97-000924RX Lee W. Eyer vs. Department Of Highway Safety And Motor Vehicles Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Thursday, July 24, 1997.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove Rule 15A-10.043, FAC, is invalid.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

LEE W. EYER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-0924RX

)

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY )

SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, )

)

Respondent, )

)

and )

)

FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF )

D.U.I. PROGRAMS, INC., )

)

Intervenor. )

)

FINAL ORDER

A formal hearing was held in this case before Larry J.

Sartin, a duly designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings, on June 16, 1997, in

Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Kelly H. Buzzett, Esquire

2 Hotz Avenue

Grayton Beach, Florida 32459

For Respondent: Electra Theodorides

Assistant General Counsel

Department of Highway Safety

and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building, A432

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500

For Intervenor: Edwin A. Steinmeyer, Esquire

Lewis, Longman, and Walker, P.A.

125 South Gadsden Street, Suite 300

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Rule 15A-10.043, Florida

Administrative Code, and certain forms incorporated therein,

constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

authority to the extent that the rule interprets the term "drug"

to include alcohol.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 3, 1997, Lee W. Eyer filed a Petition Seeking

Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule. In the

petition, Mr. Eyer challenged the validity of Rule 15A-10.029,

Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56(1),

Florida Statutes. The petition was designated

Case Number 97-0924RX. The matter was assigned to the

undersigned by an Order of Assignment entered March 6, 1997.

The formal hearing on Mr. Eyer's petition was scheduled for

Monday, March 31, 1997, by Notice of Hearing entered March 10,

1997. On Friday, March 27, 1997, Respondent filed Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss. The motion was not received by Petitioner or

the undersigned until the commencement of the formal hearing.

In the motion, Respondent represented that Rule

15A-10.029(4), Florida Administrative Code, the specific

provision being challenged by Mr. Eyer, had been repealed

March 5, 1997. Upon further inquiry, Respondent represented that

it was still using certain forms which had been adopted by

reference in Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative Code, that

contained language which had the same effect as the language of

the rule challenged by Mr. Eyer. The rule adopting those forms,

however, adopts several forms by reference. Therefore, it was

determined that the hearing should be postponed to allow Mr. Eyer

an opportunity to review the Rule 15A-10.043, Florida

Administrative Code, to determine which forms he was challenging,

and then file an amended petition. Mr. Eyer was given until

April 10, 1997, to file an amended petition. An Order Granting

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was entered April 29, 1997.

During the formal hearing on March 31, 1997, it was agreed

that the issue in this case was primarily an issue of law.

Therefore, it was suggested to the parties that they attempt to

stipulate to any factual issues in order to avoid scheduling

another hearing.

On April 4, 1997, Mr. Eyer filed an Amended Petition Seeking

Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule. In this

petition, Mr. Eyer identified the forms he was challenging. The

rule which adopts those forms by reference was not cited in the

petition, however.

On April 14, 1997, Respondent filed Respondent's Motion to

Dismiss Petitioner's Amended Petition. Respondent argued in the

motion that Petitioner had failed to allege facts which would

support a finding that he has standing to institute this matter.

On April 30, 1997, Petitioner's Response to Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Petition and Request for Hearing was filed.

On May 16, 1997, a hearing to consider the motion to dismiss

was conducted by telephone. Petitioner's alleged injury in

support of his standing was the denial of an application for a

hardship driver's license. The authority for the denial was the

language of the challenged forms. This alleged injury, however,

was moot. The denial of his application was a decision of

Respondent which Petitioner could have appealed. Petitioner did

not appeal the denial and, therefore, the Respondent's denial had

become final. Therefore, even if Petitioner were to be

successful in his rule challenge, the injury he had alleged could

not be remedied. In light of these conclusions, the parties were

informed during the motion hearing that the amended petition was

dismissed. An order granting the motion to dismiss was entered

May 20, 1997.

Counsel for Petitioner represented during the motion hearing

that Petitioner intended to reapply for a hardship driver's

permit in the immediate future. Based upon this representation,

Petitioner was given an opportunity to file a second amended

petition.

During the motion hearing, the parties agreed that the

formal hearing should be rescheduled for June 16, 1997. The

parties also agreed to attempt to enter into a stipulation of the

pertinent facts in lieu of a formal hearing.

A Second Notice of Hearing was entered May 21, 1997.

A Second Amended Petition Seeking Administrative

Determination of Validity of Rule was filed on May 20, 1997.

Petitioner challenged Rule 15A-10.043, Florida Administrative

Code, to the extent that the rule sets forth forms, implementing

and codifying Respondent's interpretation of Section

322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, that an applicant for hardship

driver's license must abstain from the use of "alcohol" for a

period of one year prior to obtaining a hardship license.

On June 2, 1997, the Florida Association of D.U.I. Programs,

Inc ., filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene. The petition was

granted without objection at the commencement of the formal

hearing.

On June 9, 1997, a Joint Motion for Summary Final Order was

entered by Respondent and Intervenor. Petitioner filed

Petitioner's Cross Motion for Summary Final Order at the

commencement of the formal hearing. Oral argument in support of

these motions was heard at the formal hearing of this case on

June 16, 1997.

The parties also filed a pleading titled "Stipulated Facts"

at the commencement of the formal hearing. The parties agreed to

the pertinent facts in this case in the Stipulated Facts.

Attached to the Stipulated Facts were Exhibits A through E.

Those Exhibits are accepted into evidence. The parties also

stipulated to the facts alleged in the Petition for Leave to

Intervene.

At the conclusion of the formal hearing, the parties were

given until June 26, 1997, to file proposed final orders.

Respondent and Intervenor filed a Proposed Final Order on

June 26, 1997. Petitioner did not file a proposed final order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The following facts, stipulated to by the parties in the

Stipulated Facts, are hereby accepted:

1. On March 16, 1993, Lee Eyer was convicted

of his second DUI within 5 years, and his license

was suspended for a period of five years (5)

pursuant to section 322.28(2)(a)2, Florida

Statutes.

2. Under section 322.271(2)(b), Florida

Statutes, a person whose license has been

suspended for a period of 5 years or less may

seek a reinstatement of a license for employment

purposes (known as a hardship license). The

statutory language requires that the person

seeking the hardship license must "have been drug

free for a least 12 months immediately prior to

such reinstatement . . . ."

3. Pursuant to Lee Eyer's request for a

reinstatement of driving privileges restricted to

business and employment purposes (hardship

license), a hearing officer of the [Department of

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] conducted an

administrative hearing on January 24, 1997.

(Exhibit A).

4. Pursuant to the direction of the hearing

officer, Lee Eyer went to Bridgeway Center, Inc.,

in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, on February 18,

1997, for the purpose of being evaluated for

admission to its Special Supervision Services

(SSS) Program, completion of which is required by

the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor

Vehicles] in order to receive a hardship license.

5. As part of the initial screening for the

SSS Program at Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer

completed a questionnaire, HSMV Form 72748 (re-

numbered in 1/97 as Form 77013), on which he

indicated that he consumes alcohol "4/week" and

that he drank a beer on January 22, 1997.

(Exhibit B).

6. At the time of his initial screening at

Bridgeway Center, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form

72062 (11/96), which states that an applicant

"[m]ust not have consumed any alcohol or drugs .

. . for 1 year prior to reinstatement." (Exhibit

C). Additionally, Mr. Eyer was given DHSMV Form

72747 (re-numbered in 1/97 as Form 77012), which

states that "[a]n applicant with a revocation of

5 years or less must have not used any drugs for

at least the past twelve (12) months. Drugs

include alcohol . . . ." (Exhibit D).

7. By letter dated February 19, 1997, Mr. Eyer

received written notice that he was denied entry

into the DUI SSS Program because of his "reported

last use of alcohol on [1/22/97]." The letter

further stated that he must be "drug/alcohol free

for a minimum of one year prior to acceptance"

into the SSS Program. (Exhibit E).

8. Through section 15A-10.043, Florida

Administrative Code (1997), the [Department of

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles] specifically

adopts and incorporates by reference Forms 77012

(formerly numbered 72747) and 77013 (formerly

numbered 72748).

9. On March 3, 1997, Lee Eyer filed a rule

challenge petition with the Division of

Administrative Hearings. After a hearing on

March 31, 1997, Mr. Eyer was given leave to file

an amended petition, which was filed on April 4,

1997. Pursuant to a hearing on May 16, 1997,

Petitioner was given leave to file a second

amended petition, which was filed on May 20,

1997, and which alleged that the rule promulgated

by the [Department of Highway Safety and Motor

Vehicles] was an invalid exercise of delegated

legislative authority.

10. Should Lee Eyer be successful in his rule

challenge, he intends to seek admission into the

SSS Program offered by Bridgeway Center, Inc., in

Fort Walton Beach, Florida.

2. The following facts, which were contained in the

Petition for Leave to Intervene filed by the Florida Association

of D.U.I. Programs, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "FADP"), and

stipulated to by the parties, are hereby accepted:

. . . . FADP is a not-for-profit Florida

corporation. Its membership is composed entirely

of licensed DUI programs.

11. FADP's primary goal is to enhance the

safety of all Floridians through a strong

statewide system of DUI enforcement, education

and treatment. FADP seeks to achieve this goal

by promoting high standards and uniformity in all

licensed DUI programs throughout the state, and

by promoting substance abuse safety education

related to drinking, drugs and driving.

12. FADP represents its members by means of

education, public relations, and participation in

legislative activities, administrative

proceedings, and court litigation.

13. FADP has 24 member programs, all of which

are licensed DUI programs. FADP and its members

will be substantially affected by any

interpretation of the rules at issue in this

proceeding because FADP and its members are

subject to regulation by the rules, and because

DUI programs must apply the challenged rule to

DUI offenders on a regular basis.

14. Bridgeway Center, Inc., the DUI program to

which Petitioner applied and was denied admission

pursuant tot he challenged rule, is a member of

FADP.

15. The relief sought by FADP in this

proceeding is appropriate for an association to

receive on behalf of its members.

3. Pursuant to the Second Amended Petition Seeking

Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule filed in this

case, Mr. Eyer has challenged Rule 15A-10.043, Florida

Administrative Code, to the extent that it adopts by reference

HSMV Forms 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), 77013 (formerly

numbered 72748), and 72062 (hereinafter referred to as the

"Challenged Rule").

4. The Challenged Rule is a rule adopted by Respondent, the

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle (hereinafter

referred to as the "Department"), to implement Section

322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

5. In pertinent part, Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida

Statutes, provides that "the Department shall require [applicants

for a restricted driver license] to have not driven and to have

been drug free for at least 12 months immediately prior to such

reinstatement. . . ." In implementing this language, the

Department has provided the following on HSMV Form 72062,

"Administrative Hearing Requirements for Revocations " for persons

who have been convicted of a second DUI conviction within 5 years

of the first conviction:

2. Must complete DUI school and be enrolled in

DUI Special Supervision Services and receive a

favorable evaluation from that program . . . .

. . . .

5. Must not have consumed any alcohol or drugs

or driven a motor vehicle for 1 year prior to

reinstatement*

. . . .

*Drugs include alcohol and those so-called non-

alcoholic beers or wines which contain less than

.5% of alcohol. . . .

6. HSMV Form 77013 (formerly numbered 72748) is a

"Screening Form" completed at the time of registration at the DUI

Special Supervision Services school. In pertinent part, this

form provides the following:

5. How often do you presently consume alcohol,

including the so-called non-alcoholic beers or

wines which contain less that [sic] 0.5% of

alcohol?

7. HSMV Form 77012 (formerly numbered 72747), an

"Information Sheet," is also provided at the time of

registration. In pertinent part, this form provides the

following:

An applicant with a revocation of 5 years or less

must have not used any drugs for at least the

past twelve (12) months. Drugs include alcohol

and those so-called non-alcoholic beers or wines

which contain less than .5% of alcohol. . . .

8. Mr. Eyer is challenging the Department's interpretation

of the term "drug" as used in Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida

Statutes, to include alcohol.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction .

9. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction

over the parties to, and the subject matter of, this proceeding.

Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

B. Standing .

10. The evidence in this case proved that Mr. Eyer is a

"person substantially affected" by the rule which he is

challenging in this proceeding.

11. The evidence also proved that FADP has standing to

intervene in this proceeding. FADP has alleged facts, stipulated

to by the parties, that support a conclusion that it is

substantially affected by the rule at issue, and that it meets

the test for standing by an association. See Florida Home

Builders Association v. Department of Labor and Employment

Security , 412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982).

C. Mr. Eyer's Challenge .

12. Mr. Eyer has alleged that the Challenged Rule is an

invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In

particular, Mr. Eyer has contended that the Challenged Rule

"enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of

law implemented." Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.

13. The law implemented and interpreted by the Department

in the Challenged Rule is Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida

Statutes:

(b) A person whose license has been revoked

for a period of 5 years or less . . . may, upon

the expiration of 12 months after the date said

revocation was imposed, petition the department

for reinstatement of his or her driving privilege

on a restricted basis. . . . Reinstatement of

the driving privilege pursuant to this subsection

shall be restricted to business or employment

purposes only. In addition, the department shall

require such persons upon reinstatement to have

not driven and to have been drug free for at

least 12 months immediately prior to such

reinstatement , to be supervised by a DUI program

licensed by the department, and to report to the

program at least three times a year as required

by the program for the duration of the revocation

period for supervision. . . . [Emphasis added]

14. Pursuant to the Challenged Rule, the Department has

interpreted the term "drug" to include alcohol.

15. For the Challenged Rule to withstand challenge, it must

be concluded that the it has been promulgated to "implement,

interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties

granted by the enabling statute." Section 120.52(8), Florida

Statutes (Supp. 1996).

D. Legislative Intent .

16. In determining whether the Challenged Rule enlarges,

modifies, or contravenes Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes,

or simply implements, interprets, or makes specific the

particular powers and duties granted by Section 322.271(2)(b),

Florida Statutes, it must be determined what the Legislature

intended when it used the term "drug" in Section 322.271(2)(b),

Florida Statutes.

17. It is the Legislature's intent that controls statutory

construction. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm , 414 So.

2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). The starting point in making such a

determination is the language of the statute itself. Mayo Clinic

Jacksonville v. Department of Professional Regulation , 625 So. 2d

918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

18. Where the language of a statute is plain and clear, the

legislative intent must be determined from that clear language

itself, and a court, or an agency adopting rules, may not go

beyond or behind the language of the statute in order to give a

different meaning that the clear meaning of the language used.

Kirby Center v. Department Labor & Employment Security , 650 So.

2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

19. Other rules of statutory construction which have been

considered in this case include the following:

a. An administrative agency is afforded wide discretion in

interpreting statutes which it is charged with administering.

Amisub v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services , 577

So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). An agency's interpretation is,

however, not absolute; an agency may not, through its

interpretation, disregard established rules of statutory

construction. Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield

Development Co. , 581 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); and Palm

Harbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly , 500 So. 2d 1382

(Fla. 2d DCA 1987);

b. Statutory language should be accorded its common,

everyday meaning, where a common, everyday word is used. James

Lewis Drywall v. Davis , 627 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993);

c. Statutes should be construed in light of the purpose to

be achieved by the legislation. Tampa-Hillsborough County

Expressway Authority v. K.E. Morris Alignment Services, Inc. , 444

So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1983); and

d. Where the Legislature uses a term in one section of a

statute, but omits it from another section of the same statute,

the omitted word is not to be implied where it has been excluded.

Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc. , 654 So. 2d 911

(Fla. 1995); and Nikolits v. Nicosia , 682 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1996).

E. The Legislative Intent of Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida

Statutes .

20. The Department has argued that the common, every day

meaning of the term "drug" includes alcohol. The Department

argues that to "interpret the term 'drug' to exclude alcohol is

contrary to the common, everyday meaning of the term 'drug.'"

21. Mr. Eyer attempted to counter this argument by

suggesting that caffeine and nicotine are also commonly accepted

as constituting "drugs," but surely the Legislature did not

intend to prohibit their use in using the term "drug" in Section

322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

22. Neither argument is persuasive. The argument that the

common meaning of the term "drug" includes alcohol ignores the

fact that what the term "drug" may commonly mean depends on the

context in which it is used. It is true that it is generally

accepted that alcohol is a "drug." It also true, however, that

when someone refers to a person as a "drug" user, they are

referring to controlled substances, and not to alcohol. The term

"drug" simply does not have one, common meaning.

23. The suggestion of Mr. Eyer that to interpret the term

"drug" as used in Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to

include alcohol would require that caffeine and nicotine also be

included ignores the context in which the term "drug" has been

used by the Legislature. In this instance, the Legislature has

declared that the use of alcohol and certain controlled

substances while operating a motor vehicle will constitute

grounds for suspending or revoking a persons right to drive.

Chapter 322, Florida Statutes, does not apply to persons who

drive while consuming caffeine or nicotine. It is only

substances, like alcohol and controlled substances, which may

impair a persons ability to operate a motor vehicle that were of

concern to the Legislature in enacting Chapter 322, Florida

Statutes.

24. A consideration of the use of the terms "drug" and

"alcohol" throughout Chapter 322, Florida Statutes, also fails to

give a clear answer to the intent of the Legislature. There are

provisions in Chapter 322, Florida Statutes, where the terms are

used in a manner which supports Mr. Eyer's interpretation of the

term "drug," and there are provisions in Chapter 322, Florida

Statutes, where the terms are used in a manner which supports the

interpretation of the term "drug" by the Department and FADP:

a. Section 322.01, Florida Statutes, provides definitions

of certain terms. The terms "alcohol," "controlled substances,"

and "narcotic drugs" are defined. There is, however, no

definition of the term "drug." This suggests that the

Legislature was aware that the term "drug" may be viewed as

including "alcohol" and, therefore, the different types of

"drugs" being dealt with in the law (alcohol, controlled

substances, and narcotic drugs) are separately defined rather

than attempting to define only one term: "drug;"

b. Section 322.095(1), Florida Statutes, provides, in

establishing traffic law and "substance abuse" education programs

that "[t]he curriculum for the course must provide instruction on

the physiological and psychological consequences of the abuse of

alcohol and other drugs , the societal and economic costs of

alcohol and drug abuse , the effects of alcohol and drug abuse on

the driver of a motor vehicle . . ." This provision supports

Mr. Eyer. It provides greater support for the Department and

FADP;

c. Section 322.055, Florida Statutes, provides penalties

for conviction of "certain drug offenses." This section defines

the "drug offenses" in terms of the use of "controlled

substances," and not in terms of alcohol. This provision

supports Mr. Eyer;

d. Section 322.056, Florida Statutes, provides penalties

for "certain alcohol or drug offenses." This provision supports

Mr. Eyer; and

e. Section 322.271(2)(c), Florida Statutes, uses the terms

"alcohol-related or drug-related offense." This provision

supports Mr. s.

25. Based upon the Legislature's use of the terms "alcohol"

and "drugs" in Chapter 322, Florida Statutes, it is still not

apparent what the Legislature intended by its use of the term

"drug" in Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

26. The statutory language at issue, based upon the

foregoing, does not establish the intent of the Legislature. It

is, therefore, appropriate to consider any available legislative

history concerning the term at issue:

a. The language at issue was added to Section 322.271,

Florida Statutes, by Chapter 90-102, Laws of Florida.;

b. An earlier version of the legislation, Committee

Substitute for Senate Bill 60, used the term "alcohol free"

instead of "drug free"; and

c. During a hearing of the Senate Judiciary-Criminal

Committee during the 1990 Legislative Session, the sponsor of the

bill, Senator Girardeau, stated that "drug" was being substituted

for the term "alcohol" because "alcohol is a drug."

27. This legislative history supports the Department's

interpretation of Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

28. The most compelling support for the Department's

interpretation of Section 322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, comes

from a consideration of the purpose behind the inclusion of the

prohibition of "drug" use during the 12-month period prior to

reinstatement of a restricted driver license. Persons who must

apply for a restricted license under Section 322.271(2)(b),

Florida Statutes, have had their right to operate a motor vehicle

revoked for a first conviction, or second conviction within a

period of five years after the first conviction, for operating a

motor vehicle under the influence of a mind-altering substance.

The Legislature has provided for the revocation of the person's

right to operate a motor vehicle because the Legislature believes

that the mind-altering substance, whether it be alcohol or some

other mind-impairing drug, has impaired the person's ability to

safely operate a motor vehicle.

29. When an individual has been convicted of operating a

motor vehicle under the influence of a mind-altering substance,

the Legislature has expressed its intent that such person not be

allowed to operate a motor vehicle, even for work purposes,

unless the person has refrained from using "drugs" during the

past 12 months. Clearly, the Legislature has recognized that

persons who have operated a motor vehicle while using a mind-

altering drug other than alcohol should not be allowed to operate

a motor vehicle even for a limited purpose until they refrain

from such use for a year. Mr. Eyer's position in this case

suggests that the Legislature intended that the same restriction

should not apply to persons who use one of the mind-altering

substances for which a person's right to drive can be revoked :

alcohol. To accept this suggested interpretation of Section

322.271(2)(b), Florida Statutes, would lead to an absurd

interpretation.

30. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the

Legislature intended to prohibit the use of alcohol during the

12-months prior to application for a hardship license when it

used the term "drug" in Section 322.217(2)(b), Florida Statutes.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

ORDERED that the Second Amended Petition Seeking

Administrative Determination of Validity of Rule is DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

LARRY J. SARTIN

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(904) 488- 9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 24th day of July, 1997.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Kelly H. Buzzett, Esquire

2 Hotz Avenue

Grayton Beach, Florida 32459

Electra Theodorides, Assistant General Counsel

Enoch J. Whitney, General Counsel

Department of Highway Safety

and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500

James W. Linn, Esquire

Edwin A. Steinmeyer, Esquire

LEWIS, LONGMAN and WALKER, P.A.

125 South Gadsden Street, Suite 300

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Carroll Webb, Executive Director

and General Counsel

Administrative Procedures Committee

Holland Building, Room 120

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code

The Elliott Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled

to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes.