01-003786PL Charlie Crist, As Commissioner Of Education vs. Oringen Colebrook Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, March 1, 2002.

Summary: Commission should place teacher on probation for three years. He shoved student in assistant principal`s office, exposing the student to mental and physical harm and causing the student embarrassment.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CHARLIE CRIST, as Commissioner )

of Education, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 01 - 3786

)

ORINGEN E. COLEBROOK, )

)

Respondent. )

_________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hea ring was held in this case

on December 18, 2001, in Fort Pierce, Florida, before Patricia

Hart Malono, a duly - designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Robert E. Sickles, Esquire

Kelly Holbrook, Esquire

Broad and Cassel

100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3500

Tampa, Florida 33602 - 3310

For Respondent: Oringen E. Colebrook, pro se

3709 Avenue O

Fort Pierce, Florida 34954

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in

the Administrative Complaint issued by the Petitioner and dated

March 28, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In an Administrative Complaint dated March 28, 2001,

Charlie Crist, as the Florida Commissioner of Education

("Commissioner"), charged Oringen E. Colebrook with having

violated certain of the statutory and rule provisions governing

the conduct of teachers in Florida's public schools. In

Count I, the Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook with having

violated Section 231.2615(1)(c), Florida Statutes, alleging that

"Respondent is guilty of gross immorality or an act involving

moral turpitude"; in Count II, the Commissioner charged

Mr. Colebrook with having violated Section 231.2615(1)(f),

Florida Statutes, alleging that "Respondent has engaged in

conduct which has seriously reduces [sic] his effectiveness as

an employ ee of the district school board"; in Count III, the

Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook with having violated

Section 231.2615(1)(i), Florida Statutes, alleging that

"Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct

for the Education Profession prescribed by the State Board of

Education Rules"; in Count IV, the Commissioner charged

Mr. Colebrook with having violated Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(a), Florida

Administrative Code, alleging that "Respondent has failed to

take reasonable efforts to protect his st udents from conditions

harmful to their learning and/or the students' mental and/or

physical health and/or safety"; and in Count VI, 1 the

Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook with having violated Rule

6B - 1.006(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code, alleging th at

"Respondent has intentionally exposed a student to unnecessary

embarrassment or disparagement."

The charges against Mr. Colebrook were derived from the

following factual allegations in the complaint:

3. In 1989, Respondent received a letter of

repriman d from his Principal for allegedly

using profane language outside of the high

school's cafeteria. The profane language

was directed toward an Assistant Principal,

and could be overheard by students.

4. On or about March 22, 1990, Respondent

received a l etter of reprimand while

employed at Fort Pierce Central High School,

for allegedly using profane and

inappropriate language in class with his

students. It was recommended that

Respondent be suspended without pay for five

days and transferred to another s chool. The

suspension was reduced from five days to

three days and Respondent was transferred to

Woodland[s] Academy, in the St. Lucie County

School District.

5. On multiple occasions while employed at

Woodland[s] Academy, Respondent made

inappropriate contact with a student in a

violent and threatening manner, and

continued to use profane and inappropriate

language in front of his students. On

May 8, 2000, Respondent threatened a minor

student, T.S., pursued the student out of

his classroom, and into t he office of the

Dean of Students at Woodland[s] Academy. In

front of Lee Haines [sic], the Dean of

Students at Woodland[s] Academy, and Deputy

Joe Hover, the School Resource Officer,

Respondent physically assaulted the minor

student, T.S., by grabbing th e student and

throwing the student over two chairs, and

onto the floor. Respondent then commented

to Deputy Hover "This may cost me my job,

but no student is going to call me drunk."

Respondent was arrested and charged with

battery as a result of the inc ident.

Mr. Colebrook timely disputed the factual allegations in the

Administrative Complaint and requested 45 days in which to

attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Office of

Professional Practices. No settlement was reached, and the

Commissioner fo rwarded the matter to the Division of

Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law

judge. Pursuant to notice, the final hearing was conducted on

December 18, 2001.

At the hearing, the Commissioner presented the testimony of

Lee Haynes, Joseph Hover, Earl Wayne Gent, Robert Hiple,

James H. Sullivan, and Johnny Thornton. Petitioner's Exhibits 3

through 9 and 14 were offered and received into evidence.

Counsel for the Commissioner also placed on the record the

Commissioner's objection to the ruling of Administrative Law

Judge Larry Sartin in the Order on Second Motion to Compel and

Motion for Sanctions he entered on December 12, 2001. Finally,

Mr. Colebrook testified in his own behalf but offered no

exhibits into evidence.

During her open ing statement, counsel for the Commissioner

stated: "The only real question to be decided today is whether

the conduct on May 8, 2000 [sic] occurred and, if so, what is

the proper sanction. Based on the progression of

Mr. Colebrook's behavior and severit y of the assault on the

student, suspension is the appropriate sanction here." This

statement, as well as the focus in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the

Administrative Complaint on the letters of reprimand issued to

Mr. Colebrook in 1989 and 1990, caused the unde rsigned to

question counsel for the Commissioner about the purpose of

including paragraphs 3 and 4 in the Administrative Complaint,

whether they were included to allege factual bases for

substantive violations or to establish a basis for an enhanced

penalt y should the Commissioner satisfy his burden of proving

the allegations in paragraph 5.

As requested, the Commissioner filed on February 7, 2002, a

memorandum of law in which he clarified that he intended to

allege in paragraphs 3 and 4 factual bases for t he substantive

violations identified in the five counts of the Administrative

Complaint. The Commissioner also argued in the memorandum that

the allegations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Administrative

Complaint were sufficient to apprise Mr. Colebrook tha t he was

being prosecuted for the 1989 and 1990 incidents that were the

subjects of the reprimand letters. The sufficiency of the

allegations to support a substantive violation is addressed

below, as appropriate.

The transcript of the proceedings was file d with the

Division of Administrative Hearings on January 28, 2002, and the

Commissioner timely filed Petitioner's Proposed Recommended

Order; Mr. Colebrook did not file a post - hearing proposal. The

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the

Commissioner's submittal have been carefully considered during

the preparation of this Recommended Order.

Finally, in order to facilitate an understanding of the

findings of fact in this Recommended Order, it is noted that, at

the commencement of the final hearing, the parties were advised

of the limitation on the use of hearsay evidence in

administrative proceedings set forth in Section 120.57(1)(c),

Florida Statutes (2001)("Hearsay evidence may be used for the

purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it

shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it

would be admissible over objection in civil actions."). Even

so, much of the evidence presented by the Commissioner, both in

documents and in testimony, was hearsay. Becaus e Mr. Colebrook

was appearing pro se , he did not object to the admissibility of

the evidence as hearsay, and the evidence was admitted into

evidence. The sufficiency of this evidence to support findings

of fact has been addressed below.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the

final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the

following findings of fact are made:

1. The Department of Education is the state agency

responsible for investigating and prosecutin g complaints against

teachers holding Florida educator's certificates for violations

of Section 231.2615, Florida Statutes. Section 231.262, Florida

Statutes. Pursuant to Section 231.2615(1), Florida Statutes,

the Educational Practices Commission is the entity responsible

for imposing discipline for any of the violations set forth in

Section 231.2615(1), Florida Statutes.

2. Mr. Colebrook holds Florida Educator's Certificate

No. 296141. At the times material to these proceedings,

Mr. Colebrook was emplo yed as a teacher by the St. Lucie County

public school system.

Incident of December 21, 1988, and January 6, 1989, letter

of reprimand .

3. During the 1988 - 1989 school year, Mr. Colebrook was

employed as a coach and physical education teacher at Fort

Pier ce Central High School. In a letter of reprimand dated

January 6, 1989, then - principal James Sullivan admonished

Mr. Colebrook for using profane language in a conversation with

an assistant principal, Wayne Gent, outside the school

cafeteria, and he noted in the letter that this conduct was a

violation of school board policy. Mr. Sullivan did not

personally observe the incident involving Mr. Colebrook and

Mr. Gent, and his account of the incident was based on

information provided to him by Mr. Gent. 2

4. Mr. Sullivan stated in the letter that the December 21,

1988, incident was "not the first time [Mr. Colebrook] had used

profane language in the workplace," 3 and, in his testimony at the

hearing, Mr. Sullivan inferred from this statement that "there

would h ave been other instances where that had occurred." 4

Mr. Sullivan could not, however, recall during his testimony any

specific incidents in which Mr. Colebrook had used profanity or

any discussions he might have had with Mr. Colebrook regarding

such an inc ident.

5. The incident referred to in the letter of reprimand

occurred on December 21, 1988, when Mr. Colebrook engaged

Mr. Gent in a conversation about the athletic budget.

Mr. Colebrook was upset about the budget, and he may have used

profanity during the conversation, 5 which lasted a couple of

minutes. In his testimony, Mr. Gent declined to describe

Mr. Colebrook as "irate" during the encounter. The conversation

took place in the corridor outside the school cafeteria during a

time when students were changing class, so that there could have

been students in the area when the conversation took place.

6. As noted above, the Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook

in paragraph 3 of the Administrative Complaint as follows: "In

1989, Respondent received a lett er of reprimand from his

Principal for allegedly using profane language outside of the

high school's cafeteria. The profane language was directed

toward an Assistant Principal and could be overheard by

students." It is uncontroverted that Mr. Colebrook r eceived a

written reprimand that was placed in his personnel file.

7. The factual allegations in paragraph 3 of the

Administrative Complaint, liberally construed, are sufficient to

allege not only that Mr. Colebrook received a written reprimand

but also t hat he committed the acts attributed to him in the

letter. However, the evidence submitted by the Commissioner is

not sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly that

Mr. Colebrook actually used profanity or was irate during the

conversation with Mr. Gent in December 1988. Mr. Sullivan's

knowledge of the incident was second - hand, based solely on

information received from Mr. Gent, 6 and Mr. Gent's recollection

at the hearing that Mr. Colebrook "may have" used profanity

during the conversation does not rise to the level of clear and

convincing proof. Furthermore, Mr. Gent's testimony describing

Mr. Colebrook as "upset" during the conversation contradicts the

description in the letter that he was "irate."

Incident of March 14, 1990, and March 22, 1990, letter

of reprimand .

8. During the 1989 - 1990 school year, Mr. Colebrook was

employed as a coach and physical education teacher at Fort

Pierce Central High School. In a letter of reprimand dated

March 22, 1990, then - principal James Sullivan notified

Mr. Colebrook that an investigation had been conducted by Robert

Hiple, an assistant principal at Fort Pierce Central High

School, into events that allegedly occurred in Mr. Colebrook's

classroom on March 14, 1990. In the letter, Mr. Sullivan

reported the res ults of Mr. Hiple's investigation and relied on

Mr. Hiple's conclusion, based exclusively on interviews with

students, that Mr. Colebrook had used "profane language in [his]

second period class on March 14, 1990." 7 According to

Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hiple rep orted that "a consensus of the

students" said that Mr. Colebrook said "'I'm not going to put up

with this fucking shit, I'll beat your Mother - fucking ass.'" 8

Mr. Sullivan also referred in the letter to information provided

by Mr. Hiple that one of the stud ents in Mr. Colebrook's class

told Mr. Hiple that she was afraid to admit to Mr. Colebrook

that she had accidentally flipped an object in class "after

seeing [his] reaction and hearing [his] comments." 9

9. The investigation to which Mr. Sullivan referred in his

March 22, 1990, letter was initiated on March 15, 1990, when

Mr. Hiple reported to Mr. Sullivan that a parent had complained

that Mr. Colebrook had used profanity and threatened a student

in the classroom. Mr. Sullivan asked Mr. Hiple to investigat e

the incident, and Mr. Hiple began by asking Mr. Colebrook for

his version of the incident. Mr. Colebrook admitted that there

had been an incident but denied using profanity or threatening a

student or students, although he admitted that he may have said

that "he was going to kick somebody's butt and he challenged a

student and yelled at them." 10

10. Mr. Hiple proceeded to gather information about the

incident by interviewing students who had been in

Mr. Colebrook's classroom at the time of the incident, and his

testimony at the hearing was consistent with the information

attributed to him by Mr. Sullivan in the letter of reprimand.

Mr. Hiple did not testify from his personal knowledge of the

incident.

11. On or about March 16, 1990, Mr. Colebrook approa ched

Mr. Hiple and asked about the investigation. Mr. Hiple advised

him that Mr. Sullivan would discuss the results of the

investigation with him. Mr. Colebrook became "a little loud and

aggressive" during this encounter and stated that he did not

want t o discuss the matter with Mr. Sullivan. 11 Mr. Colebrook

did not "threaten [Mr. Hiple] physically or even verbally, but

he was obviously upset and became loud in an open environment

where students could hear." 12

12. In the March 22, 1990, letter, Mr. Sulliv an referred

to the written reprimand issued to Mr. Colebrook in January 1989

for the use of profanity in the workplace, and he advised

Mr. Colebrook that he was recommending to the school

superintendent that he be suspended without pay for five working

day s and administratively transferred to another school for the

1990 - 91 school year. Mr. Sullivan based the recommendation that

Mr. Colebrook be transferred to another school on

Mr. Colebrook's comment to Mr. Hiple that Mr. Colebrook did not

want to talk wit h Mr. Sullivan about the results of Mr. Hiple's

investigation into the March 14, 1990, incident. In

Mr. Sullivan's view, "it creates a difficult working

relationship if a principal has a staff person who refuses to

sit down and talk with him." 13

13. Mr. C olebrook was suspended without pay for three

days, but it was not clear from the record whether he was

transferred for the 1990 - 1991 school year, as requested by

Mr. Sullivan.

14. As noted above in the Preliminary Statement, the

Commissioner charged Mr. C olebrook in paragraph 4 of the

Administrative Complaint as follows:

On or about March 22, 1990, Respondent

received a letter of reprimand while

employed at Fort Pierce Central High School,

for allegedly using profane and

inappropriate language in clas s with his

students. It was recommended that

Respondent be suspended without pay for five

days and transferred to another school. The

suspension was reduced from five days to

three days and Respondent was transferred to

Woodland[s] Academy, in the St. Lu cie County

School District.

It is uncontroverted that Mr. Colebrook received a written

reprimand based on the conduct alleged in the March 22, 1990,

letter from Mr. Sullivan and that Mr. Sullivan recommended in

the letter that Mr. Colebrook be suspended w ithout pay and

transferred to another school.

15. Giving the allegations in paragraph 4 of the

Administrative Complaint the most expansive construction

possible, they are sufficient to allege that Mr. Colebrook used

"profane language in [his] second perio d class on March 14,

1990," as recited in the March 22, 1990, letter. However, the

evidence presented by the Commissioner is not sufficient to

establish clearly and convincingly that Mr. Colebrook actually

used profane language as related by Mr. Hiple in his testimony

and by Mr. Sullivan in the letter of reprimand. Not only was

Mr. Sullivan's knowledge of the incident second - hand, based

solely on information received from Mr. Hiple, Mr. Hiple's

knowledge of the incident was also second - hand, based solely on

information provided to Mr. Hiple during interviews with some of

the students in Mr. Colebrook's classroom on the day in

question. 14

16. The evidence presented by the Commissioner is,

however, sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Colebrook used

inap propriate language in front of the students of his second -

period class on March 14, 1990, when he said "he was going to

kick somebody's butt" and yelled at the students in his class. 15

Mr. Colebrook's use of this language in front of students, while

inappr opriate, did not constitute gross immorality or involve

moral turpitude, but it can be inferred from this conduct that

Mr. Colebrook's effectiveness as a teacher was seriously reduced

in 1990, when the incident took place, at least with respect to

his effe ctiveness in teaching the students in the classroom at

the time of his outburst. Because the Commissioner presented no

evidence to establish that Mr. Colebrook directed his comment or

his yelling to any particular student, the Commissioner has

failed to e stablish that Mr. Colebrook embarrassed or disparaged

any student during the incident of March 14, 1990. The evidence

is, however, sufficient to establish that Mr. Colebrook's

statement to his students that he was going to "kick somebody's

butt" and his y elling at the students created a condition in the

classroom harmful to the students' learning.

Incident of May 8, 2000, Mr. Colebrook's use of profanity, and

September 25, 2000, letter of reprimand .

17. Mr. Colebrook was transferred to Woodlands Academy

from Fort Pierce Central High School in either 1990 or 1991.

During the 1999 - 2000 school year, Mr. Colebrook taught physical

education at Woodlands Academy.

18. In the afternoon of May 8, 2000, Mr. Colebrook was

teaching a combined special education clas s and eighth grade

class consisting of approximately 50 students. Toward the end

of the class period, a student in the classroom spoke up and

said to Mr. Colebrook: "You're a drunk son of a bitch." 16

Mr. Colebrook thought it was the student T.S., and he told him

to come to the front of the classroom, where Mr. Colebrook

apparently intended to discipline him. T.S. did not obey

Mr. Colebrook but, rather, slipped out of the classroom door.

Mr. Colebrook did not leave the classroom to go after T.S., but

he sent a student into the hall to bring him back into the

classroom; the student reported that T.S. was not in the hall.

19. About five or six minutes before the end of the class

period, T.S. showed up in the office of Lee Haynes, Dean of

Students at Woodla nds Academy. T.S. told Mr. Haynes that

Mr. Colebrook had sent him to the office. Since classes would

change in a few minutes, Mr. Haynes decided to keep T.S. in his

office until the bell rang, when he would send T.S. to his next

class.

20. Mr. Haynes an d T.S. sat at Mr. Haynes' desk and

talked. 17 Just before time for the bell to ring, Mr. Colebrook

walked into Mr. Haynes office. When T.S. saw Mr. Colebrook, he

stood up and started moving away from him, around Mr. Haynes'

desk. Mr. Colebrook moved towar d T.S., placed his right hand on

T.S.'s shoulder, asked why T.S. had called him a drunk in class,

and gave T.S. a shove with the hand on T.S.'s shoulder. The

shove was not hard enough to knock T.S. off balance, but, as a

result of the shove and of T.S.'s simultaneous movement away

from Mr. Colebrook, T.S. "tangled his feet" 18 and fell down. 19

Mr. Haynes noticed that there were two chairs in the area where

T.S. fell, and he assumed that the chairs may have "aided

[T.S.'s] fall." 20

21. As Mr. Haynes helped T. S. get back on his feet,

Mr. Colebrook made a motion toward T.S., and Mr. Haynes stood

between Mr. Colebrook and T.S. Mr. Haynes then took T.S. to the

principal's office, where Johnny Thornton, the principal of

Woodlands Academy at the time, talked with T .S. T.S. was not

injured as a result of the fall, but Mr. Thornton described him

as "visibly upset, crying." 21

22. Joseph Hover, a deputy with the St. Lucie County

Sheriff's Office who was serving as a school resource officer at

Woodlands Academy in May 2 000, was a witness to the incident,

and he arrested Mr. Colebrook on the afternoon of the incident

for misdemeanor battery. 22 The criminal case against

Mr. Colebrook was concluded on August 21, 2000, when an entry

was recorded on the court's progress docke t that no information

would be filed with respect to the charges against

Mr. Colebrook.

23. Several local newspapers printed stories about the

incident and about Mr. Colebrook's arrest. Both students and

teachers at Woodlands Academy had access to these newspapers,

and some of the students at Woodlands Academy were observed

actually reading the articles about Mr. Colebrook. In

Mr. Thornton's estimation, other teachers at Woodlands Academy

were aware of the incident, although Mr. Thornton tried to avoid

d iscussing the incident with either the teachers or the students

at Woodlands Academy.

24. In a letter dated May 10, 2000, Mr. Colebrook was

advised that an investigation into the May 8, 2000, incident

would be conducted by the school system and that he wa s

suspended with pay pending the outcome of the investigation.

The final investigative report, dated September 7, 2000, was

apparently submitted to the superintendent of schools for St.

Lucie County, William Vogel, who prepared a formal letter of

repriman d dated September 25, 2000. 23

25. In the letter, Mr. Vogel identified two bases for the

reprimand: "The act of pushing or throwing a student to the

floor" and "[t]he use of profanity in the presence of students."

Mr. Vogel did not identify the source of the information on

which he based these charges, although it is inferred that the

charges are derived from the investigative report. Mr. Vogel

advised Mr. Colebrook in the letter that he would be suspended

without pay for five days, that he would be requi red to complete

"coursework in classroom management, stress control or other

similar formal training/workshop," and that the complaint would

be sent to the state Department of Education. 24

26. After the May 8, 2000, incident, Mr. Colebrook was

given an alt ernate assignment, and he returned to teach at

Woodlands Academy in August or early September 2000 for the

2000 - 01 school year. Mr. Thornton was concerned when

Mr. Colebrook returned to Woodlands Academy that some of his

effectiveness as a teacher would b e undermined by the students'

knowledge of the May 8, 2000, incident, but there was no direct

evidence that this was indeed the case.

27. As noted above in the Preliminary Statement, the

Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook in paragraph 5 of the

Administrat ive Complaint as follows:

On multiple occasions while employed at

Woodland[s] Academy, Respondent made

inappropriate contact with a student in a

violent and threatening manner, and

continued to use profane and inappropriate

language in front of his st udents. On

May 8, 2000, Respondent threatened a minor

student, T.S., pursued the student out of

his classroom, and into the office of the

Dean of Students at Woodland[s] Academy. In

front of Lee Haines [sic], the Dean of

Students at Woodland[s] Academy, and Deputy

Joe Hover, the School Resource Officer,

Respondent physically assaulted the minor

student, T.S., by grabbing the student and

throwing the student over two chairs, and

onto the floor. Respondent then commented

to Deputy Hover "This may cost me m y job,

but no student is going to call me drunk."

Respondent was arrested and charged with

battery as a result of the incident.

The Commissioner has failed to present sufficient evidence to

establish the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Administrative

C omplaint. 25 Rather, the evidence presented by the Commissioner

is sufficient only to establish clearly and convincingly

(1) that, on May 8, 2000, Mr. Colebrook put his hand on T.S.'s

shoulder and shoved him and that, as a result of this shove and

of T.S.'s movement away from Mr. Colebrook, T.S. fell over two

metal chairs in Mr. Haynes' office and (2) that Mr. Colebrook

was arrested and charged with battery as a result of the

incident.

28. The evidence presented by the Commissioner is not

sufficient to demo nstrate that Mr. Colebrook's approaching T.S.,

placing his hand on T.S.'s shoulder, shoving T.S., and, at least

in part, causing T.S. to stumble and fall over two chairs

constituted gross immorality or involved moral turpitude.

However, Mr. Colebrook's ac tions were harmful to T.S.'s mental

health and safety even though T.S. suffered no physical injury.

In addition, because he was upset and crying, Mr. Colebrook's

actions exposed T.S. to embarrassment in front of Mr. Colebrook,

Mr. Haynes, Deputy Hover, an d Mr. Thornton. Accordingly, the

evidence presented by the Commissioner is sufficient to

establish that Mr. Colebrook violated two provisions of the

Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession

in Florida.

29. Finally, the appearance o f news stories about

Mr. Colebrook's arrest in the local press can reasonably support

the inference that the students and teachers and the community

in general were aware of the accusations against Mr. Colebrook

with respect to the incident involving T.S. and of

Mr. Colebrook's arrest. The Commissioner did not, however,

present any direct evidence to establish that Mr. Colebrook's

effectiveness as an employee of the St. Lucie County School

Board was seriously reduced as a result of the publicity, and

such an inference cannot reasonably be drawn, especially since

no information was filed against Mr. Colebrook. Mr. Colebrook's

shoving T.S., though inexcusable, was not such egregious conduct

that it would, of itself, give rise to an inference that his

effecti veness as an employee of the St. Lucie County School

Board was seriously reduced. In addition, in light of the fact

that the Superintendent of Schools for St. Lucie County did not

think it appropriate to remove Mr. Colebrook from the classroom,

the Commis sioner has failed to establish clearly and

convincingly that Mr. Colebrook's effectiveness as an employee

of the St. Lucie County School Board was seriously reduced as a

result of the May 8, 2000, incident.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

30. The Division of Administ rative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of

the parties thereto pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes (2001).

31. In its Administrative Complaint, the Commissioner

seeks, among other penalties, the revocation or suspension of

Mr. Colebrook's teaching certificate. Therefore, the

Commissioner has the burden of proving the allegations in the

Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. See

Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and

Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern and Co. , 670 So. 2d 932

(Fla. 1996); Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

32. Clear and convincing evidence, as defined by the court

in Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983),

requires that the evidence must be found to

be credible; the facts to which the

witnesses testify must be distinctly

remembered; the testimony must be precise

and explicit and the witnesses must be

lacking in confusion as to the facts in

issue. The evidence must be of such weight

that it produces in the mind of the trier of

fact a firm belief or conviction, without

hesitancy, as to the truth of the

allegations sought to be established.

33. Based on the findings of fact herein, the Commissione r

has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Colebrook

was reprimanded in writing by Mr. Sullivan in January 1989 and

in March 1990; that, in March 1990, Mr. Colebrook threatened to

"kick somebody's butt" and that he yelled at his students in the

classroom; and that Mr. Colebrook approached T.S. in Mr. Haynes

office on May 8, 2000, placed his hand on T.S.'s shoulder,

shoved T.S., and, at least in part, caused T.S. to stumble and

fall over two chairs.

34. Section 231.2615(1), Florida Statutes (200 0), gives

the Education Practices Commission the power to suspend or

revoke the teaching certificate of any person, either for a set

period of time or permanently, or to impose any penalty provided

by law, and the statute sets out the bases for the imposit ion of

such penalties.

35. Based on the factual allegations in the Administrative

Complaint, the Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook in Count I

with violating Section 231.2615(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which

provides that a teacher may be disciplined if he or she "[h]as

been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral

turpitude."

36. Section 231.2651 does not contain a definition of

gross immorality or of moral turpitude. "Gross immorality" has,

however, been defined as follows:

[t]he term "gross" in conjunction with

"immorality" has heretofore been found to

mean "immorality which involves an act of

misconduct that is serious, rather than

minor in nature, and which constitutes a

flagrant disregard of proper moral

standards." Education Practices Com mission

v. Knox , 3 FALR 1373 - A (Department of

Education 1981).

Frank T. Brogan v. Eston Mansfield , DOAH Case No. 96 - 0286

(EPC Sept. 27, 1996).

37. The court in State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth ,

146 So. 660, 661 (1933), observed that moral turpitud e

involves the idea of inherent baseness or

depravity in the private social relations or

duties owed by man to man or by man to

society. . . . It has also been defined as

anything done contrary to justice, honesty,

principle, or good morals, though it ofte n

involves the question of intent as when

unintentionally committed through error of

judgment when wrong was not contemplated.

38. In Adams v. Professional Practices Council , 406 So. 2d

1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the court concluded that teachers

"charged by sections 231.09 and 231.28(1) with providing

leadership and maintaining effectiveness as teachers . . . are

traditionally held to a high moral standard in the community."

39. Even holding Mr. Colebrook to the high moral standard

applicable to teachers , based on the findings of fact herein,

the Commissioner failed to carry his burden of proving by clear

and convincing evidence that either Mr. Colebrook's telling the

students in his class in March 1990 that he was going to "kick

somebody's butt" and yell ing at them or his shoving T.S. in

Mr. Haynes' office on May 8, 2000, constituted acts of gross

immorality or of moral turpitude. Neither of these acts

exhibited a "flagrant disregard of proper moral standards" or an

"inherent baseness or depravity" suffi cient to support such a

violation.

40. Based on the factual allegations in the Administrative

Complaint, the Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook in Count II

with violating Section 231.2615(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which

provides that a teacher may be disci plined if he or she "[u]pon

investigation, has been found guilty of personal conduct which

seriously reduces that person's effectiveness as an employee of

the school board." As noted in paragraph 33, based on the

findings of fact herein, the Commissioner has carried his burden

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Colebrook

told the students in his class in March 1990 that he was going

to "kick somebody's butt" and yelled at them. Such conduct,

occurring as it did in the classroom and direc ted at students,

gives rise to the inference that Mr. Colebrook's effectiveness

as a teacher at Fort Pierce Central High School in 1990 was

seriously reduced, at least among the students in the class at

the time of the outburst and those other students who learned

about the incident. Cf. Purvis v. Marion County School Board ,

766 So. 2d 492, 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)(Misconduct of Purvis,

who "lied under oath and resisted arrest" rose to a "level of

misconduct which would support the inference that Purvis'

ef fectiveness as a teacher had been impaired."). The

Commissioner has not, however, established that, as a result of

the incident in the classroom on March 14, 1990, Mr. Colebrook's

current effectiveness as an employee of the St. Lucie County

School Board h as been seriously reduced, and a penalty cannot

properly be imposed on Mr. Colebrook for a violation of

Section 231.2651(1)(f), Florida Statutes, that occurred in 1990.

41. As noted in paragraph 33, based on the findings of

fact herein, the Commissioner h as carried his burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Colebrook shoved T.S.

in Mr. Haynes' office on May 8, 2000, and that this shove

contributed to T.S.'s falling over two chairs. However, the

Commissioner presented no evidence to es tablish that

Mr. Colebrook's conduct in fact seriously reduced his

effectiveness as an employee of the St. Lucie County School

Board, nor can this be inferred simply because the allegations

against Mr. Colebrook and his arrest were the subject of

articles in the local newspapers and were thus known generally

in the community and among the students and teachers at

Woodlands Academy. Finally, Mr. Colebrook's conduct was not so

egregious that a serious reduction in his effectiveness as an

employee of the scho ol board can be inferred from the nature of

the conduct itself. Indeed, the most persuasive evidence that

the incident of May 8, 2000, and the publicity it generated did

not seriously reduce Mr. Colebrook's effectiveness as an

employee of the St. Lucie Co unty School Board is the decision of

the St. Lucie County Superintendent of Schools, based on

allegations of conduct which exceeded in seriousness that

supported by the evidence presented herein, that the appropriate

discipline for Mr. Colebrook was a five - day suspension, together

with formal training in classroom management or stress control.

42. Based on the factual allegations in the Administrative

Complaint, the Commissioner charged Mr. Colebrook in Count III

with violating Section 231.2615(1)(i), Flor ida Statutes, which

provides that a teacher may be disciplined if he or she "[h]as

violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the

Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education

rules." The Commissioner did not identify in Count III a ny

specific rules that Mr. Colebrook allegedly violated, but he

charged in Counts IV and IV 26 of the Administrative Complaint

that Mr. Colebrook had violated two of the Principles of

Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida,

those found in Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(a) and (e), Florida

Administrative Code, which, if proven, would constitute a

violation of Section 231.2615(1)(i), Florida Statutes.

43. Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code,

provides that a teacher has the obligation to th e student to

"make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions

harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or

physical health and/or safety." Based on the findings of fact

herein, the Commissioner carried his burden of proving by c lear

and convincing evidence that Mr. Colebrook's actions in

March 1990 violated this rule. By yelling at students and

threatening to "kick somebody's butt," Mr. Colebrook created

conditions in his classroom harmful to learning rather than

protecting his students from such conditions. Likewise, on the

basis of the findings of fact herein, the Commissioner carried

his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

Mr. Colebrook's shoving T.S. in Mr. Haynes' office on May 8,

2000, violated Rule 6B - 1.006(3), Florida Administrative Code.

Mr. Colebrook's conduct toward T.S. created a condition

potentially harmful to T.S.'s mental health and potentially

harmful to T.S.'s physical health.

44. Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code,

provides t hat a teacher has the obligation to the student to

"not intentionally expose a student to unnecessary embarrassment

or disparagement." Based on the findings of fact herein, the

Commissioner failed to carry his burden of proving by clear and

convincing evi dence that Mr. Colebrook's threatening to "kick

somebody's butt" and yelling at his students in March 1990

violated this rule. Mr. Colebrook's remarks and conduct were

not directed to any particular student and so could not

reasonably embarrass or dispara ge a student. However, based on

the findings of fact herein, the Commissioner has carried his

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

Mr. Colebrook's shoving T.S. in Mr. Haynes' office on May 8,

2000, exposed T.S. to embarrassment. Mr. Co lebrook's action

caused T.S. to fall in front of Mr. Colebrook, Mr. Haynes, and

Deputy Hover and caused him to be upset and to cry in

Mr. Thornton's office.

45. Based on the findings of fact herein and on

Mr. Colebrook's violations of Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(a) and (e),

Florida Administrative Code, the Commissioner has proven by

clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Colebrook violated

Section 231.2651(1)(i), Florida Statutes.

46. Pertinent to the consideration of the penalty that

should be imposed in this case, it is uncontroverted that

Mr. Colebrook received written reprimands in 1989 and 1990 based

on allegations that he used profanity in an area where students

were present and that he directed profanity at the students in

his classroom. The fact that Mr. Col ebrook was subject to

disciplinary action by his principal in 1989 and 1990 is not

sufficient to enhance the penalty imposed on Mr. Colebrook as a

result of the one statutory and two rule violations proven by

the Commissioner. These two letters of reprima nd relate to

incidents that are remote in time from the incident involving

T.S. and are based on allegations, unproven at this hearing,

that Mr. Colebrook used profanity in front of students.

47. After careful consideration, it is determined that,

based o n the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein,

Mr. Colebrook should be placed on probation for a period of

three years, subject to reasonable conditions to be determined

by the Education Practices Commission; such conditions might

include a requirem ent that Mr. Colebrook receive training in

anger management. 27

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission

enter a final order finding Oringen E. Colebrook guilty of

violating Rule 6B - 1.006(3)(a) and (e), Florida Administrative

Code, and Section 231.2651(1)(i), Florida Statutes; dismissing

Count I of the Administrative Complaint; and, placing

Mr. Colebrook on probation for a period of three years, subject

to such re asonable conditions as the Education Practices

Commission deems appropriate.

DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2002, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

P ATRICIA HART MALONO

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with th e Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1st day of March, 2002.

ENDNOTES

1 / The Administrative Complaint does not include a "Count V."

2 / Transcript at 66 - 67.

3 / Petitioner's Exhibit 4.

4 / Transcript at 67.

5 / The only person with direct knowledge of the events of

December 21, 1988, who testified at the final hearing was Wayne

Gent. Mr. Gent testified about the incident as fo llows:

Q. I'm going to ask you about specific

incidents. Do you recall an event that

happened on December 21 of 1988?

A. Yes.

Q. And what happened then?

A. It was in regards to the athletic budget

and coach was upset about the budget and

came to s ee me and I believe it was

according to the letter [of reprimand dated

January 6, 1989] outside the cafeteria and

he was very upset and had some words there

and probably lasted just a couple of

minutes.

Q. Now, in this conversation did

Mr. Colebrook use profanity?

A. I believe so. I believe it was cussing.

I couldn't tell you exactly what he was

saying. It's a long time ago but the letter

kind of refreshed it, but I couldn't tell

you specific language.

Q. Did he become irate in the conversation?

A . He was upset.

6 / The description of the incident in the letter of reprimand is

hearsay and is not "sufficient in itself to support a finding"

that Mr. Colebrook used profanity and was irate in his

conversation with Mr. Gent unless the letter would be admissible

in a civil proceeding as an exception to the hearsay rule. See

Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

It is questionable whether, on this record, the

Commissioner established the foundation for admission of the

letter as a business recor d since the regularly conducted

business activity of a school is the education of students not

the disciplining of teachers. However, even assuming that the

Commissioner had established in the record that the letter was

admissible as an exception to the h earsay rule under

Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes, as a document "kept in the

course of a regularly conducted business activity" where it is

"the regular practice of that business activity to make such" a

record, Mr. Sullivan's summary of the incident of December 21,

1988, is not a precise and explicit description of the event and

is, therefore, not given great weight when balanced against the

testimony of Mr. Gent. Mr. Gent's memory of the December 21,

1988, encounter with Mr. Colebrook was sufficient ly refreshed by

the contents of the letter to allow him to testify of his

personal knowledge, and this testimony cannot be bolstered by

Mr. Sullivan's description of the incident in the January 6,

1989, letter.

7 / Petitioner's Exhibit 5.

8 / Id.

9 / Id .

10 / Transcript at 49.

11 / Transcript at 50 - 51.

12 / Id.

13 / Transcript at 76 - 77.

14 / The description of the March 14, 1990, incident in

Mr. Sullivan's March 22, 1990, letter of reprimand is hearsay

and is not "sufficient in itself to support a findin g" that

Mr. Colebrook committed the acts recited in the letter unless

the letter would be admissible in a civil proceeding as an

exception to the hearsay rule. See Section 120.57(1)(c),

Florida Statutes. For the reasons stated above in footnote 6,

it is questionable whether the letter of reprimand is a business

record admissible into evidence pursuant to Section 90.803(6),

Florida Statutes. (Regrettably, the undersigned indicated to

counsel for the Commissioner at the hearing that she had

established tha t the March 22, 1990, letter was admissible as a

business record. See transcript at 73. This assurance may have

been in error.)

Even if the letter were admissible under the business

record exception to the hearsay rule, Mr. Sullivan's summary of

th e incident was based on information contained in Mr. Hiple's

investigative report, which information was obtained by

Mr. Hiple from third party witnesses during interviews he

conducted as part of his investigation. Therefore,

Mr. Sullivan's assertion that Mr. Colebrook used profane and

inappropriate language in the classroom is based on hearsay

contained within a business record and must be either

independently proven by a person with knowledge of the incident

or admissible under another exception to the h earsay rule in

order to support a finding of fact in this Recommended Order.

See Section 90.805, Florida Statutes; Harris v. Game & Fresh

Water Fish Comm'n , 495 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA

1986)(Assuming that the investigator's report was a business

rec ord, "the fact remains that the relevant information

contained in the report is itself hearsay. . . . The

investigator indicated in his report that his findings were

based on his discussions with various persons associated with

the appellant's arrest and c onviction. Such information is

hearsay and does not fall under any hearsay exception.

(Footnote omitted.) Thus, the material contained in the

investigator's report could not be relied upon by the Commission

to support it's [sic] findings."(citing to Sec tion 120.58(1),

Florida Statutes, now Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes))

None of the witnesses to the March 14, 1990, incident

appeared as witnesses at the hearing. And, it does not appear

from the record that the statements of the third party witnesses

would be admissible under any of the exceptions to the hearsay

rule set out in Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes.

Consequently, the account of the March 14, 1990, incident in the

March 22, 1990, letter of reprimand cannot support a finding

th at Mr. Colebrook committed the acts alleged in the letter.

15 / Mr. Hiple's testimony that Mr. Colebrook admitted using such

language can support a finding of fact to that effect because

Mr. Colebrook's statement is a party admission pursuant to

Section 90 .803(18), Florida Statutes, and is, therefore,

admissible over objection in a civil proceeding. See

Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

16 / Transcript at 108.

17 / There is no indication in the record that T.S. advised

Mr. Haynes of the incident in M r. Colebrook's classroom.

18 / Transcript at 19.

19 / Counsel for the Petitioner questioned Mr. Haynes about a

prior statement he had purportedly made to the effect that

Mr. Colebrook had pushed T.S. to the ground, which is

inconsistent with Mr. Haynes' te stimony that T.S. fell to the

ground. Mr. Haynes recalled making the statement to persons

investigating the incident for the school system, who

incorporated it into a written report on the incident, which

report was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 6.

Because there is no indication in the report that Mr. Haynes'

prior statement was made under oath, the statement is hearsay,

see Section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and cannot be used

to support a finding of fact since, on this record, it w ould not

be admissible over objection in a civil proceeding. See

Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Even if the statement

were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, its

persuasive value is substantially diminished because Mr. Haynes

also t old the investigators that T.S. "might have tripped," but

this statement was not included in the investigation report.

Transcript at 22.

20 / Transcript at 20.

21 / Transcript at 89.

22 / Deputy Hover testified at the hearing that

Mr. Colebrook "grabbed h old of [T.S.] and threw him across two

chairs"; that "he [T.S.] traveled about five to seven feet"; and

that, when T.S. fell over, "[w]e caught him . . . and put the

student in the foyer of the office outside the door."

Transcript at 28 - 29. This testimon y is inconsistent with the

testimony of Mr. Haynes that the push was not of sufficient

force to make T.S. lose his balance and that the shove, combined

with T.S.'s movement away from Mr. Colebrook, caused T.S. to

tangle his feet and fall into the chairs.

In addition, Deputy Hover's testimony at the hearing is

inconsistent with the statement he included in the sworn arrest

affidavit he prepared about two hours after the incident. In

the affidavit, Deputy Hover stated that Mr. Colebrook "grabbed

[T.S.] by the upper shoulder and neck area and pushed him,

causing [T.S.] to travel approximately 3 feet and fall over (2)

chairs to the floor" and that "Dean Lee Haynes assisted him

[T.S.] up and took him to the principal's office." This

account, recorded by D eputy Hover shortly after the incident, is

consistent in most particulars with Mr. Haynes' account.

Having considered and weighed the competent evidence of

record and the demeanor of the witnesses, Mr. Haynes' testimony

at the hearing has been found more persuasive than that of

Deputy Hover. Mr. Haynes was in the room with T.S. and

Mr. Colebrook and observed the entire incident, while, according

to Mr. Haynes, Deputy Hover was standing in the doorway to

Mr. Haynes' office when Mr. Haynes picked T.S. up from the

flooranscript at 19. Accordingly, Mr. Haynes' account of

the incident is accepted over that of Deputy Hover.

T.S. was not called to testify at the hearing, but the

document identified by Mr. Thornton as the statement given by

T.S. r egarding the incident was admitted into evidence as

Petitioner's Exhibit 14. This statement is hearsay, and its

contents cannot be used to support a finding of fact as to the

truth of the matters stated by T.S. because nothing in the

record establishes th at the statement would have been admissible

over objection in a civil proceeding. See Section 120.57(1)(c),

Florida Statutes. Even if the statement were admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule, it is apparent that the statement

includes a self - ser ving description of T.S.'s behavior in the

classroom and has little persuasive value for this reason. In

addition, to the extent that T.S.'s description of

Mr. Colebrook's conduct in Mr. Haynes' office differs from that

of Mr. Haynes, Mr. Haynes' version of events is given accepted

as the more credible.

23 / The investigative report was admitted into evidence as

Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Even if the Commissioner had laid the

foundation for the admission of the report as a business record

pursuant to Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes, the report is,

with the exception of Mr. Colebrook's account of the incident,

composed of a summary of information obtained from third

parties, and the conclusions are based on this second - hand

information, as well. Therefore , except for Mr. Colebrook's

admissions, see Section 90.806(18), Florida Statutes, the

contents of the report may not be used as the basis for a

finding of fact in this Recommended Order for the reasons set

forth in footnote 14 above. See Harris v. Game & Fresh Water

Fish Comm'n , 495 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)

24 / Petitioner's Exhibit 8.

25 / The only evidence to support the allegations that

Mr. Colebrook, on multiple occasions, made inappropriate contact

with students, threatened students, or us ed profane or

inappropriate language in front of the students was the

following testimony of Mr. Thornton, the principal of Woodlands

Academy from 1994 through June 2001:

1. At some point during his time as principal at Woodlands

Academy, a student told Mr. Thornton that Mr. Colebrook had

directed profanity at her, although Mr. Thornton never

personally witnessed Mr. Colebrook using inappropriate language

with a student. Mr. Thornton spoke with Mr. Colebrook about the

student's accusation, and Mr. C olebrook told him that it didn’t

occur. This testimony is not competent to establish that

Mr. Colebrook used profanity or inappropriate language with a

student because it is based exclusively on hearsay.

2. Mr. Thornton heard Mr. Colebrook tell a f emale student

something like "you can get your meal from Mr. Thornton. You're

going on a diet today," Transcript at 85, which Mr. Thornton

interpreted to mean that Mr. Colebrook was going to withhold the

student's meal. Although Mr. Colebrook told Mr. Th ornton he was

only teasing the student, Mr. Thornton told Mr. Colebrook "at

that particular time just watch what you say to students because

sometimes it can be misconstrued or what have you and that's

about it. I never -- just only a verbal reprimand. I never had

to put anything in writing." Transcript at 85. (Mr. Thornton

gave this answer in response to this question by counsel for the

Commissioner: "Had you in your position as principal, have you

ever given Mr. Colebrook verbal warning for his use o f

profanity?"). This evidence is not sufficient to establish that

Mr. Colebrook used profanity or inappropriate language with a

student.

3. Mr. Thornton was contacted by a parent who told him

that Mr. Colebrook had "grabbed her son by the arm and l eft some

blue marks." Transcript at 86. Mr. Thornton spoke with the

student and with Mr. Colebrook. Mr. Thornton related in his

testimony at the hearing that Mr. Colebrook told him that he

grabbed the student by the arm but only to pull him away from

th e water fountain because the student was washing his face in

the fountain. Mr. Thornton instructed Mr. Colebrook to avoid

putting his hands on a student.

The only evidence presented by the Commissioner to

establish that the student had red marks on his arm was the

hearsay statement of a parent; in the absence of direct evidence

that such marks were present on the student's arm, the

Commissioner did not prove clearly and convincingly that

Mr. Colebrook's physical contact with the student was violent.

The Commissioner presented no evidence to establish that the

contact was threatening or that Mr. Colebrook used profane or

inappropriate language during this incident. It cannot be

inferred from Mr. Colebrook's description of the event, as

related by Mr. Thornton, that his contact with the student was

inappropriate under the circumstances, and, because the

Commissioner did not present any evidence establishing the

standard by which a teacher's physical contact with a student is

judged appropriate, he has failed to establish clearly and

convincingly that Mr. Colebrook's act of grabbing the student by

the arm and pulling him away from the water fountain constituted

inappropriate contact.

26 / The Administrative Complaint did not contain a "Count V."

27 / One observation must be made with respect to the suggestion

in the Proposed Recommended Order that the appropriate penalty

in this case should include a requirement that Mr. Colebrook

submit to a mental health and substance abuse evaluation by the

Recovery Ne twork Program ("RNP") and to any treatment determined

necessary by the RNP. There is, however, absolutely nothing in

this record that even hints that Mr. Colebrook has a mental

condition or a substance abuse problem.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Steven G. Burton, Esquire

Broad & Cassel

100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3500

Post Offi ce Box 3310

Tampa, Florida 33602 - 3310

Oringen E. Colebrook

3709 Avenue O

Post Office Box 1436

Fort Pierce, Florida 34954

Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director

Florida Education Center

Department of Education

325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E

Tallaha ssee, Florida 32399 - 0400

Charlie Crist, Commissioner

Department of Education

The Capitol, Plaza Level 08

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

James A. Robinson, General Counsel

Department of Education

The Capitol, Suite 1701

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief

Bureau of Educator Standards

Department of Education

325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224 - E

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions

to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.