02-003356 Carmen Chirstensen vs. City Of Winter Park Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, January 31, 2003.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent failed to hire her as a waste water operator because of her sex; male hired was more qualified.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CARMEN CHRISTENSEN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 02 - 3356

)

CITY OF WINTER PARK, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal hearing in th e above - styled case was held before

Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge, Division of

Administrative Hearings, on December 12, 2002, in Orlando,

Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Carmen Christensen, pro se

5419 Shiloh Driv e

Adamsville, Alabama 35005

For Respondent: Paul J. Scheck, Esquire

Shutts & Bowen LLP

300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000

Post Office Box 4956

Orlando, Florida 32802 - 4956

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10, Florida

Statutes, by denying Petitioner employment with Respondent

because of her sex (female).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

These proceedings were commenced by Pet itioner's, Carmen

Christensen, filing of a charge of discrimination, against the

City of Winter Park, Respondent, dated April 19, 2002, with the

Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR"). The FCHR issued

a Determination, dated August 6, 2002, and on or about

August 19, 2002, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief

regarding such discrimination. This matter was referred to the

Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative

hearing on August 23, 2002. Following pre - hearing disc overy, a

formal administrative hearing was held on December 12, 2002,

before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). At the hearing,

testimony of several fact witnesses, and seven exhibits were

admitted evidence. Petitioner testified in her own behalf, and

offered the testimony of six witnesses: Joyce Carter, Human

Resource Coordinator for Respondent; David L. Zusi, Assistant

Public Works Director and Utility Manager for Respondent;

Charles E. McDonald, Supervisor, Wastewater Treatment Division

for Responde nt; William J. Harley, Section Manager, Orange

County Wastewater Utility Department; Richard L. Burns,

Wastewater Treatment Division for Respondent; and James L.

Anselmo, Supervisor, Wastewater Treatment Division for

Respondent. Respondent presented testi mony from the same six

witnesses and offered nine exhibits into evidence. The hearing

transcript reflects that these nine exhibits were offered, but

inadvertently, the ninth exhibit was actually labeled as

Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.

A Transcript of th e hearing was prepared and filed on

December 30, 2002. Petitioner filed her proposed findings of

fact on January 17, 2003, following her request for an extension

of time, and filed an amended findings of fact on January 23,

2003. Respondent filed its Pro posed Recommended Order on

January 14, 2003. Both parties' proposals have been give

careful consideration.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner, a female and a member of a protected class,

completed an application for employment with Respondent in or

about Feb ruary of 2002 for the position of Wastewater Operator

"C." The particular position she applied for was a night shift

position which runs from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.

2. In February of 2002, Respondent had an opening for a

Class "C" Wastewater Operator's position. Prior to that time,

this position had been open for approximately one year.

3. Respondent's standard interview process for a

wastewater position is that Charles McDonald ("McDonald"), the

Wastewater Production Supervisor, reviews the applicatio ns to

see if they have the minimum qualifications for the open

position. If the applicant possesses the minimum requirements,

McDonald will schedule an initial appointment with the

applicant. At this initial appointment, McDonald reviews the

duties of th e position with the applicant and finds out some

general background on the applicant. Once that is accomplished,

McDonald will arrange for an interview with his superior, James

Anselmo ("Anselmo"), the Division Chief over the water and

wastewater treatmen t facilities of Respondent.

4. Anselmo, in his capacity as a Division Chief, oversees

the operations of the water and wastewater treatment facilities

of Respondent, as well as all the personnel matters in those

departments. Anselmo has served as a superv isor for Respondent

for fourteen (14) years, and during that time has not had any

grievances or complaints of discriminatory treatment filed

against him.

5. The Wastewater Operator "C" that Respondent was seeking

to hire was to perform chemical analysis a nd perform general

preventative maintenance work. This chemical analysis work on

the water samples consists of performing "solids determination,

chlorine residual and pH determination; perform [ing] sludge

volume tests; measure dissolved oxygen levels; pe rform [ing]

chlorine residual test; turbidity and telemetry monitoring."

6. These chemical testing duties consist of more than

gathering samples, but also include taking them to the lab,

actually performing the tests and then reading and recording the

res ults. These lab - testing duties are considered an essential

function of this position.

7. The job description for this position also states that

an operator "performs general preventive maintenance work" on

machines. Anselmo considered this requirement t o include

changing packing on pumps, changing oil, greasing motors and

pumps, making adjustments on machines and fixing broken lines.

He feels this requirement is important because it is necessary

to have all of his wastewater employees cross - trained to p erform

multiple functions.

8. Petitioner's application was initially forwarded to

Anselmo, who reviewed it and was impressed with the fact that

the applicant possessed an "A" license. As a result, he

forwarded the application to McDonald to initiate the interview

process. It made no difference to Anselmo whether the applicant

was a male or a female.

9. In or about March 2002, McDonald contacted Petitioner

by telephone and arranged for her to come meet him for an

initial interview. During this initial i nterview with McDonald,

Petitioner indicated to him that she did not perform any

maintenance duties at her previous employment with the City of

Orlando. McDonald mistakenly understood Petitioner to say that

she did not do any lab work at the City of Orlan do, but rather

it was done at the laboratory by others.

10. After the initial interview with McDonald, he spoke

with Anselmo and informed him that he had a lady that had put in

for the Wastewater Operator "C" position, and suggested that he

interview her. McDonald did not emphasize the fact that

Petitioner was a female, but rather made his usual comment that

it was either a lady or a guy that was coming in for the

interview. Anselmo indicated that McDonald should bring her

over immediately for the second interview.

11. Petitioner then had an interview with Anselmo in his

office later that same day. This interview began by Anselmo and

Petitioner shaking hands. McDonald was present and handed

Anselmo a copy of Petitioner's application. Prior to this

mee ting, Anselmo had not been in possession of a copy of

Petitioner's application, other than his very brief initial

review of it.

12. Before getting into the substantive interview, Anselmo

initially said to Petitioner "Carmen Christensen, that's a very

uniq ue name. I went to school with a friend, and his name was

Carmen also." Anselmo intended this comment simply to be small

talk, and to serve as an "ice breaker."

13. Anselmo and McDonald both testified that Anselmo never

stated to Petitioner: "I thought you were a man with the name

Carmen." They also denied that Anselmo stated "I went to school

with a twin by that name." Anselmo made no references to

Petitioner's gender during the interview. This testimony is

credible.

14. After this initial "ice bre aker," Anselmo then

reviewed Petitioner's application and began asking her questions

about it. As a result of not seeing the application prior to

this, Anselmo got a few of the minor items on her application

wrong.

15. On her application, Petitioner indi cated that her

duties at the City of Orlando had required her to "grab

samples." In reading this, Anselmo assumed that this meant that

Petitioner simply gathered water and did not perform any

laboratory tests on the sample. Thus, Anselmo was hoping that

Petitioner would elaborate and demonstrate to him that she had

actually performed laboratory testing on these samples. During

the interview, Anselmo asked Christensen questions about her

duties at the City of Orlando. Petitioner responded that she

simply collected samples and carried them to the lab, and

occasionally, ran a few tests. Petitioner did not share any

specific types of tests that she had done while at the City of

Orlando. Anselmo encouraged Petitioner to take the opportunity

during the inter view to elaborate on these duties, but she

failed to do so. When he asked her whether she had performed

specific tests, she respondent that she did not because

laboratory employees had performed those tests at the City of

Orlando. Petitioner also did not present Anselmo with any of

the written certificates that she now claims she possesses. At

no time during the interview did Petitioner give Anselmo

sufficient reason to believe that she did more than gather water

samples at her previous job and bring the m to the lab.

16. During the interview, Anselmo also asked Petitioner

questions about her maintenance duties while at the City of

Orlando. Petitioner responded that maintenance work at the City

of Orlando was done by maintenance personnel and, thus, sh e had

not done any such work.

17. Finally during the interview, Anselmo asked Petitioner

about the reasons for her termination by her previous employer,

the City of Orlando. Petitioner informed Anselmo that she had

been terminated from the City of Orla ndo based on allegations of

"falsified records." The City considers allegations of

falsification of records to be a serious violation. Anselmo was

not able to verify the reasons for Christensen's termination

from the City of Orlando because she had indic ated on her

application that they could not contact her previous employers.

Based on this request by Petitioner, Anselmo made no independent

efforts to verify the reason for her termination.

18. At no time during the interview did Anselmo ever tell

Petit ioner that he did not want females working at the facility.

In fact, Anselmo testified that he hires employees based simply

on their qualifications, not their gender; although no other

female operator is employed by Respondent.

19. Other than the alleged comment about her name,

Petitioner did not offer any other evidence that Anselmo had any

problem with women working in the wastewater facility. Instead,

Petitioner gave her "opinion" that she was not hired because she

is a female.

20. At the end of the interview, Anselmo informed

Petitioner that Respondent was still accepting applications for

the position.

21. Following the interview, Anselmo and McDonald

discussed Petitioner's qualifications as a candidate. They

agreed that she appeared to be inexpe rienced based on her

responses during the interview. In particular, they were

concerned with her lack of maintenance and laboratory testing

experience.

22. Anselmo completed an Applicant Referral form on or

about March 12, 2002, in which he indicated tha t Petitioner had

been "rejected" for the position of Wastewater Operator "C." On

that form, Anselmo indicated that Petitioner had been rejected

for employment because she "said she had no lab experience or

did not perform any maintenance. Performing lab tests and

maintenance is crucial to this position." Anselmo testified

that this form accurately sets forth the reasons on which he

made the decision to reject Petitioner for employment.

23. Subsequent to Petitioner's interview, McDonald and

Anselmo had t he opportunity to interview two additional

candidates, Richard Neitling ("Neitling") and Richard Burns

("Burns").

24. Neitling set forth more laboratory testing experience

than Petitioner in his interview and on his resume. He

indicated during his interv iew with Anselmo that he had done the

specific laboratory tests that Respondent does at its wastewater

facility, including BOD's, suspended solids, mixed liquid

suspended, sludge samples and TSS. He also indicated during his

interview that he had maintena nce experience, including tearing

down pumps, changing filters and oiling and greasing machines.

25. Based on these expressed qualifications and experience

set forth in his application and presented during his interview,

as well as the fact that he was a "C" Operator and that was the

actual position being offered, Neitling was offered the position

of Operator "C." It was later discovered, however, that

Neitling had provided false information on his application, and,

therefore, he was never actually hired for the position.

26. Respondent then turned its attention to the

application of Burns. On his application and resume, Burns

indicated that he could perform "all aspects of treatment plant

op's." In addition, he indicated that he had 15 years

experience as a wastewater plant operator, and that he possessed

a Level "A" operator's license, the same license possessed by

Petitioner. After submitting his application for employment to

Respondent, Burns received an interview from McDonald and the

lead operator , Tad Blazer ("Blazer"). During this interview,

Burns informed McDonald and Blazer that he had previously done

laboratory testing including OUR's, BOD's, fecal's and others.

They also asked Burns about his maintenance skills, and he

informed them that he had received cross - training in

maintenance, preventive maintenance and pulling of pumps while

at Orange County.

27. Approximately a week after this initial interview,

Burns had an interview with Blazer, McDonald and Anselmo. In

this second interview, Bu rns again shared his laboratory testing

experience, his maintenance skills and his cross - training. In

particular, Burns represented that he could do all of the

laboratory testing that the position required, and that he had

extensive background in equipmen t maintenance. Burns also

indicated to Anselmo that he had 15 years of experience in all

aspects of the treatment process, including lab work and

maintenance duties. In addition, Burns informed them that he

had spent two months at Orange County in a cros s - training

program that consisted of him performing strictly maintenance

duties. During this interview, Burns also shared with Anselmo

the reasons for his leaving Orange County. He informed Anselmo

that he had been terminated by mutual agreement, but tha t the

reasons for the termination involved a conflict with one

supervisor, not actual performance problems.

28. Following this interview, but prior to hiring him,

Anselmo and McDonald visited Orange County's personnel

department and reviewed Burns' file. In reviewing his file,

they discovered that he had exceptional evaluations except for

his last year, and that the only negative comments in his file

involved failure to give proper notice prior to taking a

vacation. There were no allegations of falsifica tion of any

records in Burns' file at Orange County.

29. Based on his background and hands - on experience, Burns

was eventually hired by Respondent for the Operator "C" position

in May of 2002. At the time he was hired, Burns could perform

all of the func tions set forth on Respondent's job description

for the position of an Operator "C." More importantly, he had

conveyed to McDonald and Anselmo that he was capable of

performing all of those duties.

30. Respondent's wastewater facility is smaller than the

facility that Petitioner worked at while with the City of

Orlando. In fact, the City of Orlando's facility has a capacity

of 25 million gallons of water a day, while Respondent's

facility can handle only 750,000 gallons per day. In addition,

the City of Orlando employs two or three times more employees

that Respondent.

31. William Hurley ("Hurley"), the Section Manager for the

Orange County Wastewater Utility, testified that he has been

employed in the wastewater industry for 28 years, and has worked

at four different facilities during that time. In his

experience, larger facilities often require different tasks from

their operators than smaller facilities require of operators.

Hurley also testified that he plays a role in the hiring of

operators at Or ange County. In this capacity, he would consider

it a serious violation, and it would give him serious concern,

if an applicant revealed to him during the interview process

that there were allegations of her committing a falsification of

records at her pr evious employer.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter at this

proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.57(1) and 120.569 and

Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

33. The State of Florida , under the legislative scheme

contained in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, incorporates and

adopts the legal principles and precedents established in the

federal anti - discrimination laws specifically set forth under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196 4, as amended. 42 USC

Section 2000e et seq . The Florida law prohibiting unlawful

employment practices is found in Section 760.10, Florida

Statutes. This section prohibits discrimination against any

individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditi ons, or

privileges of employment because of such individual's sex.

Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The Florida Commission

on Human Relations and the Florida courts interpreting the

provisions of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 have

determine d that federal discrimination law should be used as

guidance when construing provisions of the Act. See Brand v.

Florida Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994);

Florida Department of Community Affairs v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d

1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Cooper v. Lakeland Regional Medical

Center , 16 FALR 567, 574 (FCHR 1993).

34. The Supreme Court established, and later clarified,

the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas D epartment

of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and again

in the case of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502,

113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993). The FCHR has adopted this evidentiary

model. Kilpatrick v. Howard Johnson Co. , 7 FALR 5468, 547 5

(FCHR 1985). McDonnell Douglas places upon Petitioner the

initial burden of proving a prima facie case of gender

discrimination. See also Davis vs. Humana of Florida, Inc. ,

15 FALR 231 (FCHR 1992); Laroche v. Department of Labor and

Employment Securit y , 13 FALR 4121 (FCHR 1991).

35. Judicial authorities have established the burden of

proof for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory

treatment. Petitioner must show that:

a. The Petitioner is a member of a

protected group;

b. The emplo yee is qualified for the

position; and

c. The employee was subject to an adverse

employment decision (Petitioner was not

hired);

d. The position was filled by a person of

another gender or that she was treated less

favorably than similarly - situate d persons

outside the protected class:

e. There must be shown by the evidence

that there is a causal connection between a.

and c. Crapp v. City of Miami Beach , 242

F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001); Canino v.

EEOC , 707 F.2d 468 (11th Cir. 1983); Smith

v. Georgia , 684 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1982);

Lee v. Russell County Board of Education ,

684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982), appeal after

remand, 744 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1984);

Samedi v. Miami - Dade County , 134 F.Supp. 2d

1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

36. Proving a prima facie case serves to eliminate the

most common nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner's disparate

treatment. See Teamsters v. U.S. , 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44

(1977). It is not, however, the equivalent of a factual finding

of discrimination. It is simp ly proof of actions taken by the

employer from which discriminatory animus is inferred because

experience has proved that, in the absence of any other

explanation, it is more likely than not that those actions were

bottomed on impermissible considerations. The presumption is

that more often than not people do not act in a totally

arbitrary manner, without any underlying reason, in a business

setting. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 577

(1978).

37. Once Petitioner has succeeded in provi ng all the

elements necessary to establish a prima facie case, the employer

must then articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the challenged employment decision. The employer is

required only to "produce admissible evidence which would al low

the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment

decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus ."

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , at 257. The

employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons . . . [i]t is sufficient if

the [employer's] evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to

whether it discriminated against the Plaintiff." Id. at 254.

This burden is characterized as "exceedingly light." Perryman

v. Johnson Pr oducts Co., Inc. , 698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983).

38. Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason for

the action taken, the evidentiary burden shifts back to

Petitioner who must prove that the reason offered by the

employer for its decision is not t he true reason, but is merely

a pretext. The employer need not prove that it was actually

motivated by the articulated nondiscriminatory reasons or that

the replacement was more qualified than Petitioner. Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , at 257 - 8.

39. In Burdine , the Supreme Court emphasized that the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Respondent

intentionally discriminated against Petitioner remains at all

times with Petitioner. Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine , at 253. The Court confirmed this principle again in

St. Mary's Honor Center vs. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742

(1993).

40. In the case sub judice , Petitioner has failed to

produce any direct evidence of sex discrimination. Only the

most blatant remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate constitute direct evidence of discrimination.

Scott v. Suncoast Beverages , 295 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.

2002); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. , 196 F.3d

1354, 1359 ( 11th Cir. 1999); Pashoian v. GTE Directories , 208

F.Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2002).

41. In the present case, a case involving lack of direct

evidence, Petitioner has failed to establish that she was

qualified for the position of Operator "C." According t o the

record testimony, two of the essential functions of the Operator

"C" position are laboratory testing and maintenance duties. In

her interview with Anselmo and McDonald, however, Petitioner

stated that although she was capable of performing laborator y

tests, she indicated to them that her duties at the City of

Orlando had been limited to gathering samples and passing them

along to others in the laboratory to perform those tests. In

fact, when asked to provide the specific testing she could

perform, s he failed to provide any such examples. She similarly

informed Anselmo and McDonald that she lacked maintenance

experience from her previous employment. As such, she clearly

informed Respondent that she was not qualified for the position

of an Operator " C," and thus was not qualified to be hired.

42. Petitioner has also failed to satisfy the prong of the

prima facie test that other equally or less qualified men were

hired for the position. The testimony presented at the hearing

demonstrates that each of the additional applicants, Neitling

and Burns, expressed to McDonald and Anselmo during the

interview that they had extensive laboratory testing experience.

In fact, both discussed in detail the types of testing that they

were qualified to perform. Fur thermore, Neitling and Burns,

particularly Burns, had far more extensive maintenance training

and experience. In particular, Burns had been cross - trained in

maintenance duties at Orange County, thereby possessing far

superior maintenance skills compared t o Petitioner. Thus, Burns

and Neitling were more qualified for the position than

Petitioner.

43. "Whatever the employer's decision - making process, a

disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's

protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a

determinative influence on the outcome." Hazen Paper Co. v.

Biggins , 507 U.S. 604, 610 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993). This

standard required Petitioner to establish that "but for" her

protected class and the employer's intent to dis criminate she

would have been hired. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to

come forward with sufficient evidence to meet her initial burden

of proof on the issue of gender discrimination.

44. Assuming, arguendo , however, that Petitioner had met

her initia l burden, Respondent must then articulate some

legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for the adverse action

that it took. Respondent need not persuade the trier of fact

that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons, but

must merely set forth, th rough the introduction of admissible

evidence, the reason for those actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine , at 254 - 255; Pashoian , at 1309.

45. In the instant case, Respondent offered credible

testimony that Petitioner was not selected for the position

because she failed to indicate to McDonald or Anselmo that she

had sufficient laboratory testing experience, an essential

function of an Operator "C," and because of her lack of

maintenance training at her previous job at the City of Orlan do

lacked another essential function of the Operator "C" position.

Furthermore, Petitioner's comments during the interview that she

had been terminated from her previous job based on allegations

of "falsified records" caused Anselmo great concern, and he

considered this a serious violation. Therefore, Respondent has

satisfied its requirement of articulating legitimate, non -

discriminatory reasons for not hiring Petitioner. See Samedi v.

Miami - Dade County , 134 F.Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

46. Thereaf ter, Petitioner retains the burden of

persuasion and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the legitimate reasons offered by Respondent were not its

true reasons, but rather were a pretext for intentional

discrimination. Texas Department of C ommunity Affairs , at 253;

Samedi , 134 F.Supp. 2d 1346. Thus, the ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that Respondent intentionally

discriminated against Petitioner remains at all times with

Petitioner. 450 U.S. at 253. Indeed, even when the non -

discriminatory reason articulated by a respondent has been

demonstrated by the petitioner to be false, the petitioner must

still prove that the adverse action truly was based upon

unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks ,

supra .

47. Petitioner has not satisfied her burden of persuasion

by making mere conclusory allegations of discrimination or upon

her subjective belief that an unlawful discrimination has taken

place. Samedi , 134 F.Supp. 2d at 1346. In addition, at the

pretext stage , Petitioner may not merely argue that she was more

qualified than the male candidates that were hired. Instead, at

this point she must show that she was "so much more qualified

that the disparity virtually jumps off the page and slaps one in

the face." Walker v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance

Company , 286 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2002); Lee v. GTE Fla.,

Inc. , 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 - 54 (11th Cir. 2000).

48. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence of intent to

discriminate, courts and administr ative agencies are "not in the

business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent

or fair," but rather "whether unlawful discriminatory animus

motivates a challenged employment decision." Pashoian , 208

F.Supp. 2d at 1309.

49. The absence of a n intent to discriminate based on

Petitioner's sex is demonstrated by the facts that: (1)

Petitioner failed to indicate to McDonald or Anselmo that she

had laboratory testing experience, an essential function of the

Operator "C" position; (2) Petitioner lacked maintenance

training at her previous job at the City of Orlando, another

essential function of the Operator "C" position; (3) Petitioner

informed Anselmo and McDonald that she had been terminated from

her previous job based on allegations of "falsif ied records";

and (4) the credible testimony that Anselmo has no bias against

female employees, but rather hires employees based on their

qualifications.

50. Petitioner has failed to show that the decision not to

hire her was based on anything other than legitimate, non -

discriminatory reasons.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2003, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Flori da 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 31st day of January, 2003.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Carmen Christensen

5419 Shiloh Drive

Adamsv ille, Alabama 35005

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Paul J. Scheck, Esquire

Shutts & Bowen LLP

300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000

Post Office Box 4956

Orl ando, Florida 32802 - 4956

Cecil Howard, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.