94-001135 Tracey Hardin vs. University Of Florida; Wruf Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, December 2, 1994.

Summary: Driving vehicle was reasonable requirement of position. Petitioner could not drive due to seizure disorder. Accomodation not possible without hardship.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

TRACEY KREFTING, previously )

known as TRACEY HARDIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 94-1135

)

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, )

)

Respondent. )

________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to written notice a formal hearing was held in this case before

Larry J. Sartin, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of

Administrative Hearings, on September 29, 1994, in Gainesville, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: George F. Schaefer, Esquire

1005 Southwest 2d Avenue

Gainesville, Florida 32601-6116

For Respondent: Isis Carbajal de Garcia

Associate General Counsel

University of Florida

207 Tigert Hall

Post Office Box 113125

Gainesville, Florida 32611-2073

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent, the University of Florida, discriminated against

Petitioner, Tracey Krefting, previously known as Tracey Hardin, on the basis of

a handicap as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On or about August 18, 1993, Petitioner, then known as Tracey Hardin, filed

a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"). Petitioner alleged that

Respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap. On January

21, 1994, the Commission entered a Notice of Determination: No Cause, finding

no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had

occurred.

On February 17, 1994, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief contesting the

Commission's determination and requesting a formal administrative hearing. The

petition was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by Transmittal

of Petition on February 28, 1994.

The final hearing was scheduled for May 17, 1994, by Notice of Hearing

entered April 6, 1994. On May 12, 1994, an Order Granting Unopposed Motion for

Continuance was entered. The final hearing was subsequently scheduled for

September 29, 1994 by Second Notice of Hearing entered July 18, 1994.

On September 28, 1994, the day before the final hearing, Petitioner filed a

Motion for Summary Final Order. The request for summary final order was based

upon the Respondent's failure to file an answer to the Petition for Relief as

required by Rule 60Y-5.008(5), Florida Administrative Code. A motion hearing

was held by telephone on September 28, 1994 to consider the motion. After

hearing argument of the parties, the motion was denied.

On September 28, 1994 Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time with

the Commission requesting additional time to file Respondent's Response to

Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice. Petitioner filed a

response in opposition to the Motion for Extension of Time. The response,

however, was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On October 10,

1994, the Commission entered an Order Granting Extension of Time. In the Order

the Commission, rather than granting the motion, as the title of the Order

indicates, ruled that "the Division, rather than the Commission, has

jurisdiction to rule on the motion." Based upon argument of the parties during

the September 28, 1994 telephone hearing and at the commencement of the final

hearing of this case, the Motion for Extension of Time is hereby granted.

At the final hearing Petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented

the testimony of Joan Paulsen, Kenneth Vest and Joseph Pisani, Ph D.

Petitioner's exhibits 1-13 were accepted into evidence. Petitioner's exhibits

1-2, 4, 6 and 9 were objected to on the basis of relevancy.

Respondent presented the testimony of Ralph Lowenstein, Michael

Wingertzahn, David Singer and Robert Clarke. Respondent's exhibits A-I and K

were accepted into evidence. Respondent's exhibit J was rejected as hearsay and

lack of relevancy.

Official recognition of Rules 15A-5.003 and 15A-005, Florida Administrative

Code was taken.

No transcript of the final hearing was filed by the parties. Proposed

recommended orders were to be filed on or before October 27, 1994. On October

31, 1994, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Extension of Time requesting a 10

day extension to file their proposed recommended orders. The parties had been

informed by telephone prior to October 27, 1994, that the joint request for a

ten day extension of time would be granted.

On November 7, 1994, Respondent filed a proposed recommended order.

Although Petitioner "served" her proposed recommended order on November 7, 1994,

it was not "filed" until November 9, 1994. Although Petitioner's proposed order

was filed late, it does not appear that there will be any prejudice to

Respondent if Petitioner's proposed recommended order is considered.

The proposed recommended orders filed by the parties contain proposed

findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made

either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order or the proposed finding

of fact has been accepted or rejected in the Appendix which is attached hereto.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Parties.

1. The Petitioner, Tracey Krefting, formerly known as Tracey Hardin, is a

handicapped individual. She suffers from seizure disorder.

2. Ms. Krefting graduated from the University of Florida in May of 1990.

She received a bachelor of science degree with a major in advertising. Ms.

Krefting had experience as an advertising sales representative prior to her

employment by the Respondent.

3. The Respondent, the University of Florida (hereinafter referred to as

the "University"), is a State university located in Gainesville, Florida.

4. Within the College of Journalism and Communications of the University

is a radio station, WRUF.

5. WRUF was an auxiliary operation of the University responsible for

raising revenue to fund all of its expenses, including the salaries for its

sales representatives.

6. No state funding was received directly or indirectly from the

University by WRUF.

B. Ms. Krefting's Employment by the University.

7. Ms. Krefting was employed by the University at WRUF on July 28, 1992.

Ms. Krefting was employed as "OPS", other personnel services.

8. Ms. Krefting was employed to act as one of six or seven sales

representatives of WRUF.

9. As of January 29, 1993, Robert Clark was the General Manager of WRUF.

Mr. Clark was Ms. Krefting's supervisor from January 29, 1993 until her

termination from employment.

C. Sales Representative Qualifications.

10. The essential function of sales representatives for WRUF was to sell

radio time for advertising. This function was an essential function because the

revenue necessary to operate WRUF was generated in this manner.

11. Sales representatives were responsible for servicing existing clients

and for finding new clients.

12. An essential requirement of the sales representatives of WRUF,

including Ms. Krefting, was the ability to travel to the businesses and offices

of WRUF's advertising clients and prospective clients.

13. Sales representatives were generally required to spend 80 percent of

their working hours out of the office servicing clients and seeking new clients.

Continuous contact and an ongoing relationship with clients was required.

Contacts with clients were expected to be face to face and not just over the

telephone.

14. In addition to being required to make regular contacts with clients,

sales representatives were also required to make themselves available to visit

their clients with little notice.

15. Obtaining new clients usually required more than one contact with a

prospective client by a sales representative. The sales representative was

required to sell himself or herself and the station and must gain the trust of

the prospective client.

16. Sales representatives were also responsible for performing public

service work. This work entailed the providing of public service announcements.

The public service work performed by sales representatives did not directly

generate revenue for WRUF.

17. Neither the application for employment completed by Ms. Krefting when

she was initially employed at WRUF nor the University's OPS personnel

requisition form authorizing her employment included any of the necessary skills

or qualifications for the sales representative position she was hired to fill.

18. Ms. Krefting was aware at the time she was hired, however, that she

would be required to travel to her clients locations and to the locations of

prospective clients.

19. There are other means of transportation available which would have

allowed Ms. Krefting to reach clients and prospective clients: vehicle driven

by a hired driver, public transportation, taxi, and walking. The evidence

failed to prove, however, that there were any reasonable means of transportation

available to Ms. Krefting other than driving herself which would have allowed

her to meet the requirements of a sales representative for WRUF.

D. Ms. Krefting's Handicap.

20. On April 18, 1993, Ms. Krefting fell while rollerskating. Ms.

Krefting hit her head on the ground when she fell. On April 19, 1993, Ms.

Krefting was admitted to the emergency room of the North Florida Regional

Medical Center. The evidence failed to prove that the injury she suffered on

April 18, 1993, caused Ms. Krefting to suffer any seizure.

21. On May 6, 1993, Ms. Krefting suffered a seizure while leaving her home

to go to work.

22. Ms. Krefting was ultimately diagnosed as having "seizure disorder."

23. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Krefting suffered from a

"handicap."

E. Ms. Krefting's Inability to Drive.

24. On or about May 18, 1993, Ms. Krefting provided a letter from George

G. Feussner, M.D., dated May 18, 1993, to Mr. Clark. In the letter Dr. Feussner

indicated that Ms. Krefting was able to return to work but that she could "not

operate a motor vehicle . . . ."

25. Although Dr. Feussner did not indicate how low Ms. Krefting would be

unable to drive, Ms. Krefting informed Mr. Clark that Dr. Feussner had informed

her that she would not be able to drive until she was seizure free for one year

from the date of her last epileptic seizure, May 6, 1993.

26. As a result of the restriction on Ms. Krefting's ability to drive and

based upon Florida law, Rules 15A-5.003 and 15A-5.004, Florida Administrative

Code, Ms. Krefting was unable to drive herself to see existing or prospective

clients until at least May 6, 1994.

27. Ms. Krefting discussed with Mr. Clark the possibility of hiring a

"tenant" of hers to drive her around. Ms. Krefting did not identify the

"tenant." Nor did Ms. Krefting inform Mr. Clark that she had completed making

arrangements with anyone to drive her.

28. Mr. Clark did not preclude Ms. Krefting from making arrangements to

have someone provide transportation for her. Mr. Clark did tell Ms. Krefting

that it would have to be determined what implications, if any, a driver would

have on WRUF's workers compensation coverage. The resolution of this issue was

to be delayed, however, until Ms. Krefting made concrete arrangements for a

driver and discussed those arrangements with Mr. Clark. Ms. Krefting failed to

finalize any arrangement for a driver.

29. Had Ms. Krefting provided her own driver, at her own expense, Ms.

Krefting may have been able to meet the requirement of her position that she be

able to provide her own transportation. Ms. Krefting, however, did not take the

necessary steps to hire a driver prior to her termination from employment.

30. Ms. Krefting talked to her tenant, Kenneth Vest, about acting as her

driver. Mr. Vest worked in the same building that Ms. Krefting did. Mr. Vest

worked Sunday through Wednesday from 3:30 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. He was, therefore,

generally available for part, but not all, of Ms. Krefting's working hours. Mr.

Vest was generally willing to drive Ms. Krefting, if he were compensated.

31. Ms. Krefting did not discuss with Mr. Vest the exact hours that he

would be expected to drive her or her schedule. Nor did Ms. Krefting discuss

compensation with Mr. Vest.

32. Ms. Krefting failed to prove that Mr. Vest or any other individual was

available at any time relevant to this proceeding, or at the final hearing, to

provide transportation for her in a manner that would fulfill her

responsibilities as a sales representative.

33. Because of the restriction on Ms. Krefting's ability to drive and her

failure to make alternative arrangements to have someone like Mr. Vest drive

her, Ms. Krefting failed to prove that she met all the qualifications of her

position with WRUF.

34. Ms. Krefting did not meet all the qualifications of her position. But

for her handicap, however, Ms. Krefting would have met all of the qualifications

of a sales representative.

F. The University's Decision to Terminate Ms. Krefting's

Employment.

35. On or about May 24, 1993, Mr. Clark informed Ms. Krefting that WRUF

could not continue to employ her because of her inability to drive. Ms.

Krefting suggested alternative means of meeting her responsibilities with Mr.

Clark when she was informed that WRUF would not be able to continue her

employment. Mr. Clark considered the suggestions, but did not accept any of

them.

36. On June 16, 1993 Mr. Clark agreed to extend Ms. Krefting's termination

date to accommodate her efforts to find another postition within the University.

37. Ms. Krefting was ultimately terminated from employment in early July

of 1993.

38. Ms. Krefting was terminated because she was prohibited from driving

her vehicle and there was no other reasonable means of meeting her

responsibilities to service clients and prospective clients.

G. The University's Inability to Accommodate Ms. Krefting's

Inability to Drive.

39. During 1993, the financial condition of WRUF was precarious. WRUF was

operating at a loss. Three employees had been terminated and a department had

been eliminated. Another vacant position had not been filled. WRUF was forced

to borrow funds from the University and a foundation account in order to

continue operating.

40. At all times relevant to this proceeding, WRUF was unable to create a

newly funded position or to allow a sales representative to fail to generate

reasonably expected revenues.

41. Ms. Krefting suggested several possible alternatives to accommodate

her inability to meet her requirement that she be able to drive. The

suggestions were discussed with, and considered by, Mr. Clark.

42. One suggestion Ms. Krefting made to Mr. Clark was to create a new

position. The position would entail performing all of the public service work

of the sales representatives. Mr. Clark rejected this proposal because it

entailed the creation of a new position.

43. The creation of a new position was not a reasonable accommodation.

The creation of a new position, especially one that did not generate revenue,

would have created a financial hardship on WRUF. The evidence also failed to

prove that the public service work could be performed without the need for

travel.

44. A second suggestion Ms. Krefting made to Mr. Clark was to restructure

her position so that she would be responsible for the preparing of proposals,

filing, handling incoming sales calls and telemarketing. In effect, this

suggestion also entailed the creation of a new position. This suggestion was

rejected by Mr. Clark.

45. Ms. Krefting's second suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation.

It would have created an undue financial hardship on WRUF because there was not

sufficient work to justify such a position.

46. A third suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she be

teamed with another sales representative who would do all the driving. Mr.

Clark rejected this suggestion.

47. Ms. Krefting's third suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation.

Teaming two sales representatives would have reduced the effectiveness of two

sales representatives who would be available to visit different clients and

prospective clients at the same time if they were not teamed. This would have

created an undue financial hardship on WRUF.

48. A fourth suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she use

public transportation and taxis. Mr. Clark rejected this suggestion.

49. Although it is questionably whether Ms. Krefting's fourth suggestion

constitutes an accommodation, to the extent that it does, it was not a

reasonable accommodation. Public transportation does not provide the

flexibility required of sales representatives because of the inadequacy of

routes and schedules of available transportation.

50. A fifth suggestion made by Ms. Krefting to Mr. Clark was that she

provide her own driver. It is questionable whether the use of a driver, as

suggested by Ms. Krefting, constitutes an accommodation.

51. To the extent that Ms. Krefting was suggesting that WRUF provide her a

driver, her suggestion was not a reasonable accommodation. If WRUF had been

required to provide the driver, it would have caused an undue hardship on WRUF.

52. Finally, Ms. Krefting suggested that a student intern from the

University's College of Journalism be assigned to work with her and that the

intern provide the driving required by her position. Mr. Clark rejected this

suggestion.

53. Ms. Krefting had discussed the idea of using an intern with Dr. Joseph

Pisani, the Chair of the Advertising Department of the College of Journalism.

Although Dr. Pisani was not opposed to the use of an intern-if the intern was

properly used-he was opposed to the use of an intern primarily or exclusively as

a driver.

54. The suggestion that interns be used was not a reasonable

accommodation. Student interns usually are only available to work as an intern

for a maximum of 12 hours a week. Additionally, the 12 hours a week that an

intern would be available depends upon their class schedule. Therefore, student

interns would not be available for a sufficient period of time for Ms. Krefting

to fulfill the responsibilities of her position.

55. Although it is not impossible to find a student that would be willing

to act as an intern full-time, the evidence failed to prove that it was likely

that a student could be found that would be willing to take no classes for up a

year or that it would be financially feasible for a student to do so.

56. Mr. Clark did not actually attempt to implement any of Ms. Krefting's

proposals. Mr. Clark also did not "consult with any experts" about the proposed

accommodations. Mr. Clark's failure to attempt to implement any of the

proposals or to consult with experts was not, however, necessary. The issue

confronting Mr. Clark was not one involving a decision which required special

knowledge or understanding of Ms. Krefting's handicap, or the needs of persons

who suffer from seizure disorder.

57. The only issue confronting Mr. Clark was how to accommodate the

inability of a sales representative to transport herself to meet the needs of

clients and prospective clients. Mr. Clark had all the necessary information to

decide how to deal with this issue: Ms. Krefting, regardless of her condition

or needs, was prohibited from driving an automobile for at least a year. Mr.

Clark was fully aware of the impact of this restriction on WRUF and the

resulting inability of a sales representative to carry out their

responsibilities. The suggested accommodations made by Ms. Krefting also

required no special knowledge or understanding. The suggestions only required

an understanding of the needs of WRUF and what was expected of sales

representatives.

H. Ms. Krefting's Loss of Income.

58. Subsequent to her termination by WRUF Ms. Krefting remained unemployed

until February of 1994.

59. After her termination by WRUF Ms. Krefting received unemployment

benefits of approximately $3,500.00

60. Ms. Krefting earned $800.00 for part-time employment in March of 1994.

61. Ms. Krefting was unable to work from April of 1994 until June of 1994.

62. Ms. Krefting is currently employed.

I. Ms. Krefting's Complaint.

63. Ms. Krefting filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission on

or about August 18, 1993 alleging that the University had discriminated against

her on the basis of her handicap.

64. On or about January 21, 1994, the Commission entered a Notice of

Determination: No Cause, finding no reasonable cause to believe that an

unlawful employment practice had occurred.

65. On or about February 17, 1994, Ms. Krefting filed a Petition for

Relief contesting the Commission's determination. The Petition was filed with

the Division of Administrative Hearings.

J. Conclusion.

66. The evidence in this case failed to prove that the University

terminated Ms. Krefting's employment because of her disability. Ms. Krefting

was terminated by the University because she could not meet all of the

requirements of her position.

67. The evidence failed to prove that the University could reasonably

accommodate Ms. Krefting's inability to drive without undue hardship to WRUF's

activities.

68. Ms. Krefting failed to prove that the University discriminated against

her on the basis of her handicap.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction.

69. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the

parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Sections 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes.

B. The Elements of Discriminatory Conduct; The Burden of

Proof.

70. The Florida Human Rights Act provides that it is an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire any individual

because of the individual's handicap. Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

71. Section 760.10(8), Florida Statutes, also provides:

(8) Notwithstanding any other provision of

this section, it is not an unlawful employment

practice under ss. 760.01-760.10 for an employer,

employment agency, labor organization, or joint

labor-management committee to:

(a) Take or fail to take any action on the basis

of . . . handicap . . . in those certain instances

in which . . . absence of a particular handicap

. . . is a bona fide occupational qualification

reasonably necessary for the performance of the

particular employment to which such action or

inaction is related.

72. Ms. Krefting had the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that the University intentionally discriminated against her because

of her handicap. Brand v. Florida Power Corporation, 633 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1994). See also, McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Irby

v. Allstate Insurance Co., 12 F.A.L.R. 2034, 2037 (Florida Commission on Human

Relations 1989); and Martin v. Monsanto Co., 10 F.A.L.R. 3886, 3896 (Florida

Commission on Human Relations 1988).

73. In order to establish a case of discrimination based upon handicap,

Mr. Krefting was required to establish a prima facie case of employment

discrimination by proving:

a. That she is handicapped;

b. That she is qualified for the position

she was employed in but for her handicap; and

c. That she was excluded from the position

solely by reason of her handicap. Brand, 633

So.2d at 510. See also Pushkin v. Regents of

University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th

Cir. 1981); and Hunter v. Winn-Dixie Stores,

Inc., FCHR Case No. 82-0799 (Feb. 23, 1983).

C. Ms. Krefting Presented a Prima Facie Case.

74. Ms. Krefting proved that she suffers from a handicap. See Kelly v.

Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986).

75. Based upon the court's rationale in Brand it appears that Ms. Krefting

has made a facial showing that she is qualified for the sales representative

position but for her handicap. Ms. Krefting proved that her handicap caused the

resulting restriction on her driving.

76. Finally, Ms. Krefting proved that she was terminated from her position

because she was unable drive, which was caused by her handicap.

D. Ms. Krefting Failed to Meet Her Ultimate Burden of

Proof.

77. Having met her initial burden of proof, the University was required to

prove that:

a. Ms. Krefting's handicap could not possibly

be accommodated; or

b. If her handicap could be accommodated, the

proposed accommodation was unreasonable because

it would result in an undue hardship on the

University's activities. Brand, 633 So. 2d at 511-512.

78. The evidence presented by the University in this case proved that Ms.

Krefting's inability to drive could not possibly be accommodated without undue

hardship to WRUF. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273

(1987); and Freeman v. Cavazos, 939 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1991). Ms. Krefting

failed to rebut the evidence presented by the University to prove that an undue

hardship would result from her suggested accommodations and she failed to prove

that there were any other reasonable accommodations that the University did not

consider.

79. Citing Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987), Ms. Krefting

has argued that the University was required to try the accommodations suggested

by Ms. Krefting. The rationale of the Reynolds decision has no applicability to

this case. The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Reynolds.

The evidence in this case supported a finding that the accommodations considered

by the University would not accommodate Ms. Krefting's handicap without undue

hardship to WRUF.

80. Citing Davidson v. Shoney's Big Boy Restaurant, 380 S.E.2d (W. Va.

1989), Ms. Krefting has also argued that the University was required, in order

to justify her termination from employment, to show that it had "relied on

competent medical testimony. The employer may not base such a determination

merely on an employer's subjective evaluation or merely on medical reports."

Again, this case is distinguishable from Davidson and other cases cited by Ms.

Krefting in that the issue in this case did not involve what Ms. Krefting's

capabilities were to perform her duties with seizure disorder. Under Florida

law, the limitation on Ms. Krefting's ability to drive were well established.

Additionally, at the time of the decision to terminate Ms. Krefting, Ms.

Krefting's own physician had informed the University that Ms. Krefting could not

operate a vehicle for at least a year.

81. There was also no reason to seek expert advice concerning the

accommodations considered for Ms. Krefting. Mr. Clark was not required to

decide what a person with seizure disorder was capable of doing. He was only

required to determine whether a sales person who could not drive would be able

to perform their duties. Mr. Clark possessed sufficient knowledge to determine

this issue without assistance or advice.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order

dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Tracey Krefting, previously known as

Tracey Hardin.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida.

___________________________________

LARRY J. SARTIN

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

[phone]

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of December, 1994.

APPENDIX

The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted

below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the

paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if

any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason

for their rejection have also been noted.

Ms. Krefting's Proposed Findings of Fact

1 Accepted in 2.

2 The University and not WRUF is the Respondent in this

case. See 3-5. The "departments" of WRUF are hereby

case. accepted.

3 Accepted in 7-8.

4 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 7.

5 Accepted in 7.

6 Accepted in 17. But see 18.

7 Not relevant. See 20.

8 Accepted in 21 and hereby accepted.

9 Accepted in 22.

10 Accepted in 25-26.

11 Accepted in 26.

12 Accepted in 41.

13 Accepted in 42. But see 43.

14 Accepted in 46. But see 47.

15 Accepted in 44. But see 45. The last sentence is not

supported by the weight of the evidence.

16 Accepted in 27, 30, 48 and 50. But see 29, 31-32, 49 and

51.

17 Accepted in 52-53. But see 54-55.

18 Accepted in 56. But see 57. See 35 with regard to the

last sentence.

19 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the

evidence.

20-21 Not relevant.

22 See 37-38. With regard to the last two sentences, see

56-57.

23 See 58-62.

24-25 Not relevant.

The University's Proposed Findings of Fact

1 Accepted in 1.

2 Accepted in 3.

3 Accepted in 4 and 7.

4 Accepted in 8.

5 Accepted in 9.

6 Accepted in 20.

7 Not relevant.

8 Accepted in 24.

9 Accepted in 25.

10 See 37.

11 Accepted in 65.

12 Accepted in 64.

13 Accepted in 65.

14 Hereby accepted.

14 Accepted in 10.

16 Accepted 5-6.

17 Accepted in 26.

18 Accepted in 19.

19 Accepted in 13.

20 Not relevant.

21 Accepted in 46-37.

22 Accepted in 44-45.

23 Accepted in 27-32 and 50-51.

24 Accepted in 42-43.

25 Accepted in 39-40

26 Accepted in 36.

27 Accepted in 38, 66 and 68.

COPIES FURNISHED:

George F. Schaefer, Esquire

1005 S.W. 2d Avenue

Gainesville, Florida 32601-6116

Isis Carbajal de Garcia

Associate General Counsel

University of Florida

207 Tigert Hall

Post Office Box 113125

Gainesville, Florida 32611-2073

Sharon Moultry, Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

325 John Knox Road

Building F, Suite 240

Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Dana Baird

General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

325 John Knox Road

Building F, Suite 240

Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended

Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit

written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit

written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final

order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions

to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be

filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.