00-000426 Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Real Estate vs. Terrell Laverne Solomon Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 2, 2000.

Summary: Licensee failed to fully disclose criminal history. Recommend 30-day suspension and $250 administrative fine.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 00-0426

)

TERRELL LAVERNE SOLOMON, )

)

Respondent. )

__________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings

by its duly-designated Administrative Law Judge, William J.

Kendrick, held a formal hearing in the above-styled case on

March 9, 2000, by video teleconference at sites in Tallahasse e

and Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Sunia Y. Marsh, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street

Post Office Box 1900

Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

For Respondent: Terrell Laverne Solomon, pro se

9555 Northwest 33rd Avenue

Miami, Florida 33147

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed

the offense set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if

so, what penalty should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 26, 1999, Petitioner issued a two-count

Administrative Complaint which charged Respondent, a licensed

real estate salesperson, violated certain provisions of Section

475.25, Florida Statutes. Count I alleged that Respondent

violated the provisions of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida

Statutes, by having "obtained a license by means of fraud,

misrepresentation, or concealment," and Count II alleged that

Respondent violated Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes,

by having "failed to disclose in his application for a real

estate sales person [license] information that Rule 61J2-

2.027(2), Florida Administrative Code, requires." The gravamen

of the charges was Petitioner's contention that in applying for

licensure as a real estate salesperson Respondent failed to

fully disclose his criminal history.

Respondent filed an election-of-rights wherein he disputed

the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative

Complaint. Consequently, Petitioner referred the matter to the

Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an

administrative law judge to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to

Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 120.60, Florida Statutes.

At hearing, Petitioner called Keith Chapman as a witness,

and Petitioner's Exhibits 1-8 were received into evidence. 1/

Respondent testified on his own behalf, but offered no exhibits.

A transcript of hearing was filed April 10, 2000, and the

parties were accorded 10 days from that date to file proposed

recommended orders. Petitioner elected to file such a proposal

and it has been duly-considered.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional

Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state

government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty

and responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints

pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular

Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475,

Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto.

2. Respondent, Terrell Laverne Solomon, is now, and was at

all times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesperson in

the State of Florida, having been issued license number SL-

0653405.

3. On or about June 16, 1997, Respondent filed an

application (dated June 10, 1997) with the Department for

licensure as a real estate salesperson. Pertinent to this case,

item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer "Yes"

or "No" (by checking the appropriate box) to the following

question:

Have you ever been convicted of a crime,

found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or

nolo contendere (no contest), even if

adjudication was withheld? This question

applies to any violation of the laws of any

municipality, county, state or nation,

including traffic offenses (but not parking,

speeding, inspection, or traffic signal

violations), without regard to whether you

were placed on probation, had adjudication

withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you

intend to answer "NO" because you believe

those records have been expunged or sealed

by court order pursuant to Section 943.058,

Florida Statutes, or applicable law of

another state, you are responsible for

verifying the expungement or sealing prior

to answering "NO."

If you answered "Yes," attach the details

including dates and outcome, including any

sentence and conditions imposed, in full on

a separate sheet of paper.

Your answer to this question will be

checked against local, state and federal

records. Failure to answer this question

accurately could cause denial of licensure.

If you do not fully understand this

question,

consult with an attorney or the Division of

Real Estate.

Respondent answered the question by checking the box marked

"Yes," and attached a handwritten note which revealed the

following details:

I pleaded guilty for drug possession and

carrying a concealed weapon. However, I

don't know the exact date, but it been [sic]

10 to 15 years ago. I also have a

conviction for driving under the influence

in [19]84.

The application concluded with Respondent's acknowledgement

before a Notary Public of the State of Florida as follows:

The above named, and undersigned,

applicant for licensure as a real estate

salesperson under the provisions of Chapter

475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon

being duly sworn, deposes and says that

(s)(he) is the person so applying, that

(s)(he) has carefully read the application,

answers, and the attached statements, if

any, and that all such answers and

statements are true and correct, and are as

complete as his/her knowledge, information

and records permit, without any evasions or

mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he)

knows of no reason why this application

should be denied; and (s)(he) further

extends this affidavit to cover all

amendments to this application or further

statements to the Division or its

representatives, by him/her in response to

inquiries concerning his/her qualifications.

4. On July 28, 1997, Respondent passed the salesperson

examination and was issued license number SL-0653405 as an

inactive salesperson. From September 17, 1997, through the date

of hearing, Respondent has been licensed as an active

salesperson associated with Anita Berger Realty, Inc., a broker

corporation located at 21414 West Dixie Highway, North Miami

Beach, Florida.

5. Following approval of Respondent's application, and his

licensure as a real estate salesperson, the Department received

the results of a state and federal records search which revealed

a criminal history that included charges not disclosed on

Respondent's application. That records search revealed the

following criminal history in the Circuit and County Courts,

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida (where

Respondent was "convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a

plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if

adjudication was withheld"): 2/

(a) On April 8, 1978, Respondent was

arrested and charged in Case No. M78-56023

with misdemeanor Battery, Resisting an

Officer Without Violence, and Disorderly

Conduct; and on August 19, 1981, was

convicted of each charge and sentenced to a

term of probation with special conditions.

(b) On September 17, 1979, Case No. 79-

12245, Respondent, upon entry of a plea of

guilty, was found guilty of Shooting into an

Occupied Dwelling; however, the court

withheld an adjudication of guilt.

(c) On June 17, 1985, Case No. 85-8549,

Respondent, upon entry of a plea of guilty,

was adjudicated guilty of Leaving the Scene

of an Accident Involving Personal Injury

(Count I), a third degree felony proscribed

by Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, and

Possession of a Controlled Substance, to-

wit: Heroin (Count 2), a third degree felony

proscribed by Section 893.13, Florida

Statutes; however, the court stayed and

withheld the imposition of sentence as to

each count and placed Respondent on

probation for a period of 4 years under the

supervision of the Department of

Corrections. Respondent's probation was

subsequently revoked and on April 18, 1989,

and he was committed to the custody of the

Sheriff of Dade County, Florida, to be

imprisoned for a term of 24 days, with

credit for time served.

(d) On December 30, 1989, Case No. 89-

50035, Respondent was arrested and charged

with carrying a concealed firearm, and on

December 31, 1989, was convicted and

sentenced (the specifics of which are not of

record).

As heretofore noted, Respondent's application did reveal that he

had entered a plea of "guilty for drug possession" (ostensibly

the June 17, 1985, conviction) and "carrying a concealed weapon"

(ostensibly the December 30, 1989, conviction). The remaining

criminal history was not disclosed.

6. Upon discovery of such information, the Department

apprised Respondent of its discovery and requested an

explanation. Respondent addressed the Department's concerns as

follows:

In regard with Section 455.225(1), Florida

Statutes. I answer [sic] Question 9 on my

application truthfully and to best of my

ability. It was never my intention to

violate Section 455.225 and 475.21, Florida

Statutes. I enclose[d] a letter from Metro-

Dade Police Department [with my application

which] stated that I have felony arrest and

misdemeanor arrest. At the time I was being

finger printed for DBPR, I ask [sic] the

finger printing officer can I have a copy of

my convictions and was denied. I also

enclosed a hand written letter statement,

all the conviction I can remember, and

that's why I check [sic] Question 9 Yes .

I'm not proud of my past life, but I work

hard to obtain my real estate license and

wouldn't do anything to jeodarize [sic] my

license. I just didn't remember my past

convictions, that's why I answer [sic]

question nine Yes . (Emphasis in original.)

7. Thereafter, on October 26, 1999, the Department issued

the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which,

based on Respondent's failure to disclose the aforesaid

incidents on his application, charged that Respondent has

"obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or

concealment" in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida

Statutes (Count I), and that Respondent has "failed to disclose

in his application for a real estate salesperson [license]

information that Rule 61J2-2.027(2), Florida Administrative

Code, requires" and therefore, violated Section 475.25(1)(e),

Florida Statutes (Count II). According to the complaint, the

disciplinary action sought for such violations was stated to be

as follows:

. . . [T]he penalty for each count or

separate offense may range from a reprimand;

an administrative fine not to exceed

$5,000.00 per violation; probation;

suspension of license, registration or

permit for a period not to exceed ten (10)

years; revocation of the license,

registration or permit; and any one or all

of the above penalties. . . . 3/

8. Consistent with the explanation he offered the

Department for his failure to fully disclose his criminal

history, Respondent explained, at hearing, that his response to

item 9 on the application was, at the time, an accurate

reflection of his recollection, and that it was not his

intention to mislead the Department by failing to disclose the

matters he overlooked. Specifically, the Respondent offered the

following explanation at hearing:

THE COURT: Why didn't you disclose your

1978 and 1979 problems with the disorderly

conduct and battery and the discharging the

firearm?

THE WITNESS: There's no reason. When I

went to get the fingerprint card done, I

asked the officer, can I get a print out of

my convictions and my felony record, and he

told me that he didn't do that and I didn't

know that I had to take it a step further.

I only checked Question 9, yes, to show that

I did have criminal past and I didn't know

that I had to take it a step further than

that. If I would have known that, I would

have took the opportunity to go do that.

But I didn't know that I had to check the

question and to present that for the

application.

THE COURT: What the question asked you,

if you answered, yes, then attach the

details, the dates and the outcome.

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's true and I know

I should have done it. But I asked them to

give me -- I couldn't put it on nobody but

myself. I should have taken it a step

further. To get the convictions. I wasn't

trying to hide anything from the Department.

* * *

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. MARSH:

Q Mr. Solomon, looking at your 1978

charge with the battery, resisting the

officer and disorderly conduct and the 1979

charge with the shooting in the occupied

dwelling . . . were you considering that if

you disclosed those to the commission, that

they would deny you a licensure?

A No, that's why I checked the question,

yes. I don't know how you look at it, but

if I wanted to tell the truth about it, I

would have checked, no, to the felony

arrest.

* * *

Q Did you believe the Department would

find all of your prior criminal cases?

A Yes. I knew that they would find it

but I didn't know that it would lead to this

here, because I did check the question, yes.

I didn't know it would lead to this, I would

have taken that extra day and not taken the

test and gotten the background check.

(Transcript, pages 24-27).

9. Here, Respondent's explanation for his failure to

disclose the full scope of his criminal history is credited, and

it is resolved that, at the time he submitted his application,

Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive the Department.

In so concluding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was

candid, the nature of the incidents he disclosed were serious,

as opposed to trivial, and his assumption that the complete

details of his criminal history would be revealed when the

Department (as it stated it would do on the application) checked

his response against local, state, and federal records was well

founded. Consequently, while his response to item 9 on the

application was incomplete, Respondent's failure to more fully

detail his criminal history is more appropriately characterized

as a careless, thoughtless, or heedless act as opposed to a

willful or intentional effort to mislead the Department as to

the true character of his history.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of these

proceedings. Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 120.60(5),

Florida Statutes.

11. Where, as here, the Department proposes to take

punitive action against a licensee, it must establish grounds

for disciplinary action by clear and convincing evidence. See

Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern and Co. ,

670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996); Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292

(Fla. 1987); Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation , 592

So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida

Statutes ("Findings of fact shall be based on a preponderance of

the evidence except in penal or license disciplinary proceedings

or except as otherwise provided by statute").

12. "'[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the

evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the

witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony

must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking

in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of

such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.'" In re Davey , 645

So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994), quoting with approval, from

Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

13. Moreover, in resolving cases of this nature, the

disciplinary action taken may be based only upon the offenses

specifically alleged in the administrative complaint. See

Kinney v. Department of State , 501 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 5th DCA

1987); Sternberg v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board

of Medical Examiners , 465 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); and

Hunter v. Department of Professional Regulation , 458 So. 2d 844

(Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Finally, in determining whether Respondent

violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1), as alleged in the

Administrative Complaint, one "must bear in mind that it is, in

effect, a penal statute. . . . This being true, the statute

must be strictly construed and no conduct is to be regarded as

included within it that is not reasonably proscribed by it."

Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational

Regulations , 348 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

14. Pertinent to this case, Section 475.25(1), Florida

Statutes, provides that the Florida Real Estate Commission:

. . . may deny an application for

licensure, registration, or permit, or

renewal thereof; may place a licensee,

registrant, or permittee on probation; may

suspend a license, registration, or permit

for a period not exceeding 10 years; may

revoke a license, registration, or permit;

may impose an administrative fine not to

exceed $1,000 for each count or separate

offense; and may issue a reprimand, and any

or all of the foregoing, if it finds that

the licensee, registrant, permittee, or

applicant:

* * *

(e) Has violated any of the provisions of

this chapter or any lawful order or rule

made or issued under the provisions of this

chapter or chapter 455.

* * *

(m) Has obtained a license by means of

fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment.

15. Pertinent to the perceived violation of Subsection

475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, Rule 61J2-2.027(2), Florida

Administrative Code, provides:

(2) The applicant must make it possible

to immediately begin the inquiry as to

whether the applicant is honest, truthful,

trustworthy, of good character, and bears a

good reputation for fair dealings, and will

likely make transactions and conduct

negotiations with safety to investors and to

those with whom the applicant may undertake

a relation of trust and confidence. The

applicant is required to disclose:

(a) if ever arrested or convicted of a

crime, or if any criminal or civil

proceeding is pending against the applicant,

or if any judgment or decree has been

rendered against the applicant in a case

wherein the pleadings charged the applicant

with fraudulent or dishonest dealings. . . .

16. To establish that a licensee committed a violation of

Subsection 475.25(1)(m), as alleged in Count I of the

Administrative Complaint, the Department must show not only that

the licensee provided false or misleading information on his

application, but that he did so knowingly and intentionally.

Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation , 592 So. 2d 1136,

1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ("[A]pplying to the words used [in

Section 475.25(1)(m)] their usual and natural meaning, it is

apparent that it is contemplated that an intentional act be

proved before a violation may be found."). Accord Walker v.

Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 23 Fla. L.

Weekly D292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). See also Gentry v. Department

of Professional and Occupational Regulations , 293 So. 2d 95, 97

(Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (statutory provision pro hibiting licensed

physicians from "[m]aking misleading, deceptive and untrue

representations in the practice of medicine" held not to apply

to "representations which are honestly made but happen to be

untrue"; "[t]o constitute a violation, . . . the legislature

intended that the misleading, deceptive and untrue

representations must be made willfully (intentionally))"; and

Naekel v. Department of Transportation , 782 F.2d 975, 978 (Fed.

Cir. 1986) ("[A] charge of falsification of a government

document [in this case, an employment application] requires

proof not only that an answer is wrong, but also that the wrong

answer was given with intent to deceive or mislead the agency.")

17. Here, the proof demonstrates with the requisite degree

of certainty that Respondent failed to fully disclose his

criminal history as required by item 9 on the application. What

remains to resolve is whether Respondent's failure may be

reasonably characterized as "willful," so as to constitute a

violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, or is

more appropriately characterized as careless or passive in

character so as to constitute a violation of Rule 61J2-2.027(2),

Florida Administrative Code, and, therefore, Subsection

475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. To reach a resolution of the

issue, it is necessary to resolve whether Respondent's failure

to disclose was "willful" or "intentional."

18. Where, as here, the legislature has not defined the

words used in a phrase, the language should usually be given its

plain and ordinary meaning. Southeastern Fisheries Association,

Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources , 453 So. 2d 1351 (Fla.

1984). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language, New College Edition (1979) defines "willful" as

"[s]aid or done in accordance with one's will; deliberate."

Perhaps more informative to the instant case, Black's Law

Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979) defines "willful" as follows:

Proceeding from a conscious motion of the

will; voluntary. Intending the result which

actually comes to pass; designed;

intentional; not accidental or involuntary.

An act or omission is "willfully" done, if

done voluntarily and intentionally and with

the specific intent to do something the law

forbids, or with the specific intent to fail

to do something the law requires to be done;

that is to say, with bad purpose either to

disobey or to disregard the law.

Willful is a word of many meanings, its

construction often influenced by its

context. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.

91, 101, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 89 L.Ed. 1495.

The word [willfully] often denotes an act

which is intentional, or knowing, or

voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.

But when used in a criminal context it

generally means an act done with a bad

purpose; without justifiable excuse;

stubbornly, obstinately, perversely. The

word is also employed to characterize a

thing done without ground for believing it

is lawful or conduct marked by a careless

disregard whether or not one has the right

so to act. United States v. Murdock, 290

U.S. 389, 394, 395, 54 S.Ct. 223, 225, 78

L.Ed. 381.

Whatever the grade of the offense the

presence of the word "willful" in the

definition will carry with it the

implication that for guilt the act must have

been done willingly rather than under

compulsion and, if something is required to

be done by statute, the implication that a

punishable omission must be by one having

the ability and means to perform. In re

Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801, 807, 193 P2d 734,

739.

A willful act may be described as one done

intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,

without justifiable excuse, as distinguished

from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,

heedlessly, or inadvertently. A willful act

differs essentially from a negligent act.

The one is positive and the other negative.

Premeditated; malicious; done with evil

intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or

with indifference to the natural

consequences; unlawful; without legal

justification.

19. Applying the words used in Subsection 475.25(1)(m),

Florida Statutes, their usual and customary meaning, it is

apparent that, to establish a violation of that subsection in

this case, the Department must show not only that Respondent

failed to fully disclose his criminal history, but that he did

so "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable

excuse, as distinguished from . . . carelessly, thoughtlessly,

heedlessly, or inadvertently." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth

Edition (1979), supra . Here, Respondent's failure to completely

disclose his criminal history partakes more of a careless,

thoughtless, or heedless act than one done with bad motive or

spite. Consequently, Respondent's failing has not been shown to

constitute a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida

Statutes, but has been shown to have violated the provisions of

Rule 61J2-2.027(2), Florida Administrative Code, and, therefore,

Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

20. Having resolved that Respondent violated the

provisions of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by

having failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 61J2-

2.027(2), Florida Administrative Code, it remains to resolve the

appropriate penalty that should be imposed. Pertinent to this

issue, Rule 61J2-24.001(3)(f), Florida Administrative Code,

provides that for a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e),

Florida Statutes, "[t]he usual action of the Commission shall be

to impose a penalty from an 8 year suspension to revocation and

an administrative fine of $1,000." Here, giving due regard for

the Commission's usual penalty, as well as the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances set forth in Rule 61J2-24.001(4),

Florida Administrative Code, including the time that has elapsed

since the offenses occurred and the absence of any proof that

the Department (given the nature of the offenses) would have

altered its decision (to approve Respondent's application for

licensure) had it known of Respondent's convictions, an

appropriate penalty for the violation found is a suspension for

30 days and an administrative fine of $250.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the

foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and which,

for the violation found, imposes a 30-day suspension and an

administrative fine of $250.

DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee,

Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

WILLIAM J. KENDRICK

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of May, 2000.

ENDNOTES

1/ Petitioner filed, post-hearing, a Notice of Filing Redacted

Exhibit and Amendment to Proposed Recommended Order, whereby

Petitioner offered a redacted (modified) copy of a portion of its

Exhibit 3 received into evidence. The redacted copy has been

marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9; however, since it was not

offered at hearing and does not accurately depict Respondent's

criminal record that is relevant to this case, it has been

rejected. At paragraph 5 of this Recommended Order are the only

criminal charges deemed relevant to this case.

For the record, the reader should note that the court reporter

attached copies of Petitioner's Exhibits 1-8 that were available

to Respondent at the hearing location in Miami, Florida. Also

submitted to the agency with this Recommended Order are

Petitioner's Exhibits 1-8, available at the hearing location in

Tallahassee, Florida, as well as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 for

identification, filed post-hearing.

2/ Petitioner also offered proof (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) that

on July 31, 1994, in Case No. 94-36610, the court disposed of a

charge of Disorderly Intoxication that had been filed against

Respondent by withholding adjudication and crediting Respondent

with time served. No further record exists concerning the nature

of the charge or its disposition, and such matter was not charged

in the Administrative Complaint as a basis for disciplinary

action. Consequently, it has not been deemed relevant to these

proceedings. See Kinney v. Department of State , 501 So. 2d 129

(Fla. 5th DCA 1987) and other authority cited in the Conclusions

of Law.

3/ The Department also sought an award of costs as provided for

by Section 455.227(3), Florida Statutes; however, it offered no

proof, at hearing, regarding what costs, if any, it incurred.

Consequently, there is no record basis on which to make a

recommendation concerning any cost award.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Sunia Y. Marsh, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street

Post Office Box 1900

Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Terrell Laverne Solomon

9555 Northwest 33rd Avenue

Miami, Florida 33147

Herbert S. Fecker, Director

Division of Real Estate

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Post Office Box 1900

Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.