03-003682RP Florida Outdoor Advertising Association, Inc.; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala Outdoor; The Lamar Company, L.L.C.; And Viacom Outdoor, Inc., D/B/A National Advertising Company vs. Department Of Transportation
 Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Monday, February 16, 2004.


View Dockets  
Summary: Respondent`s proposed rule regarding outdoor advertising does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8FLORIDA OUTDOOR ADVERTISING )

12ASSOCIATION, INC.; CLEAR )

16CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC.; KOALA )

21OUTDOOR; THE LAMAR COMPANY, )

26L.L.C.; AND VIACOM OUTDOOR, )

31INC., d/b/a NATIONAL )

35ADVERTISING COMPANY, )

38)

39Petitioners, )

41)

42vs. ) Case No. 03 - 3682RP

49)

50DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )

54)

55)

56Respondent. )

58)

59FINAL ORDER

61Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this

71case on November 21, 2003, in Tallahassee, Florida, before the

81Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated

88Administrative Law Judge, Barbara J. Staros.

94APPEARANCES

95For Petitioners: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire

101Livingston & Riley, P.A.

105Post Office Box 2151

109Orlando, Florida 32802

112For Respondent: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire

118Department of Transportation

121Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58

127605 Suwannee Street

130Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

135STATEMENT OF TH E ISSUE

140Whether proposed Rule 14 - 10.0052 is an invalid exercise

150of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section

157120.52(8), Florida Statutes, 1/ for the reasons described by

166Petitioners in their Petition.

170PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

172Petitioners, Florida O utdoor Advertising Association,

178Inc.; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala Outdoor; The Lamar

187Company, L.L.C.; and Viacom Outdoor, Inc., d/b/a National

195Advertising Company filed a Petition challenging proposed Rule

20314 - 10.0052 with the Division of Administrat ive Hearings on

214October 9, 2003, and it was assigned to the undersigned on

225October 13, 2003.

228A Notice of Hearing was issued on October 16, 2003,

238scheduling a formal hearing for November 12, 2003. On

247October 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a Motion for Leav e to File

259Amended Petition. The motion was granted and the case

268proceeded on Petitioners' Amended Petition. Also on October

27621, 2003, Petitioners filed an unopposed Motion for

284Continuance of Final Administrative Hearing. The motion was

292granted and the h earing was rescheduled for November 21, 2003.

303The parties filed a Joint Pre - Hearing Stipulation on November

31419, 2003.

316At hearing, Petitioners presented the testimony of Thomas

324G. Pelham, Joseph Howard Little, Richard V. Geeslin, and

333Katherine Oertel. P etitioners' Exhibits numbered 1 and 2 were

343admitted into evidence.

346Respondent presented the testimony of John Garner.

353Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1 through 7 were admitted into

362evidence. The parties offered Joint Exhibit 1 which was

371admitted into evi dence. Official recognition was taken of 23

381U.S.C. s. 131, 23 C.F.R. Subpart G, §§ 750.701 - 750.713,

392Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, an agreement dated January 27,

4011972, between the United States Department of Transportation

409and the State of Florida, an d Rule 9J - 5.003, Florida

421Administrative Code.

423A Transcript consisting of one volume was filed on

432December 15, 2003. On December 30, 2003, Petitioners filed an

442Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to file Petitioners'

451Proposed Final Order. The motion wa s granted and the parties

462timely filed Proposed Final Orders which have been considered

471in the preparation of this Final Order.

478FINDINGS OF FACT

481Stipulated Facts

4831. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a rule

494development workshop on May 20, 2002 , at 10:00 a.m. at the

505Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwannee Street, Tallahassee,

512Florida.

5132. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a public

524hearing on December 18, 2002, at the same location.

5333. The proposed rule was the subject matter of anothe r

544public hearing held on April 3, 2003, at the same location.

5554. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a

565publication under Section III of the Florida Administrative

573Weekly on September 19, 2003, wherein the rule was published

583in its final propos ed form.

5895. Petitioner Florida Outdoor Advertising Association is

596a trade association comprised of billboard companies operating

604within the State of Florida who (i) are engaged in the

"615business of outdoor advertising" as that term is defined in

625Chapter 4 79, Florida Statutes; (ii) are licensed as outdoor

635advertising companies pursuant to the provisions of Chapter

643479, Florida Statutes; (iii) are directly regulated by the

652provisions of Chapter 14 - 10, Florida Administrative Code; and

662(iv) are companies whose substantial interests will be

670affected by the proposed rule.

6756. Petitioners Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala

682Outdoor; The Lamar Company, L.L.C.; and Viacom Outdoor, Inc.,

691d/b/a National Advertising Company are billboard companies who

699(i) are engaged in the "business of outdoor advertising" as

709that term is defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes; (ii)

719are licensed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 479,

728Florida Statutes; (iii) are directly regulated by Chapter 14 -

73810, Florida Administrative Code; a nd (iv) are parties whose

748substantial interests will be affected by the proposed rule.

7577. The State of Florida, Department of Transportation

765(hereinafter "the Department"), is the state agency

773responsible for adopting the proposed rule.

7798. Petitioners are all qualified to do business within

788the State of Florida, are Florida taxpayers, and have

797participated in the entire rule adoption process, as set forth

807above, either directly or by and through their authorized

816representatives, agents, or attorneys.

8209 . The Petition filed on behalf of Petitioners was

830timely filed pursuant to the provisions of Section

838120.56(2)(a), Florida Statutes.

84110. The text of the proposed rule as published in its

852final form in the Florida Administrative Weekly on September

86119, 2003, is as follows:

86614 - 10.0052 Comprehensively Enacted Zoning

872and Zoning Enacted Primarily to Permit

878Signs.

879(1) 'Comprehensively Enacted Zoning' means

884ordinances or other laws adopted by the

891county or municipal government with

896authority over the develop ment and use of a

905parcel of land, pertaining to and

911designating the currently allowable uses on

917the parcel, pursuant to and consistent with

924a comprehensive plan enacted in accordance

930with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The

936term does not include actions ta ken

943primarily to permit signs as defined in

950section (3) of this rule.

955(2) For the purposes of this rule,

962'parcel' shall mean all the contiguous

968lands under the same ownership and the same

976land use designation adopted pursuant to

982Chapter 163, Florida Stat utes.

987(3) The Department shall consider the

993following criteria when determining whether

998commercial or industrial zoning applicable

1003to a parcel of land was adopted primarily

1011to permit the erection or maintenance of

1018signs:

1019(a) Whether the uses allowed b y the

1027applicable zoning ordinance or law include

1033commercial or industrial uses in addition

1039to signs. The following uses are not

1046recognized as commercial or industrial use

1052for the purpose of these criteria:

10581. Agricultural, forestry, ranching,

1062grazing, farming, or related activities,

1067including wayside fresh produce stands.

1072ansient or temporary activities.

10763. Railroad tracks and minor sidings.

10824. Communication towers.

10855. Electric transmission, telephone,

1089telegraph, or other communication s services

1095lines.

10966. Ditches, sewers, water, heat, or gas

1103lines.

11047. Pipelines, tanks, or pumps.

11098. Fences.

11119. Drainage ponds or water retention

1117facilities.

111810. Canals.

112011. Roads.

112212. Signs.

1124(b) Whether the size of the parcel would

1132be sufficient to conduct the commercial or

1139industrial uses allowed on the parcel under

1146the applicable county or municipal

1151government building and development code

1156requirements for commercial or industrial

1161activities, including setback requirements,

1165parcel si ze and dimension requirements, and

1172parking requirements.

1174(c) Whether the parcel is located

1180contiguous to other properties zoned or

1186used for commercial or industrial

1191activities.

1192(d) Whether there is public access to the

1200parcel sufficient to conduct the commercial

1206or industrial uses allowed on the parcel.

1213(e) Whether the public statements and

1219materials published in connection with any

1225zoning decision affecting the parcel,

1230including all public records pertaining to

1236the zoning decision, indicate the zonin g

1243decision was taken primarily to permit the

1250erection or maintenance of signs.

1255Specific authority 334.044(2), 479.07(10)

1259FS. History - New.

1263Facts Based Upon the Evidence of Record

1270History of the Rule

127411. The Department is the state agency responsib le for

1284administering state and federal law governing the placement of

1293outdoor advertising signs along the highways of the state.

1302DOT is charged with enforcing Chapter 479, Florida Statutes,

1311in concert with federal law and regulations, as well as an

1322agreem ent between the State of Florida and the United States

1333Department of Transportation referenced more specifically

1339below.

134012. On January 27, 1972, the State of Florida and the

1351United States Department of Transportation entered into an

1359agreement (the agreeme nt) for carrying out the federal law

1369known as the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (the Act).

137913. The Act, which is codified at 23 U.S.C. section 131,

1390requires states to achieve and exercise effective control of

1399outdoor advertising in areas adjacent t o the Interstate

1408highways and the federal - aid primary highway systems. The

1418predominant focus of the Act is that signs located within a

1429certain distance of Interstate and federal - aid highways should

1439be located in areas that are commercial or industrial in

1449nature. Failure to maintain such effective control may result

1458in an annual penalty of ten percent of the federal highway

1469funds apportioned to the state.

147414. There was a major rewrite of Florida law relating to

1485outdoor advertising in 1984 in an effort to come under

1495compliance with the agreement as well as with federal law and

1506regulations.

150715. As part of that legislative undertaking, the

1515language of Subsection (10) of Section 479.07(10) was enacted.

1524Section 7, Chapter 84 - 227, Laws of Florida. The languag e of

1537that subsection, which is referenced in the publication of the

1547proposed rule as the law implemented, has not changed since

1557its enactment in 1984. The last sentence of the subsection

1567requires the Department to adopt rules within 180 days after

1577the eff ective date of act, "which shall provide criteria to

1588determine whether such zoning is comprehensively enacted or

1596enacted primarily to permit signs."

160116. In response to this Legislative mandate, the

1609Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10 .0051

1619in 1986. That rule was entitled, "Zoned and Unzoned

1628Commercial and Industrial Areas along Interstate and Federal -

1637Aid Primary Highways."

164017. Florida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0051 was the

1650last effective rule on the subject matter of the propo sed rule

1662until its repeal in approximately 2000. The Department

1670describes the repeal of the rule as "inadvertent."

167818. John Garner is the manager of production and program

1688operations for the Office of Right - of - Way for the Department.

1701His duties inclu de policy - level involvement regarding outdoor

1711advertising. According to Mr. Garner, the Department chose

1719not to simply re - adopt its previous rule on the subject

1731because it believed the old language was somewhat vague and

1741should be more specific. The Depa rtment began working on the

1752proposed rule which is the subject matter of this dispute in

1763late 2000 or in 2001. Mr. Garner attended numerous meetings

1773wherein the text of the rule was discussed and participated at

1784one of public hearings on the proposed rule .

179319. Through the rule development process, the initial

1801proposed language was significantly modified to address

1808comments and concerns raised by Petitioners and others.

1816During the process of developing the proposed rule, the

1825Department considered a number of matters, including the

1833comments received during the rule workshops, guidance and

1841comment it has received over time from the Federal Highway

1851Administration concerning federal regulations, information

1856received from the Department of Community Affairs, an d an

1866examination of approaches taken by other states in addressing

1875similar matters.

1877Other statutory considerations

1880Chapter 163

188220. A year after the enactment of Section 479.07(10),

1891the 1985 Florida Legislature enacted the Local Government

1899Comprehensive P lanning and Land Development Regulation Act.

1907This legislation substantially revised and expanded Part II of

1916Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1985), regarding growth

1923management.

192421. That legislation mandated a comprehensive planning

1931process requiring each local government in the state to plan

1941comprehensively for growth and development. Each local

1948government is required to prepare a comprehensive plan which

1957will govern land use in the jurisdiction. A part of that

1968comprehensive plan is a future land use ma p which designates

1979all property within a jurisdiction for a use consistent with

1989future land use categories that are provided for in the

1999comprehensive plan, e.g., commercial or residential. The

2006future land use map must be consistent with the other parts of

2018the comprehensive plan.

202122. After a comprehensive plan has been adopted for a

2031jurisdiction, the local government must implement that plan

2039through the adoption of land development regulations,

2046including zoning. Any such regulations must be consistent

2054wit h the comprehensive land use plan so that there is a

2066comprehensive system of planning, regulation, and zoning.

207323. It is common practice in this state to include

2083within the implementing regulations a comprehensive zoning

2090ordinance which is then applied to all of the property within

2101the jurisdiction resulting in a zoning map showing zoning

2110districts. A zoning ordinance would list currently

2117permissible uses in the zoning districts.

212324. Comprehensive plans are subject to amendment not

2131more than twice a ye ar. Zoning regulations may also be

2142modified or amended by local governments, but must remain

2151consistent with the comprehensive plan.

215625. There are a few jurisdictions in Florida which have

2166land development regulations but do not have zoning ordinances

2175in place.

217726. The Department deems land use control actions taken

2186pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, to be zoning that

2196is comprehensively enacted for the purposes of Chapter 479,

2205Florida Statutes.

2207Sign Permits

220927. Section 479.07, Florida Statut es, generally requires

2217the issuance of a sign permit by the Department before the

2228erection of signs along state highways, the federal aid

2237primary system, and the Interstate highway system. This

2245section also authorizes the Department to prescribe an

2253applic ation form for such permits.

225928. The application form for an outdoor advertising

2267permit contains information about what is proposed to be

2276constructed and where an applicant proposes that it be

2285constructed.

228629. The application also contains a section t hat reads,

"2296To be completed by appropriate zoning official." This

2304section contains information on the future land use

2312designation and current zoning of the proposed location under

2321the local government's comprehensive plan and land development

2329regulations. The form also contains a section entitled,

"2337Local Governmental Permission" in which a local government

2345official indicates whether or not the outdoor advertising sign

2354identified in the application is or is not in compliance with

2365all duly adopted local ord inances.

237130. Once the local government zoning official certifies

2379that the proposed sign identified in the application is in

2389compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to

2397Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that

2406certification to loo k factually at whether the zoning action

2416was consistent with the comprehensive plan.

242231. The Department uses the application and the

2430information contained therein to determine whether a proposed

2438sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial o r

2449industrial zone." If it does, then the Department determines

2458whether those designations were adopted as part of the local

2468government's comprehensive planning effort or were primarily

2475adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location.

2484The Dep artment examines the intent surrounding a particular

2493zoning decision on a case - by - case basis.

2503CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

250632. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

2513jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2522proceeding pursua nt to Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida

2531Statutes.

253233. Petitioners have standing to challenge the proposed

2540rule which is the subject of this dispute.

254834. The Department is the state agency responsible for

2557administering state and federal law governing t he placement of

2567outdoor advertising signs along the highways of the state.

2576Ch. 479, Fla. Stat.

2580Rule Challenge Analysis

258335. In a challenge to a proposed rule, the party

2593attacking the proposed rule has the burden of going forward.

2603The agency then has the burden to prove by a preponderance of

2615the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise

2626of delegated legislative authority as to the objections

2634raised. The proposed rule is not presumed to be valid or

2645invalid. § 120.56(2)(a) and (c), Fl a. Stat.

265336. The Amended Petition challenging proposed Rule 14 -

266210.0052 alleges that the proposed rule constitutes an invalid

2671exercise of delegated authority. Petitioners assert that the

2679proposed rule violates subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of

2689Secti on 120.52(8) in that it exceeds the Department's

2698rulemaking authority; enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the

2705specific provisions of law implemented; is vague, fails to

2714establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests

2722unbridled discretion in the agency; and is arbitrary. 2/

273137. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, reads in

2738pertinent part as follows:

2742(8) 'Invalid exercise of delegated

2747legislative authority' means action which

2752goes beyond the powers, functions, and

2758duties delegated by the Legisl ature. A

2765proposed or existing rule is an invalid

2772exercise of delegated legislative authority

2777if any one of the following applies:

2784* * *

2787(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of

2795rulemaking authority, citation to which is

2801required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

2805(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or

2811contravenes the specific provisions of law

2817implemented, citation to which is required

2823by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

2826(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish

2834adequate standards for agency decisions, or

2840vests unbridled discretion in the agency;

2846(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.

2853A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported

2862by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is

2871capricious if it is adopted without thought

2878or reason or is irrational . . . .

2887Secti on 120.52(8)(b) and (c)

289238. "The authority to adopt an administrative rule must

2901be based on an explicit power or duty identified in the

2912enabling statute . . . [T]he authority for an administrative

2922rule is not a matter of degree. The question is whether the

2934statute contains a specific grant of legislative authority for

2943the rule, not whether the grant of authority is specific

2953enough ." (Emphasis in original) Florida Board of Medicine v.

2963Fla. Academy of Cosmetic Surgery , 808 So. 2d 243, 253, quoting

2974Southw est Florida Water Management District v. Save the

2983Manatee Club, Inc. , 773 So. 2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

299539. In this instance, the Department's grant of

3003rulemaking authority is found in Section 479.07(10), Florida

3011Statutes, which reads as follows :

3017479.07 Sign permits. --

3021(10) Commercially or industrial zoning

3026which is not comprehensively enacted or

3032which is enacted primarily to permit signs

3039shall not be recognized as commercial or

3046industrial zoning for purposes of this

3052provision, and permits shall be issued for

3059signs in such areas. The department shall

3066adopt rules within 180 days after this act

3074takes effect which shall provide criteria

3080to determine whether such zoning is

3086comprehensively enacted or enacted

3090primarily to permit signs.

309440. Pet itioners argue that the 180 - day reference in

3105Section 479.07(10) must be strictly construed and that the

3114Department is not legislatively mandated, obligated, or

3121authorized to enact an administrative rule in 2003 that

"3130should have been enacted in 1984."

313641. Petitioners' argument in that regard is rejected.

3144Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, gives the Department

3151clear rulemaking authority regarding the establishment of

3158criteria to determine whether commercial or industrial zoning

3166is comprehensively enact ed or enacted primarily to permit

3175signs. Moreover, the legislature has made it abundantly clear

3184that rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion and must

3195be done as soon as feasible and practicable. § 120.54(1)(a),

3205Fla. Stat. Petitioners cannot succ essfully argue that the

3214Department's obligation and authority to adopt criteria

3221expired 180 days after the effective date of the law.

323142. Petitioners further argue that Section 479.07(10)

3238was "pre - empted and rendered moot by the subsequently enacted

3249amen dment to section 479.01(3), Florida Statutes (1999),"

3257which defines commercial or industrial zone. 3/ Section 479.01,

3266Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part as follows:

3274(3) 'Commercial or industrial zone' means

3280a parcel of land designated for commercia l

3288or industrial use under both the future

3295land use map of the comprehensive plan and

3303the land use development regulations

3308adopted pursuant to chapter 163. If a

3315parcel is located in an area designated for

3323multiple uses on the future land use map of

3332a compr ehensive plan and the land

3339development regulations do not clearly

3344designate that parcel for a specific use,

3351the area will be considered an unzoned

3358commercial or industrial area if it meets

3365the criteria of subsection (23).

3370* * *

3373(23) 'Unzoned commercial or industrial

3378area' means a parcel of land designated by

3386the future land use map of the

3393comprehensive plan for multiple uses that

3399include commercial or industrial uses but

3405are not specifically designated for

3410commercial or industrial uses under the

3416land dev elopment regulations, in which

3422three or more separate and distinct

3428conforming industrial or commercial

3432activities are located.

3435(a) These activities must satisfy the

3441following criteria:

34431. At least one of the commercial or

3451industrial activities must b e located on

3458the same side of the highway and within 800

3467feet of the sign location;

34722. The commercial or industrial activities

3478must be within 660 feet from the nearest

3486edge of the right - of - way; and

34953. The commercial [sic] industrial

3500activities must b e within 1,600 feet of

3509each other.

3511Distances specified in this paragraph must

3517be measured from the nearest outer edge of

3525the primary building or primary building

3531complex when the individual units of the

3538complex are connected by covered walkways.

3544(b) Certain activities, including, but not

3550limited to, the following, may not be so

3558recognized as commercial or industrial

3563activities:

35641. Signs.

35662. Agricultural, forestry, ranching,

3570grazing, farming, and related activities,

3575including, but not limited to , wayside

3581fresh produce stands.

35843. Transient or temporary activities.

35894. Activities not visible from the main -

3597traveled way.

35995. Activities conducted more than 660 feet

3606from the nearest edge of the right - of - way.

36176. Activities conducted in a buil ding

3624principally used as a residence.

36297. Railroad tracks and minor sidings.

36358. Communication towers.

363843. Prior to 1999, subsection (3) of Section 479.01,

3647Florida Statutes, read as follows:

3652'Commercial or ind ustrial zone' means an

3659area within 660 feet of the nearest edge of

3668the right - of - way of the interstate or

3678federal - aid primary system designated

3684predominately for commercial or industrial

3689use under the future land use map of the

3698comprehensive plan adopted pu rsuant to

3704chapter 163. Where a local governmental

3710entity has not enacted a comprehensive plan

3717by local ordinance but has zoning

3723regulations governing the area, the zoning

3729of an area shall determine whether the area

3737is designated predominately for commerci al

3743or industrial uses.

374644. The current language of section 479.01(3) has not

3755changed since the 1999 amendment by Chapter 99 - 385, Laws of

3767Florida. Section 38 of Chapter 99 - 385, Laws of Florida, also

3779amended Section 479.07. By amending certain subsection s of

3788Section 479.07 but not subsection (10), the 1999 Florida

3797Legislature reenacted the language in subsection (10).

380445. Moreover, the two statutory provisions can be read

3813in harmony. Section 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, defines a

3821commercial or industr ial zone in which signs may be located.

3832Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, prohibits issuing

3838permits for signs in such zones if the commercial or

3848industrial zoning was not comprehensively enacted or was

3856enacted primarily to permit signs.

386146. Petitio ners further argue that the rulemaking

3869authority found in Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, has

3877been, in effect, pre - empted by the enactment of Chapter 163,

3889Florida Statutes. However, Section 163.3211, Florida

3895Statutes, reads in pertinent part as foll ows:

3903163.3211 Conflict with other statutes. --

3909. . . Nothing in this act is intended to

3919withdraw or diminish any legal powers or

3926responsibilities of state agencies or

3931change any requirement of existing law that

3938local regulations comply with state

3943stan dards or rules. (emphasis supplied)

394947. Petitioners' arguments regarding preemption by later

3956legislative enactment are unpersuasive. Courts will disfavor

3963construing a statute as repealed by implication unless that is

3973the only reasonable construction. Jones v. State , 813 So. 2d

398322 (Fla. 2002). Implied repeals of statutes are not favored

3993by the courts and will not be upheld in doubtful cases. Flo -

4006Sun, Inc. v. Kirk , 783 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2001).

401648. Further, Petitione rs argue that the definition of

4025the word "parcel" in paragraph (2) of the proposed rule

4035conflicts with Section 163.3164(16), Florida Statutes, which

4042reads in pertinent part as follows:

4048Local Government Comprehensive Planning and

4053Land Development Regulatio n Act:

4058definitions. -- As used in this act :

4066(16) 'Parcel of Land ' means any quantity

4074of land capable of being described with

4081such definiteness that its locations and

4087boundaries may be established, which is

4093designated by its owner or developer as

4100land to be used, or developed as, a unit or

4110which has been used or developed as a unit.

4119(emphasis supplied)

412149. The definition of the word "parcel" selected by the

4131Department is expressly limited to the term as it is used in

4143the proposed rule. Moreover, the de finition of parcel found

4153in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, will have been employed by

4163the local government in determining its comprehensive plan and

4172regulations. It is the result of those determinations that

4181the Department examines within the context of i ts

4190responsibilities under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.

419650. Petitioners further argue that paragraphs (3)(b) and

4204(c) and the definition of "parcel" in subsection (2) of the

4215proposed rule are in conflict with the provisions of Section

4225479.01(3), Flor ida Statutes. The evidence presented does not

4234establish that paragraphs (b), (c) or the definition of

"4243parcel" in the proposed rule is in conflict with Section

4253479.01(3), Florida Statutes.

425651. Based upon the statutory authority outlined above,

4264the Dep artment has not exceeded its grant of rulemaking

4274authority and the challenged proposed rule does not enlarge,

4283modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law

4291implemented as contemplated by Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c),

4299Florida Statutes.

4301Section 120. 52(8)(d)

430452. Petitioners argue that subsection (3) of the

4312proposed rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards

4321for agency decisions, and vests unbridled discretion in the

4330agency.

433153. Petitioners contend that subsection (3) of the

4339proposed rule does not provide criteria for determining when

4348zoning is enacted primarily to permit signs. Criteria are

4357commonly understood to be standards, rules, or tests upon

4366which a judgment or decision can be based. American

4375Collegiate Heritage Dictionary 328 (3r d ed. 1997). The

4384factors listed in subsection (3) of the proposed rule are

4394criteria in this commonly understood sense. Petitioners

4401assert that the criteria allow for differing application on a

4411case by case basis. Petitioners also contend that the

4420criter ia set out in subsection (3) are vague, fail to

4431establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and vest

4439unbridled discretion in the Department.

444454. An administrative rule is invalid if the rule

4453requires the performance of an act in terms that are so vague

4465that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning.

4475Southwest Florida Water Management District v. Charlotte

4482County , 774 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001), citing Donato v.

4494American Telephone & Telegraph , 767 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2000).

450455. T he Department has defined the term "parcel" for

4514purposes of the rule. Petitioners argue that the terms

"4523contiguous" and "public access" found in subsections (c) and

4532(d) are not clearly defined. These terms as used in

4542subsection (3) have common and ordina ry meanings. The fact

4552that the rule does not provide finite criteria does not mean

4563that the rule provisions are vague. Persons of common

4572intelligence can understand the list of criteria that the

4581Department will consider in deciding whether zoning was

4589pri marily enacted to permit signs.

459556. The question that the Department is required to

4604answer necessitates that it look at a set of facts that will

4616be particular to each zoning action. The proposed rule spells

4626out exactly what the Department will consider as relevant to

4636its decision.

463857. The rule does not create any discretion not

4647articulated in the statute. Section 479.07(10), Florida

4654Statutes, creates the discretion the Department will exercise

4662through the rule. A rule is not invalid merely becaus e the

4674underlying statute confers discretion on the agency. See

4682Florida Public Service Commission v. Florida Waterworks

4689Association , 731 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The

4700rule provides standards by which the Department's discretion

4708will be exercise d. Any decision by the Department that zoning

4719was enacted primarily to permit signs would have to be tied

4730into the rule criteria, and would be capable of review on that

4742basis. See generally Cortes v. State Bd. Of Regents , 665

4752So. 2d 132, 138, 140 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1995).

476258. The proposed rule implements the discretion given to

4771the Department by the Legislature. "The Legislature itself is

4780hardly suited to anticipate the endless variety of situations

4789that may occur or to rigidly prescribe the conditions or

4799so lutions to the often fact - specific situations that arise . . .

4813." Avatar Development Corp. v. State , 723 So. 2d 199 (Fla.

48241999).

4825Section 120.52(8)(e)

482759. Finally, the Amended Petition alleges that

4834subsection (3)(a) of the proposed rule is arbitrary. 4/

4843P etitioners contend that the list of excluded uses

4852inappropriately tracks the list of excluded uses that appear

4861in the statutory use test created by Sections 479.01(3) and

4871(23), which are set forth above. Petitioners argue that the

4881use test in subsection ( 23) no longer is viable because of the

48941999 amendment to the definition of "commercial or industrial

4903zone" in subsection (3).

490760. The list of excluded uses substantially tracks the

4916list of uses under the statutory test for an "unzoned

4926commercial or indu strial area." § 479.01(23), Fla. Stat. The

4936statute in turn tracks the list of uses excluded from the

4947similar use test in the 1972 agreement between the State of

4958Florida and the United States Department of Transportation.

4966The Department's decision to exc lude these uses from its rule

4977inquiry follows the same logic found in statute and policy.

498761. A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by logic

4999or the necessary facts. § 120.52(8)(e), Fla. Stat. The

5008proposed rule is supported by facts and logic.

501662. Based upon the evidence presented and the statutory

5025authority outlined above, the Department has not exceeded its

5034grant of rulemaking authority; the proposed rule does not

5043enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law

5052implemented; the propo sed rule is not vague, does not fail to

5064establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and does

5072not vest unbridled discretion in the agency; and the proposed

5082rule is not arbitrary.

5086ORDER

5087Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

5096o f Law, it is

5101ORDERED:

5102The Amended Petition challenging proposed Rule 14 - 10.0052

5111is denied.

5113DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in

5123Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

5127S

5128___________________________________

5129BARBARA J. STAR OS

5133Administrative Law Judge

5136Division of Administrative Hearings

5140The DeSoto Building

51431230 Apalachee Parkway

5146Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

5151(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

5159Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

5165www.doah.state.fl.us

5166Filed with the Clerk of the

5172Divisio n of Administrative Hearings

5177this 16th day of February, 2004.

5183ENDNOTES

51841/ All references to Fla. Stat. will be to Florida Statutes

51952003, unless otherwise indicated.

51992/ Petitioners' Proposed Final Order also asserts that the

5208proposed rule is not su pported by competent substantial

5217evidence. However, this language, which was found in Section

5226120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2002), was repealed by Section

52341, Chapter 2003 - 94, Laws of Florida, and became effective June

52464, 2003. Accordingly, that argume nt will not be addressed in

5257this Final Order. Additionally, Petitioners assert in the

5265Proposed Final Order that the proposed rule will make the

5275permitting process more expensive, complex, and time

5282consuming. The Amended Petition did not allege any violat ion

5292of Section 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), and,

5299therefore, that argument will not be addressed in this Final

5309Order.

53103/ The "preemption" arguments are construed to be a challenge

5320under Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.

53254/ Petitioners' Proposed Final Order argues that the

5333definition of "parcel" is "contrary to state law and is done

5344without logic, thought or reason." However, the Amended

5352Petition did not allege that the definition of parcel is

5362arbitrary or capricious, but that it is cont rary to or in

5374conflict with certain laws. That argument is addressed under

5383the analysis of Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c) herein.

5391COPIES FURNISHED :

5394Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire

5398Livingston & Riley P.A.

5402Post Office Box 2151

5406Orlando, Florida 32802

5409Robert M. Burdick, Esquire

5413Assistant General Counsel

5416Department of Transportation

5419Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58

5425605 Suwannee Street

5428Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

5433Liz Cloud, Chief

5436Bureau of Administrative Code

5440Department of State

5443The Elliott Building , Room 201

5448Tallahassee, Florida 32399

5451Scott Boyd, Acting Executive Director

5456and General Counsel

5459Administrative Procedures Committee

5462Holland Building, Room 120

5466Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300

5471NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

5477A party who is adver sely affected by this Final Order is

5489entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68,

5497Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the

5505Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are

5513commenced by filing the original notice of ap peal with the

5524Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy,

5534accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the

5543District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District

5553Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party

5563resid es. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of

5576rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
PDF
Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 10/01/2004
Proceedings: Record Returned from the First District Court.
PDF:
Date: 07/26/2004
Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appeal dismissed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350(b).
PDF:
Date: 05/28/2004
Proceedings: Index, Record, and Certificate of Record sent to the District Court of Appeal.
PDF:
Date: 05/07/2004
Proceedings: Statement of Service and Preparation of Record mailed to filing party.
PDF:
Date: 05/06/2004
Proceedings: Index filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/16/2004
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/12/2004
Proceedings: Letter to Ann Cole from J. Wheeler enclosing Docketing Statement filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/11/2004
Proceedings: Notice of Appeal of Final Administrative Order filed; Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal of Final Administrative Order sent to the First DCA.
PDF:
Date: 02/16/2004
Proceedings: DOAH Final Order
PDF:
Date: 02/16/2004
Proceedings: Final Order (hearing held November 21, 2003). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 01/08/2004
Proceedings: Petitioners` Proposed Final Order (filed via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 12/31/2003
Proceedings: Respondent`s Proposed Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/30/2003
Proceedings: Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to file Petitioners` Proposed Final Order (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
Date: 12/15/2003
Proceedings: Transcript filed.
Date: 11/21/2003
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 11/19/2003
Proceedings: Joint Prehearing Statement filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/04/2003
Proceedings: Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum (J. Garner) filed via facsimile.
PDF:
Date: 10/31/2003
Proceedings: Order. (Petitioners` Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition is granted).
PDF:
Date: 10/22/2003
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for November 21, 2003; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 10/21/2003
Proceedings: Response to Motion for Continuance (filed by Respondent via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 10/21/2003
Proceedings: Motion for Continuance of Final Administrative Hearing (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 10/21/2003
Proceedings: Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
PDF:
Date: 10/16/2003
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 10/16/2003
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for November 12, 2003; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 10/13/2003
Proceedings: Order of Assignment.
PDF:
Date: 10/10/2003
Proceedings: Rule Challenge transmittal letter to Liz Cloud from Ann Cole copying Scott Boyd and the Agency General Counsel.
PDF:
Date: 10/09/2003
Proceedings: Petition (filed via facsimile).

Case Information

Judge:
BARBARA J. STAROS
Date Filed:
10/09/2003
Date Assignment:
10/13/2003
Last Docket Entry:
10/01/2004
Location:
Tallahassee, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
Department of Transportation
Suffix:
RP
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (9):