01-004576RU Beverage Hospitality, Inc. vs. Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco, Status: Closed Settled and/or Dismissed prior to entry of RO/FO on Tuesday, July 30, 2002.

Summary: Agency`s policy statement: all licenses, including revoked quota license and renewals of existing licenses, are subject to random selection drawing if available by an increase in population count of 7,500 in each county.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

BEVERAGE HOSPITALITY, INC., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 01 - 4576RU

)

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES )

AND TOBACCO, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, the Division of Administrative

Hearings, by its duly - designated Administrative Law Judge,

Fred L. Buckine, held a formal hearing in this case in

Tallahassee, Florida, on January 28, 2002.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire

Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood,

Purnell & Hoffman

Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551

F or Respondent: Sherrie J. Barnes, Esquire

Atheseus Lockhart, Agency Representative

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 No rth Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Respondent's Policy Statement, that

the inclusion of revoked quota licenses in Section 561.19,

Florida Statutes, double - random selectio n by public drawing,

constitutes an unpromulgated rule contrary to Sections 120.54

and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 30, 2001, Petitioner, Beverage Hospitality,

Inc. (BHI), filed its petition challenging Respondent's, the

Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco's (Agency), statement defined as

a rule.

On December 17, 2001, a Notice of Hearing and an Order of

Pre - Hearing Instructions were issued. On December 28, 2001,

Respondent filed an objection to Pre - Hearing Instruction

modifying time to respond to discovery.

On January 2, 2002, Respondent filed a Motion to extend

time for response to discovery in accordance with a

Stipulation to continue the final hearing. An Order granting

Respondent's Motion was entered and an Amended Notice of

Hearing, scheduling the final hearing for January 28, 2002, was

entered.

On January 15, 2002, Respondent filed its Notice of Agency

Representation Deposition, naming Atheseus R . Lockhart, as an

Agency Representative. On January 25, 2002, the parties filed a

joint Pre - Hearing Stipulation, and Respondent filed a Motion to

accept Qualified Representative.

Official recognition of the following provisions was taken:

Sections 5 61.02, 561.17, 561.18, 561.19, 120.52, 120.54, and

120.56, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61A - 5.105, Florida

Administrative Code.

At the final hearing, on January 28, 2002, Petitioner

presented the testimony of Horace Moody, President of Beverage

Hospit ality, Inc., and introduced thirteen exhibits (P - 1 through

P - 13) which were accepted into evidence. Respondent presented

no testimony and had one exhibit (R - A) accepted into evidence.

Petitioner and Respondent filed Proposed Final Orders on

February 25 an d 27, 2002, respectively, which have been

considered in the preparation of this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based upon observation of the witness and his demeanor

while testifying, the documentary materials received in

evidence, stipulations by the p arties, and the entire record

complied herein, the following relevant and material facts are

found.

1. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation,

Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is the state Agency

responsible for implementatio n of Chapter 561, Florida Statutes,

Beverage Law Administration.

2. In July 2001, Petitioner (BHI) made applications to the

Agency for four quota alcoholic beverage licenses made available

by revocation. Among those licenses, BHI made application for

li cense number 47 - 00190, a quota license, initially issued

before 1980 pursuant to the Leon County Special Act governing

quota licenses; Chapters 63 - 1561 and 63 - 1976, Laws of Florida.

License number 47 - 00190, a quota license revoked by the Agency

approximat ely two years before BHI's application in 2001, became

and remained available for reissuance at the time BHI filed its

petition. The Agency denied BHI's application for revoked quota

license no. 47 - 00190 in Leon County.

3. A quota license is an alcohol ic beverage license issued

in a county whose population count, at the time of issuance,

supports its issuance. In 1979, the Florida Legislature

determined each county's population count to be 2,500 persons

per quota license. In 2000, the Legislature dete rmined each

county's population count to be 7,500 persons per quota license.

However, Section 561.19, Florida Statutes (2000), does not

specifically direct the Agency to conduct a county's population

re - count of 7,500 persons before the reissuance of a r evoked

quota license issued under the prior population count of 2,500

persons per county.

4. The double - random selection drawing conducted by the

Agency pursuant to Section 561.19, Florida Statutes, on

October 31, 2001, included an alcoholic beverage li cense for use

in Leon County that became available by virtue of the revocation

of that alcoholic beverage license bearing license number

47 - 00190, which was issued before the change in the population

count and the random selection method now contained in

Section 561.19, Florida Statutes.

5. The Agency based its denial of Leon County quota

license 47 - 00190 in its Policy Statement of general

applicability. The injury to BHI related to the denial of that

quota license is within the zone of interest to be r egulated and

protected under Chapter 561, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner

has standing to initiate and prosecute this proceeding.

6. As alluded to before, BHI also made applications in

July 2001 for revoked quota license number 26 - 00921 and revoked

quota license number 26 - 00208 in Duval County; application for

revoked quota license number 63 - 00525 in Polk County; and

application for revoked quota license number 45 - 00073 in Lake

County. Each revoked quota license was issued pursuant to the

special ac t applicable to each county and was issued before the

1980 Amendment to Section 561.19, Florida Statutes.

7. The Agency argues in its Proposed Final Order that

Duval County (2) and Lake County (1) have exceeded their

respective quota license limits, but does not address the quota

license limits of the Polk County and the Leon County revoked

quota licenses. It is assumed, based upon the fact the revoked

quota licenses in those two counties were made available for

reissuance, those quota licenses did not exceed the current

quota limit of the 7,500 population count.

8. The quota licenses above were revoked several years ago

by the Agency and became available for reissuance. Regarding

each application filed, BHI received a notice from the Agency

stati ng that:

There is no license currently available

for issuance in a (specific) County. When

licenses become available by reason of

increase in population or revocation of a

quota license, these licenses are re - issued

pursuant to a double - random selection by

public drawing. (Emphasis added)

9. The parties entered into a stipulation concerning

. . . the Division's policy statement that

revoked alcoholic beverage licenses are to

be included in drawings conducted pursuant

to Florida Statutes, 561.19. . . .

10. BHI challenged the Agency's Policy Statement of

general applicability that revoked quota alcoholic beverage

licenses are required to be included in a random drawing

pursuant to Section 561.19, Florida Statutes.

11. BHI argues that Section 561.1 9, Florida Statutes,

authorizes double - random selection drawings for issuance of

alcoholic beverage licenses in only two situations: (a) where

licenses become available by an increase in population of a

county; or (b) where a dry county, by special act, b ecomes a wet

county. The Agency has embarked on a stated policy, not adopted

as a rule, in which, contrary to Section 561.19, Florida

Statutes, it includes all revoked quota licenses in the double -

random selection drawing. The Agency has thus instituted an

unwritten rule policy contrary to Sections 120.54 and 120.56(4),

Florida Statutes.

12. The policy statement was applied to BHI's applications

for revoked licenses by letters from the Agency denying BHI's

four applications for revoked quota licenses sta ting revoked

quota licenses are to be placed in a random selection drawing

pursuant to Subsection 561.19(2), Florida Statutes.

13. The Agency, in its pubic legal notice, concerning a

double - random selection drawing, set forth the total number of

license s available in each county that are to be awarded by the

random selection drawing. Several of the counties listed in the

legal notice have an asterisk next to the total licenses

available for that county. The explanation by the Agency for

the public noti ce asterisk is to identify those revoked quota

licenses included in the total number of available licenses.

The following findings of fact are based, in part, on the

stipulation of the parties concerning this dispute.

14. The Agency does not have an adop ted rule that

addresses inclusion of all revoked license in double - random

selection drawings.

15. The Agency agreed that the above Policy Statement had

not been adopted as a rule by appropriate rulemaking procedures

as defined in Sections 120.54 and 120 .56(4), Florida Statutes.

The Agency takes the position that Section 561.19, Florida

Statutes, authorizes double - random selection by public drawing

to be used when a quota license becomes available by an increase

of 7,500 in a county's population.

16 . The Agency's position is that Section 561.02, Florida

Statutes, grants the Division Director discretionary authority

to enforce the Alcoholic Beverage Law, Chapter 561, Florida

Statutes, in accordance with the Legislative intent.

17. Accordingly, Sect ion 561.19, Florida Statutes, is the

grant of authority for the Agency's Policy Statement herein

challenged. Additionally, the Legislative intent of Section

561.19, Florida Statutes, argues the Agency, is twofold: (1) it

removed sole discretion from the Division Director to issue

quota licenses, and (2) created a system to ensure licenses

issued after 1980 would be in a fair and equitable manner to all

applicants.

18. The answer to the threshold question, of whether the

Agency's Policy Statement at iss ue is intended to have the

effect of law, is in the affirmative.

19. Prior to the 1980 Amendment to Section 561.19, Florida

Statutes, revoked quota license were reissued in accordance with

Section 561.02, Florida Statutes (1979). An application was

ma de for a specific revoked license; the application was

reviewed and investigated, and if found in compliance with

statutory requirements by the Agency, the Director issued the

quota license to the approved applicant. The parties agreed

that in the event t hat two applications were made for one

license, the first application filed and approved would be

granted the license.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

pro ceeding. Section 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes.

21. Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, allows any person

that is "substantially affected by an agency's statement" to

institute a proceeding to determine whether the policy statement

violates Section 12 0.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

22. The evidence in this case proved that the Agency

applied an unpromulgated rule to Petitioner's application for

the revoked quota license in Leon County. Petitioner was denied

the license it sought from the Agency.

23. Petitioner, therefore, was "substantially affected" by

the Agency's Policy Statement and has standing to institute this

proceeding. See State Department of Administration v. Harvey ,

356 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and Televisual Communication

v. Depa rtment of Labor , 667 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

24. The burden of proof, absent a statutory directive

to the contrary, is on the party asserting the affirmative in a

Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, proceeding. Antel v. Department

of Professional R egulation , 522 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988);

Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778

(Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Balino v. Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services , 348 So. 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

25. The initial burden of proof in a proceeding instituted

pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, is placed on the

Petitioner. Section 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes, includes

the following allegations: (a) what the alleged "Policy

Statement" is; (b) that the Policy Sta tement constitutes a rule

under Section 120.52, Florida Statutes; and (c) that the Agency

has not adopted the statement by the rulemaking procedures of

Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.

26. Section 120.56(4)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that

burden shi fts to the Agency to prove that "rulemaking is not

feasible and practicable under Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida

Statutes," if Petitioner proves the allegations required to be

included in the petition.

27. Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner was required to

prove the allegations of its petition and the Agency was

required to prove that rulemaking was not feasible and

practicable, as provided in Section 120.56(4)(c), Florida

Statutes.

28. BHI met its burden of proof and the Agency conceded

that the Chal lenged Policy Statement was not promulgated as a

rule and had the effect of law by interpreting Legislative

intent found in Section 561.19, Florida Statutes. The Agency

did not address, in the hearing or in its proposed final order,

the issue of whether r ulemaking was feasible and practicable.

29. The evidence in this case proved that the Challenged

Policy Statement is a "rule" as defined in Section 120.52(15),

Florida Statutes.

"Rule" means each Agency statement of

general applicability that imple ments,

interprets, or prescribes law or policy or

describes the procedure or form which

imposes any requirement or solicits any

information not specifically required by

statute or by an existing rule.

30. The Agency has not adopted the Challenged Policy

Statement by the rulemaking procedures provided in

Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The parties stipulated to

this fact.

31. The Agency did not offer evidence to meet its burden

that rulemaking was not feasible and practicable under

Section 12 0.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

32. Based upon the foregoing, the Challenged Policy

Statement violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

33. Section 120.56(4)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that

the Administrative Law Judge is to make the following

determination, which is considered "final," in a challenge

brought pursuant to Section 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes:

(c) The Administrative Law Judge may

determine whether all or part of a statement

violates s. 120.54(1)(a).

34. Pursuant to Se ction 120.56(4)(d), Florida Statutes, if

a final order is entered finding all or part of a policy to

violate Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the Agency is

required to "immediately discontinue all reliance upon the

statement or any substantially sim ilar statement as a basis for

agency action." Pursuant to this provision, any person to whom

an Agency attempts to apply a statement found to be an

unpromulgated rule by Final Order may rely upon the Final Order

in a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, p roceeding to avoid

application of the policy.

35. Section 120.56(4)(d), Florida Statutes, is self -

executing. To take effect, it does not require any order of the

Administrative Law Judge other than the order the Administrative

Law Judge is called upon i n Section 120.56(4)(c), Florida

Statutes, to make.

36. Section 120.56(4)(e), Florida Statutes, provides an

exception to the consequences of Section 120.56(4)(e), Florida

Statutes. Pursuant to Section 120.56(4)(e), Florida Statutes,

an Agency may rely up on a policy statement despite a

determination that the policy is an unpromulgated rule in

violation of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, if the

following conditions are met:

a. Prior to entry of the final order, the

Agency publishes, pursuant to s .

120.54(3)(a), proposed rules which address

the statement;

b. The Agency proceeds expeditiously and

in good faith to adopt rules which address

the statement; and

c. The statement or substantially similar

statement meets the requirements of s.

120.57 (1)(e).

37. The Agency has taken none of the above prescribed

regarding the Challenged Policy Statement.

38. The Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the Agency's Policy Statement is a rule. Once

Petitioner has met that requirem ent, the burden shifts to the

Agency to overcome the statutory requirement that rulemaking is

feasible and practicable, thus showing that it can continue to

rely on the Policy Statement.

39. As a threshold requirement, Petitioner has established

tha t the Agency Policy Statement constitutes a rule as defined

in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes.

40. The plain reading of Section 120.52(15), Florida

Statutes, requires an analysis of whether the Agency's Policy

Statement complies with the definition of a rule; and, if so,

whether the Policy Statement can be said to be one of general

applicability.

41. By stipulation of the parties the challenged Agency

Policy Statement has general applicability to alcoholic beverage

licenses. The Policy Statement includes revoked quota licenses

and the renewal of existing quota licenses.

42. Petitioner relies on Andrew M. Beverly v. Division of

Beverage, Department of Business Regulations , 282 So. 2d 657

(Fla. 1st DCA 1973) as legal support for this position . In

Beverly , the Plaintiff wished to obtain a license that had

previously been revoked, at a time of enactment of statute,

which changed the number of authorized licenses, but which

grand - fathered in existing licenses and was available for

issuance. The Agency considered the revoked quota license as

non - existent. The First District Court of Appeal decided that

the Legislature did not intend to eliminate the revoked license

but only to restrict the issuance of a new license.

43. Respondent relies on Division of Beverage, Department

of Business Regulations v. DAV - ED, INC. , 324 So. 2d 682 (Fla.

4th DCA 1976) for the legal position that the Beverly holding is

contrary to Section 561.20, Florida Statutes.

44. In DAV - ED the Court limited its ruling t o the

circumstances where no beverage quota licenses were available

for issuance in a county. In that case, the applicant sought a

revoked quota license and the application was denied by the

Agency. The court held that where quota license allotment for a

county was 248 and there were 287 outstanding licenses, issuance

of a license which had earlier been revoked violated the statute

providing that, upon revocation of an existing license, no

renewal thereof or new license should be issued contrary to

quota limitation; Section 561.20(3), Florida Statutes (1976).

In its decision the court pointed to the following words in

(1976), Section 561.20(3), of the Florida Statutes:

. . . upon the revocation of any existing

license no renewal thereof or new license

the refore shall be issued contrary to the

limitation herein prescribed.

45. Petitioner's position that the Agency's Policy

Statement is a rule not properly promulgated finds support from

both the First District Court of Appeal and the Fourth District

Court of Appeal's decisions. Under Beverly , if the revoked

quota licenses in question were not, in fact, "over the quota,"

they are not dead and they should be available for issuance

without being subject to a new population count and random

drawing selection. Conversely, under DAV - ED , if the revoked

quota licenses in question were, in fact, "over the quota," they

would not be available to be issued and thus should not have

been published as being available for a random selection

drawing. In either set of cir cumstances, the Agency's policy

statement of subjecting all revoked quota licenses to first a

population count and then random selection, before determining

whether said license is over quota or under quota in the issuing

county, is a rule.

46. The A gency's position that its policy statement

implements and interprets Section 561.19, Florida Statutes,

which removes all discretion from the Division's Director and

equalizes opportunity of every applicant to acquire an available

license, is without suppor t in the record.

47. The word "policy" used by the Agency in its Prehearing

Stipulation is not a term of art. It has a commonly understood

meaning. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language , 1114 (4th ed. 1981), defined the term as "(A)ny plan

adopted by a government, political party, business organization,

or the like, designed to influence and determine decisions,

actions, and other matters."

48. The Agency's Policy Statement complies with the

definition of a rule contained in Se ction 120.52(15), Florida

Statutes. The Policy Statement is one of general applicability

that prescribes the Agency's procedure and practice pertaining

to the issuance of revoked quota alcoholic beverage licenses.

49. Once, as herein, Petitioner has met its burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency

statement is a rule, the burden is upon the Agency to overcome

the statutory presumption that rulemaking is feasible and

practicable; thus, showing that it can continue to rely on the

statement. Pete Spear v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor

Vehicles , DOAH Case No. 92 - 4816RU (10/29/92).

50. In addition to the general rulemaking requirement,

pursuant to Section 561.11(1), Florida Statutes, the Agency has

the authority to:

. . . adopt rules pursuant to ss.

120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the

provisions of the Beverage Law.

In the matter of alcoholic beverage license,

subsection 561.26, requires mandatory rules

for license renewals. In those situations

the Agency:

. . . shall adopt an appropriate rule

establishing the schedule for license

renewals, which may provide for a semiannual

schedule based on a division of the state

into two geographic regions.

51. In this case, the Agency has consistently subjected all

ap plicants, including those seeking renewal of their quota

license, to the population count and random drawing selection

process.

52. The Agency argues that the Legislature, in

Section 561.20(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits the Division

Director from issui ng a revoked license, and requires the

Division Director to conduct a population count prior to issuing

any license, including renewals of existing quota licenses.

53. Section 565.02(1), Florida Statutes, states, in

pertinent part, that:

(1) No licens e under s. 565.02(1)(a) - (f),

inclusive, shall be issued so that the

number of such licenses within the limits of

the territory of any county exceeds one such

license to each 7,500 residents within such

county. Regardless of the number of quota

licenses is sued prior to October 1, 2000, on

and after that date, a new license under

Subsection 565.02(1)(a) - (f), inclusive,

shall be issued for each population increase

of 7,500 residents above the number of

residents who resided in the county

according to the Apri l 1, 1999, Florida

Estimate of Population as published by the

Bureau of Economic and Business Research at

the University of Florida, and thereafter,

based on the last regular population

estimate prepared pursuant to s. 186.901,

for such county. Such popul ation estimates

shall be the basis for annual license

issuance regardless of any local acts to the

contrary. However, such limitation shall

not prohibit the issuance of at least three

licenses in any county that may approve the

sale of intoxicating liquor s in such county.

(Emphasis added)

54. The word "regardless" in the above - quoted section of

the statutes is not a term of art. It has a commonly understood

meaning. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language , 1094 (4th ed. 1981), defined the term as "heedless;

unmindful; in spite of everything; anyway."

55. Inserting the above - meaning of "regardless" into this

section, the section states that "be unmindful of or in spite

of" prior quota licenses issued before October 1, 2000, (only)

new licenses are subject to a population count, and thus, the

random selection drawing.

56. Section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes, provides the

following with regard to an award of attorney's fees and costs

in a proceeding pursuant to Section 120. 56(4), Florida Statutes:

(a) Upon entry of a final order that all

or part of an agency statement violates

s. 120.54(1)(a), the administrative law judge

shall award reasonable costs and reasonable

attorney's fees to the Petiti oner. . . .

57. Based upon this provision, Petitioner is entitled to

reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs of this proceeding. Within

15 days after entry of this Final Order, the parties shall

confer to resolve the attorney's fees and cost issue. Shoul d the

parties not agree on reasonable attorney's fees and cost,

written notice, including one or more available dates for an

evidentiary hearing to be held not later than 29 days from the

date of this Final Order, shall be given the undersigned.

FINAL ORDE R

58. The Division's Policy Statement requiring revoked

alcoholic beverages quota licenses in counties that have not

exceeded their respective quota license limits are to be

included in drawings conducted pursuant to Section 561.19(2),

Florida Statut es, is an Agency Policy Statement of general

applicability that constitutes a rule but which has not been

adopted by rulemaking procedures. Therefore, the Policy

Statement violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

There was no evidence presented t hat rulemaking was not feasible

and practicable under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.

59. The Agency's Policy Statement as set forth herein

above, as a matter of law, meets the definition of a rule as set

forth in Section 120.52(1)(15), Florida Statute s.

60. With the Agency's Policy Statement requiring

revoked quota licenses to be included in Section

561.19(2), Florida Statutes, random selection drawings

is a rule that has not been adopted in accordance with

Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and a s such, the

Policy Statement violates Section 120.54(1), Florida

Statutes.

61. As the prevailing party and in accordance with Section

120.595(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner is entitled to an award

of reasonable costs and reasonable attorney's fees to b e

determined as herein above ordered.

DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of May, 2002, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

FRED L. BUCKINE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

12 30 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 29th day of May, 2002.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Richard Turner, Director

Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0792

Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional R egulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood,

Purnell & Hoffman

Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551

Sherrie J. Barnes, Esquire

Atheseus Lockhart, Agency Representative

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code

The Elliott Building, Room 201

Tallahassee, Fl orida 32399 - 0250

Carroll Webb, Executive Director

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

120 Holland Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300

David Greenbaum

Legislative Research Director

Committee on Governmental Rules

and Regulations

218 House O ffice Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Tina D. White

Legislative Analyst

Senate Governmental Oversight

and Productively Committee

525 Knott Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1100

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is advers ely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of app eal with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by

filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of

Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in

the Appellate District where the party reside s. The notice of

appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to

be reviewed.