03-000199EC In Re: Julianne Holt vs. * Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, October 30, 2003.

Summary: The Advocate proved two of the alleged violations (using public resources to type private letters and prepare teaching materials). The RO discusses appropriate "non-business" letters and activities, and the allegations of misuse of public resources.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

IN RE: JULIANNE HOLT. ) Case Nos. 03 - 0122EC

) 03 - 0199EC

) 03 - 0200EC

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative

H earings, by its duly - designated Administrative Law Judge,

Stephen F. Dean, held a formal hearing in the above - styled case

May 27 through June 13, 2003, in Tampa, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Advocate: James H. Peterson, III, Esquire

Assistant Attorney General

Attorney General’s Office

Plaza Level One, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

For Respondent: Gregory W. Kehoe, Esquire

Kathleen Clark Ford, Esquire

James, Hoyer, Newcomer

& Smiljanich, P.A.

4830 West Kennedy Boulevard

Tampa, Florida 33609

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues for det ermination are:

I. Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida

Statutes, by directing Public Defender's Office employees to

work on Respondent's re - election campaign during their public

working hours;

II. Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6),

Florida Statutes, by directing Public Defender's Office

employees, during public working hours and using public

resources, to prepare and deliver materials for courses that

Respondent was teaching;

III. Whether Respondent violated Section 112 .313(6),

Florida Statutes, by directing a Public Defender's Office

employee to take Respondent's personal automobile in for repairs

during public work hours;

IV. Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6),

Florida Statutes, by directing a Public Defen der's Office

employee to make personal bank deposits for Respondent and her

mother during public work hours; and

V. Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida

Statutes, by directing Public Defender Office employees to type

personal letters fo r Respondent during public work hours.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 30, 2002, the Florida Commission on Ethics issued

an order finding probable cause to believe that Respondent,

Julianne Holt, while serving as the Public Defender for the

Thirteenth Judic ial Circuit, violated Section 112.313(6),

Florida Statutes, as outlined under the Statement of Issues,

above. The case was forwarded to the Division of Administrative

Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge on or

about January 13, 2003.

Pri or to the final hearing, the parties submitted a Joint

Prehearing Stipulation containing a number of stipulations of

fact and law. References to these stipulations will be as

“Stip - ” followed by the appropriate paragraph number as set

forth under the admi tted facts section of the Joint Prehearing

Stipulation.

At the final hearing, the Advocate called six witnesses:

Sharon Slater, Melissa Dearing, Wanda Moore, Christine Sleater,

Vicky Butts and Respondent. The Advocate also called Nicole

Hanscom for her t estimony regarding school work Ms. Hanscom had

allegedly performed for Respondent after the finding of probable

cause in this case, but objections to questions regarding that

work were sustained on the grounds of relevance.

The Advocate offered 16 pre - ma rked exhibits, numbers 1

through 9, all of which were composites. Of those, the

following were received into evidence: Advocate’s Exhibit 1L;

Advocate’s Exhibits 2A through 2BB; Advocate’s Exhibits 3A, 3B,

3F and 3G; Advocate’s Exhibit 5, consisting of an electronic

disk ("Sharon Slater’s" Disk #1), a file list of documents found

on that disk, and selected printed hard copies with alphabetical

file name identifiers in the lower right hand corner of each

beginning with ELLER.MID through USAIR.LET, all of wh ich were

received with the exception of one identified as ETHICADD.WPD,

which was not received; Advocate’s Exhibit 6, consisting of an

electronic disk (“Sharon Slater’s" Disk No. 2), a file list of

documents found on that disk, and selected printed hard c opies

with alphabetical file name identifiers in the lower right hand

corner of each beginning with EVERIDGE.LET through WOOD.LET, all

of which were received with the exception of those identified as

INVENTOR.WPD and LANE.LET, which were not received; Advo cate’s

Exhibit 7, consisting of an electronic disk, a file list of

documents found on that disk, and selected printed hard copies

with alphabetical file name identifiers in the lower right hand

corner of each beginning with ADVERTIS.LIS and ending with

YA RD.SIG, 1/ all of which were received, 2/ with the exception of

one identified as STORE.SIG, which was not received; Advocate’s

Exhibits 8B through 8N, 3/ with the exception of 8F, which was not

moved; Advocate’s Exhibits 9A through 9II, with the exception of

9P, 9Q and 9Z, which were not received; and Advocate’s Exhibits

10, 12, 4/ 13, & 14. The Advocate also offered Exhibits 17 and

19, which were received into evidence. 5/ All of the Advocate’s

Exhibits that were received retained their original exhibit

desi gnations. Although Advocate’s Exhibits 9JJ and 9KK were not

received, they were proffered on the record. Reference to

Advocates’s Exhibits will be made as “A - ” followed by the

appropriate exhibit number and letter or file name designation.

Respondent te stified on her own behalf and called 14

witnesses: Jeanine Cohen, Samantha Ward, Lynn Perez, Marco

LaMonte, Walter Elly, Doug Roberts, Nichole Hanscom, former

Judge Frank Dennis Alvarez, Yolanda Olivo, Judge Gregory Paul

Holder, Wanda Campbell, Jorge Loren zo, Judge Manuel Lopez, and

Judge Raymond O. Gross. 6/

Respondent offered 52 exhibits, all of which, with the

exception of Respondent’s Exhibits 13, 14 and 23, were received

into evidence as marked by the Respondent. The Administrative

Law Judge reserved r uling on Respondent’s Exhibit 23. Although

Respondent’s Exhibit 23 was eventually rejected at hearing, it

was proffered on the record. References to Respondent’s

exhibits received into evidence will be made as “R - ” followed by

the corresponding exhibit l etter.

A transcript of the hearing was ordered by Respondent.

References to the Transcript will be made as “T - ” followed by

the appropriate page number, with the witness identified in

brackets. References to Judge Gross’s deposition testimony will

be mad e by “T2 - ” with the page number.

The parties submitted proposed recommended orders which

have been read and considered in preparing this recommended

order. All citations are to Florida Statutes (2002) unless

otherwise indicated.

FINDINGS OF FACT

THE RE SPONDENT

1. Respondent currently serves as the Public Defender for

the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Tampa, Florida, and has

served in that capacity since taking office after her election

in 1992.

2. Respondent is subject to the requirements of Part III,

Chapter 112, the Code of Ethics for public officers and

employees, by virtue of the fact that Respondent serves as

Public Defender.

3. Respondent is a public official within the meaning of

Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, by virtue of

Respon dent’s position as Public Defender, and is subject to the

provisions of Section 112.313(6).

4. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender

Employee Manual, revised February 1, 1996, sets forth the Public

Defender Office’s policies and standards appli cable during the

1996 campaign.

BACKGROUND OF COMPLAINT TO ETHICS COMMISSION

5. This complaint arose from allegations made by Scott

Moore and others, including members of Scott Moore's family to

the newspapers, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and

the Ethics Commission. 7/

6. Joe Moore, the patriarch of the family, was an old and

close friend of the Respondent. Their relationship was

described as being as close as brother and sister, and this

closeness extended to Joe's children: Scott, Mike and Melissa

Moore Dearing. In addition, Scott Moore married Wanda Granado,

who was secretary to the Respondent during a portion of time

covered by these charges.

7. The Moore family assisted the Respondent at home and at

the office in a familial manner, painting, running errands, and

looking after one another. This was mutual, and the Respondent

tendered regular employment to three members of the family, and

part - time employment to Melissa when she was home on Christmas

and summer breaks from school.

8 . Scott Moore was employed by Respondent in various

capacities. Scott Moore was, like all of the employees of the

office, an at - will employee serving at the pleasure of the

Respondent.

9. There had been a history of problems with Scott Moore

arising fro m his failure to accept supervision from the

management staff of Respondent's office. Scott Moore

consistently went to his father, Joe Moore, who in turn went to

the Respondent in an effort to circumvent supervision. This

resulted in staff dissention to the extent that the Respondent

found it necessary to have a meeting with the Moores and their

supervisors to address this issue in 1999.

10. At this meeting, the Respondent told the assembled

Moores that, notwithstanding their personal friendship, they

we re subject to the direction of their supervisors at work.

This was sufficiently disturbing to Scott Moore that he stood up

with such force at the meeting, that his chair rolled back into

the wall and knocked two pictures off the wall. He resigned,

and wa lked out of the meeting.

11. His belongings were packed up by a secretary, but

Scott Moore returned, apologized to the Respondent, and asked to

come back to work. The Respondent permitted him to do so.

Scott Moore worked for the Public Defender's offic e until May 4,

2000, at which time he was the network administrator for the

computer system of the Public Defender's office.

12. After an investigation of an incident in which a

document was copied from a file, printed out, and left

anonymously in an em ployee's office, it was determined that

Scott Moore had improperly accessed the files of other employees

and inappropriately copied multiple materials from their files.

When confronted with the materials he had copied from files in

the office, he refused to explain his conduct. He was

discharged by Respondent on May 4, 2000, for accessing and

disseminating confidential documents, accessing employees’

computer accounts, and general dereliction of duties. Scott

Moore's malfeasance included not backing up f iles as required

and not establishing firewalls between files as appropriate.

13. When discharged, Scott Moore stated to the Respondent

that he would get even with her. Scott Moore made allegations

of misconduct by the Respondent to the local newspaper , the

Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and the Florida

Ethics Commission.

14. Because of the situation, the Respondent eventually

found it necessary to discharge Joe Moore, Scott's father. Mike

Moore, Scott's brother, and Wanda Granado Moo re, Scott's wife,

resigned their employment. In sum, the firings of Scott and Joe

did not favorably dispose the members of the family towards the

Respondent. Their animus is recognized in considering their

testimony.

15. In addition, Scott Moore contacte d many former

employees of the Respondent's office and encouraged them to come

forward with any allegations of wrong - doing with which they were

familiar. As a result of this, allegations of wrong - doing going

back many years were presented to the Ethics Co mmission. Some

of the allegations were subject to the statute of limitations,

and this limited the testimony of some witnesses about their

actions and observations.

16. One of the employees to come forward was Sharon

Slater, who was the Respondent's secr etary/assistant from 1993

until 1997 when she asked to be moved to a new social services

section in Respondent's office. Slater worked in social

services for over a year, but because of complaints and Slater's

failure to complete certain educational requi rements, she was

moved to a secretarial position in the office in October of

1998. Slater tendered her resignation in April 1999, to be

effective at the end of that month; however, before the end of

the month, she became upset about the way an investigati on of

allegations she had made about Mike Moore's diverting mail

belonging to her was handled, most particularly about her

husband being contacted, and she resigned, effective

immediately.

17. Slater was the source of much of testimony which was

introdu ced in support of the allegations that she and others did

personal and campaign - related work during working hours at the

direction of the Respondent. The "hard" evidence of this work

was taken from computer disks which Slater stated she copied in

1999 fro m the hard disk of Respondent's secretary long after

Slater had left that position. The admissibility and

credibility of these records are at issue in these proceedings

as electronic records and as the printouts of those electronic

records.

18. Although Slater testified that she copied all the

records on the disk, only portions of these records were being

introduced by the Advocate because other portions of the records

downloaded by Slater related to confidential client files.

Slater was able to remember some of the records/documents which

she had typed. Of the documents she identified, at least one

she remembered typing at her home. Some of the other

records/documents bore her initials as typist.

19. Evidence was received from Melissa Moore Dearing that

she typed letters on the same computer as Slater, and letters

which she typed would have been saved upon the same directory

that Slater copied. However, Ms. Dearing could not

independently identify any of the letters which she typed.

Ms. Dearing als o stated that frequently when typing form letters

bearing the initials of Slater as the typist, that she forgot to

change them to reflect she had typed them.

20. Nicole Hanscom, a person knowledgeable in the

operation of computers and the electronic files , testified. In

sum, she testified that the "last modified date" is the date

upon which the document was last saved. An existing document

can be accessed, modified, printed out, but not saved and it

will continue to reflect the date upon which it was pre viously

saved notwithstanding that it was the source of a hard - copy

piece of mail. Conversely, a document can be called up,

no changes made to it, and be saved, whereupon the file will

reflect the last date it was saved as being the date upon which

it was modified. These results are possible without any

intentional "tinkering" with the files by knowledgeable persons.

21. Because of the ability to alter and manipulate files

as described above, these documents and records would have been

inadmissib le but for the Respondent agreeing to their

admissibility. Very little credence is placed in the disks, the

directories of the disks, and the materials printed from those

disks, notwithstanding their having been received.

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

22. Resp ondent ran for re - election as Public Defender in

1996. Many of the activities for that campaign occurred in 1995

and 1996. A number of Public Defender Office employees were

involved in Respondent’s 1996 re - election campaign activities.

23. Ms. Slater worked on Respondent’s 1996 re - election

campaign. This campaign work was voluntary and performed on

Ms. Slater’s own time. Ms. Slater’s volunteer activity for

Respondent’s 1996 re - election campaign included holding signs,

displaying a yard sign, working a campaign golf tournament, and

appearing at several campaign functions with other office staff.

24. Notwithstanding Ms. Slater's testimony to the

contrary, it appears from the campaign rosters she signed and

the testimony of others that she was a acti ve participant in the

Respondent's campaign who did what she could to further the

Respondent's re - election. This is consistent with Slater's

perception of her own self interest about which she clearly was

concerned. As an at - will employee and secretary/a ssistant to

the Public Defender, it was highly unlikely she would be

retained by anyone who defeated the Respondent for the office.

25. In addition, Ms. Slater also did other campaign work

for Respondent’s 1996 re - election campaign including typing

cam paign thank - you letters and keeping current a yard - sign list

for Ms. Holt’s review.

26. Many of the campaign thank - you letters typed by

Ms. Slater were prepared on Public Defender office computers.

Some were prepared on a Public Defender laptop at Ms. S later’s

home; however, many were prepared on a Public Defender computer

during public work hours.

27. Ms. Slater volunteered to maintain and update a typed

list of sign locations and people who volunteered to display

campaign signs for Respondent’s re - el ection campaign.

Information regarding signs came to Ms. Slater in writing and

verbally from a variety of persons. The Respondent frequently

provided information to Slater in the form of sticky notes,

which included information on persons volunteering to put a sign

up at their business or home.

28. A folder was maintained on Slater's desk into which

notes about thank - you letters and sign information were placed

by the Respondent or other office staff. Ms. Slater would also

get information for the sign placements from telephone calls

made to the office and from other employees.

29. Although Sharon Slater occasionally updated the sign

lists on a Public Defender Office computer at her home, some of

the updates were done during public work hours.

30. As pointed out in Respondent's proposed findings, the

modified dates when compared with the Respondent's calendar

reveal that many of the documents were prepared when the

Respondent was out of the office. Clearly, the Respondent was

unaware of what Slater di d at Slater's home. Although Slater's

testimony establishes that she prepared campaign letters and

maintained the sign list at work and on equipment belonging to

the Public Defender's office, she did so outside the presence of

the Respondent and without R espondent's knowledge.

31. Credible evidence was received from many witnesses

that Slater and all the other employees of the Respondent's

office were instructed that they should not and could not engage

in campaign activities at the office.

32. The R espondent provided a campaign office down the

street from her office where volunteers could work. It was

announced to the employees that they should do campaign work

there or at home and not on state time.

33. The Respondent was not constrained by law fr om putting

notes about signs or other campaign work she wanted accomplished

in Ms. Slater's campaign work folder. It was understood that

this work was not to be performed in the office.

34. Evidence was received that employees were counseled

about fail ing to obey the directive not to do campaign work on

the job. As stated above regarding the thank - you letters, the

fact that much of the work alleged to have been done by Slater

at work was done when the Respondent was not in the office

substantiates that when work was done at the office by Slater it

was in contravention of the policy.

35. Melissa Moore Dearing, 8/ who worked as an OPS employee

for the Public Defender’s Office on and off for years, also

prepared campaign thank - you letters for the campaign. She

obtained her work assignments from Slater's desk, and received

her instruction in the same manner as Slater, by writings on

legal paper or sticky - notes. It appeared that, except when

pursuing a particular project for the Respondent, Dearing

received her work assignments from Slater.

36. Dearing testified that she did not remember receiving

any instructions on what she could and could not do for the

campaign during office hours. It was clear from her testimony

as a whole, that Dearing appreciated the job opportunities

inherent in her OPS work for the Respondent, and was willing to

do any work she was given to do. Although a member of the bar

at this time and more knowledgeable of the restrictions imposed

upon officers and employees, at the time t hese events occurred,

Dearing did not consider her actions illegal or inappropriate.

37. Christine Sleater worked at the Public Defender’s

Office from January 1993 until 1998.

38. While an employee of the Public Defender’s Office,

Ms. Sleater worked a s an administrative assistant; was promoted

to computer trainer during the beginning of 1996; and,

thereafter was promoted to director of automated systems, which

position she held until leaving in 1998. From 1994 until the

early part of 1996, Ms. Sleater did work as an administrative

assistant for the Respondent as a back - up to Ms. Slater.

39. Ms. Sleater prepared at her home thousands of thank -

you letters for the Respondent’s campaign.

40. After completing the campaign letters, Ms. Sleater put

th em in an interoffice envelope and either gave them to Sharon

Slater or placed them in the Respondent’s in - box.

41. The Respondent directed Ms. Sleater to tell the head

of the Public Defender’s Office technology department, Mike

Effner, to let her take a computer home so that she could do the

thank - you letters. Mr. Effner was in charge of the computers at

the Public Defender's office and for the campaign and was

Ms. Sleater’s boss at the time.

42. The Respondent testified that Mike Effner advised her

that he had several of his own computers which were available to

people working in the campaign. Her testimony was confirmed by

others.

43. It is alleged that computer Ms. Sleater used was one

belonging to the Public Defender's office. Even if Mr. Eff ner

did provide Ms. Sleater a Public Defender’s Office personal

computer and printer, the Respondent did not know that

Ms. Sleater was using Public Defender Office equipment to

prepare thank - you letters for Respondent’s 1996 campaign.

44. Ms. Vicky Butts served as the Respondent’s Budget

Director for the Public Defender’s Office from March 1994 until

March 1999, and was in charge of the Public Defender’s Office

computer inventory. Ms. Butts testified that Christine Sleater

had Public Defender Office equi pment at home to work on the

Respondent’s 1996 re - election campaign. She based her

recollection upon a diary entry made in October 1996, regarding

an office collection that was taken up for Ms. Sleater’s

birthday gift. While Butt's recollection may have been jogged

by this unrelated diary entry, it certainly does not buttress

her testimony. Neither her testimony nor that of Sleater

demonstrates that the Respondent knew that Effner had provided

Sleater a Public Defender office machine as opposed to comput er

owned by Effner which was the Respondent's intent.

45. Although Sleater testified she got an office machine,

the Respondent testified that Sleater did not sign out for one

according to internal equipment inventories. Butts testified

Sleater did sign o ut for a Public Defender computer. The

inventories were not introduced by either the Advocate or the

Respondent. The testimony is conflicting.

46. The fact that most of the Respondent’s requests for

the preparation of campaign thank - you letters were m ade on notes

written by Respondent and placed in Sharon Slater’s in - basket

during office hours does not establish that the Respondent knew

or should have been on notice that campaign thank - you letters

were being prepared in the office on Public Defender’s Office

Equipment during public work hours.

47. The procedure was for those personnel who were typing

letters to pick up letters to be typed from the folder on

Slater's desk; to type them at home or at the campaign office;

print them out at the campaign office; and return them to the

Respondent for signature. The Respondent verified that the

campaign letters were delivered to her at the Public Defender’s

Office during public work hours. These were placed in an old

brief case reserved for campaign relate d materials and picked up

and delivered to the Respondent at various places.

48. After the Respondent signed the letters on campaign

stationary, the Respondent put them back in Sharon Slater’s in -

box at the Public Defender’s office, and Sharon Slater ha d them

mailed out, using postage that was paid for by Respondent’s 1996

re - election campaign.

49. Sharon Slater's testimony that she complied with

Respondent’s requests because she was afraid if she complained

she would lose her job is not credible. He r testimony that she

was afraid she would lose her job if she did not work to get the

Respondent re - elected is credible because as an at - will

employee, she very likely would have been replaced by a new

incumbent.

50. Melissa Moore Dearing complied with the Respondent’s

requests because the Respondent provided her with employment

during school breaks at Christmas and summers. She recognized

that she was extremely fortunate to have such a benefactor in

the Respondent's position.

51. All employees of th e Public Defender's Office were “at

will” employees. The Public Defender Employee Manual effective

during the 1996 campaign explains:

All employment and compensation with the

Public Defender’s office is “at will” in

that any employee can be terminated wit h or

without cause, and with or without notice,

at any time, at the option of either the

Public Defender or yourself, except as

otherwise provided by law. All employees

are exempt from the State of Florida Career

Service System and serve at the pleasure o f

the Public Defender.

52. Sharon Slater did feel uncomfortable about working on

the Respondent’s campaign during public work hours on Public

Defender’s Office equipment. The record in this case indicates

that she engaged in these activities when the Respondent was out

of the office.

53. The extra copies of the campaign materials which Slater

stated she printed out and retained on the day that they were

prepared were received into evidence; however, having had access

to the disks, she could have printed them out at any time, and,

as long as she did not execute a save on the document, it would

have retained its original "modified" date. The campaign letters

would have gone out on campaign letter head which was blue and

yellow. Clearly the copies introduced may have been drafts, but

they were not unsigned copies of final documents.

54. The Respondent was aware that it was improper for

office staff to work on the Respondent’s campaign during office

hours. The Respondent testified that the typin g of campaign

letters on Public Defender’s Office equipment and during office

time was not appropriate. These prohibitions were emphasized

with all personnel from her office who were working on the

campaign.

55. The Respondent’s manual for Public Defen der Employees

which was in use during the 1996 campaign states: “Employees will

not engage in political activity during working hours.” The

manual also stated that office equipment was to be used

exclusively for Public Defender business purposes.

56. The re is no evidence that the Respondent knew that

personnel were typing campaign letters on office equipment.

Slater and Dearing testified they "concluded" that the Respondent

knew, but their conclusions were conjectural.

57. The allegation that the Res pondent "directed" both

Sharon Slater and Melissa Dearing to type campaign - related

documents during public campaign work hours is based upon the

assumption that placing the campaign work into a folder on

Slater's desk during the day constituted a clear cou ntermand of

the instructions not to use Public Defender’s Office equipment

and not to work on public time.

58. The facts show that campaign materials were kept

separate in the office; that employees received appropriate

instructions regarding what they could and could not do; and that

Slater's work on campaign materials occurred when the Respondent

was out of the office.

59. There is no evidence that the Respondent ever

"directed" Slater or Dearing to do campaign work at the office on

office equipment , and there is no evidence that the Respondent

knew that Public Defender equipment was used for campaign

purposes.

PREPARATION AND DELIVERY OF COURSE MATERIAL

60. After becoming Public Defender, the Respondent began

teaching as an adjunct professor a t local colleges and

universities. Prior to this time, other than substitute

teaching in law school, the Respondent had never taught. The

first institution where the Respondent taught was Hillsborough

Community College in 1995. She has since taught cour ses at the

University of Tampa, the University of South Florida, and the

University of Phoenix.

61. The Respondent taught a course in American Government

at Hillsborough Community College in the Spring and Fall

semesters of 1995. The Respondent was pai d $1,500 per semester

for teaching American Government at Hillsborough Community

College.

62. After that, the Respondent taught one semester, at the

University of Tampa in 1998 or 1999 and was paid $1,000 for her

teaching.

63. The Respondent taught one semester at University of

South Florida (USF) in 1997, and then taught at USF the spring

and fall semesters of 1998, the spring and fall semesters in

1999, and one semester in 2000. The Respondent was paid $2,500

for each semester she taught a t USF.

64. The Respondent has taught at the University of Phoenix

since 1998. The University of Phoenix is a private university.

Respondent receives between $1,300 and $1,600 for each 6 week

term of classes, consisting of one 4 - hour class each week, that

she taught at the University of Phoenix.

65. Throughout her tenure as an adjunct professor, the

Respondent has used Public Defender office staff and resources

during public work hours to prepare course materials for her

students. She has used her secretary/assistants to type lesson

plans, type syllabi, type and edit examinations, deliver

materials, and proctor make - up examinations for the courses that

Respondent was teaching. In one instance, Melissa Dearing

proctored one or more examinations for the Respondent at night,

but purely on a voluntary basis. 10/

66. While most of the documents typed by staff in support

of this activity were between one and three pages, the total,

over time, cannot be considered de minimus . Neither can the

income be called de minimis from teaching these courses, which

for a portion of the time ran between $2,500 and roughly $7,500

annually.

67. Slater and Melissa Moore Dearing readily assented to

doing this work, and Dearing volunteered to proctor the

examinatio ns at night. Wanda Granado Moore assented to the

preparation of these materials, and records indicate that she

was paid between $5,000 and $6,000 in overtime. The Respondent

did not feel that these activities at work were wrong; she

considered that the w ork was within the range of work which

could be assigned to these personnel; but she did not consider

it contrary to their duties or to her duties.

68. The Respondent asserts that her actions were justified

because there was an overriding public purpo se to her teaching.

69. In support of her argument that her teaching served a

public purpose, the Respondent offered the testimony of several

judges and retired judges.

70. The reason that a judge's teaching serves a public

purpose is that the Code of Professional Responsibility

encourages judicial officers to educate bench, bar, and the

public about the law. The de minimis use of public office

resources to assist in teaching courses is not inconsistent with

a judge's public duties. All of the jud ges who testified

indicated that the use of public resources should be de minimis

in light of the requirements that it not interfere with the

performance of the judge's judicial duties.

71. Although a public purpose is served by education, and

teaching is not antithetical to the duties of the Public

Defender, unlike judges, education is not part of the

Respondent's public duties. Therefore, her teaching does not

further the aims and goals of her office. Although the

Respondent contends that she really does not teach for the pay

and that her outside teaching activities are a form of

“community service,” as stated above, her compensation was more

than de minimis and must be considered as personally benefiting

the Respondent.

DIRECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TO TAKE

RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE IN FOR REPAIRS

72. It is alleged that on more than five occasions while

Sharon Slater was employed as Respondent’s secretary with the

Public Defender’s Office, Respondent had Ms. Slater take or

retrieve Respondent ’s Mercedes from the repair shop during

public work hours. At least some of these occurrences were

after August of 1995 and in 1996. Other Public Defender’s

Office employees also took Respondent’s car to the shop. On at

least some of these occasions, an other Public Defender Office

employee was also required for the pick - up or delivery of the

vehicle.

73. One of the repair shops where Ms. Slater dropped off

or picked - up the Respondent’s car was located approximately 10

to 15 minutes from the Public De fender’s Office. One of the

shops she used was immediately across the street from the

Respondent's office.

74. One of the problems with these allegations and the

evidence presented in support of them is that they are vague

with regard to when, where, w hy and how the event(s) occurred.

If two employees were involved, and if it was during work hours,

and if the garage to which the car was delivered was the one

further away, then the pick - up or delivery of the Respondent’s

automobile might require approxi mately one hour of Public

Defender Office staff time, and if it was after October of 1995,

it would not be barred by the statute of limitations.

75. If the accusation is that the Respondent directed

Slater to pick up or take her car to the garage, the e vidence

adduced from several members of the staff and the Respondent was

that Sharon Slater volunteered to take Respondent’s car to and

from the repair shop. Sharon Slater's testimony is not credible

that she did not volunteer. Slater may have felt this was

demeaning, but her public demeanor and overt conduct was one of

helpful collegiality, and there was specific testimony stating

she volunteered to pick up the Respondent's car during at least

one staff conference. In addition to the conference mentione d

above, other instances in which staff picked up or took the

Respondent's car included when the Respondent was in trial.

76. The judicial district the Respondent is in covers a

large geographic area. Her car is a tool in her management of

her office. Sharon Slater's was more than a secretary for the

Respondent; she also assisted her in non - clerical duties. While

taking or picking up the Respondent’s automobile benefited the

Respondent personally, if it permitted the Respondent to stay in

a staff meet ing rather than leaving to pick up the car before

the garage closed, it directly supported and assisted the Public

Defender in conduct of her office. The "service" was for more

than the Respondent's benefit.

77. In sum, Slater's allegations and the evidence

presented in support of them are vague as to time, number and

circumstances, to include whether Slater made up the lost time.

They are vague about how many occurred with the period for which

Respondent can be prosecuted.

78. The long delay be tween the events complained of and

the prosecution of this case prevent either side from presenting

the detail necessary to determine this issue. The Advocate's

original allegations went to the Respondent's "requiring" Slater

to pick up the car; however, the evidence showed categorically

that this was not the case. The Advocate failed, as stated

above, to show how many times this happened; when it happened;

the circumstances under which it happened; and whether Slater

failed to make up the time if she vol unteered to pick up the

car. These details are necessary to determine whether there is

no benefit to the state and a violation, and to determine if it

is not barred by the statute of limitation.

DIRECTING A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE TO MAKE BANK DEPOSITS

FOR RESP ONDENT AND HER MOTHER DURING PUBLIC WORK HOURS

79. Throughout the Respondent’s tenure as Public Defender,

Joseph Moore, while employed as an investigator for the Public

Defender’s Office, made bank deposits for the Respondent and her

mother dur ing public work hours.

80. The overwhelming evidence is that all of these

deposits were made by Moore voluntarily, frequently in

conjunction with the deposit of his own check, and while in the

direct pursuit of other office business in such manner tha t the

loss of time was negligible.

81. As stated above regarding the pick up of the car, when

the errand is undertaken voluntarily, and the public is better

served by having the subordinate take care of a personal task

for an official, it serves a publi c purpose. If it is not

voluntary, it opens the door to abuse. In this case, there is

no question that it was voluntary, and the public was not ill -

served by Moore's actions.

DIRECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO TYPE

PERSONAL LETTERS DURING PUBLIC WORK H OURS

82. The evidence shows that Sharon Slater typed up a

number of documents unrelated specifically to Public Defender

business during public work hours on Public Defender Office

equipment while Ms. Slater was employed as the Respondent’s

assistant.

8 3. Campaign letters are discussed above. The Respondent

admits that Slater typed other non - legal materials for her.

These documents include thank - you letters, business letters, and

other type - written materials not related to the Public

Defender's office or campaign.

84. The Respondent gave the thank - you and business letters

to Slater to be typed as part of her general work. An example

of this type of correspondence is Advocate's Exhibit 6 Slater -

S \\ McDowell.let, which is a letter thanking Mr. McDowel l for

inviting her to an event welcoming an Olympic Gold Medalist.

While this is not legal in nature, it clearly is not a campaign

letter, but one of the type of letters that elected officials

write to constituents thanking them, congratulating them, and

recognizing them. This type of correspondence is not

"personal," and it generally furthers the work of the office.

85. Other letters which the Respondent had Slater type

were business letters not related to the Public Defender's

office. They include , but are not limited to, letters about a

leasehold interest, a letter tendering payment of a credit card

bill, and a release of liability for a pet grooming business in

which the Respondent had an interest. See Slater_S \\ Hobbs.let;

Slater_S \\ Julpet.WPD; Sl ater_S \\ RCI.let; Slater_S \\ USAIR.Let.

86. According to the Respondent, Ms. Slater always

volunteered to type up the private business documents because

she was the Respondent’s friend. Ms. Slater, however, testified

that she typed up the documents because the Respondent directed

her to do so. It is more consistent with Slater's general

conduct that she volunteered to type these documents.

87. The evidence clearly showed Slater typed the personal

documents for the Respondent on the Public Defender Offic e

computer and on public time.

88. The Respondent contends that occasional use or

“incidental abuse” of Public Defender Office equipment for

personal letters, on a minimal basis, was permitted. The

Respondent was not the only person to take advantage of this

opportunity, and the files presented included a letter Slater

had written in her own behalf, and a letter she had written in

Scott Moore's behalf.

89. Ms. Slater served as the Respondent's assistant for

four full years. In mitigation, the person al business letters

typed for Respondent presented at the hearing given the time

covered are not numerous.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

90. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

proceeding. Secti on 120.57(1).

91. Section 112.322 and Rule 34 - 5.0015, Florida

Administrative Code, authorize the Commission on Ethics to

conduct investigations and to make public reports on complaints

concerning violations of Part III, Chapter 112 (the Code of

Ethics for Public Officers and Employees).

92. The burden of proof, absent a statutory directive to

the contrary, is on the party asserting the affirmative of the

issue of the proceedings. Department of Transportation v.

J.W.C. Co., Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v.

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services , 348 So. 2d 349

(Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In this proceeding, it is the Commission,

through its Advocate, that is asserting that Respondent violated

Section 112.313(6). Therefore, the b urden of establishing by

clear and convincing evidence the elements of Respondent’s

violations is on the Commission.

93. The Supreme Court of Florida in In Re Davey , 645 So.

2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994), quoting Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d

797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), stated:

[C]lear and convincing evidence requires

that the evidence must be found to be

credible; the facts to which the witnesses

testify must be distinctly remembered; the

testimony must be precise and explicit and

the witnesses must be lac king in confusion

as the to facts in issue. The evidence must

be of such weight that it produces in the

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction, without hesitancy, as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be

established.

94. The Supreme Court of Florida also explained that

although the “clear and convincing” standard requires more than

a “preponderance of the evidence,” it does not require proof

“beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.” Id.

95. Section 112.313( 6) provides:

MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION. No public

officer, employee of an agency, or local

government attorney shall corruptly use or

attempt to use his or her official position

or any property or resource which may be

within his or her trust, or perfor m his or

her official duties, to secure a special

privilege, benefit, or exemption for

himself, herself, or others. This section

shall not be construed to conflict with

s. 104.31.

96. The term "corruptly" is defined by Section 112.312(9)

as follows:

'Corruptly' means done with a wrongful

intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or

compensating or receiving compensation for,

any benefit resulting from some act or

omission of a public servant which is

inconsistent with the proper performance of

his or her public duties.

97. The issues for determination are:

I. Whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6),

Florida Statutes, by directing Public Defender's Office

employees to work on the Responden t's re - election campaign

during their public working hours;

II. Whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6),

Florida Statutes, by directing Public Defender's Office

employees, during public working hours and using public

resources, to prepare and de liver materials for courses that the

Respondent was teaching;

III. Whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6) by

directing a Public Defender's Office employee to take

Respondent's personal automobile in for repairs during public

work hours;

IV. Wh ether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6) by

directing a Public Defender's Office employee to make personal

bank deposits for the Respondent and her mother during public

work hours; and

V. Whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6) by

direc ting Public Defender Office employees to type personal

letters for the Respondent during public work hours.

First Issue

98. Regarding the first allegation that the Respondent

directed Public Defender's Office employees to work on

Respondent's campaign du ring public working hours, the evidence

does not support a finding that the Respondent did this. This

allegation is built upon the testimony of Ms. Slater and Mrs.

Dearing that the Respondent "directed" them do to campaign work

on the job. Their testimon y taken at its broadest was that the

Respondent placed campaign - related work into a folder on

Slater's desk with sticky notes or other written directions as

to what should be done.

99. Slater's testimony that she did campaign work in the

office is credibl e; however, she did this because she believed

that her continued employment was tied to the Respondent's

winning re - election, and it was easier for her to do this work

at her own desk, on the Public Defender's equipment, during

working hours than it was fo r her to go the campaign office over

lunch or after work. However, there is no evidence that the

Respondent knew this or condoned it. In fact, if one compares

the dates much of the work was done with the Respondent's

calendar, one finds that Slater did m uch of the campaign work

while the Respondent was out of the office.

100. Mrs. Dearing, who has some animus towards the

Respondent, testified that the Respondent never told her to do

anything, but that she got her work assignments from notes stuck

to docu ments and telephone messages. She did not remember being

told not to do campaign work during the campaign; however, she

indicated that her failure to remember did not mean she did not

receive the instructions, just that she did not remember it.

The evide nce does not show the Respondent directed Dearing to do

campaign work at the office.

101. While there is no specific allegation regarding the

use of Public Defender office equipment in the campaign, the

Advocate did not prove that the Respondent improperl y directed

or permitted the use of Public Defender office equipment in the

campaign. Again the issue is whether the Respondent was aware

of the usage.

102. The testimony of Ms. Sleater was offered to show that

the Respondent "ordered" Mike Effner to le t Sleater take a

computer home to do campaign work. Effner, who was in charge of

computers at the office and for the campaign, had computers

available that were not office computers for campaign workers.

The Respondent's intent was that Sleater get a camp aign

computer.

103. Sleater testified she had an office computer which

she kept until she left the office and typed office work on it

long after the campaign was over. It is conceivable that

Sleater was given an office computer by Effner; however, the

issue ultimately is whether the Respondent was aware that Effner

gave Sleater a Public Defender computer for campaign work. The

evidence is not clear and convincing on this point.

Third Issue

104. Passing over the second issue, the third issue was

the al legation that the Respondent directed employees to take

her personal automobile in for repairs during working hours.

This allegation was based primarily upon the testimony of

Slater, who testified that she took the car to and from the shop

for the Respond ent because she feared for her job. The

testimony of Slater that she feared for her job was not

credible.

105. Credible evidence was received that Slater

volunteered to pick up and take the Respondent's car to the

garage. Slater's volunteering was not u nusual because she was

always friendly, helpful and collegial towards the Respondent

and others in the office. There was evidence that professional

staff frequently helped the Respondent in getting her car to the

shop, and that she reciprocated in assisti ng them. Credible

evidence was received that Slater's offers were generally in the

context of helping the Respondent when there was a conflict

between picking the car up and conducting Public Defender office

business. It was not proven that the Responden t directed Slater

to take the Respondent's car to the shop, or that the functions

of the office were not facilitated by permitting Slater to do

this on public time. Further the indefiniteness as to dates

raises issues about which, if any, of the incidents occurred

within the period not barred by the statute of limitations.

Fourth Issue

106. The fourth allegation is that the Respondent directed

Joe Moore and others to take bank deposits to the bank for her

and her mother. The facts showed that Joe Moore took back

deposits to the bank for the Respondent and her mother. This

was part of a multitude of things which Moore did for the

Respondent voluntarily before and after coming to work for the

Public Defender's office. Joe Moore did not testify; however,

credible evidence was received that he voluntarily did these

errands in the context of making his own deposits and doing his

own work in such a way that the loss of time from his job was

non - existent. There was no credible evidence about "other"

people t aking bank deposits. The allegation that the Respondent

directed personnel to make bank deposits for her was not proven.

Issue Five

107. The fifth allegation is that the Respondent directed

employees to type personal letters during public work hours.

The letters which were introduced in support of this allegation

were letters which were down - loaded by Slater after she was the

Respondent's secretary/assistant. Slater testified that she

went into Holt's file folder and downloaded the files that were

t here indiscriminately. Slater was unable to identify many of

the documents that were on these disks. Some of the documents

on these disks were identified by others as having been typed by

them, and being related to work within the office. Further,

becau se they contained confidential files relating to litigation

that is on - going in the Public Defender's office, the disks

themselves could not be introduced. What was tendered were

selected documents extracted from these disks. This evidence

generally does not meet the standards of reliability such that

it would be used to determine critical issues. It would not be

considered in this case if many of these documents had not been

identified by the Respondent, and she had not admitted that

Slater typed them. However, the Respondent also testified that

Slater voluntarily typed these letters for her, and her

testimony is credible. Unfortunately, it is immaterial whether

Slater did this voluntarily or was directed to type the letters.

In either case, the typin g of certain of the letters was

improper.

108. These letters fall into three categories: campaign

related; letters of thank - you, congratulation, or regret from

Respondent as the Public Defender; and the Respondent's non -

Public Defender business. The c ampaign letters are discussed

above, and were not the responsibility of the Respondent.

109. The letters identified in the findings as being those

of thank - you, regret and congratulation from the Public Defender

are expected from public officials, and w ere properly typed by

official staff.

110. This leaves the Respondent's non - public defender,

business letters typed for the Respondent.

111. While the number of these letters are few in relation

to time, they are a violation of the provisions of Se ction

112.313(6).

112. The penalty suggested by the Advocate is totally

inappropriate in terms of the value of the letters typed. The

penalty imposed should consider the costs of a business letter

and the number of letters written over the seven - year p eriod.

Issue Two

113. The penalty for the violations is within the

discretion of the Commission, but should consider the nature and

extent of the violation.

114. The second issue is that the Respondent directed

employees of the office to prep are and deliver materials for

courses the Respondent was teaching.

115. There is no question that the Respondent asked

Slater, Dearing and others to prepare various materials to

include lesson outlines, rosters, syllabi, and grade reports in

support of her teaching courses between 1995 and 2000. These

were generally less than three pages in length and would have

taken no more than three to five minutes to prepare.

116. The Respondent does not deny doing this. Her defense

is that there was no intent t o violate the law and she was not

on notice that this was wrong. In support of this argument, the

Respondent points to various judicial officers who taught for

compensation and used de minimis amounts of staff time in

support of their activities. The con duct of the judges is not

in question, and this is not a comment on the appropriateness of

their conduct because they are regulated by a different set of

rules.

117. Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct encourages

judges "to speak, write, lecture, teac h and participate in other

quasi - judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system,

the administration of justice, and the roles of the judiciary

. . . subject to the requirements of this Code." The Code

provides that these other duties shall not interfere with the

proper performance of judicial duties.

118. The judges who testified uniformly stated that they

felt that minimal use of staff to support their teaching was not

precluded, but that they minimized staff involvement so that it

would no t interfere with the proper performance of judicial

duties.

119. The majority of the staff usage by the Respondent was

limited to items of only a few pages. This typing did not

interfere with the performance of Respondent's duties; however,

the Responden t is not governed by the Judicial Canons.

120. The Respondent is governed by another set of rules

which provides that "[N]o public officer . . .shall corruptly

use . . . her official position or any property or resource

which may be within . . . her trust . . . to secure a special

privilege, benefit, or exemption for . . . herself or others."

121. The statute defines "corruptly" to mean "done with a

wrongful intent and for the purpose of obtaining . . . or

receiving compensation for . . . some act or omis sion of a

public servant which is inconsistent with the proper performance

of . . . her public duties."

122. The issue of wrongful intent is a matter for the

trier of fact to determine. Dobry v. State , 211 So. 2d 127

(Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The court in Bl ackburn v. State , 589 So. 2d

431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) stated regarding "wrongful intent" that

"[A]n essential element of the charged offense under section

112.313(6) is the statutory requirement that appellant acted

with wrongful intent, that is, that she a cted with reasonable

notice that her conduct was inconsistent with the proper

performance of her public duties and would be a violation of the

law of code of ethics[.]"

123. Unlike a judge, the Public Defender is not

"encouraged to speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in

other quasi - judicial activities[.]" There is no duality of

function to warrant the expenditure of staff time to support the

Respondent's activity in this regard. However, for the most

part, this use of staff was de minimis except for the outline

prepared by Dearing. Regarding the outline of the book prepared

by Dearing, it appeared that this was "make work" for Dearing

during one of Dearing's periods of employment. It was a major

part of Dearing's effort and was not in support o f the office's

mission. However, this was one occurrence of limited scope.

124. In considering whether a violation occurred, the dual

scope of the violation must be considered. There was a long -

term, on - going misuse of staff about which there could be s ome

confusion, and there was a short - term, major misuse of Dearing's

time about which little confusion could have existed. However,

this latter violation had more to do with misuse of position by

hiring a friend's daughter for a "make work" job than with

teaching.

125. The Respondent's de minimis use of staff was a

violation because she is presumed to know the nature and scope

of her duties. I do not find that this should be severely

penalized; first, because this is a case of first impression,

and, se cond, because it was de minimis use of staff. Regarding

the misuse of Dearing, I find that this clearly violated this

provision; however, this misuse was of limited duration and

really unrelated to teaching.

126. Based upon these considerations, a pena lty in the

range proposed by the Advocate, an amount equal to or greater to

the Respondent's total income for teaching during the period,

seems unduly large. 11/

127. Requiring the Respondent to repay Dearing's salary

for the period she was engaged in th is activity plus the amount

the Commission would assess for both types of violation of the

statute would be sufficient penalty.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that:

1. Count 1 be di smissed regarding the Respondent's

directing employees to work on the re - election campaign;

2. Count 3 be dismissed regarding the Respondent's

directing an employee to take her personal automobile in for

repairs;

3. Count 4 be dismissed regarding the Re spondent's

directing an employee to make bank deposits for her and her

mother;

4. A civil penalty of $1,500 be imposed because the

Respondent violated Section 112.313(6) by having personal

letters typed by public employees during public working hours;

an d

5. Restitution in the amount of $2,000, and a civil

penalty of $2,000 be imposed because the Respondent violated

Section 112.313(6) by having school materials prepared by public

employees during public work hours.

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of Oct ober, 2003, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

STEPHEN F. DEAN

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Flori da 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of October, 2003.

ENDNOTES

1/ Advoca te’s Exhibit 6 SHOP was received as Holt’s Exhibit 6

Shopanscript of Final Hearing, p. 667.

2/ Of those, Advocate’s Exhibits 7 CULBREAT.OAK, SAM.DOR and

TPD.LET were received as Holt Exhibits 7 as opposed to

Advocate’s Exhibits 7, with the same desig nations. See

Transcript of Final Hearing, pp. 670, 685, 690.

3/ Advocate’s Exhibit 8I was received as Holt’s 8Ianscript

of Final Hearing, p. 690.

4/ During the final hearing, the full transcript of Respondent’s

Sworn Statement given to the Ethi cs Investigator was substituted

for the partial transcript originally offered as part of

Advocate’s Exhibit “12.” The full transcript was admitted into

evidence as a substitute for Advocate’s Exhibit 12. See

Transcript of Final Hearing, p. 1143.

5/ Ad vocate’s Exhibit 17 is a composite of phone messages from

Joseph Moore regarding bank depositsanscript of Final

Hearing, pp.1096, 1000 [identified and received]. Advocate’s

Exhibit 19 is a composite of arrangement, by date, of the file

lists on Sharon Slater Disks #’s 1, 2 & 3. See Transcript of

Final Hearing, pp. 1947, 1964 [identified and received].

6/ The testimony of Judge Gross was taken by deposition on

July 31, 2003.

7/ The FDLE investigated and determined there were not crimes

committed .

8/ Melissa Moore Dearing’s last name was Moore prior to her

marriage. Ms. Dearing is the daughter of Joseph Moore, one of

those who filed a complaint with the Ethics Commission against

Respond ent. (T - 250; R - 49)

9/ The course that she taught in the Spring of 1995 occurred

prior to the reach of the statute of limitations and has not

been considered in this case.

10/ Dearing and others proctored examinations and taught courses

for the Respondent during this period. Dearing clearly

volunteered to do this as did the other personnel, who were

mostly professional staff. This was not a violation the law

because it was not done on public time and was voluntary.

11/ The Respondent was compensated between $1,000 and $2,500 per

course for teaching thes e courses. The Respondent taught three

different classes during the years 1998 and 1999, and two

different courses in 2000. She made approximately $6,600 from

teaching in 1998 and 1999, and $4,100 for teaching in 2000.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Gregory W. Keh oe, Esquire

James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich, P.A.

Post Office Box 1259

St. Petersburg, Florida 33731

James H. Peterson, III, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

Kaye Starling, Agency Cl erk

Commission on Ethics

2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101

Post Office Box 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 5709

Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel

Commission on Ethics

2822 Remingt on Green Circle, Suite 101

Post Office Box 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 5709

Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director

Commission on Ethics

2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101

Post Office Box 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 5709

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to

this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will

issue the final order in this case.