02-004049 Philomene Augustin vs. Marriott Forum At Deercreek Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, June 20, 2003.

Summary: Certified Nursing Assistant terminated from her position after nursing home resident made allegations of abuse failed to prove that she was discharged because she was black.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

PHILOMENE AUGUSTIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 02 - 4049

)

MARRIOTT SENIOR LIVING )

SERVICES, INC., 1 )

)

Respondent. )

__________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted in this case

pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes,

before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly - designated Administrative Law

Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on

February 24, 2003, by video teleconference at sites in Fort

Lauderdale and Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Philomene Augustin, pro se

4350 Northeast 15th Terrace

Pompano Beach, Florida 33064

For Respondent: Michael W. Casey, III, E squire

Muller Mintz, P.A.

First Union Financial Center, Suite 3600

200 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131 - 2338

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner 's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful

Employment Practice (Petition for Relief) filed against

Respondent should be granted by the Florida Commission on Human

Relations (Commission).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 12, 1999, Petitioner filed an employment

d iscrimination complaint with the Commission alleging that she

was terminated from her position as a Certified Nursing

Assistant with Respondent "because of [her] race - Black."

On August 27, 2002, following the completion of its

investigation of Petition er's complaint, the Commission issued a

Notice of Determination: Cause. The cause determination was

based upon Respondent's "fail[ure] to provide [requested]

information within its control to the Commission." Petitioner,

on September 20, 2002, filed wit h the Commission a Petition for

Relief seeking "$190,000.00 for all of the pain and emotional

distress [and] embar[ra]ssment[]" [she suffered] when [she] lost

[her] job," which, she alleged, was the result of her being

discriminated against by Respondent b ecause of her race.

On October 18, 2002, the Commission referred the matter to

the Division of Administrative Hearings (Division) for the

assignment of a Division Administrative Law Judge to conduct a

hearing on the allegations in Petitioner's Petition for Relief.

As noted above, the hearing was held on February 24, 2003, 2

Four witnesses testified at the hearing: Respondent, John

Culhane, Meg McKaon, and Joyce Montero. In addition, four

exhibits (Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4) were offered and

receive d into evidence. The record was left open to give

Petitioner the opportunity to present the testimony of an

additional witness, Marie Mondesir. On March 24, 2003,

Respondent filed a Status Report in the instant case, in which

it stated the following:

1. Respondent scheduled the deposition of

Marie Mondesir for March 13, 2003.

2. Respondent sent a Notice of Taking

Deposition via certified mail to Petitioner

on February 25, 2003. Petitioner received

the Notice of Taking Deposition on March 1,

2003. A c opy of the Notice of Taking

Deposition and Petitioner's receipt of such

Notice is attached at Tab 1.

3. Respondent served a Subpoena Ad

Testificandum on Marie Mondesir for the

taking of her deposition on March 4, 2003.

A copy of proof of service is atta ched at

Tab 2.

4. Neither Petitioner nor Marie Mondesir

appeared for the deposition. A copy of the

certificate of no - show is attached at Tab 3.

Respondent and the court reporter waited for

one hour for Petitioner and Ms. Mondesir to

appear. Respondent then called both

Petitioner and Ms. Mondesir to determine

whether either of them would be attending

the deposition. However, Respondent could

not reach either Petitioner or Ms. Mondesir

by telephone.

Having received Respondent's Status Report, the

under signed, on March 24, 2003, issued an Order Directing

Response, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

No later than ten days from the date of this

Order Directing Response, Petitioner shall

advise the undersigned in writing as to

whether she still desires to present the

testimony of Ms. Mondesir and, if so, those

dates on which she and Ms. Mondesir will be

unavailable for the taking of Ms. Mondesir's

testimony.

If Petitioner indicates in her written

advisement that she is no longer desirous of

pr esenting Ms. Mondesir's testimony, or if

she fails to timely file the written

advisement required by this Order Directing

Response, the undersigned will issue an

order closing the evidentiary record in the

instant case.

If Petitioner indicates in a timely filed

written advisement that she still desires to

present the testimony of Ms. Mondesir, no

later than five days after the filing of

such written advisement, Respondent shall

advise the undersigned in writing of those

dates on which it will be unavailabl e for

the taking of Ms. Mondesir's testimony.

After the expiration of this five - day

response period, the undersigned will notify

the parties in writing of when and where the

final hearing in this case will resume (for

the purpose of taking Ms. Mondesir's

testimony).[ 3 ]

Not having received a response from Petitioner to his Order

Directing Response, the undersigned, on April 9, 2003, issued an

order closing the evidentiary record in this case and

establishing a deadline for filing proposed recommended orde rs

(no later than 30 days from the date of the filing of the

hearing transcript with the Division).

The Transcript of the final hearing (consisting of one

volume) was filed with the Division on May 7, 2003.

Petitioner and Respondent filed Proposed Recomm ended Orders

on March 24, 2003, and June 6, 2003, respectively. These post -

hearing submittals have been carefully considered by the

undersigned.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as

a whole, the following findings o f fact are made:

1. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent

operated Marriott Forum at Deercreek (hereinafter referred to as

the "Facility"), a "senior living community, nursing home."

2. Petitioner was employed as a Certified Nursing

Assis tant (hereinafter referred to as "CNA") at the Facility

from 1992 or 1993, until July of 1998, when she was terminated.

3. Petitioner is black.

4. At the time of Petitioner's termination, all of the

CNAs, and all but one of the nurses, at the Facility we re black.

5. At the time of Petitioner's termination, the chain of

command leading down to Petitioner was as follows: the General

Manager, Joanna Littlefield; the Health Care Administrator,

Sheila Wiggins, and the Interim Director of Nursing, Michelle

Bo rland. The Director of Human Resources was Meg McKaon.

Ms. Littlefield had the ultimate authority to terminate

employees working at the Facility. Ms. Wiggins, Ms. Borland,

and Ms. McKaon had the authority to make termination

recommendations to Ms. Littl efield, but not to take such action

themselves.

6. In July of 1998, F. S., an elderly woman in, or

approaching, her 90's, was a resident at the Facility.

7. On or about July 9, 1998, Petitioner was involved in a

scuffle with F. S. while giving F. S. a sh ower. Joyce Montero,

a social worker at the Facility, was nearby in the hallway and

heard the "commotion." When F. S. came out of the shower,

Ms. Montero spoke to her. F. S. appeared to be "very upset."

She was screaming to Ms. Montero, "Get her away from me; she hit

me," referring to Petitioner. Ms. Montero noticed that F. S.

"had blood [streaming] from her nostril to at least the top of

her lip." The nursing staff then "took over" and "cleaned up

[F. S.'s] blood" with a towel.

8. Ms. McKaon was c ontacted and informed that there was a

CNA who had "had an altercation with a resident."

9. Ms. McKaon went to the scene "right away" to

investigate.

10. When Ms. McKaon arrived, F. S. was still "visibly

shaken and upset." Ms. McKaon saw the "bloody tow el" that had

been used to clean F. S.'s face "there next to [F. S.]." F. S.

told Ms. McKaon that she was "afraid [of Petitioner] and that

she [had been] punched in the nose" by Petitioner.

11. In accordance with Facility policy, Petitioner was

suspende d for three days pending the completion of an

investigation of F. S.'s allegation that Petitioner had

"punched" her.

12. Ms. Wiggins and Ms. McKaon presented Petitioner with a

written notice of her suspension, which read as follows:

Description of employe e's behavior . . . .

On July 9, 1998, one of our residents

[F. S.] was being given a shower by

[Petitioner]. [F. S.] stated that

[Petitioner] punched her in the nose. (She

was crying and bleeding: witnessed by Joyce

Montero).

Suspension For Investiga tion

To provide time for a thorough investigation

of all the facts before a final

determination is made, you are being

suspended for a period of 3 days.

Guarantee Of Fair Treatment Acknowledgement

I understand that my manager has recommended

the termina tion of my employment for the

reasons described above and that I have been

suspended for 3 days while a decision

regarding my employment status is made. I

understand that the final decision regarding

my employment status will be made by the

General Manage r.

The suspension period will provide time for

an investigation of all facts that led to

this recommendation. I understand that the

General Manager will be conducting this

investigation. I further understand that if

I feel I have information which will

influence the decision, I have a right to

and should discuss it with the General

Manager.

I am to report to my manager on July 13,

1998 at 10:00 a.m.

Petitioner was asked to sign the foregoing notice, but refused

to do so.

13. Ms. McKaon conducted a tho rough investigation into the

incident. Following her investigation, she came to the

conclusion that there was "enough evidence to terminate"

Petitioner. As a result, she recommended that Ms. Littlefield

take such action, the same recommendation made by M s. Wiggins.

14. After receiving Ms. McKaon's and Ms. Wiggins'

recommendations, Ms. Littlefield decided to terminate

Petitioner's employment.

15. The termination action was taken on or about July 23,

1998.

16. At this time, the Facility was on "moratoriu m" status

(that is, "not allowed to accept any more patients") as a result

of action taken against it by the Agency for Health Care

Administration because of the "many" complaints of mistreatment

that had been made by residents of the Facility.

17. Ms. W iggins was given the responsibility of personally

informing Petitioner of Ms. Littlefield's decision.

18. After telling Petitioner that her employment at the

Facility had been terminated, Ms. Wiggins escorted Petitioner

out of the building and to the park ing lot. In the parking lot,

Ms. Wiggins said to Petitioner something to the effect that,

she, Ms. Wiggins, was "going to take all of the black nurses in

the Facility." (What Ms. Wiggins meant is not at all clear from

the evidentiary record.)

19. Follow ing Petitioner's termination, the racial

composition of the CNA staff at the Facility remained the same:

all - black, as a black CNA filled Petitioner's position.

20. There has been no persuasive showing made that

Petitioner's race played any role in Ms. L ittlefield's decision

to terminate Petitioner's employment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

21. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter

referred to as the "Act") is codified in Sections 760.01 through

760.11, Florida Statutes, and Section 509.092, Florida S tatutes.

22. Among other things, the Act makes certain acts

"unlawful employment practices" and gives the Commission the

authority, if it finds, following an administrative hearing

conducted pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida

Statutes, that such an "unlawful employment practice" has

occurred, to issue an order "prohibiting the practice and

providing affirmative relief from the effects of the practice,

including back pay." Sections 760.10 and 760.11(6), Florida

Statutes.

23. Among the "unla wful employment practices" prohibited

by the Act is that described in Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida

Statutes, which provides as follows:

It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer:[ 4 ]

To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire

any individual, o r otherwise to discriminate

against any individual with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

24. In the instan t case, Petitioner has alleged that

Respondent committed such an "unlawful employment practice" when

it acted with discriminatory intent based on her race to

terminate her employment as a CNA at the Facility in July of

1998.

25. Petitioner had the burde n of proving, at the

administrative hearing held in this case, that she was the

victim of such discriminatorily motivated action. See

Department of Banking and Finance Division of Securities and

Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern and Company , 670 So. 2d

932, 934 (Fla. 1996)("'The general rule is that a party

asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of

presenting evidence as to that issue."'); Florida Department of

Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission ,

289 So. 2d 412 , 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)("[T]he burden of proof

is 'on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an

administrative tribunal."'); and Mack v. County of Cook , 827 F.

Supp. 1381, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1993)("To prevail on a racially -

based discriminato ry discharge claim under Title VII, Mack must

prove that she was a victim of intentional discrimination." 5 ).

26. "Discriminatory intent may be established through

direct or indirect circumstantial evidence." Johnson v.

Hamrick , 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 137 7 ( N.D. Ga. 2001).

27. " Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to

inference or presumption." King v. La Playa - De Varadero

Restaurant , No. 02 - 2502, 2003 WL 435084 *3 n.9 (Fla. DOA H

2003)(Recommended Order).

28. "[D]irect evidence is composed of 'only the most

blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate' on the basis of some impermissible factor. . . .

If an alleged statement at best merely suggests a discriminatory

motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence."

Schoenfeld v. Babbitt , 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999).

Likewise, a statement "that is subject to more than one

interpretation . . . does not constitute direct evidenc e."

Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co. , 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.

1997).

29. "[D]irect evidence of intent is often unavailable."

Shealy v. City of Albany, Ga. , 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir.

1996). For this reason, those who claim to be victims of

discrimi nation "are permitted to establish their cases through

inferential and circumstantial proof." Kline v. Tennessee

Valley Authority , 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).

30. Where a complainant attempts to prove intentional

discrimination using circumstanti al evidence, the "shifting

burden framework established by the [United States] Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.

Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community

Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d

207 (1981)" is applied. "Under this framework, the

[complainant] has the initial burden of establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination. If [the complainant] meets that

burden, then an inference arises that the challenged action was

motivated by a discriminatory intent. The burden then shifts to

the [respondent] to 'articulate' a legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason for its action. 6 If the [respondent]

successfully articulates such a reason, then the burden shifts

back to the [com plainant] to show that the proffered reason is

really pretext for unlawful discrimination." Schoenfeld v.

Babbitt , 168 F.3d at 1267 (citations omitted.).

31. Under this "shifting burden framework," "comments by

non - decisionmakers do not raise an inferenc e of discrimination,

especially if those comments are ambiguous." Mitchell v. USBI

Co. , 186 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999). Nor do

decisionmakers' "stray remarks" of uncertain meaning, having no

apparent connection to the adverse employment decision, r aise

such an inference. See Beatty v. Wood , 1998 WL 832639 *4 (N.D.

Ill. 1998)("A single ambiguous remark, standing alone, cannot

support an inference of pretext.").

32. A complainant alleging discriminatory discharge, who

lacks proof of a decisionmake r statement related to the

decisional process which suggests that the complainant's

discharge was discriminatorily motivated, may nonetheless

establish "a prima facie case of discrimination [by] show[ing]

(1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was

qualified for the job that she formerly held; (3) that she was

discharged; and (4) that after her discharge, the position she

held was filled by someone not within her protected class."

Singh v. Shoney's, Inc. , 64 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1995 ).

33. Under no circumstances is proof that, in essence,

amounts to no more than mere speculation and self - serving belief

on the part of the complainant concerning the motives of the

respondent sufficient, standing alone, to establish a prima

facie case o f intentional discrimination. See Lizardo v.

Denny's, Inc. , 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The record is

barren of any direct evidence of racial animus. Of course,

direct evidence of discrimination is not necessary. . . . .

However, a jury cannot infe r discrimination from thin air.

Plaintiffs have done little more than cite to their mistreatment

and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to

their race. This is not sufficient.")( citations omitted.);

Reyes v. Pacific Bell , 21 F.3d 111 5 (Table), 1994 WL 107994 **4

n.1 (9th Cir. 1994)("The only such evidence [of discrimination]

in the record is Reyes's own testimony that it is his belief

that he was fired for discriminatory reasons. This subjective

belief is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.");

Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd. , 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir.

1991)(" Little points to his own subjective belief that age

motivated Boyd. An age discrimination plaintiff's own good

faith belief that his age motivated his employer's action is of

little value."); Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Service ,

714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1983)("We are not prepared to hold

that a subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, can

be the basis of judicial relief."); Coleman v. Exxon Chemical

Corp. , 162 F. Supp. 2d 593, 622 ( S.D. Tex. 2001)(" Plaintiff's

conclusory, subjective belief that he has suffered

discrimination by Cardinal is not probative of unlawful racial

animus."); Cleveland - Goins v. City of New York , 1999 WL 673343

*2 ( S.D. N.Y. 1999)(" Plaintiff has failed to proffer any

relevant evidence that her race was a factor in defendants'

decision to terminate her. Plaintiff alleges nothing more than

that she 'was the only African - American man [sic] to hold the

position of administr ative assistant/secretary at Manhattan

Construction.' (Compl.¶ 9.) The Court finds that this single

allegation, accompanied by unsupported and speculative

statements as to defendants' discriminatory animus, is entirely

insufficient to make out a prima fac ie case or to state a claim

under Title VII."); Umansky v. Masterpiece International Ltd. ,

1998 WL 433779 *4 ( S.D. N.Y. 1998)(" Plaintiff proffers no

support for her allegations of race and gender discrimination

other than her own speculations and assumptio ns. The Court

finds that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she was discharged

in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination,

and therefore has failed to make out a prima facie case of race

or gender discrimination."); and Lo v. F.D.I.C. , 846 F. Supp.

557, 563 ( S.D. Tex. 1994)(" Lo's subjective belief of race and

national origin discrimination is legally insufficient to

support his claims under Title VII.").

34. In the instant case, Petitioner failed to meet her

burden of proving, at the ad ministrative hearing, that

Respondent discharged her from her position as a CNA at the

Facility because of her race, as she had alleged in her

employment discrimination complaint.

35. She presented no direct or circumstantial evidence

establishing, even prima facie , that she was the victim of

intentional race - based discrimination by Respondent. While

Petitioner may sincerely and genuinely believe that her

discharge was motivated by discriminatory animus on the basis of

her race, such a good faith belief, unaccompanied by any

persuasive proof establishing a nexus between Petitioner's race

and her discharge, 7 is simply insufficient to prove intentional

discrimination on the part of Respondent.

36. Although not required to do so inasmuch as the burden

of production never shifted to it, Respondent advanced a

legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for terminating

Petitioner's employment, to wit: that Petitioner had punched

F. S. in the nose. See Billups v. Methodist Hospital of

Chicago , 922 F.2d 1300, 130 3 (7th Cir. 1991)("The district court

found that in response to plaintiff's prima facie case the

defendant articulated a legitimate non - discriminatory reason for

terminating her employment, namely that she physically abused a

patient. There is little doub t that the defendant's articulated

reason is legitimate. Physically abusing an elderly patient is

serious misconduct."). Moreover, the record affirmatively

establishes that this articulated reason was, more likely than

not, the real reason Petitioner was terminated and not merely a

pretext for racial discrimination. 8

37. In view of the foregoing, no "unlawful employment

practice" should be found to have occurred and Petitioner's

Petition for Relief should therefore be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding

that Respondent is not guilty of the "unlawful employment

practice" alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's

Petition for Reli ef based on such finding.

DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2003, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

___________________________________

STUART M. LERNER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 20th day of June, 2003 .

ENDNOTES

1/ At the outset of the final hearing in this case, the

undersigned granted Respondent's request that the style of the

instant case be changed to reflect that "Marriott Senior Living

Services, Inc.," rather than "Marriott Forum at Deercreek, " is

the "correct legal name of the Respondent."

2/ The hearing was originally scheduled to commence on

December 27, 2002, but was continued at Respondent's request.

3/ In an endnote, the undersigned observed:

Ms. Mondesir's mere failure to appear fo r

her deposition on March 13, 2003, standing

alone, is not a reason to prevent Petitioner

from presenting Ms. Mondesir's testimony.

See State v. Farley , 788 So. 2d 338, 340

( Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (" Exclusion of a witness

for failure to appear at a deposition is

appropriate only when lesser sanctions have

been attempted without success."); and State

v. Gonzalez , 695 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1997)("The exclusion of a witness is

justified only after some lesser sanction,

such as contempt or a writ of bodi ly

attachment, has been attempted without

success in making the witness attend a

deposition.").

4/ An "employer," as that term is used in Section 760.10(1)(a),

Florida Statutes, is defined in Section 760.02(7), Florida

Statutes, as "any person employing 15 or more employees for each

working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current

or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."

5/ "Because th[e] [A]ct is patterned after Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e - 2, federal case law

dealing with Title VII is applicable." Florida Department of

Community Affairs v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA

1991).

6/ "To 'articulate' does not mean 'to express in

argument.' . . . It means to produce evidence ." Rodriguez v.

General Motors Corporation , 904 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990).

7/ The indecipherable remark concerning the "black nurses" at

the Facility made by Ms. Wiggins (who was not the person who

made the decision to discharge Petitioner) does not constitute

such evidence.

8/ Regardless of whether Petitioner actually punched F. S. in

the nose (which is an issue the undersigned need not resolve),

the evidentiary record reveals that Ms. Littlefield, who made

the decision to terminate Petitioner, certainly had reason to

believe that Petitioner engaged in such serious misconduct. See

Moore v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. , 683 F.2d 1321, 1323 n.4 (11th

Cir. 1982)("It is well settled in employment discrimination

cases such as this that for an employer to p revail the jury need

not determine that the employer was correct in its assessment of

the employee's performance; it need only determine that the

defendant in good faith believed plaintiff's performance to be

unsatisfactory and that the asserted reason for the discharge is

therefore not a mere pretext for discrimination.").

That the Facility's CNA staff was all - black at the time of

Petitioner's termination and remained so following Petitioner's

departure from the Facility strongly suggests that, in

disch arging Petitioner, Ms. Littlefield did not act out of

racial animus and that the reason given for the discharge

(Petitioner's physically abusing F. S.) was not a mere

subterfuge to mask such animus. See Nieto v. L&H Packing Co. ,

108 F.3d 621, 623 - 24 (5th Cir. 1997)("Not only did Nieto fail to

provide evidence that would allow a fact finder to infer that

Surlean's decision was motivated by his national origin, but the

record evidence provides substantial support to the contrary.

For starters, eighty - eight percent of Surlean's work force is

comprised of minorities. Second, it is undisputed that the

employee who was promoted to replace Nieto as night production

supervisor was also Hispanic. While not outcome determinative,

this fact is certainly material to the question of

discriminatory intent.").

COPIES FURNISHED:

Philomene Augustin

4350 Northeast 15th Terrace

Pompano Beach, Florida 33064

Michael W. Casey, III, Esquire

Muller Mintz, P.A.

First Union Financial Center, Suite 3600

200 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131 - 2338

Cecil Howard, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 323301

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Par kway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 323301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions

to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.