00-002767PL Tom Gallagher, As Commissioner Of Education vs. Ronald R. Desjarlais Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, October 31, 2000.

Summary: Petitioner proved that teacher lied about setting fire to his motor vehicle on school grounds and thus proved a lack of honesty in professional dealings; one and a half year suspension of teacher`s certificate.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

TOM GALLAGHER, AS COMMISSIONER )

OF EDUCATION , )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 00-2767PL

)

RONALD R. DESJARLAIS, )

)

Respondent. )

_______________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings, conducted the final hearing in Fort

Myers, Florida, on October 2, 2000.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Bruce P. Taylor

Post Office Box 131

St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-0131

For Respondent: Robert J. Coleman

Coleman & Coleman

Post Office Box 2089

Fort Myers, Florida 33902

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of deliberately

setting his motor vehicle on fire on school grounds and then

fraudulently concealing that he did so and whether such conduct

is an act involving moral turpitude, in violation of Section

231.28(1)(c), Florida Statutes; personal conduct that seriously

reduces the effectiveness of a school board employee, in

violation of Section 231.28(1)(f), Florida Statutes; and in

derogation of the following three provisions of the Principles of

Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida, in

violation of Section 231.28(1)( i), Florida Statutes: the

requirement of making a reasonable effort to protect a student

from conditions harmful to learning or to protect the student's

mental health or physical safety, as required by Rule

6B -1.006(3)(a), Florida Administr ative Code; the prohibition

against exposing a student to unnecessary embarrassment or

disparagement, as prohibited by Rule 6B -1.006(3)(e), Florida

Administrative Code; and the requirement of maintaining honesty

in all professional dealings, as required by Rule 6B-1.006(5)(a),

Florida Administrative Code.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By Administrative Complaint dated June 6, 2000, Petitioner

alleged that, on April 19, 1999, Respondent deliberately set his

motor vehicle on fire in the parking lot of Cypress Lake High

School. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent

initially lied to investigators, saying that he did not know how

the fire had started, and then later admitted to having set the

fire himself.

The Administrative Complaint alleges that Resp ondent later

pleaded no contest to criminal mischief. The circuit court

allegedly withheld adjudication and sentenced Respondent to one

year's probation, counseling, court costs, and fines.

At the hearing, Petitioner called six witnesses and offered

into evidence ten exhibits. Respondent called one witness and

offered into evidence six exhibits. All exhibits were admitted.

The court reporter filed the Transcript on October 18, 2000.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent has held Florida Educator's Certificate

751546, which covers Spanish, since 1995. The certificate

expires June 30, 2002.

2. Since his arrival in Florida in 1995, Respondent has

taught Spanish at Cypress Lake High School in Lee County. He

taught continuously in this position until terminated on or

shortly after April 19, 1999, for the incident described below.

3. Respondent was a popular and effective teacher. He

enjoyed good rapport with his students and their parents. He

volunteered to run the school Spanish club and helped at football

and basketball games.

4. On the morning of April 19, 1999, Respondent drove his

1997 Toyota 4Runner SR5 to work. Respondent claimed that the

sport utility vehicle had not given him problems, and he had not

had any problems making the payments on the car loan secured by

the vehicle.

5. On his way to work, Respondent stopped in a gas station

and filled up the tank. He paid for the gasoline with a debit

card and proceeded to drive to Cypress Lake High School where he

taught.

6. Respondent arrived at Cypress Lake High School at about

6:00 a.m. He parked in the front of the building. He normally

parked in the back of the building, but there was some

construction activity that had taken place in the rear parking

area. Respondent walks with the assistance of a cane, and he

would likely avoid debris-filled or disorganized parking areas.

7. At 6:00 a.m., Respondent would unlikely encounter any

staff at the school except kitchen staff, who parked in the rear.

Three or four teachers, including Respondent, typically arrived

by 6:00 a.m., but the great majority of the teachers arrived

significantly later. The teachers' day ran from 7:00 a.m. until

2:30 p.m.

8. Likewise, students would not arrive until after

6:30 a.m. The first school bus arrived at 6:40 a.m., but most of

the buses did not arrive until 7:00 a.m. School started at

7:20 a.m.

9. Arriving at 6:00 a.m., Respondent thus joined on the

campus no more than a couple of teachers, some of the kitchen

staff in the back, and no students.

10. On the morning in question, Respondent took some

materials into the office to copy. He had not been inside for

very long when a janitor, who was performing his morning trash-

collection duties, saw that Respondent's parked vehicle was on

fire. Proceeding to the main office, the janitor encountered

Respondent and informed him that his vehicle was on fire.

Respondent expressed surprised disbelief.

11. In fact, Respondent was not surprised. Under

Petitioner's version of events, Respondent was not surprised

because he had set the fire himself. Under Respondent's version

of events, he was not surprised because, after he had entered the

building, he discovered someone setting fire to Respondent's

vehicle.

12. Respondent testified that he had found the library

locked, so he was walking to another area to do his copying and

drop off his briefcase in his classroom. As he walked by a point

from which he could see his parked vehicle, Respondent noticed

that the rear right door was open.

13. Respondent testified that he walked directly to his

vehicle. As he approached, he smelled gasoline. He then saw a

young man on the left side of the vehicle with shoulder-length

brown hair and dressed in camouflage beside the car. The man saw

Respondent and shouted, "Fuck you, teach." The vehicle then

burst into flames, as Respondent was standing on the right side

of the vehicle. The man then warned Respondent, "If you tell,

your wife and family are next." After uttering this warning, the

man ran into the school building and turned down a hall.

Respondent testified that he had never seen the man before or

since and did not know his identity.

14. The different versions of events coalesce at this

point. Authorities summoned to the school extinguished the fire

prior to the principal's arrival at school around 6:23 a.m.

However, the fire had extensively damaged the vehicle, whose

interior had been consumed by flames.

15. Despite the intensity of the flames, which required

foam rather than water to extinguish, the first firefighter on

the scene testified that the fire had not really been dangerous

and that the vehicle's location was well away from the building

and any other vehicles. Given the early hour of the fire, only a

couple of onlookers were present during the blaze, and they were

not students.

16. The first firefighter on the scene is also a deputy

sheriff with the Lee County Sheriff's Office. Having noticed a

container in the front seat of the vehicle, the firefighter asked

Respondent, who was standing by, if anyone might be mad at him.

When Respondent said no one was mad at him, the firefighter

explained that he had found a container on the passenger side.

Respondent asked if he could approach the vehicle and look

inside. When the firefighter agreed that he could, Respondent

walked around the nearer right side of the vehicle, whose windows

were smoky, and approached the left side of the vehicle, whose

windows had been broken out. Having crossed in front of the

vehicle, Respondent passed up an opportunity to peer into the

driver's window, choosing instead to look into the left rear

window.

17. In looking in the left rear window, Respondent saw

another container that had been behind the driver's seat, but

which the firefighters had not yet found. Respondent explained

that he had wanted to look through a window that gave him a view

of the front, middle, and back of the interior. However, no one

had restricted the number or location of views that he could take

of the interior.

18. Respondent then returned to the firefighter, who said

that they would conduct an investigation and that Respondent

should remain available. Respondent testified that he believed

that the investigators would dust the vehicle for fingerprints,

and then they would discover the identity of the person who had

burned the vehicle. Respondent explained that he did not wish to

countermand the order of the arsonist by identifying him or doing

anything that would assist the authorities in capturing him.

19. A short while later, after being summoned to the

principal's office, Respondent told the principal that "someone

apparently torched" the vehicle. Respondent did not assert that

a student had set the fire. After speaking with the principal,

Respondent returned to the parking lot to speak with the

firefighter and an arson investigator from the State Fire

Marshall's Office.

20. Upon his arrival, the arson investigator had taken

samples from the two containers: one in the front passenger area

and one in the right rear passenger area. These samples later

proved that the containers, which were large, plastic water jugs,

had contained gasoline. The arson investigator did not take a

sample from a third jug, which appeared to be the type of jug

used to transport swimming pool chlorine.

21. The arson investigator analyzed the burn marks in the

interior and determined that the fire started with gasoline in

the driver's area, where the damage was greatest. Lacking any

evidence of other forms of ignition, the investigator determined

that the fire ignited with an open-flame device, such as a

lighted match or lighter.

22. The arson investigator asked Respondent some

preliminary questions concerning his ownership of the vehicle,

whether he had had any problems with the vehicle or with any

persons, and how he had learned of the fire. Noticing that his

right pant leg had been slightly singed by fire, the investigator

asked if Respondent had been near any open flames recently.

Respondent replied that he had not. The investigator asked if he

could examine Respondent's right hand. After Respondent extended

his hand for examination, the investigator noticed that the hair

on the hand had been singed and rolled up or beaded, as though it

had had contact with accelerent and flame.

23. At this point, the arson investigator informed

Respondent of his observations on the pant leg and hand. He

asked Respondent if he would prefer to avoid the embarrassment of

further interrogation at the school and instead join the

investigator at a nearby sheriff's office substation.

24. After Respondent agreed to join the investigator at the

substation, the investigator summoned a sheriff's deputy to

transport Respondent to the substation. A few minutes later a

deputy, in a marked patrol car, arrived at the school and

transported Respondent, unhandcuffed, to the substation.

25. Respondent arrived at the substation first. He went to

the restroom and removed his socks, replacing them in a way as to

conceal a hole that had been burned in one sock, just above the

loafer on his right foot. In fact, Respondent had suffered a

painful burn on his right foot while standing by the driver's

door of his vehicle and starting the fire.

26. At the substation, the arson investigator was joined by

the firefighter who had allowed Respondent to view his vehicle

and another firefighter, who was also a representative of the

State Fire Marshall's Office. The three men then led Respondent

into an interview room off the main lobby. The arson

investigator summarized the evidence against Respondent and

warned him, "We can do this the easy way or the hard way." He

added that, if Respondent cooperated, they could go to the state

attorney and judge and explain that Respondent had been

cooperative. The arson investigator then read Respondent his

Miranda rights, and Respondent responded, "I think I'm going to

need a lawyer."

27. The arson investigator and firefighter immediately left

the interview room. The other representative of the State Fire

Marshall's Office remained in the interview room and spoke with

Respondent. The record is undeveloped as to the contents of

their conversation. However, after about 20 minutes, Respondent

stated that he wanted to speak to the arson investigator.

28. When the arson investigator and firefighter returned to

the interview room, Respondent asked to speak a few minutes to

the arson investigator alone, and, following this conversation,

Respondent agreed to give a statement, although no one again read

him his Miranda rights.

29. In an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress

filed on September 26, 2000, in Lee County Circuit Court Case No.

99-1314CF, the trial judge determined that Respondent's Miranda

rights had been violated. The court noted that the transporting

of Respondent to the substation, rather than questioning him at

the school, effectively placed Respondent in custody by the time

that he reached the substation, as he had no way to get back to

school. The court noted that the record demonstrated that two of

the law enforcement officers continued to communicate with

Respondent after he had invoked his Miranda rights. The court

also noted with disapproval the summarizing of the evidence

against Respondent, which the court characterized as suggesting

the details of the crime.

30. The statement inculpates only Respondent, who states

that he set the fire after purchasing the gasoline and filling

the jugs on his way to school that morning. The closest that the

statement comes to an explanation of motive is a statement from

Respondent: "I think I need psychological help. I really don't

remember doing what I did."

31. In the meantime, back at school, most persons were

talking about the incident. Despite the fact that no one had

suggested that a student had set the fire, the school was

consumed with rumors that a student had done so. Other teachers

were upset at the possibility that a student had done this act

and were concerned for their safety. Students were distracted

all day by the rumors. The principal did what he could do to get

people back on task.

32. Later in the day, a representative of the sheriff's

office called the principal and informed him that Respondent had

been arrested. The principal disseminated this information,

which greatly eased the anxiety of the teachers.

33. Still later in the day, Respondent called the principal

and said, "I'm sorry." He did not specify for what he was

apologizing. He asked the principal to bring his cell phone and

briefcase from school to him at the county jail. At Respondent's

request, the principal then called Respondent's wife and informed

her that her husband had been arrested for setting his vehicle on

fire. She responded that she lacked transportation, but would

try to get to the jail.

34. A single article in the local newspaper covered the

story the following day. The article noted Respondent's arrest

and some of the details of the incidence. There were no other

news stories in any media concerning this incident, even when

Respondent was sentenced. There was no public reaction to the

incident either. Teachers and students remained concerned for

Respondent's welfare. The only letter from a parent was

supportive of Respondent and opposed his termination, which

happened anyway.

35. Without regard to Respondent's statement at the

substation, the record demonstrates clearly and convincingly that

Respondent burned his own vehicle. The facts are clear and

convincing without Respondent's testimony at the hearing, and

they are clear and convincing with his testimony at the hearing.

36. Without Respondent's testimony, the facts are that

Respondent's late-model vehicle burned in the school parking lot

one morning before school. A few minutes later, Respondent bore

marks of close proximity to fire on his right hand and right pant

leg, despite denials of having been near an open fire recently.

The morning of the fire, Respondent had fueled his vehicle.

37. With Respondent's testimony, the facts are that

Respondent burned his vehicle and then invented a bizarre story

an unknown assailant, for no apparent reason, torched

Respondent's vehicle and then threatened harm to Respondent's

family, unless Respondent remained silent. In a dated

expression, the assailant spoke of a teacher as "teach." The

assailant's implicit promise not to harm Respondent's family, if

Respondent remained silent, was somehow trustworthy to

Respondent, despite the irrationality of this man. And, despite

the threat to Respondent's family, Respondent first called the

principal, rather than his wife and warn her that some lunatic

was on the loose who, if he could not be trusted, might attack

her and their family.

38. Eventually, Respondent pleaded no contest to criminal

mischief, a misdemeanor. The court withheld adjudication and

sentenced Respondent to one year's probation (with early

termination after six months), court costs of $209, a fine of

$150, and counseling, which he has completed. Respondent wisely

never filed a claim for insurance proceeds.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

39. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes.

All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code.)

40. Section 231.28(1)(c), (f), and ( i) provides:

The Education Practices Commission shall have

authority to suspend the teaching certificate

of any person as defined in s. 228.041(9) or

(10) for a period of time not to exceed 3

years, thereby denying that person the right

to teach for that period of time, after which

the holder may return to teaching as provided

in subsection (4); to revoke the teaching

certificate of any person, thereby denying

that person the right to teach for a period

of time not to exceed 10 years, with

reinstatement subject to the provisions of

subsection (4); to revoke permanently the

teaching certificate of any person; to

suspend the teaching certificate, upon order

of the court, of any person found to have a

delinquent child support obligation; or to

impose any other penalty provided by law,

provided it can be shown that such person:

(c) Has been guilty of gross immorality

or an act involving moral turpitude;

(f) Upon investigation, has been found

guilty of personal conduct which seriously

reduces that person's effectiveness as an

employee of the school board; [and]

( i) Has violated the Principles of

Professional Conduct for the Education

Profession prescribed by State Board of

Education rules[.]

41. Rule 1.006(3)(a) and (e) provides that each teacher has

an "[o] bligation to the student [that] requires that the

individual":

(a) Shall make reasonable effort to protect

the student from conditions harmful to

learning and/or to the student's mental

and/or physical health and/or safety.

(e) Shall not intentionally expose a student

to unnecessary embarrassment or

disparagement.

42. Rule 1.006(5)(a) provides that each teacher has an

"[o] bligation to the profession of education [that] requires that

the individual . . . [s]hall maintain honesty in all professional

dealings."

43. Petitioner must prove the material allegations by clear

and convincing evidence. Department of Banking and Finance v.

Osborne Stern and Company, Inc. , 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996) and

Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

44. Respondent has proved that the Administrative Law Judge

must suppress the use of the statement for inculpatory purposes.

As the trial judge found, the statement was made in violation of

Respondent's Miranda rights. See Criminal Justice Standards and

Training Commission v. Blendsoe , DOAH Case No. 97-1922, 1997 WL

1053328 (1997), final order adopting recommended order in toto on

February 20, 1998.

45. Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence

that Respondent failed to maintain honesty in all of his

professional dealings. Respondent set his vehicle on fire on the

school campus. When questioned by firefighters and law-

enforcement personnel discharging their responsibilities to

protect the safety of the school, students, parents, staff, and

teachers, Respondent lied. When questioned by the principal

discharging his responsibilities to protect the safety of, and

promote the purposes of, the school, students, staff, and

teachers, Respondent lied. Such dishonesty undermines the

integrity of the teaching profession and public confidence in the

education profession.

46. Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that

Respondent is guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces

his effectiveness as a school board employeeust is an

important component of the relationship that must exist among

teachers and between administrators and a teacher. Respondent's

dishonesty seriously undermines this trust. The absence of any

adverse public reaction to Respondent's act of setting his

vehicle on fire does not have any bearing on the effect on

teachers and administrators of Respondent's subsequent

dishonesty.

47. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent's acts and

omissions disparaged or embarrassed students. There is no

evidence whatsoever that any student felt embarrassment.

48. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent's acts and

omissions endangered anyone. The firefighter testified that the

fire was not especially dangerous. Although parked in the

closest space to the building, the vehicle was sufficiently far

from the building never to have endangered the structure.

Because of the early hour, the fire did not endanger anyone,

except possibly the firefighters, one of whom, again, disclaimed

any especial danger.

49. The closest issue is whether Respondent's acts and

omissions constitute moral turpitude or gross immorality. These

are fact questions. See , e.g. , Bush v. Brogan , 725 So. 2d 1237

(Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

50. The first question under moral turpitude is whether the

act of setting fire to the vehicle is an act of moral turpitude.

Initially, the State of Florida charged Respondent with second-

degree arson, under Section 806.01(2), which prohibits anyone

from "willfully and unlawfully" from setting fire to, among other

things, a vehicle. The record does not establish the

circumstances surrounding the setting of the fire, so it is

impossible to determine that Respondent's act constituted arson.

51. Even if Respondent's act were to constitute arson or an

act reasonably similar to arson, it is unclear as to whether

Respondent's act would involve moral turpitude. Undoubtedly,

arson is a serious crime, properly included in the list of crimes

that are wrong in themselves or mala in se , as opposed to those

crimes that are mala prohibita , or wrong merely because they are

prohibited by statute. Arson is a crime that is malum in se .

Coleman v. State of Florida , 119 Fla. 653, 656, 161 So. 89, 90

(Fla. 1935). However, a breach of the peace also is a crime that

is malum in se . Id.

52. Assuming that a breach of the peace is not ordinarily a

crime involving moral turpitude, then either not all crimes that

are mala in se are necessarily crimes involving moral turpitude

or, if they are, the list of crimes that involve moral turpitude

changes over time, depending on social conditions. As for the

latter possibility, see Nelson v. Department of Business and

Professional Regulation , 707 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)

( Sharpe, J., concurring: "Even though different generations may

not be involved in this case (licensees and members of the

Department), I submit that our population has become sufficiently

diverse that the term "moral turpitude" no longer carries a

sufficient warning to indicate what activities are proscribed.

Further, what is contrary to morals has changed over time, and

can vary from community to community."). Thus, for example, at

times when or in places where the social fabric is especially

thin, the crime of a breach of the peace, due to the likelihood

of ensuing violence, may be a crime involving moral turpitude.

Likewise, arson in setting a fire in a crowded urban area

(especially when structures were made of thatch and organized

firefighting was nonexistent) implies a greater repudiation of

the social bond than does than arson in setting a fire to a boat

in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico and isolated from other

boats. Of course, the result is different when arson is, as is

typically the case, part of an act of fraud or violence. Cf. The

Florida Bar v. Cohen , 583 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1991)(Court rejected

bar examiner's recommendation of one-year suspension and imposed

disbarment for arson followed by fraudulent collection of $30,000

in insurance proceeds).

53. The factual determination of whether Respondent's act

in setting fire to his motor vehicle, in the circumstances

presented by this case, constitutes moral turpitude is thus

complicated and does not lend itself to resolution by recourse to

the body of knowledge with which each person in our society is

expected to possess. The factual record on this point is

insufficiently developed to support a determination that

Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

setting of the fire constitutes moral turpitude or gross

immorality.

54. Another close question is whether Respondent's

dishonesty following the fire constitutes moral turpitude.

Dishonesty may involve moral turpitude. See , e.g. , Pearl v.

Florida Board of Real Estate , 394 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA

1981). However, the Pearl court quoted with approval the

following definitions of moral turpitude, and they do not

encompass all acts of dishonesty:

According to Black's Law Dictionary, moral

turpitude is: An act of baseness, vileness,

or depravity in the private and social duties

which a man owes to his fellow men, or to

society in general, contrary to the accepted

and customary rule of right and duty between

man and man. Black's Law Dictionary 1160

(rev. 4th ed. 1968).

The Supreme Court of Florida has defined

moral turpitude: Moral turpitude involves

the idea of inherent baseness or depravity in

the private social relations or duties owed

by man to man or by man to society.

(citations omitted).

55. Additionally, the clear prohibition contained in Rule

6B-1.006(5)(a) against dishonesty in professional dealings

suggests that dishonesty in general may not involve moral

turpitude in every case. Cf. The Florida Bar v. Mogil , 763 So.

2d 303, 311 (Fla. 2000).

56. In this case, Respondent's dishonesty is ameliorated by

the fact that, only a few hours after lying about the fire, he

made a full and accurate confession to the authorities and

thereby ended the damage that his dishonesty had caused. On the

facts of this case, Petitioner has failed to prove that

Respondent's dishonesty involves moral turpitude.

57. Rule 6B-11.007(2) sets forth the disciplinary

guidelines, but this rule does not address the present violation

of the requirements of maintaining effectiveness as an employee

of the school board and honesty in professional dealings. The

rule addresses these violations in such contexts as altering an

educator's certificate or students' records. The only rule

partly addressing the present situation is Rule 6B -11.007(2)(g),

which covers the commission of criminal acts in violation of

Section 231.28(c) or (f). Of course, Respondent's criminal act,

for which he was convicted, was for criminal mischief (not rising

to the level of arson) in setting the fire; Respondent was not

convicted for lying about his act for a few hours. However,

lying during an investigation is a criminal act, and this rule,

which most closely applies to the present case, calls for a range

of penalty from a reprimand to suspension for a misdemeanor.

58. Rule 6B-11.007(3) sets forth the various factors of

aggravation and mitigation. Obvious mitigating factors are that

this is Respondent's only discipline and no one was, or was

likely to be, injured by the act of setting the fire or lying

about it for a few hours. The most important factor, though, is

stated at Rule 6B-11.007(3)(s): "[p]resent status of physical

and/or mental condition contributing to the violation . . .."

59. Setting fire to a motor vehicle on school grounds, even

though well before school starts, and then lying about it, even

for only a few hours, suggest serious instability. Respondent's

fantastic fabrication concerning his decision to abide by the

demands of an addled arsonist suggests that Respondent has not

accepted responsibility for his bizarre behavior. At the same

time, Respondent's unwise choice to advance this fabrication

precludes informed analysis of his current condition, thus

leaving undisturbed the obvious inference that Respondent,

himself, may be disturbed and may not have made serious progress

in addressing the source or sources of his problems.

60. The proper disposition of this case is a suspension

that will provide Respondent with sufficient time to address his

underlying problems and will provide the Education Practices

Commission with an opportunity, upon Respondent's reapplication,

to determine the success that Respondent has had in dealing with

these problems. A four-year suspension seems too long,

especially given Respondent's enthusiastic record as a teacher

and the fact that the day of April 19, 1999, seems to stand in

puzzling isolation from the four years preceding that date.

61. However, the post-suspension, automatic-reinstatement

provisions of Section 231.28(4)(a) state:

A teaching certificate which has been

suspended under this section is automatically

reinstated at the end of the suspension

period, provided such certificate did not

expire during the period of suspension. If

the certificate expired during the period of

suspension, the holder of the former

certificate may secure a new certificate by

making application therefor and by meeting

the certification requirements of the state

board current at the time of the application

for the new certificate. . . .

62. Thus, a suspension ending on or prior to June 30, 2002,

would deprive the Education Practices Commission of the chance to

determine for itself Respondent's suitability to return to

teaching.

RECOMMENDATION

It is

RE COMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a

final order suspending the educator's certificate held by

Respondent through July 2, 2002.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2000, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

ROBERT E. MEALE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 31st day of October, 2000.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director

Florida Education Center

Department of Education

325 West Gaines Street

Room 224-E

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief

Bureau of Educator Standards,

Department of Education

325 West Gaines Street

Suite 224-E

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel

Department of Education

The Capital, Suite 1701

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Bruce P. Taylor

Attorney for Petitioner

Post Office Box 131

St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-0131

Robert J. Coleman

Coleman & Coleman

Post Office Box 2089

Fort Myers, Florida 33902

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15

days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to

this recommended order must be filed with the agency that will

issue the final order in this case.