92-001766
Blackshears Ii Aluminum, Inc. vs.
Department Of Revenue
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 4, 1993.
Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 4, 1993.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8BLACKSHEARS II ALUMINUM, )
13INC., )
15)
16Petitioner, )
18)
19vs. ) CASE NO. 92-1766
24)
25DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )
29)
30Respondent. )
32____________________________)
33RECOMMENDED ORDER
35The above matter came before the undersigned on June 4, 1992, on the
48parties' motions for partial summary adjudication. The parties were represented
58at hearing as follows:
62APPEARANCES
63For Petitioner: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
70315 South Calhoun Street
74Suite 500
76Tallahassee, FL 32301
79For Respondent: Joseph P. Mellichamp, III, Esquire
86Department of Legal Affairs
90The Capitol, Tax Section
94Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
97STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
101The issue is whether petitioner, a sales tax dealer, must pay taxes,
113interest and penalties for collecting sales taxes on certain nontaxable
123transactions and then failing to remit those funds to respondent.
133PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
135This matter began on January 7, 1992, when respondent, Department of
146Revenue (DOR), issued its notice of reconsideration advising petitioner,
155Blackshears II Aluminum, Inc., that a revised tax assessment was being issued
167against petitioner in the amount of $623,131.69. Although the notice addressed
179five issues, the only relevant issue here is respondent's determination that
190petitioner had collected sales taxes on certain nontaxable transactions and,
200absent evidence of refund assignments, petitioner was obligated to remit those
211funds to the state. On March 6, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for formal
225administrative hearing to contest the agency decision. In brief, petitioner
235contended that respondent had assessed taxes, interest and penalties in excess
246of its statutory authority. The matter was referred by respondent to the
258Division of Administrative Hearings on March 19, 1992, with a request that a
271Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a hearing. By notice of hearing dated
284June 2, 1992, a final hearing was scheduled on June 25 and 26, 1992, in Crystal
300River, Florida. Prior to the hearing, each party filed a motion for partial
313summary adjudication on the issue described above. Argument on the motions was
325heard on June 4, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. During the motion hearing, the
338parties agreed to continue the final hearing and have the matter abated while
351they attempted to settle the other four issues. On April 6, 1993, the parties
365filed a joint stipulation acknowledging that all factual issues had been
376resolved and that only one legal issue remained for determination. They agreed
388further that the undersigned could retain jurisdiction in this matter for the
400purpose of entering a Recommended Order on that issue. Accordingly, this
411Recommended Order deals with that issue and is the subject of the two pending
425motions.
426FINDINGS OF FACT
429Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings, filings, and
440stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined:
4501. On an undisclosed date, respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR),
460conducted an audit of petitioner, Blackshears II Aluminum, Inc. (Blackshears), a
471registered sales tax dealer located in Crystal River, Florida. The audit
482covered the period from June 1, 1985, through March 31, 1989. As a result of
497that audit, on December 27, 1989, DOR issued a notice of intent to make sales
512and use tax audit charges. After petitioner availed itself of various informal
524procedures, a notice of reconsideration (notice) was issued on January 7, 1992,
536imposing a final assessment of $623,131.69. This action prompted Blackshears to
548initiate this proceeding.
5512. Although the notice addressed five issues, only issue three is relevant
563to this proceeding. That issue is broadly defined in the notice as "whether
576taxes collected on nontaxable transactions are state funds." According to the
587notice, the issue should be answered in the affirmative because
597(e)very dealer in the State of Florida is an
606agent for the state in that it is their
615responsibility to collect and remit sales tax.
622Blackshears collected the funds in the name of
630the State of Florida and has presented no
638refund assignments from the purchasers to
644permit them to apply for refunds, therefore,
651the State of Florida is due the funds. If the
661Department were to permit the use of its name
670to unjustly enrich Blackshears, a continuing
676deception would occur.
6793. The parties agree that petitioner collected sales taxes on various
690transactions (real property contracts) during the audit period. Whether such
700transactions were subject to the sales tax is in dispute, but for purposes of
714resolving the issue presented here, the parties have agreed that the undersigned
726can assume that the transactions were nontaxable. It is further agreed that
738even though petitioner collected the taxes from its customers, it failed to
750remit them to the state, and it has likewise failed to furnish proof that it
765refunded those moneys to its customers. Accordingly, DOR's assessment seeks to
776collect those taxes together with interest and substantial penalties.
7854. The parties have also agreed that the portion of the total tax
798assessment attributable to real property contracts is $277,406.53. As of March
81029, 1993, the assessment totaled $636,570.37, after the accrual of interest and
823penalties. However, petitioner has paid to the state $16,180.19, for which it
836should receive credit.
8395. During the audit period, Rule 12A-1.014(6), Florida Administrative
848Code, was in effect and provided as follows:
856(6) Whenever a dealer credits a customer with
864tax on returned merchandise or for tax
871erroneously collected, he must refund such tax
878to his customer before his claim to the State
887for credit or refund will be approved.
894Under the terms of this rule, which interpreted the provisions of Chapter 212,
907Florida Statutes, any moneys erroneously collected by a dealer as taxes were to
920be remitted to the state. However, if the moneys were refunded to the customer,
934the dealer could then receive a refund of the moneys previously paid or a credit
949towards other taxes due.
953CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
9566. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject
967matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Subsections 120.57(1) and
977120.575(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
9807. Ordinarily, DOR's burden of proof is limited "to a showing that an
993assessment has been made against the taxpayer and the factual and legal grounds
1006upon which the applicable department made the assessment." Subsection
1015120.575(2), Florida Statutes. Assuming such a showing was made, petitioner
1025would then bear the burden of countering that showing and proving that the
1038assessment is incorrect. However, the burden of proof has only secondary
1049importance here since the parties have agreed that there are no factual matters
1062in dispute and that only a question of law must be decided. In addition, it is
1078noted that in resolving this legal issue, to the extent a construction of the
1092statutory law is required, those laws are to be construed strongly in favor of
1106the taxpayer and against the state, and that all ambiguities and doubts are to
1120be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Maas Brothers, Inc. v. Dickinson, 195
1133So.2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1967).
11388. Section 212.15, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part as follows:
1149212.15 Taxes declared state funds; penalties
1155for failure to remit taxes; due and delinquent
1163dates; judicial review.-
1166(1) The taxes imposed by this chapter shall
1174become state funds at the moment of collection
1182and shall for each month be due to the
1191department on the first day of the succeeding
1199month and delinquent on the 21st day of such
1208month. All returns postmarked after the 20th
1215day of such month are delinquent.
1221* * *
1224(4) All taxes collected under this chapter
1231shall be remitted to the department. . . .
1240DOR asserts that under the foregoing statute, once a dealer intentionally or
1252inadvertently collects taxes from its customers on nontaxable transactions,
1261those moneys immediately have the status of taxes, and unless evidence is shown
1274by the dealer that the moneys were refunded to the customers, they should be
1288timely remitted to the state. In response, petitioner generally contends that
1299since there was no tax imposed by law on the various transactions, there can be
1314no tax which is subject to assessment nor any obligation to remit moneys to the
1329state. It further contends that since penalties and interest under Chapter 212,
1341Florida Statutes, can only be assessed on a tax imposed by that chapter, there
1355can likewise be no proper assessment here for interest and penalties. It is
1368noted that the parties were unable to cite any final agency order or appellate
1382decision which deals squarely with this issue.
13899. The case of Department of Revenue v. Rudd, 545 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA
14041989) is helpful in resolving this issue. In Rudd, a DOR employee (Rudd) had
1418illegally authorized refunds of sales taxes which had not in fact been paid.
1431The refunds were made from general revenue funds in response to applications for
1444refunds filed by Rudd's co-conspirators. When DOR attempted to recover some of
1456those funds from Rudd pursuant to a jeopardy tax warrant, Rudd argued that funds
1470which were improperly refunded by DOR were not "taxes" within the meaning of
1483subsection 212.15(4) and thus DOR could not use jeopardy tax warrants as a
1496vehicle to retrieve general revenue funds. Rejecting that argument as having
"1507patent incongruities", and noting that it was "hardly surprising that the issue
1519has not been litigated", the court held that a more reasonable interpretation of
1532subsection 212.15(4) is that general revenue funds improperly refunded as taxes
1543should be accorded the status of a tax. Id. at 371, n.3. Applying that
1557rationale to the issue presented here, it is concluded that moneys collected as
1570a sales tax by a dealer on nontaxable transactions should likewise be accorded
1583the status of a tax under section 212.15. Therefore, when Blackshears
1594represented to its customers that taxes were due on certain transactions, and
1606collected those moneys, they became "state funds at the moment of collection"
1618and Blackshears had a duty to timely remit those funds to the state. To
1632conclude otherwise would place an unreasonable and illogical interpretation on
1642the law, reach a result that is contrary to the holding in Rudd, and allow a
1658dealer to collect taxes from his customers on nontaxable transactions, yet avoid
1670any responsibility of remitting those moneys to the state. The assessment
1681should accordingly be sustained.
168510. In reaching the above conclusion, the undersigned has given thoughtful
1696consideration to the arguments of petitioner, one of which merits further
1707discussion. Petitioner points out that effective July 1, 1991, the legislature
1718enacted Section 213.756, Florida Statutes, which provides as follows:
1727Funds collected are state tax funds. - Funds
1735collected from a purchaser under the
1741representation that they are taxes provided
1747for under the state revenue laws are state
1755funds from the moment of collection and are
1763not subject to refund absent proof that such
1771funds have been refunded previously to the
1778purchaser.
1779Petitioner argues that by adopting this law, the legislature expressly
1789acknowledged the lack of any authority prior to the law's effective date for DOR
1803to make the challenged assessment. It is true, of course, that ordinarily a law
1817is intended to have prospective operation and the legislative inclusion of a
1829July 1, 1991, effective date would manifest that intention. However, a
1840subsequent statutory enactment such as this "does not necessarily indicate an
1851intent to change the law for the intent may be to clarify what was doubtful, and
1867to safeguard against misapprehension as to existing law." State ex rel. Szabo
1879Food Services, Inc. of North Carolina v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.
18921973). Prior to the enactment of section 213.756, DOR construed the revenue
1904laws, including section 212.15, as imposing a responsiblity on dealers to
1915promptly remit all moneys collected as taxes. This statutory interpretation was
1926embodied in rule 12A-1.046(6) during the audit period, and DOR's broad
1937construction of the word "taxes" found in section 212.15 has been approved by
1950the courts. Rudd, supra. It is also clear that the legislature agreed with
1963DOR's construction of the law since section 213.756 essentially codifies the
1974intent and requirement of rule 12A-1.014(6) and assumes that all moneys
1985collected as taxes have been previously remitted to the state. Therefore, it is
1998concluded that section 213.756 was intended to make the revenue laws "correspond
2010to what had been previously been supposed or assumed to be the law." Szabo at
2025531. Put another way, the intent of section 213.756 was not to change the law,
2040but rather to clarify "what was doubtful, and to safeguard misapprehension as to
2053existing law." Id.
2056RECOMMENDATION
2057Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
2070RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting its motion for
2081partial summary adjudication and sustaining the assessment on issue three of its
2093notice of reconsideration, plus interest and penalties, less those taxes already
2104paid and identified in paragraph 2 of the parties' joint stipulation.
2115DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.
2127___________________________________
2128DONALD R. ALEXANDER
2131Hearing Officer
2133Division of Administrative Hearings
2137The DeSoto Building
21401230 Apalachee Parkway
2143Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
2146(904) 488-9675
2148Filed with the Clerk of the
2154Division of Administrative Hearings
2158this 3rd day of May, 1993.
2164COPIES FURNISHED:
2166Larry Fuchs, Executive Director
2170Department of Revenue
2173104 Carlton Building
2176Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
2179Linda Lettera, Esquire
2182204 Carlton Building
2185Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
2188C. Lynne Chapman, Esquire
2192Department of Legal Affairs
2196The Capitol-Tax Section
2199Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
2202Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
2207315 South Calhoun Street
2211Suite 500
2213Tallahassee, FL 32301
2216NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
2222ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED
2234ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT
2248WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL
2260ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS
2273TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE
2285FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.
- Date
- Proceedings
- Date: 08/31/1993
- Proceedings: Final Order filed.
- Date: 08/12/1993
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice filed.
- Date: 04/06/1993
- Proceedings: Letter to DRA from C. Lynne Chapman (re: parties reaching an agreement) filed.
- Date: 04/06/1993
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing; Transcript filed.
- Date: 04/06/1993
- Proceedings: Joint Stipulation filed.
- Date: 03/22/1993
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (parties are directed to file a status report within 15 days from the date of this order)
- Date: 11/06/1992
- Proceedings: Joint Status Report filed.
- Date: 10/06/1992
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 11-6-92.)
- Date: 10/02/1992
- Proceedings: Joint Status Report filed.
- Date: 09/15/1992
- Proceedings: Order sent out. Case to remain in abeyance until 10/2/92; status report due)
- Date: 09/11/1992
- Proceedings: Letter to DRA from Joseph C. Mellichamp (re: ltr of confirmation regarding settlement) filed.
- Date: 08/06/1992
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (Case to remain in abeyance until 9/11/92; status report due)
- Date: 08/05/1992
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Status Report filed.
- Date: 06/24/1992
- Proceedings: Order sent out. (Parties to file status report by 8-1-92)
- Date: 06/23/1992
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion for Continuance filed.
- Date: 06/04/1992
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Supplemental Authorities filed.
- Date: 06/03/1992
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Supplemental Authority filed.
- Date: 05/29/1992
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Amended Notice of Oral Argument filed.
- Date: 05/28/1992
- Proceedings: Notice of Oral Argument filed. (From Harold F.X. Purnell)
- Date: 05/15/1992
- Proceedings: Petitioner`s Reply to Department`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication; Request for Oral Argument filed.
- Date: 05/12/1992
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication and Response to Petitioner`s Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication filed.
- Date: 04/28/1992
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Law filed.
- Date: 04/02/1992
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for June 25, 1992, June 26 is also reserved if necessary; 11:00am; Crystal River, specific location to be given at later date)
- Date: 04/01/1992
- Proceedings: (Petitioner) Response to the Initial Order filed.
- Date: 03/27/1992
- Proceedings: (Respondent) Answer filed.
- Date: 03/23/1992
- Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
- Date: 03/19/1992
- Proceedings: Agency referral letter; Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- D. R. ALEXANDER
- Date Filed:
- 03/19/1992
- Date Assignment:
- 03/23/1992
- Last Docket Entry:
- 08/31/1993
- Location:
- Crystal River, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO