03-003682RP
Florida Outdoor Advertising Association, Inc.; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala Outdoor; The Lamar Company, L.L.C.; And Viacom Outdoor, Inc., D/B/A National Advertising Company vs.
Department Of Transportation
Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Monday, February 16, 2004.
DOAH Final Order on Monday, February 16, 2004.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8FLORIDA OUTDOOR ADVERTISING )
12ASSOCIATION, INC.; CLEAR )
16CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC.; KOALA )
21OUTDOOR; THE LAMAR COMPANY, )
26L.L.C.; AND VIACOM OUTDOOR, )
31INC., d/b/a NATIONAL )
35ADVERTISING COMPANY, )
38)
39Petitioners, )
41)
42vs. ) Case No. 03 - 3682RP
49)
50DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )
54)
55)
56Respondent. )
58)
59FINAL ORDER
61Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this
71case on November 21, 2003, in Tallahassee, Florida, before the
81Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated
88Administrative Law Judge, Barbara J. Staros.
94APPEARANCES
95For Petitioners: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire
101Livingston & Riley, P.A.
105Post Office Box 2151
109Orlando, Florida 32802
112For Respondent: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire
118Department of Transportation
121Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58
127605 Suwannee Street
130Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458
135STATEMENT OF TH E ISSUE
140Whether proposed Rule 14 - 10.0052 is an invalid exercise
150of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section
157120.52(8), Florida Statutes, 1/ for the reasons described by
166Petitioners in their Petition.
170PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
172Petitioners, Florida O utdoor Advertising Association,
178Inc.; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala Outdoor; The Lamar
187Company, L.L.C.; and Viacom Outdoor, Inc., d/b/a National
195Advertising Company filed a Petition challenging proposed Rule
20314 - 10.0052 with the Division of Administrat ive Hearings on
214October 9, 2003, and it was assigned to the undersigned on
225October 13, 2003.
228A Notice of Hearing was issued on October 16, 2003,
238scheduling a formal hearing for November 12, 2003. On
247October 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a Motion for Leav e to File
259Amended Petition. The motion was granted and the case
268proceeded on Petitioners' Amended Petition. Also on October
27621, 2003, Petitioners filed an unopposed Motion for
284Continuance of Final Administrative Hearing. The motion was
292granted and the h earing was rescheduled for November 21, 2003.
303The parties filed a Joint Pre - Hearing Stipulation on November
31419, 2003.
316At hearing, Petitioners presented the testimony of Thomas
324G. Pelham, Joseph Howard Little, Richard V. Geeslin, and
333Katherine Oertel. P etitioners' Exhibits numbered 1 and 2 were
343admitted into evidence.
346Respondent presented the testimony of John Garner.
353Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1 through 7 were admitted into
362evidence. The parties offered Joint Exhibit 1 which was
371admitted into evi dence. Official recognition was taken of 23
381U.S.C. s. 131, 23 C.F.R. Subpart G, §§ 750.701 - 750.713,
392Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, an agreement dated January 27,
4011972, between the United States Department of Transportation
409and the State of Florida, an d Rule 9J - 5.003, Florida
421Administrative Code.
423A Transcript consisting of one volume was filed on
432December 15, 2003. On December 30, 2003, Petitioners filed an
442Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to file Petitioners'
451Proposed Final Order. The motion wa s granted and the parties
462timely filed Proposed Final Orders which have been considered
471in the preparation of this Final Order.
478FINDINGS OF FACT
481Stipulated Facts
4831. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a rule
494development workshop on May 20, 2002 , at 10:00 a.m. at the
505Haydon Burns Building, 605 Suwannee Street, Tallahassee,
512Florida.
5132. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a public
524hearing on December 18, 2002, at the same location.
5333. The proposed rule was the subject matter of anothe r
544public hearing held on April 3, 2003, at the same location.
5554. The proposed rule was the subject matter of a
565publication under Section III of the Florida Administrative
573Weekly on September 19, 2003, wherein the rule was published
583in its final propos ed form.
5895. Petitioner Florida Outdoor Advertising Association is
596a trade association comprised of billboard companies operating
604within the State of Florida who (i) are engaged in the
"615business of outdoor advertising" as that term is defined in
625Chapter 4 79, Florida Statutes; (ii) are licensed as outdoor
635advertising companies pursuant to the provisions of Chapter
643479, Florida Statutes; (iii) are directly regulated by the
652provisions of Chapter 14 - 10, Florida Administrative Code; and
662(iv) are companies whose substantial interests will be
670affected by the proposed rule.
6756. Petitioners Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.; Koala
682Outdoor; The Lamar Company, L.L.C.; and Viacom Outdoor, Inc.,
691d/b/a National Advertising Company are billboard companies who
699(i) are engaged in the "business of outdoor advertising" as
709that term is defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes; (ii)
719are licensed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 479,
728Florida Statutes; (iii) are directly regulated by Chapter 14 -
73810, Florida Administrative Code; a nd (iv) are parties whose
748substantial interests will be affected by the proposed rule.
7577. The State of Florida, Department of Transportation
765(hereinafter "the Department"), is the state agency
773responsible for adopting the proposed rule.
7798. Petitioners are all qualified to do business within
788the State of Florida, are Florida taxpayers, and have
797participated in the entire rule adoption process, as set forth
807above, either directly or by and through their authorized
816representatives, agents, or attorneys.
8209 . The Petition filed on behalf of Petitioners was
830timely filed pursuant to the provisions of Section
838120.56(2)(a), Florida Statutes.
84110. The text of the proposed rule as published in its
852final form in the Florida Administrative Weekly on September
86119, 2003, is as follows:
86614 - 10.0052 Comprehensively Enacted Zoning
872and Zoning Enacted Primarily to Permit
878Signs.
879(1) 'Comprehensively Enacted Zoning' means
884ordinances or other laws adopted by the
891county or municipal government with
896authority over the develop ment and use of a
905parcel of land, pertaining to and
911designating the currently allowable uses on
917the parcel, pursuant to and consistent with
924a comprehensive plan enacted in accordance
930with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The
936term does not include actions ta ken
943primarily to permit signs as defined in
950section (3) of this rule.
955(2) For the purposes of this rule,
962'parcel' shall mean all the contiguous
968lands under the same ownership and the same
976land use designation adopted pursuant to
982Chapter 163, Florida Stat utes.
987(3) The Department shall consider the
993following criteria when determining whether
998commercial or industrial zoning applicable
1003to a parcel of land was adopted primarily
1011to permit the erection or maintenance of
1018signs:
1019(a) Whether the uses allowed b y the
1027applicable zoning ordinance or law include
1033commercial or industrial uses in addition
1039to signs. The following uses are not
1046recognized as commercial or industrial use
1052for the purpose of these criteria:
10581. Agricultural, forestry, ranching,
1062grazing, farming, or related activities,
1067including wayside fresh produce stands.
1072ansient or temporary activities.
10763. Railroad tracks and minor sidings.
10824. Communication towers.
10855. Electric transmission, telephone,
1089telegraph, or other communication s services
1095lines.
10966. Ditches, sewers, water, heat, or gas
1103lines.
11047. Pipelines, tanks, or pumps.
11098. Fences.
11119. Drainage ponds or water retention
1117facilities.
111810. Canals.
112011. Roads.
112212. Signs.
1124(b) Whether the size of the parcel would
1132be sufficient to conduct the commercial or
1139industrial uses allowed on the parcel under
1146the applicable county or municipal
1151government building and development code
1156requirements for commercial or industrial
1161activities, including setback requirements,
1165parcel si ze and dimension requirements, and
1172parking requirements.
1174(c) Whether the parcel is located
1180contiguous to other properties zoned or
1186used for commercial or industrial
1191activities.
1192(d) Whether there is public access to the
1200parcel sufficient to conduct the commercial
1206or industrial uses allowed on the parcel.
1213(e) Whether the public statements and
1219materials published in connection with any
1225zoning decision affecting the parcel,
1230including all public records pertaining to
1236the zoning decision, indicate the zonin g
1243decision was taken primarily to permit the
1250erection or maintenance of signs.
1255Specific authority 334.044(2), 479.07(10)
1259FS. History - New.
1263Facts Based Upon the Evidence of Record
1270History of the Rule
127411. The Department is the state agency responsib le for
1284administering state and federal law governing the placement of
1293outdoor advertising signs along the highways of the state.
1302DOT is charged with enforcing Chapter 479, Florida Statutes,
1311in concert with federal law and regulations, as well as an
1322agreem ent between the State of Florida and the United States
1333Department of Transportation referenced more specifically
1339below.
134012. On January 27, 1972, the State of Florida and the
1351United States Department of Transportation entered into an
1359agreement (the agreeme nt) for carrying out the federal law
1369known as the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (the Act).
137913. The Act, which is codified at 23 U.S.C. section 131,
1390requires states to achieve and exercise effective control of
1399outdoor advertising in areas adjacent t o the Interstate
1408highways and the federal - aid primary highway systems. The
1418predominant focus of the Act is that signs located within a
1429certain distance of Interstate and federal - aid highways should
1439be located in areas that are commercial or industrial in
1449nature. Failure to maintain such effective control may result
1458in an annual penalty of ten percent of the federal highway
1469funds apportioned to the state.
147414. There was a major rewrite of Florida law relating to
1485outdoor advertising in 1984 in an effort to come under
1495compliance with the agreement as well as with federal law and
1506regulations.
150715. As part of that legislative undertaking, the
1515language of Subsection (10) of Section 479.07(10) was enacted.
1524Section 7, Chapter 84 - 227, Laws of Florida. The languag e of
1537that subsection, which is referenced in the publication of the
1547proposed rule as the law implemented, has not changed since
1557its enactment in 1984. The last sentence of the subsection
1567requires the Department to adopt rules within 180 days after
1577the eff ective date of act, "which shall provide criteria to
1588determine whether such zoning is comprehensively enacted or
1596enacted primarily to permit signs."
160116. In response to this Legislative mandate, the
1609Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10 .0051
1619in 1986. That rule was entitled, "Zoned and Unzoned
1628Commercial and Industrial Areas along Interstate and Federal -
1637Aid Primary Highways."
164017. Florida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0051 was the
1650last effective rule on the subject matter of the propo sed rule
1662until its repeal in approximately 2000. The Department
1670describes the repeal of the rule as "inadvertent."
167818. John Garner is the manager of production and program
1688operations for the Office of Right - of - Way for the Department.
1701His duties inclu de policy - level involvement regarding outdoor
1711advertising. According to Mr. Garner, the Department chose
1719not to simply re - adopt its previous rule on the subject
1731because it believed the old language was somewhat vague and
1741should be more specific. The Depa rtment began working on the
1752proposed rule which is the subject matter of this dispute in
1763late 2000 or in 2001. Mr. Garner attended numerous meetings
1773wherein the text of the rule was discussed and participated at
1784one of public hearings on the proposed rule .
179319. Through the rule development process, the initial
1801proposed language was significantly modified to address
1808comments and concerns raised by Petitioners and others.
1816During the process of developing the proposed rule, the
1825Department considered a number of matters, including the
1833comments received during the rule workshops, guidance and
1841comment it has received over time from the Federal Highway
1851Administration concerning federal regulations, information
1856received from the Department of Community Affairs, an d an
1866examination of approaches taken by other states in addressing
1875similar matters.
1877Other statutory considerations
1880Chapter 163
188220. A year after the enactment of Section 479.07(10),
1891the 1985 Florida Legislature enacted the Local Government
1899Comprehensive P lanning and Land Development Regulation Act.
1907This legislation substantially revised and expanded Part II of
1916Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1985), regarding growth
1923management.
192421. That legislation mandated a comprehensive planning
1931process requiring each local government in the state to plan
1941comprehensively for growth and development. Each local
1948government is required to prepare a comprehensive plan which
1957will govern land use in the jurisdiction. A part of that
1968comprehensive plan is a future land use ma p which designates
1979all property within a jurisdiction for a use consistent with
1989future land use categories that are provided for in the
1999comprehensive plan, e.g., commercial or residential. The
2006future land use map must be consistent with the other parts of
2018the comprehensive plan.
202122. After a comprehensive plan has been adopted for a
2031jurisdiction, the local government must implement that plan
2039through the adoption of land development regulations,
2046including zoning. Any such regulations must be consistent
2054wit h the comprehensive land use plan so that there is a
2066comprehensive system of planning, regulation, and zoning.
207323. It is common practice in this state to include
2083within the implementing regulations a comprehensive zoning
2090ordinance which is then applied to all of the property within
2101the jurisdiction resulting in a zoning map showing zoning
2110districts. A zoning ordinance would list currently
2117permissible uses in the zoning districts.
212324. Comprehensive plans are subject to amendment not
2131more than twice a ye ar. Zoning regulations may also be
2142modified or amended by local governments, but must remain
2151consistent with the comprehensive plan.
215625. There are a few jurisdictions in Florida which have
2166land development regulations but do not have zoning ordinances
2175in place.
217726. The Department deems land use control actions taken
2186pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, to be zoning that
2196is comprehensively enacted for the purposes of Chapter 479,
2205Florida Statutes.
2207Sign Permits
220927. Section 479.07, Florida Statut es, generally requires
2217the issuance of a sign permit by the Department before the
2228erection of signs along state highways, the federal aid
2237primary system, and the Interstate highway system. This
2245section also authorizes the Department to prescribe an
2253applic ation form for such permits.
225928. The application form for an outdoor advertising
2267permit contains information about what is proposed to be
2276constructed and where an applicant proposes that it be
2285constructed.
228629. The application also contains a section t hat reads,
"2296To be completed by appropriate zoning official." This
2304section contains information on the future land use
2312designation and current zoning of the proposed location under
2321the local government's comprehensive plan and land development
2329regulations. The form also contains a section entitled,
"2337Local Governmental Permission" in which a local government
2345official indicates whether or not the outdoor advertising sign
2354identified in the application is or is not in compliance with
2365all duly adopted local ord inances.
237130. Once the local government zoning official certifies
2379that the proposed sign identified in the application is in
2389compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to
2397Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that
2406certification to loo k factually at whether the zoning action
2416was consistent with the comprehensive plan.
242231. The Department uses the application and the
2430information contained therein to determine whether a proposed
2438sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial o r
2449industrial zone." If it does, then the Department determines
2458whether those designations were adopted as part of the local
2468government's comprehensive planning effort or were primarily
2475adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location.
2484The Dep artment examines the intent surrounding a particular
2493zoning decision on a case - by - case basis.
2503CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
250632. The Division of Administrative Hearings has
2513jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this
2522proceeding pursua nt to Section 120.56(1) and (2), Florida
2531Statutes.
253233. Petitioners have standing to challenge the proposed
2540rule which is the subject of this dispute.
254834. The Department is the state agency responsible for
2557administering state and federal law governing t he placement of
2567outdoor advertising signs along the highways of the state.
2576Ch. 479, Fla. Stat.
2580Rule Challenge Analysis
258335. In a challenge to a proposed rule, the party
2593attacking the proposed rule has the burden of going forward.
2603The agency then has the burden to prove by a preponderance of
2615the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise
2626of delegated legislative authority as to the objections
2634raised. The proposed rule is not presumed to be valid or
2645invalid. § 120.56(2)(a) and (c), Fl a. Stat.
265336. The Amended Petition challenging proposed Rule 14 -
266210.0052 alleges that the proposed rule constitutes an invalid
2671exercise of delegated authority. Petitioners assert that the
2679proposed rule violates subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of
2689Secti on 120.52(8) in that it exceeds the Department's
2698rulemaking authority; enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the
2705specific provisions of law implemented; is vague, fails to
2714establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests
2722unbridled discretion in the agency; and is arbitrary. 2/
273137. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, reads in
2738pertinent part as follows:
2742(8) 'Invalid exercise of delegated
2747legislative authority' means action which
2752goes beyond the powers, functions, and
2758duties delegated by the Legisl ature. A
2765proposed or existing rule is an invalid
2772exercise of delegated legislative authority
2777if any one of the following applies:
2784* * *
2787(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of
2795rulemaking authority, citation to which is
2801required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;
2805(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or
2811contravenes the specific provisions of law
2817implemented, citation to which is required
2823by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;
2826(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish
2834adequate standards for agency decisions, or
2840vests unbridled discretion in the agency;
2846(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.
2853A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported
2862by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is
2871capricious if it is adopted without thought
2878or reason or is irrational . . . .
2887Secti on 120.52(8)(b) and (c)
289238. "The authority to adopt an administrative rule must
2901be based on an explicit power or duty identified in the
2912enabling statute . . . [T]he authority for an administrative
2922rule is not a matter of degree. The question is whether the
2934statute contains a specific grant of legislative authority for
2943the rule, not whether the grant of authority is specific
2953enough ." (Emphasis in original) Florida Board of Medicine v.
2963Fla. Academy of Cosmetic Surgery , 808 So. 2d 243, 253, quoting
2974Southw est Florida Water Management District v. Save the
2983Manatee Club, Inc. , 773 So. 2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
299539. In this instance, the Department's grant of
3003rulemaking authority is found in Section 479.07(10), Florida
3011Statutes, which reads as follows :
3017479.07 Sign permits. --
3021(10) Commercially or industrial zoning
3026which is not comprehensively enacted or
3032which is enacted primarily to permit signs
3039shall not be recognized as commercial or
3046industrial zoning for purposes of this
3052provision, and permits shall be issued for
3059signs in such areas. The department shall
3066adopt rules within 180 days after this act
3074takes effect which shall provide criteria
3080to determine whether such zoning is
3086comprehensively enacted or enacted
3090primarily to permit signs.
309440. Pet itioners argue that the 180 - day reference in
3105Section 479.07(10) must be strictly construed and that the
3114Department is not legislatively mandated, obligated, or
3121authorized to enact an administrative rule in 2003 that
"3130should have been enacted in 1984."
313641. Petitioners' argument in that regard is rejected.
3144Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, gives the Department
3151clear rulemaking authority regarding the establishment of
3158criteria to determine whether commercial or industrial zoning
3166is comprehensively enact ed or enacted primarily to permit
3175signs. Moreover, the legislature has made it abundantly clear
3184that rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion and must
3195be done as soon as feasible and practicable. § 120.54(1)(a),
3205Fla. Stat. Petitioners cannot succ essfully argue that the
3214Department's obligation and authority to adopt criteria
3221expired 180 days after the effective date of the law.
323142. Petitioners further argue that Section 479.07(10)
3238was "pre - empted and rendered moot by the subsequently enacted
3249amen dment to section 479.01(3), Florida Statutes (1999),"
3257which defines commercial or industrial zone. 3/ Section 479.01,
3266Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part as follows:
3274(3) 'Commercial or industrial zone' means
3280a parcel of land designated for commercia l
3288or industrial use under both the future
3295land use map of the comprehensive plan and
3303the land use development regulations
3308adopted pursuant to chapter 163. If a
3315parcel is located in an area designated for
3323multiple uses on the future land use map of
3332a compr ehensive plan and the land
3339development regulations do not clearly
3344designate that parcel for a specific use,
3351the area will be considered an unzoned
3358commercial or industrial area if it meets
3365the criteria of subsection (23).
3370* * *
3373(23) 'Unzoned commercial or industrial
3378area' means a parcel of land designated by
3386the future land use map of the
3393comprehensive plan for multiple uses that
3399include commercial or industrial uses but
3405are not specifically designated for
3410commercial or industrial uses under the
3416land dev elopment regulations, in which
3422three or more separate and distinct
3428conforming industrial or commercial
3432activities are located.
3435(a) These activities must satisfy the
3441following criteria:
34431. At least one of the commercial or
3451industrial activities must b e located on
3458the same side of the highway and within 800
3467feet of the sign location;
34722. The commercial or industrial activities
3478must be within 660 feet from the nearest
3486edge of the right - of - way; and
34953. The commercial [sic] industrial
3500activities must b e within 1,600 feet of
3509each other.
3511Distances specified in this paragraph must
3517be measured from the nearest outer edge of
3525the primary building or primary building
3531complex when the individual units of the
3538complex are connected by covered walkways.
3544(b) Certain activities, including, but not
3550limited to, the following, may not be so
3558recognized as commercial or industrial
3563activities:
35641. Signs.
35662. Agricultural, forestry, ranching,
3570grazing, farming, and related activities,
3575including, but not limited to , wayside
3581fresh produce stands.
35843. Transient or temporary activities.
35894. Activities not visible from the main -
3597traveled way.
35995. Activities conducted more than 660 feet
3606from the nearest edge of the right - of - way.
36176. Activities conducted in a buil ding
3624principally used as a residence.
36297. Railroad tracks and minor sidings.
36358. Communication towers.
363843. Prior to 1999, subsection (3) of Section 479.01,
3647Florida Statutes, read as follows:
3652'Commercial or ind ustrial zone' means an
3659area within 660 feet of the nearest edge of
3668the right - of - way of the interstate or
3678federal - aid primary system designated
3684predominately for commercial or industrial
3689use under the future land use map of the
3698comprehensive plan adopted pu rsuant to
3704chapter 163. Where a local governmental
3710entity has not enacted a comprehensive plan
3717by local ordinance but has zoning
3723regulations governing the area, the zoning
3729of an area shall determine whether the area
3737is designated predominately for commerci al
3743or industrial uses.
374644. The current language of section 479.01(3) has not
3755changed since the 1999 amendment by Chapter 99 - 385, Laws of
3767Florida. Section 38 of Chapter 99 - 385, Laws of Florida, also
3779amended Section 479.07. By amending certain subsection s of
3788Section 479.07 but not subsection (10), the 1999 Florida
3797Legislature reenacted the language in subsection (10).
380445. Moreover, the two statutory provisions can be read
3813in harmony. Section 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, defines a
3821commercial or industr ial zone in which signs may be located.
3832Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, prohibits issuing
3838permits for signs in such zones if the commercial or
3848industrial zoning was not comprehensively enacted or was
3856enacted primarily to permit signs.
386146. Petitio ners further argue that the rulemaking
3869authority found in Section 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, has
3877been, in effect, pre - empted by the enactment of Chapter 163,
3889Florida Statutes. However, Section 163.3211, Florida
3895Statutes, reads in pertinent part as foll ows:
3903163.3211 Conflict with other statutes. --
3909. . . Nothing in this act is intended to
3919withdraw or diminish any legal powers or
3926responsibilities of state agencies or
3931change any requirement of existing law that
3938local regulations comply with state
3943stan dards or rules. (emphasis supplied)
394947. Petitioners' arguments regarding preemption by later
3956legislative enactment are unpersuasive. Courts will disfavor
3963construing a statute as repealed by implication unless that is
3973the only reasonable construction. Jones v. State , 813 So. 2d
398322 (Fla. 2002). Implied repeals of statutes are not favored
3993by the courts and will not be upheld in doubtful cases. Flo -
4006Sun, Inc. v. Kirk , 783 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2001).
401648. Further, Petitione rs argue that the definition of
4025the word "parcel" in paragraph (2) of the proposed rule
4035conflicts with Section 163.3164(16), Florida Statutes, which
4042reads in pertinent part as follows:
4048Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
4053Land Development Regulatio n Act:
4058definitions. -- As used in this act :
4066(16) 'Parcel of Land ' means any quantity
4074of land capable of being described with
4081such definiteness that its locations and
4087boundaries may be established, which is
4093designated by its owner or developer as
4100land to be used, or developed as, a unit or
4110which has been used or developed as a unit.
4119(emphasis supplied)
412149. The definition of the word "parcel" selected by the
4131Department is expressly limited to the term as it is used in
4143the proposed rule. Moreover, the de finition of parcel found
4153in Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, will have been employed by
4163the local government in determining its comprehensive plan and
4172regulations. It is the result of those determinations that
4181the Department examines within the context of i ts
4190responsibilities under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
419650. Petitioners further argue that paragraphs (3)(b) and
4204(c) and the definition of "parcel" in subsection (2) of the
4215proposed rule are in conflict with the provisions of Section
4225479.01(3), Flor ida Statutes. The evidence presented does not
4234establish that paragraphs (b), (c) or the definition of
"4243parcel" in the proposed rule is in conflict with Section
4253479.01(3), Florida Statutes.
425651. Based upon the statutory authority outlined above,
4264the Dep artment has not exceeded its grant of rulemaking
4274authority and the challenged proposed rule does not enlarge,
4283modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law
4291implemented as contemplated by Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c),
4299Florida Statutes.
4301Section 120. 52(8)(d)
430452. Petitioners argue that subsection (3) of the
4312proposed rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards
4321for agency decisions, and vests unbridled discretion in the
4330agency.
433153. Petitioners contend that subsection (3) of the
4339proposed rule does not provide criteria for determining when
4348zoning is enacted primarily to permit signs. Criteria are
4357commonly understood to be standards, rules, or tests upon
4366which a judgment or decision can be based. American
4375Collegiate Heritage Dictionary 328 (3r d ed. 1997). The
4384factors listed in subsection (3) of the proposed rule are
4394criteria in this commonly understood sense. Petitioners
4401assert that the criteria allow for differing application on a
4411case by case basis. Petitioners also contend that the
4420criter ia set out in subsection (3) are vague, fail to
4431establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and vest
4439unbridled discretion in the Department.
444454. An administrative rule is invalid if the rule
4453requires the performance of an act in terms that are so vague
4465that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning.
4475Southwest Florida Water Management District v. Charlotte
4482County , 774 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001), citing Donato v.
4494American Telephone & Telegraph , 767 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2000).
450455. T he Department has defined the term "parcel" for
4514purposes of the rule. Petitioners argue that the terms
"4523contiguous" and "public access" found in subsections (c) and
4532(d) are not clearly defined. These terms as used in
4542subsection (3) have common and ordina ry meanings. The fact
4552that the rule does not provide finite criteria does not mean
4563that the rule provisions are vague. Persons of common
4572intelligence can understand the list of criteria that the
4581Department will consider in deciding whether zoning was
4589pri marily enacted to permit signs.
459556. The question that the Department is required to
4604answer necessitates that it look at a set of facts that will
4616be particular to each zoning action. The proposed rule spells
4626out exactly what the Department will consider as relevant to
4636its decision.
463857. The rule does not create any discretion not
4647articulated in the statute. Section 479.07(10), Florida
4654Statutes, creates the discretion the Department will exercise
4662through the rule. A rule is not invalid merely becaus e the
4674underlying statute confers discretion on the agency. See
4682Florida Public Service Commission v. Florida Waterworks
4689Association , 731 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The
4700rule provides standards by which the Department's discretion
4708will be exercise d. Any decision by the Department that zoning
4719was enacted primarily to permit signs would have to be tied
4730into the rule criteria, and would be capable of review on that
4742basis. See generally Cortes v. State Bd. Of Regents , 665
4752So. 2d 132, 138, 140 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1995).
476258. The proposed rule implements the discretion given to
4771the Department by the Legislature. "The Legislature itself is
4780hardly suited to anticipate the endless variety of situations
4789that may occur or to rigidly prescribe the conditions or
4799so lutions to the often fact - specific situations that arise . . .
4813." Avatar Development Corp. v. State , 723 So. 2d 199 (Fla.
48241999).
4825Section 120.52(8)(e)
482759. Finally, the Amended Petition alleges that
4834subsection (3)(a) of the proposed rule is arbitrary. 4/
4843P etitioners contend that the list of excluded uses
4852inappropriately tracks the list of excluded uses that appear
4861in the statutory use test created by Sections 479.01(3) and
4871(23), which are set forth above. Petitioners argue that the
4881use test in subsection ( 23) no longer is viable because of the
48941999 amendment to the definition of "commercial or industrial
4903zone" in subsection (3).
490760. The list of excluded uses substantially tracks the
4916list of uses under the statutory test for an "unzoned
4926commercial or indu strial area." § 479.01(23), Fla. Stat. The
4936statute in turn tracks the list of uses excluded from the
4947similar use test in the 1972 agreement between the State of
4958Florida and the United States Department of Transportation.
4966The Department's decision to exc lude these uses from its rule
4977inquiry follows the same logic found in statute and policy.
498761. A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by logic
4999or the necessary facts. § 120.52(8)(e), Fla. Stat. The
5008proposed rule is supported by facts and logic.
501662. Based upon the evidence presented and the statutory
5025authority outlined above, the Department has not exceeded its
5034grant of rulemaking authority; the proposed rule does not
5043enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law
5052implemented; the propo sed rule is not vague, does not fail to
5064establish adequate standards for agency decisions, and does
5072not vest unbridled discretion in the agency; and the proposed
5082rule is not arbitrary.
5086ORDER
5087Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
5096o f Law, it is
5101ORDERED:
5102The Amended Petition challenging proposed Rule 14 - 10.0052
5111is denied.
5113DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in
5123Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
5127S
5128___________________________________
5129BARBARA J. STAR OS
5133Administrative Law Judge
5136Division of Administrative Hearings
5140The DeSoto Building
51431230 Apalachee Parkway
5146Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
5151(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675
5159Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
5165www.doah.state.fl.us
5166Filed with the Clerk of the
5172Divisio n of Administrative Hearings
5177this 16th day of February, 2004.
5183ENDNOTES
51841/ All references to Fla. Stat. will be to Florida Statutes
51952003, unless otherwise indicated.
51992/ Petitioners' Proposed Final Order also asserts that the
5208proposed rule is not su pported by competent substantial
5217evidence. However, this language, which was found in Section
5226120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2002), was repealed by Section
52341, Chapter 2003 - 94, Laws of Florida, and became effective June
52464, 2003. Accordingly, that argume nt will not be addressed in
5257this Final Order. Additionally, Petitioners assert in the
5265Proposed Final Order that the proposed rule will make the
5275permitting process more expensive, complex, and time
5282consuming. The Amended Petition did not allege any violat ion
5292of Section 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), and,
5299therefore, that argument will not be addressed in this Final
5309Order.
53103/ The "preemption" arguments are construed to be a challenge
5320under Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.
53254/ Petitioners' Proposed Final Order argues that the
5333definition of "parcel" is "contrary to state law and is done
5344without logic, thought or reason." However, the Amended
5352Petition did not allege that the definition of parcel is
5362arbitrary or capricious, but that it is cont rary to or in
5374conflict with certain laws. That argument is addressed under
5383the analysis of Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c) herein.
5391COPIES FURNISHED :
5394Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire
5398Livingston & Riley P.A.
5402Post Office Box 2151
5406Orlando, Florida 32802
5409Robert M. Burdick, Esquire
5413Assistant General Counsel
5416Department of Transportation
5419Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58
5425605 Suwannee Street
5428Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458
5433Liz Cloud, Chief
5436Bureau of Administrative Code
5440Department of State
5443The Elliott Building , Room 201
5448Tallahassee, Florida 32399
5451Scott Boyd, Acting Executive Director
5456and General Counsel
5459Administrative Procedures Committee
5462Holland Building, Room 120
5466Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300
5471NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
5477A party who is adver sely affected by this Final Order is
5489entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68,
5497Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the
5505Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are
5513commenced by filing the original notice of ap peal with the
5524Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy,
5534accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the
5543District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District
5553Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party
5563resid es. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of
5576rendition of the order to be reviewed.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 07/26/2004
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appeal dismissed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350(b).
- PDF:
- Date: 05/28/2004
- Proceedings: Index, Record, and Certificate of Record sent to the District Court of Appeal.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/07/2004
- Proceedings: Statement of Service and Preparation of Record mailed to filing party.
- PDF:
- Date: 03/12/2004
- Proceedings: Letter to Ann Cole from J. Wheeler enclosing Docketing Statement filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 03/11/2004
- Proceedings: Notice of Appeal of Final Administrative Order filed; Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal of Final Administrative Order sent to the First DCA.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/30/2003
- Proceedings: Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to file Petitioners` Proposed Final Order (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
- Date: 12/15/2003
- Proceedings: Transcript filed.
- Date: 11/21/2003
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 11/04/2003
- Proceedings: Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum (J. Garner) filed via facsimile.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/31/2003
- Proceedings: Order. (Petitioners` Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition is granted).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/22/2003
- Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for November 21, 2003; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/21/2003
- Proceedings: Response to Motion for Continuance (filed by Respondent via facsimile).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/21/2003
- Proceedings: Motion for Continuance of Final Administrative Hearing (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/21/2003
- Proceedings: Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition (filed by G. Livingston via facsimile).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/16/2003
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for November 12, 2003; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
Case Information
- Judge:
- BARBARA J. STAROS
- Date Filed:
- 10/09/2003
- Date Assignment:
- 10/13/2003
- Last Docket Entry:
- 10/01/2004
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- Department of Transportation
- Suffix:
- RP
Counsels
-
Robert M. Burdick, Esquire
Address of Record -
Gerald S Livingston, Esquire
Address of Record