95-004841 Waltraund E. Paehler vs. Division Of Retirement
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, May 20, 1996.


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Summary: Retiree not deemed to be mentally incompetant when retirement application executed; request to change from early to disability retirement denied.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8WALTRAUD E. PAEHLER, )

12)

13Petitioner, )

15)

16vs. ) CASE NO. 95-4841

21)

22DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, )

26)

27Respondent. )

29_____________________________)

30RECOMMENDED ORDER

32Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of

44Administrative Hearings by its assigned Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander, on

55February 6, 1996, in Jacksonville, Florida.

61APPEARANCES

62For Petitioner: Mark S. Levine, Esquire

68245 East Virginia Street

72Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263

75For Respondent: Stanley M. Danek, Esquire

81Division of Retirement

842639-C North Monroe Street

88Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

91STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

95The issue in this case is whether petitioner was mentally incapacitated at

107the time she chose the early (service) retirement option from the state.

119PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

121This matter began on September 6, 1995, when respondent, Division of

132Retirement, advised petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, that her request to change

143from service retirement to disability retirement had been denied since she had

155already cashed or deposited a retirement benefit. Thereafter, petitioner

164requested a formal hearing to contest the agency's action. The matter was

176referred by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 5,

1881995, with a request that a Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a hearing.

202By notice of hearing dated November 13, 1995, a final hearing was scheduled

215on February 6, 1996, in Jacksonville, Florida.

222At final hearing, petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented the

234testimony of her daughter, Gwendolyn R. Harvey. Also, she offered petitioner's

245exhibits 1-4. All exhibits were received in evidence. Exhibits 1-3 are the

257deposition testimony of Dr. Mark A. Hardin, a board certified general

268practictioner and accepted as an expert in the general practice of medicine; Dr.

281Seabury D. Stoneburner, Jr., a nephrologist and internist and accepted as an

293expert in kidney disease and internal medicine; and Kristina Crenshaw, a

304licensed mental health counselor. Respondent presented the testimony of

313Patricia G. Brown, an employee at Middleburg High School in Middleburg, Florida;

325and Mark Sadler, its disability retirement administrator. Also, it offered

335respondent's exhibit 1 which was received in evidence.

343The transcript of hearing was filed on March 20, 1996. By agreement of the

357parties the time for filing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was

371extended to May 3, 1996. The same were timely filed by the parties. A ruling

386on each proposed finding has been made in the Appendix attached to this

399Recommended Order.

401FINDINGS OF FACT

404Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are

416determined:

4171. Petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, was a classroom teacher in the Clay

429County public school system until 1993, and says she had a total of nineteen

443years of service. During that time period, she participated in the Florida

455Retirement System, which is administered by respondent, Division of Retirement

465(Division).

4662. In 1992, petitioner was suffering from a number of illnesses, including

478chronic kidney failure and congestive heart failure, which impaired her ability

489to continue working as a teacher. She also suffered from depression. These

501conditions continued into 1993. During this time period, she was hospitalized

512on at least two occasions.

5173. Because her work was very stressful, and tended to exacerbate her

529medical condition, petitioner accepted her physician's advice and decided to

539resign her teaching position effective April 14, 1993. On April 21, 1993, or a

553week later, she executed her application for retirement and opted to take early

566retirement effective May 1, 1993, when she was fifty-four years of age.

5784. Even though the local school board had periodically distributed

588information booklets to all teachers, including petitioner, concerning early,

597normal and disability types of retirement, and the various retirement options

608were discussed annually at each school's in-service training seminar, petitioner

618says she was still unaware of the disability retirement option. Thus, she

630elected to take early retirement on April 21, 1993. Because of her age, her

644retirement benefits were reduced by forty percent, or five percent for each year

657under the normal retirement age of sixty-two. Assuming she was qualified, had

669she elected to take disability retirement, there would have been no penalty

681because of her age.

6855. At or about the time petitioner decided to resign her teaching

697position, her daughter, who was assisting petitioner in her personal affairs,

708telephoned the local school board in an effort to ascertain potential retirement

720options for her mother. She spoke with an unknown individual in the school

733personnel office who the daughter says was not "very knowledgeable." The two

745discussed "in general what (her) mother could do" with respect to retirement,

757but the daughter says she received no specifics other than the fact that her

771mother would be "entitled to partial pay." She also requested that an

783application for service retirement form be mailed to her mother. The daughter

795then relayed this sketchy information to her mother.

8036. Because of financial constraints, and in order to receive her benefits

815immediately, petitioner decided to take early retirement rather than wait until

826normal retirement age. After selecting the option 1 benefit, which entitled her

838to benefits for her lifetime only, petitioner carried the form to her school's

851personnel office where she executed it on April 21, 1993, before the principal's

864secretary, a notary public. Although the secretary could not recall the

875specific event, she affirmed that she would not allow anyone to sign a document

889who did not appear to be competent.

8967. In selecting option 1, which gave the highest monthly benefits for early

909retirement, petitioner acknowledged she understood the ramifications of making

918that choice when she did so on April 21, 1993. Thus, on that date she possessed

934sufficient mental capacity to know that these benefits would last only during

946her lifetime, and her daughters would not receive any benefits after her death.

959At final hearing she confirmed that, prior to executing the form, she had

972reviewed the various options under early retirement and selected the first

983option since she "figure(d) (she had) done enough for them all (of her) life,

997they can take care of themselves."

10038. In June 1994, petitioner read an article in a teacher trade publication

1016and learned that a number of states offered disability retirement as an option

1029and did not penalize retirees for early retirement due to a disability. This

1042article prompted petitioner the following month to write a letter to the

1054Division.

10559. When petitioner made inquiry with the Division in July 1994 concerning

1067a change from early (service) to disability retirement, she was told that under

1080Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, she could not do so after

1091cashing her first check. By then, petitioner had long since cashed the first

1104retirement check mailed to her at the end of May 1993. That advice prompted her

1119to eventually challenge the Division's rejection of her claim on the theory that

1132she was "incapacitated" when she made her decision to take early retirement.

114410. In support of her contention that in 1993 she lacked the necessary

1157mental capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her retirement,

1167petitioner presented the testimony of three health professionals from whom she

1178was receiving care in 1993. Their deposition testimony is found in petitioner's

1190exhibits 1-3 received in evidence.

119511. Dr. Hardin, a family physician, was petitioner's primary treating

1205physician from February 1992 until April 1993. In the spring of 1993, he

1218recalled petitioner as being "confused," "in an imbalanced state," suffering

"1228mental duress," dependent on explicit instructions for appointments, and taking

1238a variety of prescribed medications for tobacco cessation, chronic renal

1248failure, congestive cardiac condition, high blood pressure, cardiomyopathy,

1256tremors, anxiety and migraine headaches. Because of these conditions, Dr.

1266Hardin found it difficult to believe that she could "handle" a more complicated

1279matter such as choosing a retirement option. Dr. Hardin acknowledged, however,

1290that during the spring of 1993, he had little chance "to follow her" since

1304another physician, Dr. Stoneburner, was managing petitioner's most important

1313illness, renal failure.

131612. Dr. Stoneburner, a nephrologist and internist who has treated

1326petitioner for a kidney disease since 1985, felt that in the spring of 1993 she

"1341was not in a very good position to make a competent decision based on her

1356emotional state." Just prior to her retirement, he observed petitioner as

1367having "significant depression" and "a lack of desire to work." She was also

1380taking as many as six or seven medications at one time which could "possibly"

1394cause "someone to be confused." Based on these circumstances, Dr. Stoneburner

1405opined that petitioner was not competent to make a rational judgment. However,

1417Dr. Stoneburner conceded that if petitioner had been given retirement options

1428explained in layman's terms, and had someone to assist her in explaining the

1441various options, she could have made an intelligent decision.

145013. Kristina Crenshaw, a licensed mental health counselor, met with

1460petitioner on four occasions between February 18 and April 12, 1993. Ms.

1472Crenshaw found petitioner to have "significant difficulty with depression," in

1482an "agitated, very stressed, (and) overwhelmed" condition, and with a "strong

1493sense of uncertainty about her future." While the witness believed that

1504petitioner would have understood a pamphlet describing her retirement options,

1514she would not have "necessarily understood all the implications to her own

1526personal life." The witness agreed, however, that once petitioner made a

1537decision to resign her job, she seemed more "upbeat" and "positive." Further,

1549petitioner had told her by telephone on April 15, 1993, that she felt "much

1563better" after retiring from her job. The counselor did not know if petitioner

1576was mentally competent when she opted for early retirement a week later.

158814. Nothwithstanding the testimony of the health professionals, the

1597findings in paragraph 7 are deemed to be more compelling on the critical issue

1611of competency, and it is found that on April 21, 1993, petitioner understood the

1625nature and consequences of her acts, and she was capable of binding herself by

1639the retirement application. Therefore, her request to have rule 60S-4.002(4)

1649waived, or to have her "contract" with the Division set aside, should be denied.

1663CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

166615. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the

1676subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida

1687Statutes.

168816. As the party seeking a change in her retirement status, petitioner

1700must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to the

1714requested relief. See, e. g., Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396

1728So.2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this case, she seeks to prove that she

1744was mentally incapacitated at the time she elected to take early retirement, a

1757most difficult task.

176017. Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, is the rule which gave

1771rise to this dispute. It provides in relevant part as follows:

1782(4) After a retirement benefit payment

1788has been cashed or deposited:

1793* * *

1796(c) The type of retirement, i.e. normal,

1803early, or disability, may not be changed . . .

1813Under the foregoing rule, once a retiree receives and cashes a benefit payment,

1826the retiree cannot change his or her retirement option. The rule is consistent

1839with the holding in Arnow v. Williams, 343 So.2d 1309, 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977),

1854where the court determined that retirement benefits vest at the time of

1866retirement when the retiree receives his or her first retirement warrant.

187718. Petitioner acknowledges receiving a retirement benefit payment and

1886cashing the same but contends that when she elected to participate in early

1899retirement in April 1993, she was not of sound mind and capacity to make an

1914intelligent decision. More specifically, she contends that the application for

1924service retirement executed on April 21, 1993, was a contract between the

1936parties, and she lacked the necessary capacity to understand the nature of the

1949transaction. She asks that the contract be set aside under the rationale found

1962in Wheat v. Montgomery, 202 S.E. 664 (Ga. App. 1973) and Putnam Lumber Co. et al

1978v. Berry, 2 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1941). In the latter case, which holds more

1992precedential value than an out-of-state decision, the court affirmed a finding

2003by a jury that an injured employee was not bound by a release of liability

2018executed while heavily addicted to pain killers.

202519. The Division takes the position that Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida

2035Administrative Code, is controlling, and absent an adjudication of incompetency,

2045it cannot be waived under any circumstances. Alternatively, it suggests that

2056the record does not support an administrative determination that petitioner was

2067legally incompetent, but at best it supports only a finding that in April 1993

2081she was "medically or emotionally incompetent," a condition not rendering her

2092incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of her acts.

210220. Although there is no judicial precedent on this issue, there are a

2115number of agency final orders which involve claims by retirees that they were

2128incompetent when selecting their retirement option. See, e.g., Burns v. Dept.

2139of Admin., Div. of Retirement, Case No. 91-4652 (Div. of Ret., April 17, 1992);

2153Day v. Div. of Retirement, Case No. 90-2085 (Div. of Ret., March 18, 1991);

2167Hutchinson v. Dept. of Admin., Div. of Retirement, Case No. 91-3870 (Div. of

2180Ret., January 29, 1992); Grantham v. Dept. of Admin., Div. of Retirement, Case

2193No. 89-2455 (Div. of Ret., January 22, 1990). In each case, the Division has

2207followed the practice of strictly enforcing rule 60S-4.002(4) unless there was

2218sufficient proof to make an administrative determination that the retiree was

2229mentally incompetent when he or she executed the retirement application.

223921. In making the foregoing determination, the Division has consistently

2249followed the well-established rule that in order to make a transaction voidable,

2261it must be shown that the person was incapable of understanding the character of

2275the transaction in question. This principle has been described in the following

2287manner:

2288A reasonable test for the purpose of deter-

2296mining whether an infirmity operates to render

2303a person incapable of binding himself abso-

2310lutely by a contract is whether his mind has

2319been so affected as to render him incapable

2327of understanding the nature and consequences

2333of his acts, or, more exactly whether his

2341mental powers have become so far affected as

2349to make him unable to understand the character

2357of the transaction in question.

2362In the determination of whether a person's

2369mental illness or weakness is sufficient in

2376itself to render his contracts and conveyances

2383voidable, a distinction is made between actual

2390insanity and a weakness of the mind unaccom-

2398panied by an infirmity overthrowing reason.

2404The fact that a person is physically incapable

2412to look after his property, or that his mind

2421is enfeebled because of age or disease, is not

2430sufficient to affect the validity of his con-

2438tract or conveyance, where he still retains a

2446full comprehension of the meaning, design,

2452and effect of his acts at the time of its

2462execution. However, mental weakness, even

2467though not amounting to incapacity, is mat-

2474erial where the question arises whether a

2481fraud has been perpetrated on, or an undue

2489advantage taken of, one contracting party

2495by the other.

249829 Fla. Jur.2d, Incompetent Persons, s. 158

250522. The more credible and persuasive evidence supports a conclusion that

2516petitioner understood the nature of her retirement decision on April 21, 1993,

2528and thus she cannot prevail on her claim. In reaching this conclusion, the

2541undersigned has considered the evidence, as reflected in finding of fact 7, that

2554when petitioner took early retirement in April 1993, she had the capacity to

2567recognize the distinction between the various options available under that form

2578of retirement. More specifically, she clearly understood that by taking option

25891, her monthly benefits would be maximized, and her daughters would receive no

2602benefits after her death. The regrettable fact that petitioner had no knowledge

2614of, or failed to inquire about, a disability retirement option does not alter

2627this conclusion.

262923. At the same time, the undersigned has considered the deposition

2640testimony presented by the three health professionals. While it supports a

2651finding that petitioner was extremely sick, and she was in a confused, stressed

2664and agitated state of mind due to a number of medications being injested at the

2679same time and a documented diagnosis of depression, as noted in paragraphs 11-

269213, it did not support a finding that she was incapable of understanding the

2706nature and consequences of her acts. Unfortunately, therefore, petitioner's

2715requested relief must be denied.

2720RECOMMENDATION

2721Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is

2734RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order determining

2745that petitioner was mentally competent when she elected to take early retirement

2757and that her request to have rule 60S-4.0002(4) waived so as to permit her to

2772file a request for disability retirement be denied.

2780DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.

2792____________________________________

2793DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer

2798Division of Administrative Hearings

2802The DeSoto Building

28051230 Apalachee Parkway

2808Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

2811(904) 488-9675

2813Filed with the Clerk of the

2819Division of Administrative Hearings

2823this 20th day of May, 1996.

2829APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4841

2836Petitioner:

28371. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1.

28452. Rejected as being unnecessary.

28503. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12.

28584-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2.

28666-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3.

28748-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4.

288210-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8.

289012. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.

289813. Covered in preliminary statement.

290314-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12.

291121-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11.

291925-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13.

292732-37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6.

293538-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5.

294340. Covered in preliminary statement.

294841-43. Rejected as being unnecessary.

2953Respondent:

29541. Rejected since the evidence shows that petitioner was employed by the Clay

2967County School Board and not the Duval County School Board. Also, the only

2980evidence of record as to years of service is the testimony of petitioner that

2994she had nineteen years of service. However, this fact is not necessary to

3007resolve the dispute.

30102. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8.

30183. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9.

30284. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9.

30365. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10.

30446-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12.

30528-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11.

306010-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13.

306813. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5.

307614. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6.

308415. Rejected as being unnecessary.

3089Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the

3102remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for the resolution

3113of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of

3126law.

3127COPIES FURNISHED:

3129Mark H. Levine, Esquire

3133245 East Virginia Street

3137Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263

3140Stanley M. Danek, Esquire

3144Division of Retirement

31472639-C North Monroe Street

3151Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

3154A. J. McMullian, III, Director

3159Division of Retirement

31622639-C North Monroe Street

3166Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

3169NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

3175All parties have the right to submit to the agency written exceptions to this

3189Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least ten days in which to

3203submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to

3215submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the

3227Final Order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing

3240exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order

3251should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
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Date
Proceedings
Date: 07/23/1996
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/18/1996
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 07/18/1996
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 05/20/1996
Proceedings: Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 02/06/96.
Date: 05/06/1996
Proceedings: Respondent`s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law filed.
Date: 04/30/1996
Proceedings: Respondent Division of Retirement`s Motion for Additional Time Within Which to File the Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Date: 04/30/1996
Proceedings: (From M. Levine) Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Date: 03/26/1996
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Notice of Receipt of Transcript and Due Date for Proposed Recommended Order w/cover letter filed.
Date: 03/20/1996
Proceedings: Transcript filed.
Date: 02/12/1996
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Filing of Exhibits w/cover letter filed.
Date: 01/30/1996
Proceedings: Deposition of Mark Hardin, M.D. ; Notice of Filing Original Deposition filed.
Date: 01/29/1996
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Compliance With Request for Production of Documents; Notice of Response to Petitioner`s Interrogatories to Respondent filed.
Date: 01/12/1996
Proceedings: Deposition of Kristina Crenshaw ; Deposition of Seabury Stoneburner, M.D. ; (2) Notice of Filing Original Deposition w/cover letter filed.
Date: 01/04/1996
Proceedings: Order Designating Location of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 2/6/96; 10:30am; Jax)
Date: 12/29/1995
Proceedings: (Petitioner) Notice of Taking Deposition; Petitioner`s First Request to Produce Documents; (Petitioner) Notice of Propounding Interrogatories filed.
Date: 12/26/1995
Proceedings: (Mark S. Levine) Notice of Taking Depositions filed.
Date: 12/04/1995
Proceedings: (Respondent) Notice of Taking Depositions filed.
Date: 11/17/1995
Proceedings: Notice of Compliance With Request for Production (from Mark Levine) filed.
Date: 11/13/1995
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 2/6/96; 10:30am; Jax)
Date: 10/30/1995
Proceedings: (Respondent) Joint Response to Initial Order w/cover letter filed.
Date: 10/20/1995
Proceedings: Order sent out. (parties have until 11/3/95 to respond to initial Order)
Date: 10/19/1995
Proceedings: (Respondent) Motion for Additional Time to File Response to Initial Order w/cover letter filed.
Date: 10/13/1995
Proceedings: Notice of Service of Respondent`s First Interrogatories to Petitioner; Notice of Service of Respondent`s First Request for Production of Documents filed.
Date: 10/10/1995
Proceedings: Initial Order issued.
Date: 10/05/1995
Proceedings: Notice Of Election To Request for Assignment of Hearing Officer; Agency Action Letter; Petition for Formal Hearing filed.

Case Information

Judge:
D. R. ALEXANDER
Date Filed:
10/05/1995
Date Assignment:
10/10/1995
Last Docket Entry:
07/23/1996
Location:
Jacksonville, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

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