01-003038RP Killingsworth Environmental, Inc.; Environmental Security, Inc.; Environmental Security Of Okaloosa, Inc.; Environmental Security Of Panama City, Inc.; And Environmental Security Of Gainesville, Inc. vs. Department Of Agriculture And Consumer Services Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Friday, January 3, 2003.

Summary: Petitioner failed to establish actual proposed or umpromulgated rule which affected its substantial interests by preponderant evidence. Agency was merely carrying out requirements of statutory definition and has embarked upon negotiated rule-making.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

KILLINGSWORTH ENVIRONMENTAL, )

INC.; ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, )

INC.; ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY OF )

OKALOOSA, INC.; ENVIRONMENTAL )

SECURITY OF PANAMA CITY, INC.; )

AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY OF )

GAINESVILLE, INC., )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 01 - 3038RP

)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND )

CONSUMER SERVICES, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, this cause came on for formal he aring

before P. Michael Ruff, duly - designated Administrative Law Judge

of the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Panama City,

Florida, on August 22 and 23, 2002.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Robert O. Beasley, Esquire

Litvak and Beasley, L.L.P.

220 West Garden Street, Suite 205

Post Office Box 13503

Pensacola, Florida 32591 - 3503

For Respondent: Jack W. Crooks, Esquire

Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services

407 South Calhoun Street

Mayo Building, Room 520

Tal lahassee, Florida 32399 - 0800

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues to be resolved are as follows:

1. With regard to Count Four of the Amended Petition,

whether the Petitioners have sufficiently alleged a rule

challenge and more particularly whether suf ficient facts have

been alleged to identify the challenged rule, whether existing,

proposed, or unpromulgated; and whether, through an

unpromulgated rule, the Department ( Respondent) has prohibited

the installation of "pest control insulation" or borate

co ntaining insulation by anyone other than a card - carrying

employee of a certified pest control operator or licensee. If

so, it must be determined whether such action is outside the

Respondent's rulemaking authority, whether it is contrary to

statute, wheth er it disregards the exceptions proved in Section

482.211(9), Florida Statutes, and whether it violates Section

482.051, Florida Statutes.

2. With regard to Count Five of the Amended Petition,

whether the Petitioners have sufficiently alleged a rule

chal lenge to a proposed or existing rule or have offered

evidence legally sufficient to establish a rule, proposed, or

existing, which the Petitioners are challenging relating to the

Respondent allegedly having selectively investigated pest

control operators p erforming 100 or more pre - construction

termite treatments annually, and whether such action is an

invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

3. With regard to Count Six of the Amended Petition,

whether the Petitioners have sufficiently allege d a rule

challenge to a proposed or existing rule or have offered

evidence legally sufficient to establish a rule, proposed,

existing, or unpromulgated, which the Petitioners are

challenging relating to the Respondent's alleged enforced

application of term iticide arbitrarily and capriciously by not

requiring the best available technology and not regulating

according to acceptable standards in the manner in which it

conducts field investigations.

4. With regard to Count Seven of the Amended Petition,

wheth er the Petitioners have sufficiently alleged a rule

challenge based on a proposed or existing rule or have offered

legally sufficient evidence to establish a rule, proposed,

existing, or unpromulgated, which the Petitioners are

challenging relating to the Respondent's enforcement of Chapter

482, Florida Statutes, as it relates to preventive soil

treatments for new construction and its alleged failure to

protect the public.

5. With regard to Counts Two, Three, and Eight of the

Amended Petition, whether the Petitioners have alleged any facts

or presented any evidence to establish a proposed, existing, or

unpromulgated rule substantially affecting the interests of the

Petitioners.

6. Whether either the Petitioners or the Respondent are

entitled to recovery of attorney's fees and costs.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Petitioners initiated this administrative action with

the filing of a Petition with the Division of Administrative

Hearings. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the nine -

count Petition and th e Motion to Dismiss was granted by Order of

March 7, 2002, in which the Administrative Law Judge ruled that

the motion was timely because it raised jurisdictional issues

and ordering dismissal with leave to amend. An Amended Petition

was filed and served on March 27, 2002, consisting of eight

counts, alleged to be an administrative rule challenge pursuant

to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.

The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for

More Definite Statement on April 12, 2002, as well as a

sup plement to the motion dated April 18, 2002. Oral argument

was had on the motions and the responses thereto, and an Order

was entered May 14, 2002, granting the motion to the extent that

the challenge to the Respondent's memoranda numbered 705 and

705a, as unpromulgated rules, was rendered moot because the

memoranda had been rescinded by the agency.

The Respondent filed a motion for summary final order,

attorney's fees and costs shortly before hearing, and this was

addressed at the outset of the formal hea ring on August 22,

2002. The Respondent at that time, through counsel, renewed its

Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Summary Final Order. In

this instance, the Respondent is contending the Petitioners have

not legally carried the burden of showing tha t there was a

challenge to a rule and have not shown with specificity any

provisions of a rule, statement, or agency action with

sufficient facts to show that such constituted a rule, which

affected the substantial interests of the Petitioners.

The Petiti oners, at hearing, presented no evidence or

argument concerning Count Eight of the Amended Petition, stating

that Count One had been eliminated by virtue of the previous

Order on the Motion to Dismiss and that Counts Two and Three

were related to Count One and, thus, expired along with Count

One and had been rendered moot by the earlier ruling on the

Motion to Dismiss. Thus, no evidence was presented as to Counts

One, Two, Three, or Eight.

Evidence was presented at hearing concerning Counts Four,

Five, Si x, and Seven. The Petitioners presented testimony from

four witnesses and various exhibits introduced into evidence as

Exhibits A through T. The Respondent presented testimony from

five witnesses and Exhibits numbered One through Six which were

admitted into evidence. Official recognition was taken of

Chapter 482, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 5E - 14, Florida

Administrative Code.

Upon conclusion of the proceeding, a transcript thereof was

ordered and an extended briefing schedule requested by the

parti es, which was approved by the Administrative Law Judge.

The Proposed Final Orders were timely filed and have been

considered in the rendition of this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Petitioners conceded at hearing that the Order on

the Motion to Dis miss, prior to the hearing, concerning the

mootness caused by the withdrawal of the above - referenced agency

memos not only disposed of Count One of the Amended Petition,

but had rendered moot Counts Two and Three, as well. No

evidence was presented as to the those counts. Neither was any

evidence or argument presented regarding Count Eight of the

Amended Petition. Thus, Counts Two, Three, and Eight, as well

as Count One, should be dismissed.

2. The Petitioners, with regard to Count Four of the

Amended P etition, did not allege the text of any statement or

description of one which could be construed as an unpromulgated

rule by the agency, which prohibited the installation of

insulation containing borate by anyone other than a "card -

carrying" employee of a certified pest control operator or

licensee. There was no evidence to establish the existence of

such an unpromulgated statement or rule of general application.

3. Cliff Killingsworth testified that he was an officer

and party representative of the Petit ioners' companies in this

case. "In - cide" is a cellulose fiber with borate or borate -

containing materials for fire retardancy and fungal control.

The manufacturer had increased the borate content in the

material so that it could make claims with the Envi ronmental

Protection Agency (EPA ) for the product's pest control value.

Mr. Killingsworth acknowledged that it was a licensed and

registered "pest control product." While Mr. Killingsworth

agreed that claims to the public about the pest control value of

the product should be done by a pest control operator, he felt

that should not prevent him from subcontracting the installation

of the insulation material to a professional insulation

installer so that the material would be properly installed in a

home or other building.

4. Mr. Killingsworth met with Steve Dwinell and Joe

Parker, representatives of the Respondent agency, in

Jacksonville, Florida, in the summer of 1997. He provided them

with a 30 - to - 40 - page report regarding installation of the

insulation with its pest control properties. He received no

communication from the Respondent following this meeting and

sought no written opinion from the Respondent about the use of

the material before he began using it.

5. Mr. Killingsworth invited George Owens , a field

inspector for the Respondent in the Northwest Florida area, to

observe the product being installed in a structure.

Mr. Killingsworth testified that Mr. Owens, thereafter, sent him

a letter stating that the Respondent was not going to re gulate

that material. Mr. Killingsworth, however, did not produce that

letter or a copy of it.

6. Mr. Owens testified that he had visited a site in

Destin, Florida, at Mr. Killingsworth's invitation, where "Green

Stone" insulation was being applied by being blown into a small

section of a wall. He did not know that a subcontractor was

making the application when he visited the site. He thought

that an employee of Mr. Killingsworth was performing the

installation of the material. Mr. Owens did not rec all telling

Mr. Killingsworth or any of his representatives that application

of the product by an agent other than Mr. Killingsworth's own

company would be prohibited. It was not Mr. Owens' belief that

he had authority to make those decisions. He did not believe

that he had authority to approve or disapprove the application

of a pesticide.

7. Mr. Killingsworth invited Mike McDaniels, another field

investigator with the Respondent in the Gainesville, Florida,

area to observe the installation of the produc t in the spring of

1998. Mr. McDaniels commented to Mr. Killingsworth that he was

glad that they were doing it, but he made no report. After the

Petitioners' companies had been operating for two or three

months in the Gainesville area, sharing space with Green Stone

Industries, the company producing the insulation, Mr. McDaniels

returned. He informed Mr. Killingsworth that the Respondent

agency had changed its position on the application of the

product. Because it was a "labeled material," that is, labe led

and promoted as a certified pest control product, for purposes

of EPA regulations, it had to be installed and handled only by a

pest control operator meeting the definition of an employee

under Chapter 482, Florida Statutes.

8. Mr. McDaniel was shown the insulation in question by

Mr. Killingsworth and how it was installed at a job site. He

never told Mr. Killingsworth whether he could use the product or

not, but during a "non - adversarial inspection," he told him that

he had to have "ID cardholders" ( i .e. , employees of a licensed

pest control operator) install the insulation, since it had

advertised pesticide qualities. Mr. McDaniel was shown a

warehouse with two different types of insulation. One had

borate advertised as a fire retardant. The other had a higher

content of borate which was advertised to have pesticide

qualities. Mr. McDaniel determined that employees applying the

second type of product were conducting pest control by

installing that product and should, therefore, have pest control

op erator identification cards. He explained that to

Mr. Killingsworth and thought he may have written that opinion

on an inspection form which he supplied to Mr. Killingsworth.

He also believes he notified his supervisor, Phil Helseth. His

normal practice, when a new material is reported to him or

observed, is to inform his superior of the facts concerning that

product. He never told Mr. Killingsworth or his representatives

that they could not install the product in question. He

informed them th at since it was listed as a pesticide that they

would have to be have employees of a licensed pest control

operator to legally install the product.

9. Mr. McDaniel did not consult with anyone at the

Respondent agency about this, but rather relied on his own

judgment as to agency policy and the interpretation of the

statutes and rules enforced by the Respondent. He testified

that he had no central direction from his superiors at the

Department on the issue and was unaware what other districts or

regions under the Department's regulation were doing to address

this question. He simply determined that if the Petitioners'

personnel were applying a product that was a registered

pesticide insulation that, under his understanding of the broad

statutory definiti on of pesticides as anything that "curbed,

mitigated, destroyed, or repelled insects," then the installers

would have to be employees of a registered pesticide operator.

10. Mr. Dwinell testified as the bureau chief for the

Bureau of Entomology and Pest Co ntrol. He met with

Mr. Killingsworth along with Mr. Parker, another employee of the

bureau. Mr. Killingsworth made a presentation regarding the

product in dispute, the borate - impregnated cellulose insulation.

He determined that the product was a pesticide because it was

advertised as a registered pesticide and performed pesticide

functions, in addition to its insulation function. He did not

recall that the precise issue of subcontracting with a non -

licensed pest control operator or insulation installer was a

topic of their conversation. Following that meeting, he may

have discussed the question with Mr. Helseth, in a general way,

but does not recall discussing it with any other person. He

recalls some discussion concerning the Gainesville off ice of the

Killingsworth companies and whether Mr. Killingsworth, or that

office of his company, was licensed as a certified operator. He

believes he recalls that a cease and desist letter informing the

Killingsworth companies of the need to have the appl ication of

the product performed by someone licensed to do pest control may

have been sent, although he is not certain.

11. Mr. Dwinell established that the Respondent agency had

never published anything regarding pest control insulation. He

noted that a pesticide was a pesticide under the statutory

definition, whether a corn bait, insulation, or mixed in a jug.

The same laws applied to it and under Chapter 482, Florida

Statutes, a pesticide must be applied by a licensed applicator.

12. Mr. Killingsworth insisted that the insulation

product, though a registered pesticide, was exempt from the

provisions of Section 482.211(9), Florida Statutes, because it

was a derivative wood product. He agreed that the product in

question was a wood by - product and not woo d. If a product did

not meet the statutory definition of being exempt, then it would

be appropriate for the Respondent to issue a cease and desist

directive until the Petitioners came into compliance with

Chapter 482, Florida Statutes.

13. Mr. Dwinell opi ned that the subject insulation product

was not exempt under the provisions of Section 482.211(9),

Florida Statutes. Unlike pre - treated lumber, which is exempt,

the installation product at issue is a registered pesticide.

Pre - treated lumber, though treat ed with pesticide in the

manufacturing process, is not intended to be used as pesticide,

nor is it a registered pesticide.

14. The Petitioners have not stated a basis for a rule

challenge pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, as to

Counts Five and Six of the Amended Petition. Although

references were made to alleged "actions" by the Respondent

agency, the Petitioners have not alleged with particularity, nor

adduced any competent, substantial evidence of any rule

provisions alleged to be invalid, no r have they shown, in an

evidential way, any to be invalid. The evidence does not show

that there is a rule, either proposed, existing, or as an

unpromulgated agency statement of general applicability, which

is actually being challenged by the Petitioners . There has not

been a definitive showing by preponderant evidence that such

exists concerning the product and operation at issue.

15. The Petitioners in Count Seven of the Amended Petition

have not stated any basis for a rule challenge in accordance

with Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. There are numerous

references to provisions of Chapter 482, Florida Statutes, but

it is not alleged with any particularity which rule provisions

are purported to be invalid, nor has preponderant evidence been

adduced to establish any rule provisions either proposed,

existing, or as unpromulgated agency statements, which have

imposed a substantial effect on the Petitioners. In this

regard, the Petitioners' counsel argued at the hearing:

Your Honor, what we have suggeste d is that

the rule that's being challenged is the

Department's statutory obligation under the

statute as it relates to their promulgated

Rule 5E - 14.105, and as it relates to their

treatment guarantees or warranties that are

required by that regulation for a treatment

that just doesn't work.

The Department rule requires a certain

warranty and requires a renewable warranty,

placing that upon the pest control operator

under the guise of protecting the consumer,

but the fact of the matter is, it doesn't

prot ect the consumer, and it just endangers

the pest control operator.

And so I guess the actual rule is the

5E - 14.105. In addition to that we have the

statutory obligations of the Department,

which is to provide a protection to the

public health and the economic benefit of

the consumer and evaluate these chemicals

that they are requiring warranties for.

That's the basis of the rule challenge,

and admittedly, this one is a little bit

nebulous, but there is a regulatory, I

guess, mandate of these precon struction soil

treatments as a method, as the preferred

method, and to the extent that the

operators, who are the regulated entity in

this case are required to -- is mandated to

require a warranty for a method they know

doesn't work . . . .

16. Mr. Killings worth acknowledged in his testimony that

he was not contending that there should not be a warranty

requirement for treatments of subterranean termites, as stated

in the above - cited Rule 5E - 14.105, Florida Administrative Code.

He also acknowledged that he was not contending that the

Respondent should require warranties from pest control companies

for every kind of pest control performed. He thought there were

a lot of factors not within a pest control operator's control

affecting particular wood fungi, but what was in the pest

operator's control was the opportunity to do a preventive

treatment for more than just subterranean termites and they, in

his view, should not be prevented from doing so. When asked

what preventive treatment he had been prevented fro m doing by

the Respondent, his reply was:

The effect of memos and other actions

prevented us from doing our choice of

preventative treatment, the borate

application, through the effects of raising

questions in building officials' eyes,

through the effect s of increasing the

economic impact to us to get it done.

Builders will not pay enough to do both soil

treatment and bait and borate.

17. The memoranda referred to as preventing Mr.

Killingsworth from doing his choice of preventive treatment were

not ac tually identified in the record, however. Mr. Dwinell

testified that the EPA guidelines require an efficacy standard

for soil treatments which states: "Data derived from such

testing should provide complete resistance to termite attack for

a period of fi ve years." The EPA also provides guidelines for

preventive treatment/wood impregnation: "When acceptable data

derived from testing for at least two years, or less than five

years, shows complete resistance to termite attack, the product

may be registered ." The efficacy standard for borate, thus, was

not five years, but two years.

18. Mr. Dwinell had concerns about the type of data that

had been relied upon by the EPA for registration and how that

data related to the situation in Florida. That was the ba sis

for the negotiated rulemaking process that the Respondent was

engaged in at the time of the hearing in this case. The purpose

of the negotiated rulemaking process was to comply with the

statute that required a rule, but ultimately the purpose was to

h ave a mechanism in the State of Florida where the product was

registered for use under construction and a reliable set of data

that could show whether the product would actually protect

against termites when applied. The ultimate goal of the statute

at is sue is to protect the consumer, which is the Respondent's

statutory duty.

19. Borate pesticides are registered for use, with label

directions for use during construction. They are one of three

categories of materials for use in construction, including soi l -

applied pesticide materials, baiting products, and wood

treatments, the last being the borates. There are no directives

issued by the Respondent that specifically preclude the use of

either borate as a stand - alone treatment or a baiting system as

a stan d - alone treatment. The Respondent does not require soil

treatments only. Mr. Dwinell has never told any licensee that

he could not use borate products if he were licensed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction o f the parties to and the subject matter hereof.

Sections 120.57, 120.569, and 120.56, Florida Statutes.

21. No evidence has been presented as to Counts One, Two,

Three, and Eight of the Amended Petition and, consequently,

those counts should be dismissed .

22. Concerning Counts Four, Five, and Six of the Amended

Petition, no competent and substantial, preponderant evidence

has been presented to establish an existing rule, proposed rule,

or unpromulgated rule or agency statement of general

applicability, w hich could be construed as a rule substantially

affecting the Petitioners and subject to challenge under the

provisions of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Therefore,

because there is no preponderant proof advanced of any actual,

proposed, or unpromulgat ed rule or agency statement which is

being challenged, these counts should also be dismissed.

23. Additionally, with regard to Count Four, Section

482.021(21)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "pest control," in

pertinent part, as "the application of any subs tance to prevent,

destroy, repel, mitigate, curb, control, or eradicate any pest

in, on, or under a structure." "Pesticide" is defined in

pertinent part by Section 482.021(22)(a), Florida Statutes, as

any substance or mixture of substances intended for "p reventing,

destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents,

nematodes, fungi, weeds, or other forms of plant or animal life

or viruses . . . ." Section 482.071(1), Florida Statutes,

provides that it is "unlawful for any person to operate a pest

control business that is not licensed by the department."

Section 482.091(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that each

employee who performs pest control for a licensee must have an

ID or identification card.

24. The Petitioners have conceded that the in sulation

containing borate, which it wants to apply using unlicensed

personnel or employees without ID cards, is a registered

pesticide. The Petitioners also concede that it is a wood

by - product. As such, it is not exempted from the provisions of

Chap ter 482, Florida Statutes, by Section 482.211(9), Florida

Statutes. The foregoing statutory law, not any rule, is what

prohibits the application of the registered pesticide

installation by anyone other than a properly licensed pest

control operator or his employees, who have been provided with

ID cards in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 482,

Florida Statutes.

25. Concerning Count Seven of the Amended Petition, there

is no competent, substantial, preponderant evidence to establish

an existing rul e, proposed rule, or agency statement of general

applicability (unpromulgated rule) by the Respondent which could

be construed as a rule substantially affecting the Petitioners.

The Petitioners' counsel argued that Rule 5E - 14.105, Florida

Administrative C ode, was the rule which was being challenged

(even though this was not alleged in the Amended Petition),

along with the statutory obligations of the Respondent. In

counsel's own words, "that's the basis of the rule challenge,

and admittedly, this one is a little bit nebulous . . . ."

26. Section 120.56(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides:

The petition seeking an administrative

determination must state with particularity

the provisions alleged to be invalid with

sufficient explanation of the facts or

grou nds for the alleged invalidity and facts

sufficient to show that the person

challenging a rule is substantially affected

by it, or that the person challenging a

proposed rule would be substantially

affected by it.

27. There is no competent, substantial e vidence presented

by the Petitioners which can preponderantly show that

Rule 5E - 14.105, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid or that

the Petitioners have been adversely affected by it.

Mr. Killingsworth conceded that he was not conte nding that there

should not be a warranty requirement for treatment of

subterranean termites, which is required by Rule 5E - 14.105,

Florida Administrative Code. As articulated by

Mr. Killingsworth, the Petitioners' real complaint seems to be

that certain "other memos and actions," which were not

identified with particularity, prevented the Petitioners from

using the borate treatments as a method of prevention. This was

purportedly because the memoranda or actions raised questions in

building officials' eyes regarding the effectiveness of borate

as a treatment and because builders would not pay enough to do

both a soil treatment and a bait and borate treatment. The

purported memoranda were not identified with particularity and,

thus, cannot fo rm the basis of a rule challenge, in an

evidential sense, in this proceeding.

28. Neither Rule 5E - 14.105, Florida Administrative Code,

nor any other rule or directive issued by the Respondent

specifically precluded the use of either borate as a stand - alo ne

treatment or a baiting system as a stand - alone treatment for new

construction in Florida. The Respondent agency has not been

shown to have a policy or a statute or rule - based authority for

requiring the application of soil treatments only. There is no

preponderant evidence to show that it is doing so.

29. Finally, it is noted that the Respondent and

Petitioners have moved for attorney's fees and costs based upon

Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes. That provision

authorizes the award of attorney' s fees in a proper situation,

within the discretion of the Administrative Law Judge, when it

is determined that a party has participated in a proceeding for

an improper purpose. The motions for attorney's fees are denied

because it has not been establishe d that the Petitioners

participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose, as that

standard is elucidated in Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida

Statutes. In fact, it has not been demonstrated that either

party participated for an improper purpose or in a ny wise failed

to advance its positions with good faith, such that the various

bases in the above statutory provision justifying an award of

attorney's fees would come into play. The motions for

attorney's fees and costs are denied.

ORDER

Accordingly, ha ving considered the foregoing Findings of

Facts and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor

and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments

of the parties, it is

ORDERED:

That the Amended Petition is denied, including any cl aims

for attorney's fees by the Petitioners, as well as by the

Respondent. The Petition is hereby dismissed.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 2003, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

P. MICHAEL RUFF

Adminis trative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Admin istrative Hearings

this 3rd day of January, 2003.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Robert O. Beasley, Esquire

Litvak & Beasley, L.L.P.

220 West Garden Street, Suite 205

Post Office Box 13503

Pensacola, Florida 32591 - 3503

Jack W. Crooks, Esquire

Department of Agricultu re and

Consumer Services

407 South Calhoun Street

Room 520, Mayo Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0800

Honorable Charles H. Bronson

Commissioner of Agriculture

Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services

The Capitol, Plaza Level 10

Tallahasse e, Florida 32399 - 0810

Richard Ditschler, General Counsel

Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services

The Capitol, Plaza Level 10

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0810

Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief

Bureau of License and Bond

Department of Agricultu re and

Consumer Services

407 South Calhoun Street

Mail Stop 38

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0800

Carroll Webb, Executive Director

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

120 Holland Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code

The Elliot Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proce edings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by

filing fees prescribed by law, wit h the District Court of

Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in

the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of

appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to

be reviewed.