes provided

1747for under the state revenue laws are state

1755funds from the moment of collection and are

1763not subject to refund absent proof that such

1771funds have been refunded previously to the

1778purchaser.

1779Petitioner argues that by adopting this law, the legislature expressly

1789acknowledged the lack of any authority prior to the law's effective date for DOR

1803to make the challenged assessment. It is true, of course, that ordinarily a law

1817is intended to have prospective operation and the legislative inclusion of a

1829July 1, 1991, effective date would manifest that intention. However, a

1840subsequent statutory enactment such as this "does not necessarily indicate an

1851intent to change the law for the intent may be to clarify what was doubtful, and

1867to safeguard against misapprehension as to existing law." State ex rel. Szabo

1879Food Services, Inc. of North Carolina v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.

18921973). Prior to the enactment of section 213.756, DOR construed the revenue

1904laws, including section 212.15, as imposing a responsiblity on dealers to

1915promptly remit all moneys collected as taxes. This statutory interpretation was

1926embodied in rule 12A-1.046(6) during the audit period, and DOR's broad

1937construction of the word "taxes" found in section 212.15 has been approved by

1950the courts. Rudd, supra. It is also clear that the legislature agreed with

1963DOR's construction of the law since section 213.756 essentially codifies the

1974intent and requirement of rule 12A-1.014(6) and assumes that all moneys

1985collected as taxes have been previously remitted to the state. Therefore, it is

1998concluded that section 213.756 was intended to make the revenue laws "correspond

2010to what had been previously been supposed or assumed to be the law." Szabo at

2025531. Put another way, the intent of section 213.756 was not to change the law,

2040but rather to clarify "what was doubtful, and to safeguard misapprehension as to

2053existing law." Id.

2056RECOMMENDATION

2057Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is

2070RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting its motion for

2081partial summary adjudication and sustaining the assessment on issue three of its

2093notice of reconsideration, plus interest and penalties, less those taxes already

2104paid and identified in paragraph 2 of the parties' joint stipulation.

2115DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.

2127___________________________________

2128DONALD R. ALEXANDER

2131Hearing Officer

2133Division of Administrative Hearings

2137The DeSoto Building

21401230 Apalachee Parkway

2143Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

2146(904) 488-9675

2148Filed with the Clerk of the

2154Division of Administrative Hearings

2158this 3rd day of May, 1993.

2164COPIES FURNISHED:

2166Larry Fuchs, Executive Director

2170Department of Revenue

2173104 Carlton Building

2176Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100

2179Linda Lettera, Esquire

2182204 Carlton Building

2185Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100

2188C. Lynne Chapman, Esquire

2192Department of Legal Affairs

2196The Capitol-Tax Section

2199Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

2202Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

2207315 South Calhoun Street

2211Suite 500

2213Tallahassee, FL 32301

2216NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

2222ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED

2234ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT

2248WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL

2260ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS

2273TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE

2285FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.

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PDF
Date
Proceedings
Date: 08/31/1993
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/26/1993
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 08/26/1993
Proceedings: Recommended Order
Date: 08/12/1993
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/04/1993
Proceedings: Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 6/4/92.
Date: 04/06/1993
Proceedings: Letter to DRA from C. Lynne Chapman (re: parties reaching an agreement) filed.
Date: 04/06/1993
Proceedings: Notice of Filing; Transcript filed.
Date: 04/06/1993
Proceedings: Joint Stipulation filed.
Date: 03/22/1993
Proceedings: Order sent out. (parties are directed to file a status report within 15 days from the date of this order)
Date: 11/06/1992
Proceedings: Joint Status Report filed.
Date: 10/06/1992
Proceedings: Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 11-6-92.)
Date: 10/02/1992
Proceedings: Joint Status Report filed.
Date: 09/15/1992
Proceedings: Order sent out. Case to remain in abeyance until 10/2/92; status report due)
Date: 09/11/1992
Proceedings: Letter to DRA from Joseph C. Mellichamp (re: ltr of confirmation regarding settlement) filed.
Date: 08/06/1992
Proceedings: Order sent out. (Case to remain in abeyance until 9/11/92; status report due)
Date: 08/05/1992
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Status Report filed.
Date: 06/24/1992
Proceedings: Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 8-1-92)
Date: 06/23/1992
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion for Continuance filed.
Date: 06/04/1992
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Supplemental Authorities filed.
Date: 06/03/1992
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Supplemental Authority filed.
Date: 05/29/1992
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Amended Notice of Oral Argument filed.
Date: 05/28/1992
Proceedings: Notice of Oral Argument filed. (From Harold F.X. Purnell)
Date: 05/15/1992
Proceedings: Petitioner`s Reply to Department`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication; Request for Oral Argument filed.
Date: 05/12/1992
Proceedings: Respondent`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication and Response to Petitioner`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication filed.
Date: 04/28/1992
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Law filed.
Date: 04/02/1992
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for June 25, 1992, June 26 is also reserved if necessary; 11:00am; Crystal River, specific location to be given at later date)
Date: 04/01/1992
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Response to the Initial Order filed.
Date: 03/27/1992
Proceedings: (Respondent) Answer filed.
Date: 03/23/1992
Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
Date: 03/19/1992
Proceedings: Agency referral letter; Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings filed.

Case Information

Judge:
D. R. ALEXANDER
Date Filed:
03/19/1992
Date Assignment:
03/23/1992
Last Docket Entry:
08/31/1993
Location:
Crystal River, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

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