00-001472 Department Of Children And Family Services vs. Louise Daniels Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, November 9, 2000.

Summary: A foster parent spanked a foster child. This constitutes corporal punishment, leading to a recommendation that the foster license be revoked.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN )

AND FAMILY SERVICES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 00-1472

)

LOUISE DANIELS, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Notice was provided and on August 23, 2000, a formal hearing

was held in this case. The hearing location was the Suwannee

County Courthouse, Second Floor, Room 2, 200 South Ohio Avenue,

Live Oak, Florida. Authority for conducting the hearing is set

forth in Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The

hearing was conducted by Charles C. Adams, Administrative Law

Judge.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Lucy Goddard, Esquire

Depar tment of Children

and Family Services

Post Office Box 390, Mail Sort 3

Gainesville, Florida 32602-0390

For Respondent: Merrill C. Tunsil, Esquire

Post Office Box 2113

Lake City, Florida 32056

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Should Petitioner revoke the foster home license held by

Respondent for the alleged use of excessive corporal punishment

against a foster child cared for in Respondent's home?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 16, 2000, Ms. Judith S. Parks, Operations Program

Administrator, Department of Children and Family Services,

District 3, wrote Respondent notifying Respondent pursuant to

Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Rules 65C-13.005, 65C-

13.006 and 65C-13.010(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code, that

Petitioner proposed to revoke Respondent's foster home license.

The basis for the proposed action was in relation to an alleged

incident on or about December 30, 1999, involving use of

excessive corporal punishment against a foster child cared for by

Respondent in her home, as evidenced by bruises on that child.

The charging document notified Respondent that she could contest

the allegations by requesting a hearing to be conducted in

accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. In correspondence

from Respondent to Petitioner received by Petitioner's District 3

legal counsel on March 29, 2000, Respondent sought a formal

hearing to contest the factual allegations in the complaint

letter.

On April 5, 2000, the Division of Administrative Hearings

received written notification from Petitioner requesting an

Administrative Law Judge to conduct a hearing to resolve disputed

facts between the parties leading to the entry of a recommended

order. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

Following one continuance the hearing was conducted on the

aforementioned date.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Use Video Taped Deposition of

Minor Child in Lieu of Live Testimony or Alternatively for In-

Camera or Separate Examination of Minor Child. This motion was

in relation to B.H. who at the time of hearing was six years old

and was five years old on or about December 30, 1999, when the

alleged incident took place. The alleged incident involves the

use of corporal punishment by Respondent directed to A.H., B.H.'s

brother. A.H. at the time of the alleged incident was three

years old. A.H. was four years old when the motion was filed.

The motion is dated August 22, 2000. The video deposition of

B.H. referred to in the motion was taken on August 3, 2000, in

the presence of Cassie Minnich, Court Reporter; Lucy Goddard,

Esquire; and Merril C. Tunsil, Esquire, who questioned B.H.

concerning the alleged incident without the child's providing an

oath before responding to the questions. B.H.'s guardian ad

litem , Ms. Becky Hamalian, was also in attendance. The

transcript of the video deposition was identified in the hearing

record as DCF Exhibit No. 2. The video-tape of the deposition

session was identified as DCF Exhibit No. 3.

At hearing, by agreement between the attorneys, B.H. was

presented as a witness in - camera , without Respondent's

attendance. The in-hearing examination of the witness B.H. was

made in the presence of Ray D. Convery, Court Reporter, the

attorneys, Ms. Hamalian as guardian ad litem , and the

undersigned. Again, B.H. was questioned without his oath to tell

the truth but in consideration of questions designed to test his

ability to discern the truth. Through the questioning B.H. did

not recount facts implicating Respondent in the use of corporal

punishment directed to A.H. on or about December 30, 1999.

In turn Petitioner's counsel sought the introduction of DCF

Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, the video deposition transcript and video-

tape of the deposition taken on August 3, 2000, under authority

set forth in Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes. In addition

Petitioner's counsel sought the introduction of oral statements

attributable to B.H. and A.H. made on December 30, 1999,

concerning Respondent's alleged use of corporal punishment

against A.H. on or around that date. The basis for the attempted

introduction of those hearsay statements was Section 90.803(23),

Florida Statutes. By these attempts Petitioner hoped to

demonstrate that the statements made by the children outside the

hearing, complied with the hearsay exception set forth in Section

90.803(23), Florida Statutes.

Moreover, on August 3, 2000, A.H. gave a video-taped

deposition before Ms. Minnich, Court Reporter. A.H. was examined

by Ms. Goddard and Mr. Tunsil. Ms. Hamalian as guardian ad litem

was also in attendance. Respondent offered the transcript of

that video-deposition as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 and the video

of that deposition as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. The A.H. video

deposition is subject to consideration consistent with Section

90.803(23), Florida Statutes.

In the event that the out-of-hearing statements by B.H. and

A.H., made through the deposition sessions on August 3, 2000, or

made orally on December 30, 1999, were not found to be exceptions

to hearsay in accordance with Section 90.803(23), Florida

Statutes, they are subject to consideration as other forms of

evidence. As explained during the final hearing, those

statements would be examined to determine if they might be used

for purposes of supplementing or explaining other evidence,

having been found insufficient in themselves to support a finding

of fact based upon the realization that those statements by the

children would be inadmissible over objections lodged in civil

actions. Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

Consideration of the statements by A.H. and B.H. under

Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, is controlled by the

decisions in State v. Townsend , 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994) and In

the Interest of C.W., a Child v. Dept of Health and

Rehabilitative Services , 681 So. 2d 1181, (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Having considered these matters, DCF Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3

and Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, in relation to the video-

taped depositions given by A.H. and B.H. on August 3, 2000, are

denied admission as not constituting exceptions to hearsay under

Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes. The oral statements

attributable to B.H. on December 30, 1999, do not constitute

exceptions to hearsay under Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes.

The oral statements attributable to A.H. on December 30, 1999,

are exceptions to hearsay under Section 90.803(23), Florida

Statutes. 1

DCF Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 pertaining to B.H. are admissible

under Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes. The oral

statements attributable to B.H. on December 30, 1999, are

admissible under Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, the August 3, 2000,

video-deposition materials in association with A.H. are

admissible to the extent they tend to impeach A.H.'s oral

statement made on December 30, 1999.

Petitioner presented B.H., Stacey Cleveland, Julia Johnson,

Steve Lampros, and Barbara Brannan as its witnesses. DCF's

Exhibits Nos. 1 and 4 through 10 were admitted. Ruling was

reserved on the admission of DCF's Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. They

are admitted as described above. Respondent testified in her own

behalf. Ruling was reserved on the admission of Respondent's

Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. They are admitted as described above.

The hearing transcript was filed on September 7, 2000. Upon

the request by counsel for Petitioner, without opposition from

Respondent's counsel, the time for filing proposed recommended

orders was extended to 20 days from receipt of the transcript by

the Division of Administrative Hearings. By such arrangement the

requirement for entering a recommended order within 30 days of

the date upon which the transcript was received was waived.

Section 28-106.216, Florida Administrative Code. On

September 25, 2000, Petitioner filed its proposed recommended

order which has been considered in preparing the recommended

order. Respondent did not submit a proposed recommended order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In accordance with Section 409.175, Florida Statutes,

Petitioner licenses family foster homes.

2. At times relevant to the inquiry Respondent has held a

family foster home license issued by Petitioner.

3. As a condition of her licensure as a foster parent,

Respondent received training in Model Approach to Partnerships

and Parenting (MAPP). The MAPP training addressed the imposition

of discipline directed to foster children in Respondent's care.

The disciplinary policy included a prohibition against

disciplinary practices involving corporal punishment. In

particular the disciplinary policy prohibited slapping or

spanking a child. (DCF Exhibit No. 9) By signing a copy of that

disciplinary policy Respondent acknowledged her understanding and

agreement to abide by those terms on May 28, 1999. Generally, by

stipulation between counsel, Respondent concedes the existence of

the policy prohibiting slapping or spanking a child in her care.

4. Ms. Stacey Cleveland has responsibility in Petitioner's

District 3 related to foster home licensing. Ms. Cleveland

provided MAPP training to Respondent, including training on

discipline and the prohibition against the use of corporal

punishment. In 1997, Ms. Cleveland had a specific discussion

with Respondent concerning the prohibition against the use of

corporal punishment in caring for foster children. At that time

Respondent stated her agreement with the prohibition against the

use of corporal punishment directed to foster children.

5. From April 23, 1999, through December 30, 1999, A.H. and

B.H. lived in Respondent's home as foster children. On

December 30, 1999, A.H. was three years old and B.H. was five

years old.

6. On December 30, 1999, A.H. and B.H. were involved in a

supervised visit with their natural mother at the Petitioner's

Live Oak, Florida office.

7. During the visit the natural mother took A.H. to the

bathroom and discovered bruises on his buttocks. The natural

mother immediately reported the discovery to Petitioner's

personnel.

8. Julia Johnson and Steven Lampros, Petitioner's

employees, both observed the bruises on A.H.'s buttocks.

Mr. Lampros took photographs of the bruises. (DCF Exhibits

Nos. 4 through 6)

9. Respondent caused the bruising to A.H.'s buttocks by

imposing corporal punishment on A.H. at a time prior to

December 30, 1999. This act was contrary to the prohibitio n

against the use of corporal punishment by spanking. Respondent

knowingly violated those terms. Respondent's testimony that A.H.

may have received the bruises by jumping off the sofa and falling

on the wooden arm of that furniture; jumping off the sofa landing

on his buttocks on the floor; being pushed by another foster

child from a toy jeep or being pushed against the bathroom door

by B.H., his brother, is not persuasive.

10. The finding that A.H. was bruised on his buttocks when

Respondent spanked him is corroborated by the deposition

testimony of Dr. Howard Rogers, a Board-Certified physician in

general pediatrics. Dr. Rogers routinely examines children who

are the alleged victims of abuse. Dr. Rogers examined A.H. on

December 30, 1999. He recalls the examination based upon his

report rendered concerning the examination and the photos made by

Mr. Lampros on December 30, 1999. Dr. Rogers does not believe

that the bruises on A.H.'s buttocks were accidental in nature

given the intensity of the bruising and the linear shape of some

of the bruises. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty

Dr. Rogers did not find the bruises to be consistent with any

form of trauma other than corporal punishment. According to

Dr. Rogers corporal punishment was t he more likely cause of the

bruising. Dr. Rogers' opinion concerning the appearance of the

bruises is credited.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

11. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this

action in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes.

12. Petitioner seeks to revoke the foster home license held

by Respondent based upon the alleged administration of corporal

punishment against A.H., a foster child in her care, on or about

December 30, 1999.

13. Petitioner issued a foster care license to Respondent

under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.

14. Section 409.175(8)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes

empowers Petitioner to discipline the foster home license held by

Respondent wherein it states:

(a) The department may deny, suspend or

revoke a license.

(b) Any of the following actions by a home

or agency or its personnel is a ground for

denial, suspension or revocation of a

license:

1. An intentional or negligent act

materially affecting the health or safety of

children in the home or agency.

2. A violation of the provisions of this

section or of licensing rules promulgated

pursuant to this section.

15. The foster home license held by Respondent is not a

property right, it is a matter of public trust and privilege, not

an entitlement. Section 409.175(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Having

in mind the nature of the license, to prevail in this case

Petitioner must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the

evidence. Section 120.57(1)(h), Florida Statutes.

16. As stated in the charge letter, Respondent is alleged

to have violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)5, a licensing rule

promulgated pursuant to Section 409.175(8)(b), Florida Statutes.

Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)5.f states:

(1) Responsibilities of the Substitute

Parent to the Child.

* * *

(b) Family Care Activities.

* * *

5. Discipline.

* * *

f. The substitute care parents must not use

corporal punishment of any kind.

17. Petitioner has also provided guidance to the Respondent

through the MAPP training that Respondent should not engage in

corporal punishment by spanking a child, an admonition

acknowledged by Respondent.

18. Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that Respondent engaged in corporal punishment in

spanking A.H. a foster child in her care. Given the absolute

prohibition against the use of corporal punishment of any kind in

caring for a foster child license, revocation is appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of

law reached, it is

RECOMMENDED:

That Petitioner enter a final order revoking the family

foster home license held by Respondent.

DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2000, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

CHARLES C. ADAMS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 9th day of November , 2000.

ENDNOTE

1/ Section 90.803(23) states:

HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF CHILD VICTIM.--

(a) Unless the source of information or the

method or circumstances by which the

statement is reported indicates a lack of

trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement

made by a child victim with a physical,

mental, emotional, or developmental age of 11

or less describing any act of child abuse or

neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a

child, the offense of child abuse, the

offense of aggravated child abuse, or any

offense involving an unlawful sexual act,

contact, intrusion, or penetration performed

in the presence of, with, by, or on the

declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is

admissible in evidence in any civil or

criminal proceeding if:

1. The court finds in a hearing conducted

outside the presence of the jury that the

time, content, and circumstances of the

statement provide sufficient safeguards of

reliability. In making its determination,

the court may consider the mental and

physical age and maturity of the child; the

nature an duration of the abuse or offense,

the relationship of the child to the

offender, the reliability of the assertion,

the reliability of the child victim, and any

other factor deemed appropriate; and

2. The child either:

a. Testifies; or

b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided

that there is other corroborative evidence of

the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall

include a finding by the court that the

child's participation in the trial or

proceeding would result in a substantial

likelihood of severe emotional or mental

harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s.

90.804(1).

(b) In a criminal action, the defendant

shall be notified no later than 10 days

before trial that a statement which qualifies

as a hearsay exception pursuant to this

subsection will be offered as evidence at

trial. The notice shall include a written

statement of the content of the child's

statement, the time at which the statement

was made, the circumstances surrounding the

statement which indicate its reliability, and

such other particulars as necessary to

provide full disclosure of the statement.

(c) The court shall make specific findings

of fact, on the record, as to the basis for

its ruling under this subsection.

Both A.H and B.H. at times they gave out-of-hearing

statements on December 30, 1999 and August 3, 2000, were less

than eleven years of age as contemplated by Section 90.803(23),

Florida Statutes.

On December 30, 1999, the natural mother of A.H. and B.H.

was participating in a visit with the children at Petitioner's

facility. On that date the natural mother discovered bruises on

the buttocks of A.H. as depicted in DCF Exhibits Nos. 4 through 6

admitted as evidence. Upon this discovery, the mother

immediately inquired of Ms. Julia Johnson, Family Services

Counselor for Petitioner, what should be done.

On this occasion A.H. told Ms. Johnson that "he had been

spanked."

When Ms. Johnson refers to A.H.'s remarking that he had been

"spanked," that reflects her sense of what the child said, it is

not a verbatim recount of the remarks by A.H.

On December 30, 1999, while questioning A.H. at the

Petitioner's facility Ms. Johnson recounts A.H.'s reference to

"Mother", "Mommie", "Mom." Ms. Johnson attempted to clarify "who

Mommie was, was it the Mom he lived with or the Mom that was

visiting him there?" A.H. responded that it was the "Mom" he

lived with. At that time A.H. was living with the Respondent and

not his natural mother. In Ms. Johnson's presence A.H. stated

that the "spanking" was done with a belt.

A.H. was taken to Mr. Steve Lampros, a Child Protective

Investigator for Petitioner. Mr. Lampros took pictures of the

bruises on A.H.'s buttocks. DCF Exhibits Nos. 4 through 6

Ms. Johnson also observed the bruises on A.H.'s buttocks.

Mr. Lampros interviewed A.H. and B.H. on December 30, 1999.

A.H. was interviewed first. Mr. Lampros asked A.H. how A.H. got

the marks on his backside. Mr. Lampros interpreted A.H.'s

response as stating that he received a spanking from Mom. In his

remarks A.H. used the term "spanked." A.H. told Mr. Lampros that

he was spanked with a belt. Mr. Lampros asked A.H. to clarify

whether the mother that A.H. referred to as spanking A.H. was his

natural mother or Respondent. During this process A.H. referred

to Respondent as being the person who spanked A.H.

On December 30, 1999, when Mr. Lampros questioned B.H. about

A.H., Mr. Lampros asked B.H. if "A.H." had been bad and been

spanked. B.H. replied that A.H. was spanked and sent to his

room. In this interview B.H. told Mr. Lampros that Respondent,

whom B.H. referred to as "Mrs. Daniels," had spanked "A." The

reference to "A." is taken to mean A.H. B.H. said a dark blue

belt had been used in the spanking. In the earlier interview

A.H. had referred to the belt as being black in color.

The interview which Mr. Lampros held with A.H., to include

the examining and photographing of A.H.'s buttocks took

approximately 15 minutes. The actual conversation held between

Mr. Lampros and A.H. took approximately 5 to 6 minutes.

Mr. Lampros did not find A.H. especially talkative, but A .H. did

answer the questions posed to him. A.H. did not give a clear

answer concerning the point in time at which he had been spanked.

This was in contrast to B.H.'s statement to Mr. Lampros

indicating that A.H. was spanked by Respondent the day before the

December 30, 1999 interview. B.H. referred to the place in time

at which Respondent spanked A.H. as "yesterday."

On December 30, 1999, Mr. Lampros took approximately ten

minutes in interviewing B.H. concerning the alleged incident. In

the course of this discussion Mr. Lampros asked B.H. if he had

been spanked, but spent most of the interview inquiring about

A.H. being spanked. B.H.'s comments about A.H.'s spanking were

made toward the end of the interview with Mr. Lampros.

As contemplated by Section 90.803(23)(a), Florida Statutes,

the statements made by A.H. during the course of his interview on

December 30, 1999, refer to child abuse through the Respondent's

use of corporal punishment within the context of the prohibited

disciplinary practice of slapping or spanking a child who is

under foster care. A.H. was the putative victim of child abuse.

B.H. was an observer, not a victim. Only A.H.'s statements made

on December 30, 1999, are subject to examination pursuant to

Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes.

Given the nature of the report of bruising, the time taken

in conducting the interview, the place in which the interview was

conducted, the content of the remarks by the child when

identifying the person responsible for administering the corporal

punishment, as has been explained, sufficient safeguards of

reliability exists concerning A.H.'s remarks. The age of A.H. on

December 30, 1999 leads to the conclusion that A.H. did not

specifically understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth.

No attempt was made to ascertain his ability to tell the truth in

the course of the interview. Notwithstanding his age, given the

nature of the statements made by A.H. and the method and

circumstances under which the spanking was reported, the

statements made by A.H. do not lack trustworthiness.

In relation to reliability, while it is recognized that A.H.

was young when the interview was conducted on December 30, 1999,

as to mental age and maturity, this did not detract from his

ability to report the nature and duration of the abuse that has

been described, taking into account his relationship to the

Respondent.

In determining the trustworthiness and reliability of A.H.'s

December 30, 1999 statement, it is noted that the bruises were

discovered by the natural mother who immediately sought the

assistance of Petitioner's employees. Shortly thereafter in a

brief interview A.H. responded that "Mom" had spanked him and

distinguished between the Respondent and his natural mother. His

terminology in describing the incident was what you would expect

of a child of similar age. There was no apparent motive to

fabricate the claim that Respondent spanked him. Given the

nature of A.H.'s statement and the supporting physical evidence,

the circumstance was not one in which A.H. was unable to

distinguish between reality and fantasy. His accusations were

not vague nor the product of improper influence. His accusations

were not contradictory.

A.H. did not testify at the hearing. Section

90.803(23)(a)2.a, Florida Statutes. For his statement provided

on December 30, 1999, concerning corporal punishment administered

by Respondent to be admitted as an exception to hearsay, A.H.

must be found to be unavailable as a witness consistent with

Section 90.803(23)(a)2.b, Florida Statutes, and the cases cited.

To corroborate A.H.'s December 30, 1999 statement accusing

Respondent, the deposition testimony of Dr. Howard Rogers, Board

Certified in general pediatrics, was presented. That deposition

is DCF Exhibit No. 1. Dr. Rogers examined A.H.'s buttocks on

December 30, 1999. Dr. Rogers observed bruises on the buttocks

as well as the lower back. Based upon his observation,

Dr. Rogers expressed, within a reasonable degree of medical

certainty, that the bruises on the buttocks were not accidentally

obtained. Dr. Rogers observed the bruising by the intensity

present and the shape, implying a linear pattern, especially as

to the right side of the buttocks, indicating something like a

belt or some instrument had been used in establishing the

bruises. Given that bruising was found on both sides of the

buttocks that was fairly significant, Dr. Rogers, within a

reasonable degree of medical certainty, expressed the opinion

that the bruising was inconsistent with other forms of trauma

than corporal punishment. Dr. Rogers expressed the opinion that

it is very uncommon to get bruises on the buttocks that are not

inflicted. The appearance of the bruising on A.H.'s buttocks was

consistent with something Dr. Rogers sees fairly often in his

work. That appearance is associated with the administration of

corporal punishment by spanking or paddling, causing bruising.

Dr. Rogers' opinion is persuasive when describing the bruises

present on A.H.'s buttocks.

No expert testimony was introduced that A.H.'s participation

in the hearing would result in substantial likelihood of severe

emotional or mental harm.

It has been concluded that A.H. when he provided his

statement on December 30, 1999, was incapable of understanding

the duty of a witness to tell the truth. Section 90.603(2),

Florida Statutes. Thus in keeping with the opinion in State v.

Townsend , supra , A.H. was unavailable to testify as a witness at

the hearing based upon an existing mental infirmity within the

meaning of Section 90.804(1)(d), Florida Statutes, related to his

incompetency to testify, lacking an appreciation of the duty and

obligation to tell the truth when the statement was provided on

December 30, 1999. Nonetheless, the nature of the incident

reported by A.H., together with the continuing physical

manifestation of A.H.'s report, the bruising, make A.H.'s

statement sufficiently competent without strict adherence to the

expectation that A.H. be capable of understanding the duty of a

witness to tell the truth.

In a statement provided by A.H. on August 3, 2000, that was

video-taped and transcribed, A.H. did not provide a statement

that Respondent had spanked him on or about December 30, 1999.

The August 3, 2000 statement is not an exception to hearsay

envisioned by Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes.

The video-taped statement given by B.H. on August 3, 2000,

did not constitute an out-of-hearing statement made by a child

victim in describing an act of child abuse. The August 3, 2000

statement by B.H. is not countenanced by Section 90.803(23),

Florida Statutes, as an exception to hearsay.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Lucy Goddard, Esquire

Department of Children

and Family Services

Post Office Box 390, Mail Sort 3

Gainesville, Florida 32602-0390

Merrill C. Tunsil, Esquire

Post Office Box 2113

Lake City, Florida 32056

Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk

Department of Children

and Family Services

Building 2, Room 204B

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Josie Tomayo, General Counsel

Department of Children

and Family Services

Building 2, Room 204

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.