02-002375BID Simplex Grinnell Lp vs. Department Of Corrections Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, August 7, 2002.

Summary: Bid was responsive because bidder had relevant experience in one of several areas of fire safety equipment services.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

SIMPLEX GRINNELL LP, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 02 - 2375BID

)

)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )

)

Respondent, )

)

and )

)

INTERSTATE FIRE SYSTEMS, )

INC., and PIPER FIRE )

PROTECTION, INC., )

)

Intervenors. )

______________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law Judge of the Division

of Administrative Hearings, conducted the final hearing in

Tallahassee, Florida, o n July 12, 2002.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Karen D. Walker

Holland & Knight, LLP

Post Office Drawer 810

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: Susan P. Stephens

Lori D. Stith

Assistant General Counsel

Department of Corrections

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2500

For Intervenor: Piper Fire Protection, Inc.:

Don O'Lone, Business Manager

Qualified Representative

Piper Fire Protection, Inc.

Post Office Box 9005

Largo, Florida 33771

For Interven or: Interstate Fire Systems, Inc.:

No appearance

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues are whether Respondent's proposed award of four

contracts to Intervenor Piper Fire Protection, Inc., is contrary

to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications, pursuant to

Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes, and, if so, whether

Respondent's identification of Intervenor Interstate Fire

Systems, Inc., as the next lowest responsive bidder for one of

the contracts is also contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or

the specifications.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By formal written protest filed on June 3, 2002, and

amended on July 12, 2002, Petitioner protested Respondent's

proposed award of four contracts to Respondent Piper Fire

Protection, Inc. The Administrative Law Judge granted leave to

both intervenors to intervene in this case.

At the hearing, Petitioner called two witnesses.

Respondent called three witnesses and offered into evidence two

exhibits: Respondent Exhibits 1 - 2. Intervenors calle d no

witness. The parties jointly offered 13 exhibits: Joint

Exhibits 1 - 13. All exhibits were admitted.

The court reporter filed the transcript on July 26, 2002.

The parties filed their proposed recommended orders on August 5,

2002.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1 . On February 21, 2002, Respondent issued an invitation

to bid under the bid title, "Life Safety Equipment Inspection,

Maintenance & Repair Services" (ITB). ITB Section 6.1 provides

that Respondent will award a contract to the "responsive,

responsible bi dder" with the lowest bid; thus, the ITB does not

contain business criteria on which responsive bids of

responsible bidders are evaluated.

2. ITB Section 2.1 states: "Life Safety Equipment

inspection, maintenance and repair services have, in the past,

be en procured by the individual institution or facility or

handled in - house." Electing to centralize the procurement of

these services, Respondent "has decided to competitively bid for

life safety equipment inspection services by region." ITB

Section 2.3 d iscloses that Respondent intends to contract with a

single vendor in each geographical region.

3. ITB Section 2.2 states:

The successful bidder/contractor shall

provide Life Safety Equipment inspection,

maintenance and repair services for the

following items . . .:

1. Annual Fire Alarm System inspection,

testing, repair and maintenance.

2. Fire Extinguisher six (6) year recharge

and maintenance, twelve (12) year recharge

and hydrostatic testing, and fire

extinguisher replacement.

3. Semi - Annual Ki tchen Fire Suppression

Systems testing, inspection and maintenance.

4. Annual Sprinkler Systems inspection,

repair and maintenance.

5. Kitchen Exhaust Hood Cleaning on an as -

needed basis with a minimum of twice

annually.

4. ITB Section 3.1.1 states t hat the selected contractor

shall provide "Life Safety Equipment inspection, maintenance and

repair services on the following equipment: Fire Alarm Systems,

Kitchen Fire Suppression Systems, Sprinkler Systems and Kitchen

Hoods." Section 3.1.1 requires th at the "Contractor shall be

licensed" under Chapter 633, Florida Statutes.

5. ITB Section 3.7.3 states: "The Contractor's staff

shall be fully trained and certified to perform the inspection,

maintenance and repair of the equipment specified in this ITB.

Acceptable proof of certification shall be in accordance with

Chapter 633, Florida Statutes."

6. Chapter 633, Florida Statutes, enumerates the

responsibilities of the State Fire Marshall, Department of

Insurance. In general, the State Fire Marshall has complete

licensing and disciplinary jurisdiction over commercial

suppliers of the activities described in subparagraphs 2 - 4 of

paragraph 3, above. Under Section 633.70(1), the State Fire

Marshall has nonexclusive jurisdiction over certain violations

by a larm system contractors (as used in this recommended order,

"alarm system contractors" shall include electrical contractors

authorized to perform alarm system services).

7. Although not addressed by the ITB, except possibly the

first sentence of Section 3.7.3, alarm system contractors are

under the licensing and disciplinary jurisdiction of the

Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board, Department of Business

and Professional Regulation, pursuant to, respectively, Sections

489.511 and 489.533(2), Florida S tatutes. Licensing and

disciplinary jurisdiction for the cleaning of kitchen exhaust

hood systems in correctional institutions is unclear, but

Respondent's Rule 33 - 20.4003(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code,

adopts Rule 64E - 11.008(4), Florida Administrati ve Code, which

requires that kitchen ventilation systems comply with applicable

fire prevention systems.

8. In contrast to ITB Section 3, which describes the scope

of services, ITB Section 4 sets forth the provisions governing

the procurement process. ITB Section 4.3.6 states: "The

Department will reject any and all bids not meeting mandatory

responsiveness requirements. In addition, the Department will

reject any and all bids containing material deviations."

9. ITB Section 4.3.6.1 defines "mandatory responsiveness

requirements" as "[t]erms, conditions or requirements that must

be met by the bidder/contractor to be responsive to this ITB.

These responsiveness requirements are mandatory . Failure to

meet these responsiveness requirements will cause re jection of a

bid."

10. ITB Section 4.3.6.2 defines "material deviations" as:

The Department has established certain

requirements with respect to bids to be

submitted by bidder/contractor. The use of

shall , must or will (except to indicate

simple futurity ) in this ITB indicates a

requirement or condition which may not be

waived by the Department. A deviation is

material if, in the Department's sole

discretion, the deficient response is not in

substantial accord with this ITB's

requirements, provides an ad vantage to one

bidder over other bidders, has a potentially

significant effect on the quantity or

quality of items or services bid, or on the

cost to the Department. Material deviations

cannot be waived and shall be the basis for

rejection of a bid.

11. ITB Section 4.3.6.3 defines "minor irregularities" as:

A variation from the ITB terms and

conditions which does not affect the price

of the bid or give the bidder an advantage

or benefit not enjoyed by the other bidders

or does not adversely impact the in terests

of the Department.

12. ITB Section 4.3.9 states:

All bidders planning to submit a bid must

submit a letter stateing this intent by the

date and time specified in the "Calendar of

Events" (Section 4.2). This letter may be

e - mailed, mailed, faxe d or hand delivered;

however, the bidder should confirm receipt

of the notice of intent in order to ensure

continued receipt of procurement materials.

Section 4.3.10 adds that Respondent will mail addenda to the ITB

" only to those bidders submitting a Let ter of Intent to Bid ."

13. ITB Section 5.1 identifies four "mandatory

responsiveness requirements." Section 5.1.1 requires the bidder

to supply an original and one copy of the bid. Section 5.1.2

requires a duly authorized person to sign the supplement al bid

sheets. Section 5.1.3 requires the bidder to sign and deliver

an acknowledgement of contractual services. Section 5.1.4

requires the bidder to sign an acknowledged certification of six

conditions: "business/corporate experience," "authority to

le gally bind the bidder," "acceptance of terms and conditions,"

"statement of no involvement," "nondiscrimination statement,"

and "unauthorized employment of alien workers statement."

14. ITB Section 5.1.4.1 details the requirements of the

"business/corpora te experience" certification:

A statement certifying that the

bidder/contractor has business/corporate

experience of at least three (3) years

relevant to the provision of life safety

equipment services as defined herein, within

the last five (5) years.

15 . The reference in Section 5.1.4.1 to "life safety

equipment services as defined herein" is not to an explicit

definition of such services in the ITB. A restatement of

Section 5.1.4.1 in the attachments omits "as defined herein."

16. ITB Section 1.6 def ines "Life Safety Equipment

Inspection, Maintenance and Repair Services" as: "The

inspection, maintenance and repair of fire alarm systems, fire

extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems, sprinkler

systems and the cleaning of kitchen exhaust hoods."

17. Petitioner and Intervenors timely submitted bids.

Petitioner and Intervenor Piper Fire Protection, Inc. (Piper),

submitted bids for all four geographical regions into which

Respondent divided Florida. Intervenor Interstate Fire Systems,

Inc. (Inter state), submitted a bid only for one geographical

region. Petitioner and Piper timely submitted letters of intent

to bid, but Interstate never submitted such a letter.

18. Determining that Petitioner and Intervenors' bids were

all responsive, Respondent selected Piper's bids for all four

geographical regions as the lowest bids. Petitioner submitted

the second - lowest bid for three regions and, for the fourth

region, Petitioner submitted the third - lowest bid; Interstate

submitted the second - lowest bid for this region.

19. Petitioner timely submitted its notice of intent to

protest and written protest. Petitioner and Intervenors have

standing to participate in this case.

20. Petitioner contends that Piper's bid, which includes

an executed certificate of business/corporate experience, was

not responsive because Piper lacked the requisite

business/corporate experience. Petitioner contends that

Interstate's bid was not responsive because Interstate failed to

submit a letter of intent to bid.

21. For three of the last five years, Piper presents the

requisite experience only in sprinkler systems, not in fire

alarm systems, fire extinguishers, or kitchen fire suppression

systems. By contrast, Petitioner, which has been in the fire -

safety business for over a century, has the requisite experience

in all of these items.

22. As used in ITB Section 5.1.4.1, the "provision of life

safety services as defined herein" requires consideration of the

definition, at ITB Section 1.6, of "life safety equipment

inspection, maintenance and repair services" as the "inspection,

maintenance and repair of fire alarm systems, fire

extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems, sprinkler

systems and the cleaning of kitchen exhaust hoods."

23. Obviously, Section 1.6 applies the a ctivities of

inspecting, maintaining, and repairing only to fire alarm

systems, fire extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems,

and sprinkler systems. Not only does it not make sense to

inspect, maintain, and repair the "cleaning of kitchen exhaust

hoods," but ITB Section 3.1.6 limits the scope of work for

kitchen exhaust systems to cleaning. The scope of services for

kitchen exhaust hoods is thus considerably narrower than the

scope of services for the other items.

24. Kitchen exhaust hoods differ from the other items in

another important respect. Although, among these items, only

the kitchen exhaust hood is a significant source of fire, the

licensing regime imposed on the inspecting, maintaining, and

repairing of the other items is considerably m ore elaborate than

the licensing scheme imposed upon the cleaning of kitchen

exhaust hoods -- likely due to the relative degrees of difficulty

involved in the two sets of tasks.

25. As confirmed by the testimony of its witness

responsible for preparing the ITB, Respondent did not intend to

allow a bidder with three - of - the - last - five years' experience in

cleaning kitchen exhaust hoods to satisfy this responsiveness

criterion solely on the basis of this experience. A close

reading of the ITB supports this inte ntion. As noted above, the

language of the ITB and common sense justify different treatment

for the cleaning of kitchen exhaust hoods than for the

inspecting, maintaining, and repairing of the fire alarm

systems, fire extinguishers, kitchen fire suppressi on systems,

and sprinkler systems.

26. Perhaps most importantly, the responsiveness criterion

addresses only life safety equipment. Fire alarm systems, fire

extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems, and sprinkler

systems are examples of equipmen t whose sole purpose is life

safety. The purpose of a kitchen exhaust hood is not life

safety, but kitchen ventilation. A clean kitchen exhaust hood

eliminates a source of fire, but is not, in itself, a form a

life safety equipment. The heading of Secti on 1.6 describes the

inspecting, maintaining, and repairing of fire alarm systems,

fire extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems, and

sprinkler systems; the cleaning of kitchen exhaust hoods appears

to have been an addition -- perhaps a late one -- by s omeone who

gave little thought to the effect of this apparently innocuous

clause on the grammar or title of Section 1.6 and, thus, the

meaning of Section 5.1.4.1.

27. Even though the ITB precludes a bidder's reliance on

cleaning kitchen exhaust hoods to m eet the criterion of

business/corporate experience, the more difficult question

remains whether a bidder must present experience across the

entire range of remaining items, or whether a bidder may present

experience limited to one or fewer than all of the remaining

items.

28. As noted above, by regulatory regimes, a line of

possible demarcation exists between fire alarm systems, on the

one hand, and fire extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression

systems, and sprinkler systems, on the other hand.

Additiona lly, the fire - alarm system is a detection system, and

the remaining items are fire - fighting devices or systems.

However, Piper's sole qualifying experience is in one of the

fire - fighting systems, so this case does not directly raise the

question of the su fficiency of otherwise - qualifying experience

in only a fire - detection system.

29. Section 5.1.4.1 speaks in a general tone. First, the

actual requirement is in services -- the services here are

inspecting, maintaining, and repairing. Second, the extent of

the qualifying experience is left open. During the qualifying

three years, the bidder needs only "experience." The ITB does

not require exclusive experience, nor does it require even

substantial experience. Arguably, part - time experience would

suffice. Third, the ITB does not qualify the kind of "life

safety equipment" for which service experience is required.

Given the tone of the relatively relaxed responsiveness

requirement, the Administrative Law Judge chooses "any" rather

than "all" as a fairer w ord to precede "life safety equipment."

(The close linkage among inspecting, maintaining, and repairing,

as compared to the loose linkage among fire alarm systems, fire

extinguishers, kitchen fire suppression systems, and sprinkler

systems, strongly sugge sts that the meaningful distinction is

not among the types of services, but rather among the types of

equipment receiving services.)

30. The fairest reading of the ITB thus allows a bidder to

satisfy the responsiveness criterion with qualifying experience

in only sprinkler systems, as Piper has done.

31. Although it is unnecessary to address the contention

regarding Interstate, the requirement of filing a letter of

intent to bid was clearly to assure that the prospective bidder

would receive copies of bid materials, such as addenda. The

testimony of Petitioner's witness that Petitioner's "knowledge"

that Interstate, a strong competitor, was not going to submit a

bid allowed Petitioner more latitude in setting a price is

outweighed by the evidence of the p urpose of this requirement,

as set forth in the ITB and the deposition testimony of one of

Respondent's witness, as well as the lower bid of Piper.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter. S ection 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida

Statutes.)

33. Section 120.57(3)(f) provides:

. . . the burden of proof shall rest with

the party protesting the proposed agency

action. In a competitive - procurement

protest , other than a rejection of all bids,

the administrative law judge shall conduct a

de novo proceeding to determine whether the

agency’s proposed action is contrary to the

agency’s governing statutes, the agency’s

rules or policies, or the bid or proposal

s pecifications. The standard of proof for

such proceedings shall be whether the

proposed agency action was clearly

erroneous, contrary to competition,

arbitrary, or capricious. In any bid -

protest proceeding contesting an intended

agency action to reject a ll bids, the

standard of review by an administrative law

judge shall be whether the agency’s intended

action is illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or

fraudulent.

34. Section 120.57(3)(f) states that the ultimate issue in

an award case is whether the proposed agency action is contrary

to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications. Section

120.57(3)(f) states that the standard of proof in an award case

is whether the proposed agency action is clearly erroneous,

contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capr icious (Clearly

Erroneous Standard).

35. Section 120.57(3)(f) also states that an award case,

but not a nonaward case, is a de novo proceeding. In the

typical de novo proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(j),

the administrative law judge finds fact s using the preponderance

standard, not a standard more deferential to the agency. In the

typical de novo proceeding, the administrative law judge

determines the basic and ultimate facts, as long as they are

determinable by ordinary methods of proof and a re not infused

with policy considerations. See , e.g. , Holmes v. Turlington ,

480 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Bush v. Brogan , 725 So. 2d

1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Gross v. Department of Health , __ So.

2d __, 27 Fla. L. Wkly. D1492, 2002 WL 1389304 (Fla. 5th DCA

2002); South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. v.

Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 738 So. 2d

391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); and Belleau v. Department of

Environmental Protection , 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

36. Wheth er the facts are denominated basic or ultimate,

the factfinding responsibility of the administrative law judge

in the typical de novo hearing encompasses all of the facts that

are necessary to reduce the remaining issues to pure questions

of law. Cf. Pie rce v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , 279 So. 2d 281

(Fla. 1973). These facts include direct facts and reasonable

inferences drawn from these direct facts. See , e.g. ,

Southpointe Pharmacy v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative

Services , 596 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and Heifetz v.

Department of Business Regulation , 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA

1985).

37. The Clearly Erroneous Standard, which applies to the

assessment of the proposed agency action, does not conflict with

the requirement of Sections 120 .57(3)(f) and 120.57(1)(j) that

the administrative law judge apply the preponderance standard to

the basic and ultimate facts. The court in Asphalt Pavers, Inc.

v. Department of Transportation , 602 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA

1992), held that the administrat ive law judge retained typical

factfinding responsibility even after Department of

Transportation v. Groves - Watkins Constructors , 530 So. 2d 912

(Fla. 1988), in which the Supreme Court held that the hearing

officer occupied a deferential role in a nonaward case.

(Maintaining the Groves - Watkins deferential standard for a

nonaward case, Section 120.57(1)(j) establishes a less -

deferential standard for an award case.)

38. The Asphalt Pavers court rejected the agency's

attempt, in reliance upon Groves - Watkins , to preempt the hearing

officer's typical factfinding responsibilities. In Asphalt

Pavers , the agency overturned a finding by the hearing officer

that a bid package had included a disadvantaged business

enterprise (DBE) form. The Asphalt Pavers court rea ffirmed the

post - Groves - Watkins responsibility of the hearing officer -- as to

factual matters susceptible to ordinary methods of proof and not

infused with policy considerations -- to engage in typical

factfinding, including drawing permissible inferences and making

ultimate findings of fact.

39. In addition to applying the Clearly Erroneous Standard

to the determination whether the proposed decision to award is

contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications,

the administrative law judge applies the Clearly Erroneous

Standard to questions of fact requiring the application of the

agency’s technical expertise, such as whether a specific product

or service qualitatively complies with the specifications;

questions infused with agency policy; and all questions of law

within the substantive expertise of the agency, such as the

meaning of its nonprocedural rules.

40. The administrative law judge also applies the Clearly

Erroneous Standard in addressing mixed questions of fact and

law. In a legal acti on, a judge resolves mixed questions of

fact and law as a matter of law if only one resolution is

reasonable; if more than one resolution is reasonable, the trier

of fact resolves the issue. See , e.g. , Adams v. G.D. Searle &

Co., Inc. , 576 So. 2d 728 (Fla . 2d DCA 1991), and Hooper v.

Barnett Bank of West Florida , 474 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA

1985).

41. Similarly, in a case requiring the interpretation of a

contract susceptible to more than one interpretation, a judge

determines as a matter of law whether the contract is ambiguous

and, if so, the trier of fact resolves the ambiguity. See ,

e.g. , North Star Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Artzt , __ So. 2d __, 2002

WL 1431916 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Barclays American Mortgage

Corp. v. Bank of Central Florida , 629 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA

1993). The trier of fact may have to resolve factual disputes

to enable the legal determination of whether a contract is

ambiguous. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund v. Lost Village Corp. , 805 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

These legal principles governing the interpretation of contracts

are applicable to the interpretation of an agency’s

specifications, bidder’s bid, or offeror’s proposal -- all of

which are forms of offers to contract.

42. The question often arises whether a deviation in a bid

or offer constitutes a material variance, which the agency may

not waive, or a minor irregularity, which the agency may waive.

Although the ultimate question of responsiveness requires the

application of a deferential s tandard, as discussed below, the

fact - intensive determination of such issues as competitive

advantage, which underlie most determinations concerning the

significance of deviations, requires the application of the

preponderance standard, except in situation s in which the

agency’s determination concerning the significance of a

deviation is infused with agency policy or agency expertise.

43. This dual approach to the standard of proof is

consistent with State Contracting and Engineering Corporation v.

Departm ent of Transportation , 709 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA

1998). In State Contracting , the court affirmed the agency’s

final order that rejected the recommendation of the

administrative law judge to reject a bid on the ground that it

was nonresponsive. The bid included the required disadvantaged

business enterprise (DBE) form, but, after hearing, the

administrative law judge determined that the bidder could not

meet the required level of participation by DBEs. The agency

believed that responsiveness demanded o nly that the form be

facially sufficient and compliance would be a matter of

enforcement. Rejecting the recommendation of the administrative

law judge, the agency reasoned that the administrative law judge

had failed to determine that the agency’s interpr etation of its

rule was clearly erroneous.

44. In affirming the agency’s final order, the State

Contracting court quoted the provisions of Section 120.57(3)(f)

for evaluating the proposed agency action against the four

criteria of contrary to statutes, ru les, policies, and the

specifications and against the Clearly Erroneous Standard.

Addressing the meaning of a de novo hearing in an award case,

the court stated, at page 609:

In this context, the phrase “de novo

hearing” is used to describe a form of

intr a - agency review. The [administrative

law judge] may receive evidence, as with any

formal hearing under section 120.57(1), but

the object of the proceeding is to evaluate

the action taken by the agency.

45. The State Contracting court applied the Clearly

Erroneous Standard to the agency decision to award, the agency’s

interpretation of one of its rules, and the agency’s

determination that the bid was responsive. The State

Contracting case did not feature prominently factual disputes

concerning the basic a nd ultimate facts.

46. The present case requires an interpretation of the

ITB. The ITB is susceptible of more than one interpretation, so

it is necessary to enter findings of fact to resolve the dispute

concerning the meaning of the ITB. In doing so, th e

interpretation should be "consistent with reason, probability

and the practical aspect of the transaction." Iniguez v.

American Hotel Register Co. , __ So. 2d __, 2002 WL 881384 (Fla.

3d DCA 2002) (citing with approval Maines v. Davis , 491 So. 2d

1233 (F la. 1st DCA 1986).

47. The proper reading of the ITB is that a bidder

satisfies the responsiveness criterion by providing qualifying

service experience in fire alarm systems, fire extinguishers,

kitchen fire suppression systems, or sprinkler systems. Pip er

has the requisite experience in sprinkler systems, so its bid

was responsive.

48. Additionally, the failure of Interstate to submit a

letter of intent to bid was a minor irregularity, which

Respondent could and did waive. The omission of the letter ga ve

Interstate no competitive advantage.

RECOMMENDATION

It is

RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a

final order dismissing the bid protest of Petitioner and

awarding the contract to Piper.

DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2002, i n

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

ROBERT E. MEALE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearing s

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 7th day of August, 2002.

COPIES FURNISH ED:

Michael W. Moore, Secretary

Department of Corrections

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2500

Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel

Department of Corrections

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 6563

Don O'Lone, Business Mana ger

Piper Fire Protection, Inc.

Post office Box 9005

Largo, Florida 33771

Susan P. Stephens, Esquire

Department of Corrections

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2500

Karen D. Walker, Esquire

Holland & Knight, LLP

Post Office Box 810

Tall ahassee, Florida 32302

Michael A. Wester

Interstate Fire System, Inc.

1451 South Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

10 days from the date of thi s recommended order. Any exceptions

to this recommended order must be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this