02-002187BID
Florida Blacktop, Inc. vs.
Department Of Transportation
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, August 6, 2002.
Recommended Order on Tuesday, August 6, 2002.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8FLORIDA BLACKTOP, INC., )
12)
13Petitioner, )
15)
16vs. )
18)
19DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )
23)
24Respondent, ) Case No. 02 - 2187BID
31)
32)
33and )
35)
36WEEKLEY ASPHALT PAVING, IN C., )
42)
43Intervenor. )
45______________________________)
46RECOMMENDED ORDER
48Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law Judge of the Division
57of Administrative Hearings, conducted the final hearing in Fort
66Lauderdale, Florida, on June 20, 2002.
72APPEARANCES
73F or Petitioner: Joseph W. Lawrence, II
80Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A.
85360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130
92Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
96For Respondent: Barbara Gasper Hines
101Assistant General Counsel
104Department of Transportation
107605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58
113Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458
118For Intervenor: F. Alan Cummings
123Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP
1281004 DeSoto Park Drive
132Post Office Box 589
136Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0589
141STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
145The issue is whether Respondents proposed award o f a
155contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies,
164or the specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida
172Statutes.
173PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
175By Formal Protest and Request for Hearing filed April 17,
1852002, Petitioner alleged that, on March 8, 2002, it timely
195submitted a bid, with a bid bond, in response to an invitation
207to bid Respondents Project Number 222457, FIN Number
21532822925201, Contract Number E4D18. Petitioner alleged that it
223submitted the lowest bid, but, on April 3, 200 2, Respondent
234posted its notice of intent to accept Intervenors bid and
244reject Petitioners bid because Petitioners bid lacked the
252required bid bond. Petitioner alleged that its notice of
261protest and formal written protest were timely.
268At the hearing, Petitioner called three witnesses and
276offered into evidence 11 exhibits: Petitioner Exhibits 1 - 11.
286Respondent called four witnesses and offered into evidence five
295exhibits: Respondent Exhibits 1 - 5. Intervenor called no
304witnesses and offered into eviden ce no exhibits. All exhibits
314were admitted except Petitioner Exhibit 4, which was proffered.
323The court reporter filed the transcript on July 12, 2002.
333The parties filed their proposed findings of fact and
342conclusions of law by August 1, 2002.
349FINDINGS O F FACT
3531. On February 15, 2002, Respondent advertised for bids
362for Contract E4D18 (ITB). The ITB requires bidders to submit
372their bids with a bid bond and power of attorney no later than
38511:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002.
3912. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids at the
400specified location. Petitioners bid price was $2,094,748.99,
409and Intervenors bid price was $2,095,530.00. Petitioner and
419Intervenor have standing to participate in this case.
4273. In preparing its bid, Petitioner obtained a bid bo nd
438and power of attorney from Great American Insurance Company
447through its local bonding agent, Nielson, Alter and Associates.
456(All references to bid bonds shall mean the bid bond and
467accompanying power of attorney.) Nielson, Alter and Associates
475and its predecessor has provided bid bonds for Petitioner for 12
486years.
4874. Pursuant to its standard business practice, Petitioner
495received the bid bond from Nielson, Alter and Associates the day
506prior to the deadline for submitting bids. The bond was in
517proper form, duly authorized, and validly executed, so it was
527enforceable upon delivery from Petitioner to Respondent. If
535Petitioner in fact delivered the bond with the bid on the
546following day, Respondent would have no basis to reject
555Petitioners bid as unresp onsive.
5605. Petitioners employee responsible for assembling and
567delivering Petitioners bid has been so employed by Petitioner
576for three and one - half years. She testified that she placed the
589bid bond in the package with the bid itself, sealed the package ,
601drove it to the assigned location, and submitted the sealed bid
612package to Respondent by 10:30 a.m. on March 8, 2002.
6226. Respondents employees accepted Petitioners sealed bid
629package and, without opening it, placed it in a locked filing
640cabinet, where they placed the three other timely submitted bids
650for the subject project. At 11:00 a.m. -- the time specified for
662the opening of bids -- one of Respondents employees removed the
673four sealed bid packages and took them to the conference room
684for the opening of the bids in response to the ITB. At the same
698time and place, Respondents employees were opening 21 other
707bids in response to five other invitations to bid on projects
718unrelated to the subject project.
7237. The conference room was small and contained a table.
733On one side of the table sat three of Respondents employees,
744who remained with the bid packages continuously from when they
754arrived in the conference room until, after they were opened,
764they were taken upstairs to a data processing center. On the
775other side of the table sat Petitioners employee and a
785representative of another bidder. The 25 bid packages were in
795six separate piles, divided by project.
8018. One of Respondents employees opened each bid and
810handed it to a second employee who announc ed the name of the
823bidder and the amount of the bid. The second employee then
834passed the bid to the third employee who recorded the bid. As
846was consistent with Respondents past practice, no one announced
855whether each bid was complete.
8609. At the end o f the opening of the bids in response to
874the ITB, Respondents employee announced that Intervenor had
882submitted the lowest bid. Due to a mathematical error in
892Intervenors bid, it appeared from the cover sheets that
901Intervenors bid was the lowest. Only later, after the
910mathematical error was corrected, did Respondents employees
917discover that Petitioner had submitted the lowest bid.
92510. After Petitioners employee and the representative of
933the other bidder had left the conference room, Respondents
942thre e employees examined the bid packages more closely. They
952could not find the bid bond in Petitioners bid package, nor
963could they find the bid bond in the bid package of a bidder for
977one of the other contracts.
98211. The first of Respondents employees to discover that
991she could not find the bid bond in Petitioners bid package
1002reexamined Petitioners bid package in search of the documents.
1011The three employees then checked inside every envelope for the
1021documents that were missing from the bid packages of Petitioner
1031and the other bidder, but they could not find the missing
1042documents.
104312. It was highly unusual for a bid bond to be missing
1055from a bid package and probably unprecedented for bid bonds to
1066be missing from two bids for separate jobs opened at the same
1078time.
107913. Consistent with their practice then and now,
1087Respondents employees separated the bidders checks from the
1095bid packages and placed the checks in a secure location.
1105Consistent with their practice then and now, one of Respondents
1115employees then delivered the remainder of each bid package to
1125the data processing center upstairs. Consistent with their
1133practice then, but not now, Respondents employees did not
1142document that the bid bond was missing for several days after
1153the bid opening.
115614. P etitioner contends that Respondents employees did
1164not discover that the bid bond was missing until days after the
1176bid opening. Petitioner reasons, in part, that Respondents
1184employees were not as attentive to Petitioners bid because they
1194thought that it was only the second lowest bid. Petitioner
1204contends that the discovery of the missing bid bond several days
1215after its submittal provides Respondents employees with
1222considerable opportunity to mishandle the bid package and
1230inadvertently misplace the bid bond.
123515. In support of its contention that Respondents
1243employees did not immediately discover the missing bid bond,
1252Petitioner offered the testimony to this effect of its president
1262and proffered similar testimony of another witness. The bases
1271of this testimony were separate statements from the employee who
1281supervised the three employees who opened, announced, and
1289recorded the bids. However, this testimony, even from both
1298witnesses, could not overcome the clear and unequivocal
1306testimony of all three o f Respondents employees that they
1316discovered that Petitioners bid package was missing the bid
1325bond on the day of the bid opening. Any statement to the
1337contrary by Respondent's supervisory employee may have been
1345based on her misrecollection or ignorance of the facts or
1355misunderstanding of the questions posed to her, although it is
1365also possible that both listeners separately misunderstood what
1373she was saying.
137616. A bid bond is a crucial component of a bid. Its
1388omission confers a competitive advantage upon a bidder, which,
1397after bid opening, could elect not to cure the omission and thus
1409be relieved of the obligation that it otherwise appeared to have
1420offered to undertake by submitting its bid.
142717. Intervenor's post - hearing memorandum adds a perceptive
1436discussion of the dullness of memory when attesting to a matter
1447of routine, as was the testimony of Petitioner's employee who
"1457always" attached bid bonds to bids, compared to the vividness
1467of memory when attesting to a rare deviation from routine, as
1478was t he testimony of Respondent's three employees who were
1488startled to find that bid bonds were missing from two bid
1499packages, looked for the missing documents, and could not find
1509them. On the present record, it would be slightly less
1519troubling to find that Pe titioner's bid package lacked the bid
1530bond, but, as noted below, the burden of proof is on Petitioner,
1542so it suffices to find that Petitioner has failed to prove that
1554its bid package contained the bid bond.
1561CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
156418. The Division of Administr ative Hearings has
1572jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 120.57(1),
1579Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida
1588Statutes.)
158919. Section 120.57(3)(f) provides:
1593. . . the burden of proof shall rest with
1603the party protesting the pr oposed agency
1610action. In a competitive - procurement
1616protest, other than a rejection of all bids,
1624the administrative law judge shall conduct a
1631de novo proceeding to determine whether the
1638agencys proposed action is contrary to the
1645agencys governing statute s, the agencys
1651rules or policies, or the bid or proposal
1659specifications. The standard of proof for
1665such proceedings shall be whether the
1671proposed agency action was clearly
1676erroneous, contrary to competition,
1680arbitrary, or capricious. In any bid -
1687protest proceeding contesting an intended
1692agency action to reject all bids, the
1699standard of review by an administrative law
1706judge shall be whether the agencys intended
1713action is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or
1719fraudulent.
172020. Section 120.57(3)(f) states that the ultimate issue in
1729an award case is whether the proposed agency action is contrary
1740to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications. Section
1748120.57(3)(f) states that the standard of proof in an award case
1759is whether the proposed agency action is cle arly erroneous,
1769contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious (Clearly
1776Erroneous Standard).
177821. Section 120.57(3)(f) also states that an award case,
1787but not a nonaward case, is a de novo proceeding. In the
1799typical de novo proceeding, pursuant to Se ction 120.57(1)(j),
1808the administrative law judge finds facts using the preponderance
1817standard, not a standard more deferential to the agency. In the
1828typical de novo proceeding, the administrative law judge
1836determines the basic and ultimate facts, as long as they are
1847determinable by ordinary methods of proof and are not infused
1857with policy considerations. See , e.g. , Holmes v. Turlington ,
1865480 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Bush v. Brogan , 725 So. 2d
18791237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gross v. Department of Health , _ _ So.
18922d __, 27 Fla. L. Wkly. D1492, 2002 WL 1389304 (Fla. 5th DCA
19052002); South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. v.
1913Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 738 So. 2d
1922391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); and Belleau v. Department of
1932Environmental Pr otection , 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
194322. Whether the facts are denominated basic or ultimate,
1952the factfinding responsibility of the administrative law judge
1960in the typical de novo hearing encompasses all of the facts that
1972are necessary to redu ce the remaining issues to pure questions
1983of law. Cf. Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , 279 So. 2d 281
1995(Fla. 1973). These facts include direct facts and reasonable
2004inferences drawn from these direct facts. See , e.g. ,
2012Southpointe Pharmacy v. Department o f Health and Rehabilitative
2021Services , 596 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and Heifetz v.
2033Department of Business Regulation , 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA
20441985).
204523. The Clearly Erroneous Standard, which applies to the
2054assessment of the proposed agency act ion, does not conflict with
2065the requirement of Sections 120.57(3)(f) and 120.57(1)(j) that
2073the administrative law judge apply the preponderance standard to
2082the basic and ultimate facts. The court in Asphalt Pavers, Inc.
2093v. Department of Transportation , 60 2 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA
21051992), held that the administrative law judge retained typical
2114factfinding responsibility even after Department of
2120Transportation v. Groves - Watkins Constructors , 530 So. 2d 912
2130(Fla. 1988), in which the Supreme Court held that th e hearing
2142officer occupied a deferential role in a nonaward case.
2151(Maintaining the Groves - Watkins deferential standard for a
2160nonaward case, Section 120.57(1)(j) establishes a less -
2168deferential standard for an award case.)
217424. The Asphalt Pavers court reje cted the agency's
2183attempt, in reliance upon Groves - Watkins , to preempt the hearing
2194officer's typical factfinding responsibilities. In Asphalt
2200Pavers , the agency overturned a finding by the hearing officer
2210that a bid package had included a disadvantaged bu siness
2220enterprise (DBE) form. The Asphalt Pavers court reaffirmed the
2229post - Groves - Watkins responsibility of the hearing officer -- as to
2242factual matters susceptible to ordinary methods of proof and not
2252infused with policy considerations -- to engage in typica l
2262factfinding, including drawing permissible inferences and making
2269ultimate findings of fact.
227325. In addition to applying the Clearly Erroneous Standard
2282to the determination whether the proposed decision to award is
2292contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications,
2300the administrative law judge applies the Clearly Erroneous
2308Standard to questions of fact requiring the application of the
2318agencys technical expertise, such as whether a specific product
2327or service qualitatively complies with the spe cifications;
2335questions infused with agency policy; and all questions of law
2345within the substantive expertise of the agency, such as the
2355meaning of its nonprocedural rules.
236026. The administrative law judge also applies the Clearly
2369Erroneous Standard in a ddressing mixed questions of fact and
2379law. In a legal action, a judge resolves mixed questions of
2390fact and law as a matter of law if only one resolution is
2403reasonable; if more than one resolution is reasonable, the trier
2413of fact resolves the issue. See , e.g. , Adams v. G.D. Searle &
2425Co., Inc. , 576 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Hooper v.
2438Barnett Bank of West Florida , 474 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA
24501985).
245127. Similarly, in a case requiring the interpretation of a
2461contract susceptible to more than one in terpretation, a judge
2471determines as a matter of law whether the contract is ambiguous
2482and, if so, the trier of fact resolves the ambiguity. See ,
2493e.g. , North Star Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Artzt , __ So. 2d __, 2002
2506WL 1431916 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Barclays American Mortgage
2516Corp. v. Bank of Central Florida , 629 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA
25291993). The trier of fact may have to resolve factual disputes
2540to enable the legal determination of whether a contract is
2550ambiguous. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improve ment Trust
2560Fund v. Lost Village Corp. , 805 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
2573These legal principles governing the interpretation of contracts
2581are applicable to the interpretation of an agencys
2589specifications, bidders bid, or offerors proposal -- all of
2598whic h are forms of offers to contract.
260628. The question often arises whether a deviation in a bid
2617or offer constitutes a material variance, which the agency may
2627not waive, or a minor irregularity, which the agency may waive.
2638Although the ultimate question of responsiveness requires the
2646application of a deferential standard, as discussed below, the
2655fact - intensive determination of such issues as competitive
2664advantage, which underlie most determinations concerning the
2671significance of deviations, requires the app lication of the
2680preponderance standard, except in situations in which the
2688agencys determination concerning the significance of a
2695deviation is infused with agency policy or agency expertise.
270429. This dual approach to the standard of proof is
2714consistent wi th State Contracting and Engineering Corporation v.
2723Department of Transportation , 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA
27331998). In State Contracting , the court affirmed the agencys
2742final order that rejected the recommendation of the
2750administrative law judge to rej ect a bid on the ground that it
2763was nonresponsive. The bid included the required disadvantaged
2771business enterprise (DBE) form, but, after hearing, the
2779administrative law judge determined that the bidder could not
2788meet the required level of participation b y DBEs. The agency
2799believed that responsiveness demanded only that the form be
2808facially sufficient and compliance would be a matter of
2817enforcement. Rejecting the recommendation of the administrative
2824law judge, the agency reasoned that the administrative law judge
2834had failed to determine that the agencys interpretation of its
2844rule was clearly erroneous.
284830. In affirming the agencys final order, the State
2857Contracting court quoted the provisions of Section 120.57(3)(f)
2865for evaluating the proposed agency a ction against the four
2875criteria of contrary to statutes, rules, policies, and the
2884specifications and against the Clearly Erroneous Standard.
2891Addressing the meaning of a de novo hearing in an award case,
2903the court stated, at page 609:
2909In this context, the phrase de novo
2916hearing is used to describe a form of
2924intra - agency review. The [administrative
2930law judge] may receive evidence, as with any
2938formal hearing under section 120.57(1), but
2944the object of the proceeding is to evaluate
2952the action taken by the ag ency.
295931. The State Contracting court applied the Clearly
2967Erroneous Standard to the agency decision to award, the agencys
2977interpretation of one of its rules, and the agencys
2986determination that the bid was responsive. The State
2994Contracting case did not feature prominently factual disputes
3002concerning the basic and ultimate facts.
300832. In the present case, the main issue is whether
3018Petitioners bid package included the bid bond when it was
3028submitted to Respondent. All of the required facts are
3037determinab le by ordinary methods of proof, and none of the
3048required facts is infused with policy or requires the
3057application of agency expertise. Finding the basic facts and
3066making permissible inferences based on these facts supply the
3075factual foundation upon which this case may be resolved.
3084Therefore, these determinations require the application of the
3092preponderance standard of proof.
309633. As noted in the Findings of Fact, Petitioner has
3106failed to prove that the bid bond accompanied its bid package
3117when submitted to Respondent. There were opportunities for
3125Respondent's employees to lose the bid bond, and there were
3135opportunities for Petitioner's employee to lose the bid bond.
3144It is very odd that two bid packages in one day lacked bid
3157bonds, but very odd events ha ppen, just not often. The most
3169persuasive evidence in this case is the testimony of
3178Respondent's three employees that they could not find the bid
3188bond while they were still in the conference room.
319734. Petitioner relies on two cases similar to the present
3207case. In Overstreet Paving Company v. Department of
3215Transportation , 608 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), and Asphalt
3226Pavers , cited above, the bid packages of both bidders, which
3236were bidding on different portions of the same project, lacked
3246the subcontract ors DBE forms. The agency declared both bids
3256nonresponsive for their failure to include this required item.
3265In both cases, the courts, applying the deferential standard of
3275Groves - Watkins , held that the agency lacked the authority to
3286reject the bids as n onresponsive for the missing DBE forms.
329735. As noted above, the Asphalt Pavers hearing officer
3306found that the DBE form accompanied the bid package when it was
3318submitted to the agency and was lost sometime while in the
3329agency's possession. In Asphalt Pav ers , no agency employee
3338could recall opening the subject bid package, and no employee
3348discovered that the DBE form was missing until two and one - half
3361hours after bid opening and after a number of agency employees
3372had handled the opened bid package. Determ ining that the
3382agency's rejection of the bid was arbitrary because it was based
3393on a missing form that the agency had lost, the court reversed
3405the agency's final order rejecting the bid as nonresponsive.
341436. The Overstreet Paving hearing officer did not
3422e xpressly find that the agency lost the DBE form, but did find
3435that the omission of the form did not give the bidder a
3447competitive advantage; thus, the deviation was a minor
3455irregularity rather than a material variance. Rejecting the
3463agency's argument that the bidder must establish that the agency
3473lost the DBE form in order, effectively, to force the agency to
3485exercise its discretion to waive a minor irregularity, the court
3495held that, given the relative unimportance of the DBE form, the
3506bidder need only est ablish a prima facie case that it had
3518included the form in its bid package. Once the bidder made such
3530a case, the agency had to refute the prima facie case, or else
3543its acceptance of a higher bid would be arbitrary. In assessing
3554the evidence, the court s tressed that the agency's employees did
3565not discover that the bid package was missing the DBE form for
3577some time after the bid opening.
358337. These cases are not as similar to the present case as
3595they initially appear. First, a bidder obtains competitive
3603advantage by the omission of a bid bond, but not by the omission
3616of a DBE form. Second, the agency's delay in discovering the
3627missing items raises the likelihood that the agency lost the
3637item, but the agency's immediate discovery of a missing item
3647raises the likelihood that the bidder lost the item.
365638. Here, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent
3665lost Petitioner's bid bond. Thus, Petitioner has failed to
3674prove that Respondent is responsible for the missing bid bond,
3684whose omission is a material variance. Therefore, Respondent
3692properly rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive and awarded
3700the contract to Intervenor.
3704RECOMMENDATION
3705It is
3707RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a
3715final order dismissing the bid protest of Petiti oner and
3725awarding the contract to Intervenor.
3730DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in
3740Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
3744___________________________________
3745ROBERT E. MEALE
3748Administrative Law Judge
3751Division of Administrative Hearings
3755The DeSoto Building
37581230 Apalachee Parkway
3761Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
3766(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675
3774Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
3780www.doah.state.fl.us
3781Filed with the Clerk of the
3787Division of Ad ministrative Hearings
3792this 6th day of August, 2002.
3798COPIES FURNISHED:
3800Thomas F. Barry, Secretary
3804Department of Transportation
3807Haydon Burns Building
3810605 Suwannee Street
3813Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450
3818James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings
3825Department of Transportation
3828Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58
3834605 Suwannee Street
3837Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450
3842Barbara Gasper Hines
3845Assistant General Counsel
3848Department of Transportation
3851605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58
3857Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458
3862Joseph W. Lawrence, II
3866Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A.
3871360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130
3878Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
3882F. Alan Cummings
3885Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP
38901004 DeSoto Park Drive
3894Post Office Box 589
3898T allahassee, Florida 32302 - 0589
3904NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
3910All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
392010 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions
3931to this recommended order must be filed with the agency that
3942will issue the final order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 08/06/2002
- Proceedings: Recommended Order issued (hearing held June 20, 2002) CASE CLOSED.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/06/2002
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying hearing record referred to the Agency sent out.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/01/2002
- Proceedings: Proposed Recommended Order of Petitioner, Department of Transportation filed.
- Date: 07/12/2002
- Proceedings: Transcript 2 Volumes filed.
- Date: 06/20/2002
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held; see case file for applicable time frames.
- PDF:
- Date: 06/19/2002
- Proceedings: Florida Blacktop, Inc. Pre-Hearing Stipulation (filed via facsimile).
- PDF:
- Date: 06/19/2002
- Proceedings: Department`s Opposition to Motion to Compel Production of Documents filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 06/18/2002
- Proceedings: Petitioner`s Motion to Compel Production of Documents to State of Florida, Department of Transportation (filed via facsimile).
- PDF:
- Date: 06/17/2002
- Proceedings: Respondent, Department of Transportation`s, Response to Petitioner`s Request for Production of Documents filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 06/13/2002
- Proceedings: Order Granting Motion to Intervene issued. (Weekly Asphalt Paving, Inc.)
- PDF:
- Date: 06/13/2002
- Proceedings: Petitioner`s Request for Production of Documents to State of Florida, Department of Transportation filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- ROBERT E. MEALE
- Date Filed:
- 05/29/2002
- Date Assignment:
- 05/29/2002
- Last Docket Entry:
- 09/13/2002
- Location:
- Fort Lauderdale, Florida
- District:
- Southern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
- Suffix:
- BID
Counsels
-
F. Alan Cummings, Esquire
Address of Record -
Barbara G Hines, Esquire
Address of Record -
Joseph W Lawrence, II, Esquire
Address of Record