02-002187BID Florida Blacktop, Inc. vs. Department Of Transportation
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, August 6, 2002.


View Dockets  
Summary: Bid protestor failed to prove that agency lost missing bid bond, the absence of which was a material variance.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8FLORIDA BLACKTOP, INC., )

12)

13Petitioner, )

15)

16vs. )

18)

19DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )

23)

24Respondent, ) Case No. 02 - 2187BID

31)

32)

33and )

35)

36WEEKLEY ASPHALT PAVING, IN C., )

42)

43Intervenor. )

45______________________________)

46RECOMMENDED ORDER

48Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law Judge of the Division

57of Administrative Hearings, conducted the final hearing in Fort

66Lauderdale, Florida, on June 20, 2002.

72APPEARANCES

73F or Petitioner: Joseph W. Lawrence, II

80Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A.

85360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130

92Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

96For Respondent: Barbara Gasper Hines

101Assistant General Counsel

104Department of Transportation

107605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58

113Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

118For Intervenor: F. Alan Cummings

123Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP

1281004 DeSoto Park Drive

132Post Office Box 589

136Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0589

141STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

145The issue is whether Respondent’s proposed award o f a

155contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies,

164or the specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida

172Statutes.

173PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

175By Formal Protest and Request for Hearing filed April 17,

1852002, Petitioner alleged that, on March 8, 2002, it timely

195submitted a bid, with a bid bond, in response to an invitation

207to bid Respondent’s Project Number 222457, FIN Number

21532822925201, Contract Number E4D18. Petitioner alleged that it

223submitted the lowest bid, but, on April 3, 200 2, Respondent

234posted its notice of intent to accept Intervenor’s bid and

244reject Petitioner’s bid because Petitioner’s bid lacked the

252required bid bond. Petitioner alleged that its notice of

261protest and formal written protest were timely.

268At the hearing, Petitioner called three witnesses and

276offered into evidence 11 exhibits: Petitioner Exhibits 1 - 11.

286Respondent called four witnesses and offered into evidence five

295exhibits: Respondent Exhibits 1 - 5. Intervenor called no

304witnesses and offered into eviden ce no exhibits. All exhibits

314were admitted except Petitioner Exhibit 4, which was proffered.

323The court reporter filed the transcript on July 12, 2002.

333The parties filed their proposed findings of fact and

342conclusions of law by August 1, 2002.

349FINDINGS O F FACT

3531. On February 15, 2002, Respondent advertised for bids

362for Contract E4D18 (ITB). The ITB requires bidders to submit

372their bids with a bid bond and power of attorney no later than

38511:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002.

3912. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids at the

400specified location. Petitioner’s bid price was $2,094,748.99,

409and Intervenor’s bid price was $2,095,530.00. Petitioner and

419Intervenor have standing to participate in this case.

4273. In preparing its bid, Petitioner obtained a bid bo nd

438and power of attorney from Great American Insurance Company

447through its local bonding agent, Nielson, Alter and Associates.

456(All references to bid bonds shall mean the bid bond and

467accompanying power of attorney.) Nielson, Alter and Associates

475and its predecessor has provided bid bonds for Petitioner for 12

486years.

4874. Pursuant to its standard business practice, Petitioner

495received the bid bond from Nielson, Alter and Associates the day

506prior to the deadline for submitting bids. The bond was in

517proper form, duly authorized, and validly executed, so it was

527enforceable upon delivery from Petitioner to Respondent. If

535Petitioner in fact delivered the bond with the bid on the

546following day, Respondent would have no basis to reject

555Petitioner’s bid as unresp onsive.

5605. Petitioner’s employee responsible for assembling and

567delivering Petitioner’s bid has been so employed by Petitioner

576for three and one - half years. She testified that she placed the

589bid bond in the package with the bid itself, sealed the package ,

601drove it to the assigned location, and submitted the sealed bid

612package to Respondent by 10:30 a.m. on March 8, 2002.

6226. Respondent’s employees accepted Petitioner’s sealed bid

629package and, without opening it, placed it in a locked filing

640cabinet, where they placed the three other timely submitted bids

650for the subject project. At 11:00 a.m. -- the time specified for

662the opening of bids -- one of Respondent’s employees removed the

673four sealed bid packages and took them to the conference room

684for the opening of the bids in response to the ITB. At the same

698time and place, Respondent’s employees were opening 21 other

707bids in response to five other invitations to bid on projects

718unrelated to the subject project.

7237. The conference room was small and contained a table.

733On one side of the table sat three of Respondent’s employees,

744who remained with the bid packages continuously from when they

754arrived in the conference room until, after they were opened,

764they were taken upstairs to a data processing center. On the

775other side of the table sat Petitioner’s employee and a

785representative of another bidder. The 25 bid packages were in

795six separate piles, divided by project.

8018. One of Respondent’s employees opened each bid and

810handed it to a second employee who announc ed the name of the

823bidder and the amount of the bid. The second employee then

834passed the bid to the third employee who recorded the bid. As

846was consistent with Respondent’s past practice, no one announced

855whether each bid was complete.

8609. At the end o f the opening of the bids in response to

874the ITB, Respondent’s employee announced that Intervenor had

882submitted the lowest bid. Due to a mathematical error in

892Intervenor’s bid, it appeared from the cover sheets that

901Intervenor’s bid was the lowest. Only later, after the

910mathematical error was corrected, did Respondent’s employees

917discover that Petitioner had submitted the lowest bid.

92510. After Petitioner’s employee and the representative of

933the other bidder had left the conference room, Respondent’s

942thre e employees examined the bid packages more closely. They

952could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package, nor

963could they find the bid bond in the bid package of a bidder for

977one of the other contracts.

98211. The first of Respondent’s employees to discover that

991she could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package

1002reexamined Petitioner’s bid package in search of the documents.

1011The three employees then checked inside every envelope for the

1021documents that were missing from the bid packages of Petitioner

1031and the other bidder, but they could not find the missing

1042documents.

104312. It was highly unusual for a bid bond to be missing

1055from a bid package and probably unprecedented for bid bonds to

1066be missing from two bids for separate jobs opened at the same

1078time.

107913. Consistent with their practice then and now,

1087Respondent’s employees separated the bidders’ checks from the

1095bid packages and placed the checks in a secure location.

1105Consistent with their practice then and now, one of Respondent’s

1115employees then delivered the remainder of each bid package to

1125the data processing center upstairs. Consistent with their

1133practice then, but not now, Respondent’s employees did not

1142document that the bid bond was missing for several days after

1153the bid opening.

115614. P etitioner contends that Respondent’s employees did

1164not discover that the bid bond was missing until days after the

1176bid opening. Petitioner reasons, in part, that Respondent’s

1184employees were not as attentive to Petitioner’s bid because they

1194thought that it was only the second lowest bid. Petitioner

1204contends that the discovery of the missing bid bond several days

1215after its submittal provides Respondent’s employees with

1222considerable opportunity to mishandle the bid package and

1230inadvertently misplace the bid bond.

123515. In support of its contention that Respondent’s

1243employees did not immediately discover the missing bid bond,

1252Petitioner offered the testimony to this effect of its president

1262and proffered similar testimony of another witness. The bases

1271of this testimony were separate statements from the employee who

1281supervised the three employees who opened, announced, and

1289recorded the bids. However, this testimony, even from both

1298witnesses, could not overcome the clear and unequivocal

1306testimony of all three o f Respondent’s employees that they

1316discovered that Petitioner’s bid package was missing the bid

1325bond on the day of the bid opening. Any statement to the

1337contrary by Respondent's supervisory employee may have been

1345based on her misrecollection or ignorance of the facts or

1355misunderstanding of the questions posed to her, although it is

1365also possible that both listeners separately misunderstood what

1373she was saying.

137616. A bid bond is a crucial component of a bid. Its

1388omission confers a competitive advantage upon a bidder, which,

1397after bid opening, could elect not to cure the omission and thus

1409be relieved of the obligation that it otherwise appeared to have

1420offered to undertake by submitting its bid.

142717. Intervenor's post - hearing memorandum adds a perceptive

1436discussion of the dullness of memory when attesting to a matter

1447of routine, as was the testimony of Petitioner's employee who

"1457always" attached bid bonds to bids, compared to the vividness

1467of memory when attesting to a rare deviation from routine, as

1478was t he testimony of Respondent's three employees who were

1488startled to find that bid bonds were missing from two bid

1499packages, looked for the missing documents, and could not find

1509them. On the present record, it would be slightly less

1519troubling to find that Pe titioner's bid package lacked the bid

1530bond, but, as noted below, the burden of proof is on Petitioner,

1542so it suffices to find that Petitioner has failed to prove that

1554its bid package contained the bid bond.

1561CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

156418. The Division of Administr ative Hearings has

1572jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 120.57(1),

1579Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida

1588Statutes.)

158919. Section 120.57(3)(f) provides:

1593. . . the burden of proof shall rest with

1603the party protesting the pr oposed agency

1610action. In a competitive - procurement

1616protest, other than a rejection of all bids,

1624the administrative law judge shall conduct a

1631de novo proceeding to determine whether the

1638agency’s proposed action is contrary to the

1645agency’s governing statute s, the agency’s

1651rules or policies, or the bid or proposal

1659specifications. The standard of proof for

1665such proceedings shall be whether the

1671proposed agency action was clearly

1676erroneous, contrary to competition,

1680arbitrary, or capricious. In any bid -

1687protest proceeding contesting an intended

1692agency action to reject all bids, the

1699standard of review by an administrative law

1706judge shall be whether the agency’s intended

1713action is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or

1719fraudulent.

172020. Section 120.57(3)(f) states that the ultimate issue in

1729an award case is whether the proposed agency action is contrary

1740to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications. Section

1748120.57(3)(f) states that the standard of proof in an award case

1759is whether the proposed agency action is cle arly erroneous,

1769contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious (Clearly

1776Erroneous Standard).

177821. Section 120.57(3)(f) also states that an award case,

1787but not a nonaward case, is a de novo proceeding. In the

1799typical de novo proceeding, pursuant to Se ction 120.57(1)(j),

1808the administrative law judge finds facts using the preponderance

1817standard, not a standard more deferential to the agency. In the

1828typical de novo proceeding, the administrative law judge

1836determines the basic and ultimate facts, as long as they are

1847determinable by ordinary methods of proof and are not infused

1857with policy considerations. See , e.g. , Holmes v. Turlington ,

1865480 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Bush v. Brogan , 725 So. 2d

18791237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gross v. Department of Health , _ _ So.

18922d __, 27 Fla. L. Wkly. D1492, 2002 WL 1389304 (Fla. 5th DCA

19052002); South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. v.

1913Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 738 So. 2d

1922391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); and Belleau v. Department of

1932Environmental Pr otection , 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

194322. Whether the facts are denominated basic or ultimate,

1952the factfinding responsibility of the administrative law judge

1960in the typical de novo hearing encompasses all of the facts that

1972are necessary to redu ce the remaining issues to pure questions

1983of law. Cf. Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , 279 So. 2d 281

1995(Fla. 1973). These facts include direct facts and reasonable

2004inferences drawn from these direct facts. See , e.g. ,

2012Southpointe Pharmacy v. Department o f Health and Rehabilitative

2021Services , 596 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and Heifetz v.

2033Department of Business Regulation , 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA

20441985).

204523. The Clearly Erroneous Standard, which applies to the

2054assessment of the proposed agency act ion, does not conflict with

2065the requirement of Sections 120.57(3)(f) and 120.57(1)(j) that

2073the administrative law judge apply the preponderance standard to

2082the basic and ultimate facts. The court in Asphalt Pavers, Inc.

2093v. Department of Transportation , 60 2 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA

21051992), held that the administrative law judge retained typical

2114factfinding responsibility even after Department of

2120Transportation v. Groves - Watkins Constructors , 530 So. 2d 912

2130(Fla. 1988), in which the Supreme Court held that th e hearing

2142officer occupied a deferential role in a nonaward case.

2151(Maintaining the Groves - Watkins deferential standard for a

2160nonaward case, Section 120.57(1)(j) establishes a less -

2168deferential standard for an award case.)

217424. The Asphalt Pavers court reje cted the agency's

2183attempt, in reliance upon Groves - Watkins , to preempt the hearing

2194officer's typical factfinding responsibilities. In Asphalt

2200Pavers , the agency overturned a finding by the hearing officer

2210that a bid package had included a disadvantaged bu siness

2220enterprise (DBE) form. The Asphalt Pavers court reaffirmed the

2229post - Groves - Watkins responsibility of the hearing officer -- as to

2242factual matters susceptible to ordinary methods of proof and not

2252infused with policy considerations -- to engage in typica l

2262factfinding, including drawing permissible inferences and making

2269ultimate findings of fact.

227325. In addition to applying the Clearly Erroneous Standard

2282to the determination whether the proposed decision to award is

2292contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications,

2300the administrative law judge applies the Clearly Erroneous

2308Standard to questions of fact requiring the application of the

2318agency’s technical expertise, such as whether a specific product

2327or service qualitatively complies with the spe cifications;

2335questions infused with agency policy; and all questions of law

2345within the substantive expertise of the agency, such as the

2355meaning of its nonprocedural rules.

236026. The administrative law judge also applies the Clearly

2369Erroneous Standard in a ddressing mixed questions of fact and

2379law. In a legal action, a judge resolves mixed questions of

2390fact and law as a matter of law if only one resolution is

2403reasonable; if more than one resolution is reasonable, the trier

2413of fact resolves the issue. See , e.g. , Adams v. G.D. Searle &

2425Co., Inc. , 576 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Hooper v.

2438Barnett Bank of West Florida , 474 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA

24501985).

245127. Similarly, in a case requiring the interpretation of a

2461contract susceptible to more than one in terpretation, a judge

2471determines as a matter of law whether the contract is ambiguous

2482and, if so, the trier of fact resolves the ambiguity. See ,

2493e.g. , North Star Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Artzt , __ So. 2d __, 2002

2506WL 1431916 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Barclays American Mortgage

2516Corp. v. Bank of Central Florida , 629 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA

25291993). The trier of fact may have to resolve factual disputes

2540to enable the legal determination of whether a contract is

2550ambiguous. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve ment Trust

2560Fund v. Lost Village Corp. , 805 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2573These legal principles governing the interpretation of contracts

2581are applicable to the interpretation of an agency’s

2589specifications, bidder’s bid, or offeror’s proposal -- all of

2598whic h are forms of offers to contract.

260628. The question often arises whether a deviation in a bid

2617or offer constitutes a material variance, which the agency may

2627not waive, or a minor irregularity, which the agency may waive.

2638Although the ultimate question of responsiveness requires the

2646application of a deferential standard, as discussed below, the

2655fact - intensive determination of such issues as competitive

2664advantage, which underlie most determinations concerning the

2671significance of deviations, requires the app lication of the

2680preponderance standard, except in situations in which the

2688agency’s determination concerning the significance of a

2695deviation is infused with agency policy or agency expertise.

270429. This dual approach to the standard of proof is

2714consistent wi th State Contracting and Engineering Corporation v.

2723Department of Transportation , 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA

27331998). In State Contracting , the court affirmed the agency’s

2742final order that rejected the recommendation of the

2750administrative law judge to rej ect a bid on the ground that it

2763was nonresponsive. The bid included the required disadvantaged

2771business enterprise (DBE) form, but, after hearing, the

2779administrative law judge determined that the bidder could not

2788meet the required level of participation b y DBEs. The agency

2799believed that responsiveness demanded only that the form be

2808facially sufficient and compliance would be a matter of

2817enforcement. Rejecting the recommendation of the administrative

2824law judge, the agency reasoned that the administrative law judge

2834had failed to determine that the agency’s interpretation of its

2844rule was clearly erroneous.

284830. In affirming the agency’s final order, the State

2857Contracting court quoted the provisions of Section 120.57(3)(f)

2865for evaluating the proposed agency a ction against the four

2875criteria of contrary to statutes, rules, policies, and the

2884specifications and against the Clearly Erroneous Standard.

2891Addressing the meaning of a de novo hearing in an award case,

2903the court stated, at page 609:

2909In this context, the phrase “de novo

2916hearing” is used to describe a form of

2924intra - agency review. The [administrative

2930law judge] may receive evidence, as with any

2938formal hearing under section 120.57(1), but

2944the object of the proceeding is to evaluate

2952the action taken by the ag ency.

295931. The State Contracting court applied the Clearly

2967Erroneous Standard to the agency decision to award, the agency’s

2977interpretation of one of its rules, and the agency’s

2986determination that the bid was responsive. The State

2994Contracting case did not feature prominently factual disputes

3002concerning the basic and ultimate facts.

300832. In the present case, the main issue is whether

3018Petitioner’s bid package included the bid bond when it was

3028submitted to Respondent. All of the required facts are

3037determinab le by ordinary methods of proof, and none of the

3048required facts is infused with policy or requires the

3057application of agency expertise. Finding the basic facts and

3066making permissible inferences based on these facts supply the

3075factual foundation upon which this case may be resolved.

3084Therefore, these determinations require the application of the

3092preponderance standard of proof.

309633. As noted in the Findings of Fact, Petitioner has

3106failed to prove that the bid bond accompanied its bid package

3117when submitted to Respondent. There were opportunities for

3125Respondent's employees to lose the bid bond, and there were

3135opportunities for Petitioner's employee to lose the bid bond.

3144It is very odd that two bid packages in one day lacked bid

3157bonds, but very odd events ha ppen, just not often. The most

3169persuasive evidence in this case is the testimony of

3178Respondent's three employees that they could not find the bid

3188bond while they were still in the conference room.

319734. Petitioner relies on two cases similar to the present

3207case. In Overstreet Paving Company v. Department of

3215Transportation , 608 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), and Asphalt

3226Pavers , cited above, the bid packages of both bidders, which

3236were bidding on different portions of the same project, lacked

3246the subcontract ors’ DBE forms. The agency declared both bids

3256nonresponsive for their failure to include this required item.

3265In both cases, the courts, applying the deferential standard of

3275Groves - Watkins , held that the agency lacked the authority to

3286reject the bids as n onresponsive for the missing DBE forms.

329735. As noted above, the Asphalt Pavers hearing officer

3306found that the DBE form accompanied the bid package when it was

3318submitted to the agency and was lost sometime while in the

3329agency's possession. In Asphalt Pav ers , no agency employee

3338could recall opening the subject bid package, and no employee

3348discovered that the DBE form was missing until two and one - half

3361hours after bid opening and after a number of agency employees

3372had handled the opened bid package. Determ ining that the

3382agency's rejection of the bid was arbitrary because it was based

3393on a missing form that the agency had lost, the court reversed

3405the agency's final order rejecting the bid as nonresponsive.

341436. The Overstreet Paving hearing officer did not

3422e xpressly find that the agency lost the DBE form, but did find

3435that the omission of the form did not give the bidder a

3447competitive advantage; thus, the deviation was a minor

3455irregularity rather than a material variance. Rejecting the

3463agency's argument that the bidder must establish that the agency

3473lost the DBE form in order, effectively, to force the agency to

3485exercise its discretion to waive a minor irregularity, the court

3495held that, given the relative unimportance of the DBE form, the

3506bidder need only est ablish a prima facie case that it had

3518included the form in its bid package. Once the bidder made such

3530a case, the agency had to refute the prima facie case, or else

3543its acceptance of a higher bid would be arbitrary. In assessing

3554the evidence, the court s tressed that the agency's employees did

3565not discover that the bid package was missing the DBE form for

3577some time after the bid opening.

358337. These cases are not as similar to the present case as

3595they initially appear. First, a bidder obtains competitive

3603advantage by the omission of a bid bond, but not by the omission

3616of a DBE form. Second, the agency's delay in discovering the

3627missing items raises the likelihood that the agency lost the

3637item, but the agency's immediate discovery of a missing item

3647raises the likelihood that the bidder lost the item.

365638. Here, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent

3665lost Petitioner's bid bond. Thus, Petitioner has failed to

3674prove that Respondent is responsible for the missing bid bond,

3684whose omission is a material variance. Therefore, Respondent

3692properly rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive and awarded

3700the contract to Intervenor.

3704RECOMMENDATION

3705It is

3707RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a

3715final order dismissing the bid protest of Petiti oner and

3725awarding the contract to Intervenor.

3730DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in

3740Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

3744___________________________________

3745ROBERT E. MEALE

3748Administrative Law Judge

3751Division of Administrative Hearings

3755The DeSoto Building

37581230 Apalachee Parkway

3761Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

3766(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

3774Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

3780www.doah.state.fl.us

3781Filed with the Clerk of the

3787Division of Ad ministrative Hearings

3792this 6th day of August, 2002.

3798COPIES FURNISHED:

3800Thomas F. Barry, Secretary

3804Department of Transportation

3807Haydon Burns Building

3810605 Suwannee Street

3813Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450

3818James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings

3825Department of Transportation

3828Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58

3834605 Suwannee Street

3837Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450

3842Barbara Gasper Hines

3845Assistant General Counsel

3848Department of Transportation

3851605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58

3857Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

3862Joseph W. Lawrence, II

3866Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A.

3871360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130

3878Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

3882F. Alan Cummings

3885Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP

38901004 DeSoto Park Drive

3894Post Office Box 589

3898T allahassee, Florida 32302 - 0589

3904NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

3910All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

392010 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions

3931to this recommended order must be filed with the agency that

3942will issue the final order in this case.

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
PDF
Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 09/13/2002
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/11/2002
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 08/06/2002
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 08/06/2002
Proceedings: Recommended Order issued (hearing held June 20, 2002) CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 08/06/2002
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying hearing record referred to the Agency sent out.
PDF:
Date: 08/01/2002
Proceedings: Proposed Recommended Order of Petitioner, Department of Transportation filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/01/2002
Proceedings: Florida Blacktop`s Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/31/2002
Proceedings: Memorandum filed by F. Cummings
Date: 07/12/2002
Proceedings: Transcript 2 Volumes filed.
Date: 06/20/2002
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held; see case file for applicable time frames.
PDF:
Date: 06/19/2002
Proceedings: Petitioner`s Notice to Produce at Trial (filed via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 06/19/2002
Proceedings: Florida Blacktop, Inc. Pre-Hearing Stipulation (filed via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 06/19/2002
Proceedings: Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed by Intervenor.
PDF:
Date: 06/19/2002
Proceedings: Department`s Opposition to Motion to Compel Production of Documents filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/18/2002
Proceedings: Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed by Respondent.
PDF:
Date: 06/18/2002
Proceedings: Petitioner`s Motion to Compel Production of Documents to State of Florida, Department of Transportation (filed via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 06/17/2002
Proceedings: Respondent, Department of Transportation`s, Response to Petitioner`s Request for Production of Documents filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2002
Proceedings: Order Granting Motion to Intervene issued. (Weekly Asphalt Paving, Inc.)
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2002
Proceedings: Petitioner`s Request for Production of Documents to State of Florida, Department of Transportation filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2002
Proceedings: Notice of Appearence (filed by J. Lawrence via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 06/12/2002
Proceedings: Weekly Asphalt Paving, Inc.`s Motion to Intervene filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/30/2002
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued.
PDF:
Date: 05/30/2002
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing issued (hearing set for June 20, 2002; 9:00 a.m.; Fort Lauderdale, FL).
PDF:
Date: 05/29/2002
Proceedings: Formal Protest and Request for Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/29/2002
Proceedings: Agency referral filed.

Case Information

Judge:
ROBERT E. MEALE
Date Filed:
05/29/2002
Date Assignment:
05/29/2002
Last Docket Entry:
09/13/2002
Location:
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
District:
Southern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
Suffix:
BID
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (1):