02-003575 Dorothy J. Mccrimmon vs. Daimler Chrysler Corporation Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, April 8, 2003.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove causal connection between her termination and her race and/or gender; Respondent demonstrated nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner`s termination; dismiss.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DOROTHY J. McCRIMMON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 02 - 3575

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal he aring was held before the Division of

Administrative Hearings by Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative

Law Judge, on February 19 and March 14, 2003, in Orlando,

Florida. The following appearances were entered:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Dorothy J. McCrimmo n, pro se

5361 Commander Drive

Number 304

Orlando, Florida 32822

For Respondent: Stephanie L. Adler, Esquire

Susan K. McKenna, Esquire

Jackson Lewis LLP

390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285

Orlando, Florida 32801

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with

Respondent as a picker/stock keeper on or about

September 26 , 2001, on the basis of her race (African - American)

and/or gender (female), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a),

Florida Statutes (2001).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the

Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCH R), charging

Respondent with employment discrimination. On or about

August 6, 2002, a determination was issued by the FCHR. On

September 9, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with

the FCHR and requested a formal hearing. This matter was

subse quently referred by the FCHR to the Division of

Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing de novo on

September 13, 2002, and this matter was set for hearing. Upon

counsel for Respondent filing a notice of appearance and a

motion to continue, the forma l hearing was rescheduled and

discovery commenced. Following discovery, a formal hearing was

commenced on February 19, 2003.

At the hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se and advised the

Administrative Law Judge that she had requested that several

people app ear at the hearing as her witnesses, but she had not

served them with subpoenas because they stated that they would

appear voluntarily. However, only one of those persons appeared

and testified. One other witness was served with a subpoena but

did not ap pear. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the

hearing would proceed, but that Petitioner could seek to keep

the record open in order to obtain the testimony of the

subpoenaed witness, James Swift, at a later date. Petitioner

presented the testimony o f five witnesses but declined to

testify in her own behalf. No exhibits were offered or received

in evidence on behalf of Petitioner. Respondent presented the

testimony of four witnesses and submitted two exhibits,

including the deposition testimony of P etitioner taken on

December 31, 2002, which were admitted. A Transcript was

ordered and was filed on March 14, 2003. Following the hearing,

Petitioner made an ore tenus motion, during a telephone

conference call, to reopen her case - in - chief in order to o ffer

the testimony of James Swift. The motion was granted, over

objection. The hearing was re - noticed and reconvened on March

14, 2003; however, the witness failed to appear, and the hearing

was adjourned. The parties were allowed 15 days from the

heari ng in which to file proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Petitioner has not filed proposed findings

as of the date of this Recommended Order. Respondent filed

proposed findings on March 28, 2003.

Based upon all of the evidence, the followin g findings of

fact are determined:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under

the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.

2. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a temporary

employee to perform the job of picker/stock kee per at its Parts

Distribution Center in Orlando, Florida, during the time period

from September 12, 2001, to September 26, 2001, the date she was

terminated. Petitioner worked a total of 14 days for

Respondent.

3. Petitioner is an African - American female , a member of a

protected class.

4. The Parts Distribution Center for Respondent in

Orlando, Florida, is a facility that holds automotive parts that

are then shipped to dealerships.

5. All temporary employees at Respondent are at - will

employees. Tempora ry employees are told during their

orientation that they are at - will employees who can be

terminated at any time, for any reason. Temporary employees at

Respondent are only eligible to work 119 days. Most temporary

employees are not offered full time per manent employment. There

is no guarantee that a temporary employee will receive an offer

to work as a permanent employee.

6. Petitioner was hired to perform the job of picker/stock

keeper. A picker/stock keeper takes parts off of shelves to be

shipped t o dealerships. Petitioner participated in an

orientation, and Petitioner received the same training as every

other temporary employee. Petitioner worked the night shift.

7. Respondent maintains written Standards of Conduct to

which all employees must ad here. The Standards of Conduct apply

to both temporary and permanent employees. The Standards of

Conduct were in effect in September 2001, when Petitioner worked

as a temporary employee.

8. All employees are given a copy of the Standards of

Conduct when they are hired. Petitioner received a copy of the

Standards of Conduct when she was hired, and the Standards of

Conduct are posted throughout the plant.

9. The Standards of Conduct provide that an employee's

"[f]ailure or refusal to follow the instructi ons of supervision"

is grounds for "disciplinary action up to and including

discharge."

10. The supervisors who worked at Respondent's

Distribution Center during Petitioner's employment were Richard

Alvarez ("Alvarez") (Hispanic male), Lenier Sweeting

("S weeting") (Black male), and Joe Bromley (White male).

11. Alvarez was temporary supervisor for the night shift

from June 2001 until December 2001. Alvarez was Petitioner's

direct supervisor.

12. Sweeting was a supervisor in September 2001. Sweeting

was chosen to become a supervisor by Hal McDougle, a Black male.

Sweeting was the supervisor on the day shift when Petitioner

worked at the Distribution Center. His shift ended at 3:30 p.m.

but he stayed in the building to help with the transition to the

ni ght shift. Alvarez would normally walk Sweeting to the front

door to discuss what had occurred during the day shift.

13. On September 25, 2001, Sweeting was walking past the

bathroom with Alvarez and heard two women talking and laughing

in the bathroom. Alvarez recognized one of the voices to be

that of Petitioner.

14. Alvarez had heard rumors that Petitioner had been

taking a lot of extended breaks and told Sweeting about the

complaints he had been receiving. Alvarez received at least two

complaints, and possibly four or five, from Petitioner's co -

workers that she was taking extended breaks and not on the floor

working.

15. Alvarez wanted to wait and see how long Petitioner

remained in the bathroom. Sweeting and Alvarez waited outside

the bathroom un til they saw Petitioner exit the bathroom with

Maria Dejesus. Alvarez believes that he and Sweeting waited

outside the bathroom for approximately ten to 15 minutes.

16. Alvarez told Petitioner that she had been taking an

extensive break and needed to go back to work. Sweeting

witnessed Alvarez tell Petitioner to go back to work in a

professional tone. Alvarez also told Petitioner that he had

heard rumors that she was taking extended breaks. He told her

that since he saw it first hand, he wanted to ment ion it to her

and let her know it would not be tolerated.

17. Petitioner asked Alvarez which bathroom she could use

in a very sarcastic tone. Sweeting observed Petitioner ask this

question. Alvarez told Petitioner that he did not care which

bathroom she used, as long as she did not abuse the break

period.

18. Petitioner proceeded to ask Alvarez in a sarcastic

tone which bathroom she could use several times throughout the

night. Despite Petitioner's sarcastic tone, Alvarez answered

her questions profess ionally. Alvarez never asked Petitioner

how old she was, whether she was married or how many children

she had.

19. Sweeting asked Maria Dejesus to go back to work as

well.

20. Sweeting and Alvarez have told other employees to go

back to work when they h ave observed employees taking extended

breaks. They have spoken to employees of both genders and all

racial groups.

21. On September 26, 2001, Alvarez assigned Petitioner to

the "fast rack" area. Petitioner had never previously worked in

the fast rack a rea. Alvarez personally instructed Petitioner in

how to perform the assignment. Alvarez told Petitioner to pick

the parts and put them on a rack float.

22. After Alvarez gave Petitioner her instructions,

Petitioner began her assignment. Petitioner neve r asked Alvarez

any questions about her assignment or expressed that she was

having difficulty with the job.

23. Wanda Carithers ("Carithers") saw Petitioner using the

wrong equipment to complete her assignment. Petitioner was

using a bin cart instead of a float to pick the items.

24. Alvarez noticed that Petitioner's assignment was

running late. Alvarez walked over to the fast rack area and

asked Petitioner two questions. Alvarez asked Petitioner

whether she was going to be able to pick the whole assi gnment

using the bin cart that she was using. Petitioner did not

respond to or acknowledge Alvarez. Alvarez then asked

Petitioner if she was almost done with her assignment.

Petitioner rolled her eyes and said, "Your first question, yes,

second question , no." Alvarez was very uncomfortable with

Petitioner's response and demeanor.

25. Alvarez told Petitioner that perhaps they had gotten

off on the wrong foot. Petitioner asked Alvarez something about

her union rights. Alvarez saw Petitioner's co - worker ,

Carithers, who was a union representative, driving by. Alvarez

asked Carithers to explain to Petitioner her union rights as a

temporary employee. During this conversation, Alvarez tried

repeatedly to talk to Petitioner and on each occasion,

Petitioner cut Alvarez off and would not let him speak.

26. When Alvarez realized that he was not making any

progress with Petitioner, he asked her to go to the warehouse

office so that they could talk to a senior supervisor, Al White

("White") (Black male). Alvare z hoped that they could work out

their differences with White's help. Alvarez started to walk

approximately ten steps. He turned back and realized that

Petitioner was not moving towards the office. Alvarez walked

back to Petitioner and asked her a secon d time to go to the

office. Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez told

Petitioner, "This is your last chance; go to the warehouse

office." Once again, Petitioner did not move.

27. Alvarez, after asking Petitioner to go to the office

three times with no response, told Petitioner that her services

were no longer needed, that she should gather up her things, and

that she was terminated.

28. Alvarez terminated Petitioner for her failure to

follow a direct order of her supervisor in violation of

Resp ondent's Standards of Conduct No. 6.

29. Petitioner refused to move even after she was

terminated. Petitioner asked Alvarez to reconsider, and he said

that he had made up his mind. Alvarez started to walk away.

When he saw that Petitioner was still not moving, he told her

that he could call law enforcement to escort Petitioner off the

property.

30. Alvarez, and ultimately Petitioner, walked to the

office. White asked Petitioner if she knew why she was

terminated. Petitioner never asked to have someon e from the

union with her in the office until after she was terminated. At

that time, Alvarez and White complied with her request and paged

Rodney Witt, a union official, to come to the office.

31. Carithers observed Petitioner fail to follow Alvarez's

i nstruction to go to the office. Carithers recalls that

Petitioner told Alvarez that Petitioner did not have to listen

to Alvarez.

32. Amber McPherson heard Alvarez call Petitioner to the

office several times. Petitioner did not respond to Alvarez's

requ ests.

33. Sweeting has never experienced discrimination from

management while working for Respondent for over seven years.

Sweeting has never heard Alvarez make any gender or race - related

comments or slurs. Sweeting has never heard any management

employ ee at Respondent make a gender or race related comment or

slur.

34. Alvarez did not consider Petitioner's gender or race

when he made the decision to terminate Petitioner.

35. In addition, Petitioner lied on her application to

Respondent and failed to in dicate that she had been terminated

from a prior employment. Petitioner had been terminated from

Walt Disney World Company for theft. If Respondent had known

that Petitioner had lied on her application or had been

terminated for theft from a prior employ er, it would not have

hired her. Had Respondent learned that she had lied on her

application after she was hired, she would have been terminated.

36. Petitioner had no idea why she thinks she was treated

differently based upon her gender or race. She ju st had a

"feeling" or a "hunch." Petitioner had no evidence or

information that her termination was based on her gender or

race. Petitioner had no idea why she was terminated. She did

not believe that it was because she failed to follow a command.

Peti tioner had no idea whether her supervisor, Alvarez,

considered her gender or race when he terminated her employment

with Respondent.

37. Petitioner bases her claims that Respondent

discriminated against her on the fact that there is general

racism and sex ism in society. Petitioner checked the "sex" and

"race" box on her FCHR Charge of Discrimination simply because

she is female and African - American.

38. Petitioner felt as though she was harassed but cannot

articulate a reason for it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3 9. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding, and the

parties thereto, pursuant to subsections 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Y - 4.016(1), Florida Administrative

Code.

40. The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme

contained in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, incorporates and

adopts the legal principles and precedents established in the

federal anti - discrimination laws specifically set forth under

Title VII of the Civil R ights Act of 1964, as amended. 42 USC

Section 2000e et seq . The Florida law prohibiting unlawful

employment practices is found in Section 760.10, Florida

Statutes. This section prohibits discrimination against any

individual with respect to compensation , terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment because of such individual's race

and/or sex. Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The

Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Florida courts

interpreting the provisions of the Florida Civil Right s Act of

1992 have determined that federal discrimination law should be

used as guidance when construing provisions of the Act. See

Brand v. Florida Power Corp. 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA

1994); Florida Department of Community Affairs v. Bryant , 58 6

So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Cooper v. Lakeland Regional

Medical Center , 16 FALR 567, 574 (FCHR 1993).

41. Petitioner has the ultimate burden to prove

discrimination either by direct or indirect evidence. Direct

evidence is evidence which, if belie ved, would prove the

existence of discrimination without inference or presumption.

Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 - 82 (11th Cir. 1989).

Blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate, constitute direct evidence of di scrimination. See

Earley v. Champion International Corporation , 907 F.2d 1077,

1081 (11th Cir. 1990). There is no record of any direct

evidence of discrimination on the part of Petitioner's

supervisor. There is no evidence Alvarez made any gender or

rac e related comments or slurs. Petitioner has not presented

any documentary evidence which would constitute direct evidence

of discrimination.

42. Absent any direct evidence of discrimination, the

Supreme Court established, and later clarified, the burden of

proof in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and again in the case of

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742

(1993). The FCHR has adopted this evidentiary model.

Kilpatrick v. Howard Johnson Co. , 7 FALR 5468, 5475 (FCHR 1985).

McDonnell Douglas places upon Petitioner the initial burden of

proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See also

Davis v. Humana of Florida, Inc. , 15 FALR 231 (FCHR 1992);

Laroche v. Department of Labor and Employment Security , 13 FALR

4121 (FCHR 1991).

43. Judicial authorities have established the burden of

proof for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory

treatm ent. Petitioner must show that:

a. Petitioner is a member of a protected

group;

b. The employee is qualified for the

position; and

c. The employee was subject to an adverse

employment decision (Petitioner was

terminated);

d. The position w as filled by a person of

another race or that she was treated less

favorably than similarly - situated persons

outside the protected class:

e. There must be shown by the evidence

that there is a causal connection between a.

and c. Crapp v. City of Miami Beach , 242

F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir 2001); Canino v.

EEOC , 707 F.2d 468 (11th Cir. 1983); Smith

v. Georgia , 684 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1982);

Lee v. Russell County Board of Education ,

684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982), appeal after

remand, 744 F.2d 768 (11th Ci r. 1984).

44. Proving a prima facie case serves to eliminate the

most common nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner's disparate

treatment. See Teamsters v. U.S. , 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44

(1977). It is not, however, the equivalent of a factual finding

of discrimination. It is simply proof of actions taken by the

employer from which discriminatory animus is inferred because

experience has proved that, in the absence of any other

explanation, it is more likely than not that those actions were

bottomed o n impermissible considerations. The presumption is

that more often than not people do not act in a totally

arbitrary manner, without any underlying reason, in a business

setting. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 577

(1978).

45. Once Pe titioner has succeeded in proving all the

elements necessary to establish a prima facie case, the employer

must then articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the challenged employment decision. The employer is

required only to "produce adm issible evidence which would allow

the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment

decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus ."

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , at 257. The

employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons . . . [i]t is sufficient if

the [employer's] evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to

whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Id . at 254.

This burden is characterized as "exceedingly light." Perryman

v. Johnson Products Co., Inc. , 698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983).

46. Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason for

the action taken, the evidentiary burden shifts back to

Petitioner who must prove that the reason offered by the

emp loyer for its decision is not the true reason, but is merely

a pretext. The employer need not prove that it was actually

motivated by the articulated nondiscriminatory reasons or that

the replacement was more qualified than Petitioner. Texas

Department o f Community Affairs v. Burdine , at 257 - 8.

47. In Burdine , the Supreme Court emphasized that the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Respondent

intentionally discriminated against Petitioner remains at all

times with Petitioner. Texas Dep artment of Community Affairs v.

Burdine , at 253. The Court confirmed this principle again in

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742

(1993).

48. In the case sub judice , Petitioner has established

that she is a member of a protected class. She has established

that she was qualified for the position at the time she was

hired and that she was subjected to an adverse employment

decision when she was terminated. However, Petitioner has

failed to come forward with credible evidence that there is a

causal connection between her race or her gender and her

termination. Petitioner has failed to show that similarly -

situated males or similarly - situated persons outside the

protected class received more favorable treatment under similar

circumst ances. Therefore, there can be no inference of

discrimination. Pound v. Stone , 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).

"Whatever the employer's decision making process, a disparate

treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected

trait actually play ed a role in that process and had a

determinative influence on the outcome." Hazen Paper Co. v.

Biggins , 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993). This

standard requires Petitioner to establish that "but for" her

protected class and the employer's intent to discriminate she

would not have been terminated. Petitioner has failed to came

forward with sufficient evidence to meet her initial burden of

proof on the issue of racial discrimination.

49. First, Petitioner was not qualified for the job

becau se she was not performing up to the standards required by

her employer. Respondent requires all of its employees,

including temporary employees, to adhere to its Standards of

Conduct. The testimony during the hearing was undisputed,

Petitioner failed to follow the instructions of her supervisors

and had a poor attitude. Failing to follow instructions and

demonstrating a poor attitude deems an employee unqualified for

the job. For example, in Vandel v. Standard Motor Products,

Inc. , 52 F.Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 1999), a former employee who

had problems with interpersonal skills and a poor attitude was

deemed unqualified for his job. Although the employee had the

necessary technical knowledge, his documented interpersonal and

attitude problems showed the e mployee was not meeting the

employer's legitimate job experiences, and, therefore, was not

qualified for the job.

50. Second, even assuming Petitioner was qualified, she

had failed to meet the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis. Petitioner has not introduced any evidence to create

an inference of discrimination. She has failed to cite any non -

minority employees who were treated differently than she was

treated under similar circumstances. In order to make a prima

facie case, Petitioner mus t demonstrate there were employees

outside of the protected class who engaged in similar conduct

but were not terminated. Maniccia v. Brown , 171 F.3d 1364, 1368

(11th Cir. 1998). The most important factors in comparing

disciplinary actions imposed on emp loyees are the nature of the

offenses in relation to the punishment imposed. Id. "We

require that the quantity and quality of the comparator's

misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second

guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confu sing apples

with oranges." Id. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence

whatsoever to support the fourth and most important element in

proving any claim of discrimination through indirect evidence.

The hearing record is completely devoid of any evide nce which

would create even an inference that employees who were outside

of a protected class were treated differently than Petitioner.

51. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had met her initial

burden, the sequence of presentation of evidence then require d

Respondent to come forward and articulate valid,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the resulting termination

decision. Respondent has done so. The burden to articulate a

legitimate business reason for the action is one of production,

not of persuasion. Th e Court need not weigh the credibility of

the nondiscriminatory reason at this stage of the burden

shifting analysis. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. ,

120 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks ,

at 509. Respondent terminat ed Petitioner's employment because

she failed to respond to her supervisor's direct order for her

to go to the office. Petitioner presented no evidence that

contradicted Respondent's witnesses. Every witness who

testified about the incident on September 26, 2001, which led up

to Petitioner's termination testified consistently that

Petitioner failed to follow her supervisor's instructions to go

to the office despite at least three requests to do so.

Regardless of the reason her supervisor asked her to go to the

office or the reason Petitioner failed to respond to him,

Respondent has every right to require its employees to adhere to

its Standards of Conduct. When Petitioner failed to follow

number 6 of Respondent's Standards of Conduct, it had a

legitimate , nondiscriminatory basis for terminating her. See

Davidson v. Time, Inc. , 972 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)

(discrimination laws should not be used as a vehicle for second

guessing an employer's business judgment).

52. The record in this case is undisput ed. Petitioner

failed to testify at the hearing or introduce any evidence to

suggest that the basis offered for her termination by her

employer was false or that the real basis was invidious

discrimination. In fact, Petitioner testified in her

deposition , which was read into the record at the hearing, that

she had no evidence of discrimination. Instead, her case was

based on a "hunch" that she was fired for some other reason than

her failure to follow her supervisor's instructions. Petitioner

testified that she actually has no idea why she was terminated.

If she does not know, she cannot meet her ultimate burden to

prove that Respondent considered her race or her gender when her

employment was terminated. Petitioner's own subjective

feelings, without e vidence of racial bias, are insufficient to

support a claim of discrimination. Wright v. Wyandotte County

Sheriff's Department , 963 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Kan. 1997).

53. Petitioner has the continuing burden of persuading the

trier of fact that Respondent int entionally discriminated

against her. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine ,

supra . When a Petitioner alleges disparate treatment,

"liability depends on whether the protected trait actually

motivated the employer's decision." Hazen Paper Co. v.

Briggins , 507 U.S. at 610. The plaintiff's race or gender must

have actually played a role in the employer's decision - making

process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.

Petitioner simply cannot prevail on her claims of disparate

treatmen t unless she can demonstrate that Respondent

intentionally discriminated against her. Cason Enterprises,

Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County , 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337

(S.D. Fla. 1998). An employer may terminate an employee fairly

or unfairly and for any re ason or no reason at all without

incurring Title VII liability unless its decision was motivated

by invidious discrimination. Fucci v. Graduate Hospital , 969 F.

Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

54. Petitioner worked for Respondent for 14 days as a

temporary em ployee. There is no dispute that Petitioner failed

to follow her supervisor's instructions on September 26, 2001.

As a result, Petitioner's supervisor terminated her. There is

no evidence to demonstrate that her termination was a result of

her gender or her race. Petitioner failed to introduce any

evidence to establish a prima facie case or to prove that

Respondent's legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for her

termination was a pretext for discrimination.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2003, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

_______________ ____________________

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 8th day of April, 2003.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Stephanie L. Adler, Esquire

Susan K. McKenna, Esquire

Jackson Lewis LLP

390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285

Orlando, Florida 32801

Doroth y J. McCrimmon

5361 Commander Drive

Number 304

Orlando, Florida 32822

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Cecil Howard, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Hu man Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions

to this rec ommended order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.