04-000045PL Department Of Health, Board Of Denistry vs. Jack Saban, D.D.S. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, January 31, 2005.

Summary: Violations of paragraphs (m) and (x) of Florida Statutes 466.028(1) warrants administrative fine, probation, and additional education course.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF )

DENTISTRY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 04 - 0045PL

)

JACK SABAN, D.D.S., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

before Administrative Law Judge Michael M. Parrish of the

Division of Administrative Hearings. The first session of the

final hearing was held on May 18, 2004, by means of a video

teleconference between sites in Tallahassee and Fort Lauderdale,

Florida. The second, and last, session of the final hearing was

held on October 19, 2004, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Deirdre A. Farrington, Esquire

Department of Heal th

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265

For Respondent: Max R. Price, Esquire

Law Offices of Max R. Price, P.A.

6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 104

Miami, Florida 33143

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner

seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent, a

licensed dentist, on the basis of alleged violations of

paragraphs (m) and (x) of Section 466.028(1), Florida Statutes.

The alleged violations are set fort h in a two - count Amended

Administrative Complaint.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The alleged violation of paragraph (m) is based on

allegations that the Respondent's records of his treatment of

Patient A.S. are deficient in several particulars, primarily by

reason of failure to include required information in the

records. The alleged violation of paragraph (x) is based on

allegations that the Respondent is guilty of incompetence or

negligence by reason of his alleged failure to meet the minimum

standards of perfor mance in diagnosis and treatment when he was

treating Patient A.S.

The violations alleged in the Amended Administrative

Complaint were disputed by Respondent, and he requested an

evidentiary hearing. In due course, the case was forwarded to

the Division o f Administrative Hearings to conduct an

evidentiary hearing.

At the final hearing on May 18 and on October 19, 2004, the

Petitioner presented the live testimony of two expert witnesses.

The Petitioner also offered 18 exhibits. Petitioner's

Exhibits 1 th rough 16 were received in evidence. Petitioner's

Exhibits 17 and 18 were rejected.

Respondent testified on his own behalf and also presented

the live testimony of one expert witness. The Respondent also

offered four numbered exhibits, all of which were received in

evidence. 1

Further, during the course of the final hearing requests

were made for official recognition of specified documents, which

requests were granted.

The transcript of the second session of the final hearing

was filed with the Division o f Administrative Hearings on

November 3, 2004. The parties requested, and were allowed,

30 days from the date of the filing of the transcript within

which to file their proposed recommended orders. Both parties

filed timely Proposed Recommended Orders co ntaining proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The post - hearing

submissions of the parties have been carefully considered during

the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Stipulated facts 2

1. The Respondent, Jack Saban, D. D.S., is now, and was at

all material times, licensed as a dentist in the State of

Florida, having been issued license number DN 8257. The

Respondent's address of record is 150 North University Drive,

Suite 100, Plantation, Florida. The Respondent is not board -

certified in any specialty.

2. The Respondent provided dental care to Patient A.S.

from April 3, 2000, to August 6, 2001. On or about June 14,

2001, Patient A.S., then a 41 - year - old female, presented to

Respondent for emergency treatment of severe pain in her tooth

number 31, a lower right molar. On or about June 14, 2001, the

Respondent began root canal therapy on Patient A.S.'s tooth

number 31.

3. The Respondent was able to treat the distal canal of

Patient A.S.'s tooth number 31, but he could not enter the

mesial canals of that tooth and he referred Patient A.S. to a

specialist.

4. On or about June 22, 2001, Patient A.S. returned to the

Respondent for treatment, and the Respondent again attempted to

enter the mesial canals by drilling on Patie nt A.S.'s tooth

number 31.

Facts based on evidence at the final hearing

5. On June 14, 2001, Patient A.S. presented to the

Respondent's office experiencing severe pain in a lower right

molar, tooth number 31. On that date the Respondent began root

canal therapy on tooth number 31. The Respondent was able to

treat the distal canal of tooth number 31, but he could not

enter the two mesial canals. The Respondent's drilling produced

bleeding, which he noted as "mesio - lingual canal pulpitis." The

Responden t believed that the subject tooth was hypercalcified;

that is, that it contained excess dental tissue that closed off

the root canals. During the treatment session on June 14, 2001,

the Respondent sealed tooth number 31 with a temporary filling.

Because of the secondary and tertiary reparative dentin which

resulted from previous treatment of Patient A.S.'s tooth number

31, the Respondent believed the required endodontics were beyond

his skill. 3 Accordingly, the Respondent referred Patient A.S. to

a spec ialist in endodontics.

6. On June 15, 2001, Patient A.S. presented at the office

of the endodontist (Dr. Green) to whom the Respondent had

referred her, but she did not see Dr. Green. Later that same

day, Patient A.S. presented to another endodontist, D r. Kaplan.

On that occasion, Dr. Kaplan performed a clinical examination

and made an x - ray of the subject tooth. On the basis of the

examination and the x - ray, Dr. Kaplan concluded that the floor

of the pulp chamber of Patient A.S.'s tooth number 31 was very

thin and was perhaps even perforated. Dr. Kaplan discussed his

conclusions with Patient A.S. and discussed treatment

possibilities with her, but Dr. Kaplan did not perform any

treatment.

7. On June 18, 2001, the Respondent spoke with Dr. Kaplan.

D r. Kaplan told him that Patient A.S.'s tooth number 31 was near

perforation or was perforated, and that the patient had chosen

not to be treated by Dr. Kaplan.

8. On June 22, 2001, Patient A.S. returned to the

Respondent's office with her husband and req uested that the

Respondent treat her tooth number 31. With Patient A.S.'s

husband present, the Respondent discussed the treatment options

which had previously been explained to the patient by

Dr. Kaplan, and also reviewed the risks associated with

treatme nt of the subject tooth. Patient A.S. and her husband

insisted that the Respondent complete the root canal therapy on

tooth number 31. Against his better judgment, the Respondent

yielded to their requests and embarked upon further endodontic

treatment of the subject tooth. During the Respondent's attempt

to access the hypercalcified mesial canals, a perforation

occurred in the furcation area. 4 The Respondent again urged

Patient A.S. and her husband to seek endodontic treatment of her

tooth number 31 fro m an endodontic specialist.

9. Instead of seeking treatment by an endodontic

specialist, Patient A.S. returned to the Respondent's office on

June 29, 2001, and again implored him to continue treating the

subject tooth. On June 29, 2001, the distal canal was sealed,

but entry into the mesial canals was not possible.

10. On July 13, 2001, Patient A.S. again presented at the

Respondent's office, and again he attempted to treat her tooth

number 31. On that date, one last unsuccessful effort was made

to en ter the mesial canals. Each time Patient A.S. requested

that the Respondent treat her tooth number 31, the Respondent

recommended that she seek treatment from an endodontic

specialist.

11. The Respondent did not at any time advise Patient A.S.

that he h ad perforated her tooth number 31. The Respondent's

records of his treatment of Patient A.S. do not contain any

mention of a perforation of the subject tooth prior to the

notations on August 6, 2001, regarding the Respondent's

conversation with Dr. Baker in which Dr. Baker told the

Respondent that Patient A.S.'s tooth number 31 was perforated.

12. When a dentist perforates a patient's tooth, the

dentist should promptly inform the patient of the perforation,

should promptly note in the treatment records t hat a perforation

occurred, and should promptly refer the patient to a specialist

to initiate reparative measures.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

General matters

13. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and

456.073(5), Florida Statutes.

14. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with

regulating the practice of dentistry pursuant to Section 20.43,

Florida Statutes, Chapter 456, Florida Sta tutes, and

Chapter 466, Florida Statutes.

15. Where the revocation or suspension of a dentist's

license is sought, proof greater than a mere preponderance of

the evidence must be submitted before the Board of Dentistry

(Board) may take punitive action aga inst a licensed dentist.

Clear and convincing evidence of the dentist's guilt is

required. § 458.331(3), Fla. Stat. See also Department of

Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor

Protection v. Osborne Stern and Company , 670 So. 2d 932, 935

(Fla. 1996); Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987);

McKinney v. Castor , 667 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995);

Tenbroeck v. Castor , 640 So. 2d 164, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994);

Nair v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 654

So . 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Pic N' Save v. Department

of Business Regulation , 601 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992);

Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation , 592 So. 2d 1136

(Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Newberry v. Florida Department of Law

Enforcement , 585 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Pascale v.

Department of Insurance , 525 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988);

§ 458.331(3), Fla. Stat.; § 120.57(1)(h), Fla. Stat. ("Findings

of fact shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence,

except in penal or licensu re disciplinary proceedings or except

as otherwise provided by statute.")

16. "'[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the

evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the

witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony

must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking

in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of

such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.'" In re Davey , 645

So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994), quoting, with approval, from

Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

17. When the Board seeks to take punitive action against a

dentist, su ch action may be based only upon those offenses

specifically alleged in the administrative complaint. See

Cottrill v. Department of Insurance , 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.

1st DCA 1996); Chrysler v. Department of Professional

Regulation , 627 So. 2d 31 (Fla . 1st DCA 1993); Klein v.

Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 625 So. 2d

1237, 1238 - 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Arpayoglou v. Department of

Professional Regulation , 603 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992);

Willner v. Department of Professional Regulati on, Board of

Medicine , 563 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Celaya v.

Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine , 560

So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Kinney v. Department of

State , 501 So. 2d 129, 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Sternberg v.

Department of Professional Regulation , 465 So. 2d 1324, 1325

(Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Hunter v. Department of Professional

Regulation , 458 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

18. Furthermore, in determining whether Section

466.028(1), Florida Statutes, has b een violated in the manner

charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, one "must bear

in mind that it is, in effect, a penal statute. . . . This

being true the statute must be strictly construed and no conduct

is to be regarded as included within it that is not reasonably

proscribed by it. Furthermore, if there are any ambiguities

included such must be construed in favor of the . . . licensee."

Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational

Regulations , 348 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) .

Fairly new legislation

19. By operation of legislation enacted during the 2003

session of the Florida Legislature, effective September 15,

2003, "[t]he determination of whether or not a licensee has

violated the laws and rules regulating the profession, including

a determination of the reasonable standard of care, is a

conclusion of law to be determined by the board . . . and is not

a finding of fact to be determined by an administrative law

judge." See Chapter 2003 - 416, Laws of Florida, at Section 20

( amending Section 456.073(5), Florida Statutes (2002)). There

does not yet appear to be any decisional guidance from any of

the Florida appellate courts, as to what extent, if any, the

above - quoted amendment requires any changes in the manner in

which hear ings before the Division of Administrative Hearings

should be conducted, or requires any changes in the content of

the recommended orders prepared by the DOAH administrative law

judges. By their conduct at hearing both parties seemed to be

of the view tha t the above - quoted statutory amendments did not

change the nature of the evidence to be offered in cases of this

nature, because both parties requested, and were granted, the

opportunity to offer expert witness testimony on the subject

matter of whether Re spondent "has violated the laws and rules

regulating the profession," as well as on the subject matter of

what constitutes the "reasonable standard of care."

20. The Proposed Recommended Orders submitted by the

parties do not suggest that the above - quoted statutory language

requires any changes to the nature of the content that has

customarily been included in recommended orders in cases of this

nature. Because the amendments appear to address matters of

procedure rather than matters of substance, the ame ndments

appear to be applicable to cases pending as of the effective

date of the law that created the amendments. 5 See Basel v.

McFarland & Sons, Inc. , 815 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), in

which the court noted at page 692: "In the absence of clear

leg islative intent, a law affecting substantive rights is

presumed to apply prospectively only while procedural or

remedial statutes are presumed to operate retrospectively. See

Young v. Altenhaus , 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1985)." See also Life

Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Sawgrass Care Center, Inc. , 683

So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

21. The language of the subject amendments to Section

456.073(5), Florida Statutes (2002), is sufficiently broad for

it to be interpreted and applied in more than one way. And some

of the possible interpretations and applications might at some

future date provide a basis for modification of the manner in

which administrative hearings in such cases are conducted. But

such possible interpretations and applications are merely

possibilities; they are not certainties. Therefore, unless and

until there is some authoritative interpretation or

implementation of the subject amendments directing otherwise,

the most prudent course appears to be for the DOAH

administrative law judges to continue to receive evidence and to

continue to make "determinations" (by findings of fact or by

conclusions of law) as to what constitutes the "reasonable

standard of care" and as to whether a licensee "has violated the

laws and rules regulating the pr ofession”; especially in cases

like this one in which both parties requested such a course of

action by the administrative law judge. 6

The specific statutes, rules, and charges

22. At the time of the events that form the basis for the

charges in this case , paragraphs (m) and (x) of Section

466.028(1), Florida Statutes, authorized the Board to revoke,

suspend, or otherwise discipline the license of a dentist for

reasons that included the following:

(m) Failing to keep written dental records

and medical his tory records justifying the

course of treatment of the patient

including, but not limited to, patient

histories, examination results, test

results, and X rays, if taken.

***

(x) Being guilty of incompetence or

negligence by failing to meet the minimum

sta ndards of performance in diagnosis and

treatment when measured against generally

prevailing peer performance, including, but

not limited to, the undertaking of diagnosis

and treatment for which the dentist is not

qualified by training or experience or bein g

guilty of dental malpractice. For purposes

of this paragraph, it shall be legally

presumed that a dentist is not guilty of

incompetence or negligence by declining to

treat an individual if, in the dentist's

professional judgment, the dentist or a

member of her or his clinical staff is not

qualified by training and experience, or the

dentist's treatment facility is not

clinically satisfactory or properly equipped

to treat the unique characteristics and

health status of the dental patient,

provided the den tist refers the patient to a

qualified dentist or facility for

appropriate treatment. As used in this

paragraph, "dental malpractice" includes,

but is not limited to, three or more claims

within the previous 5 - year period which

resulted in indemnity being paid, or any

single indemnity paid in excess of $25,000

in a judgment or settlement, as a result of

negligent conduct on the part of the

dentist.

23. Florida Administrative Rule 64B5 - 17.002(1) contains

the following pertinent language:

(1) For the pu rpose of implementing the

provisions of subsection 466.028(1)(m),

F.S., a dentist shall maintain written

records on each patient which written

records shall contain, at a minimum, the

following information about the patient:

(a) Appropriate medical hist ory;

(b) Results of clinical examination and

tests conducted, including the

identification, or lack thereof, of any oral

pathology or diseases;

(c) Any radiographs used for the diagnosis

or treatment of the patient;

(d) Treatment plan proposed by t he

dentist; and

(e) Treatment rendered to the patient.

24. Count One of the Amended Administrative Complaint

charges the Respondent with violation of Section 466.028(1)(m),

Florida Statutes, by reason of alleged failures in his record

keeping, which are described as follows in paragraphs 20, 21,

and 22 of the Amended Administrative Complaint:

20. Respondent failed to note in his

treatment records that he had perforated

Patient A.S.'s tooth no. 31.

21 Respondent failed to note in his

treatment r ecords for Patient A.S. any

treatment plan proposed for Patient A.S.'s

tooth no. 31.

22. Based on the foregoing, Respondent

has violated Section 466.028(1)(m), Florida

Statutes (2000), as further defined by Rule

64B5 - 17.002(d) and (e), Florida

Administ rative Code, by failing to keep

written dental records justifying the course

of treatment of the patient by failing to

note in his treatment records for Patient

A.S. the treatment plan proposed by the

dentist and treatment rendered to Patient

A.S.

25. It is clear that the Respondent "failed to note in his

treatment records that he had perforated Patient A.S.'s tooth

no. 31." Such a failure is a violation of Section

466.028(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as implemented and interpreted

in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B5 - 17.002.

26. With regard to the second factual basis for the

allegations that the Respondent violated Section 466.028(1)(x),

Florida Statutes, it is clear that the Respondent did have a

treatment plan for Patient A.S.'s tooth number 31. And while

there was some expert witness testimony critical of the

sufficiency of that treatment plan, the Respondent is not

charged with having an insufficient treatment plan. Rather, he

is charged with not having any plan at all. Accordingly, so

much of th e violation charged in Count One as is based on

allegations regarding the treatment plan should be dismissed.

27. Count Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint

charges the Respondent with violation of Section 466.028(1)(x),

Florida Statutes, by reaso n of allegations that he was

incompetent or negligent in the ways described as follows in

paragraphs 25, 27, and 28 of the Amended Administrative

Complaint:

25. Respondent attempted to perform root

canal therapy on Patient A.S.'s tooth no. 31

even thoug h the required endodontics for

tooth no. 31 was beyond his skill.

27. Respondent failed to advise Patient

A.S. that he had perforated her tooth.

28. Based on the foregoing, Respondent

has violated Section 466.028(1)(x), Florida

Statutes (2000), by being guilty of

incompetence or negligence by failing to

meet the minimum standards of performance in

diagnosis and treatment when measured

against generally prevailing peer

performance by the undertaking of treatment

for which Respondent was not qualified by

training or experience, by failing to advise

Patient A.S. of the risk of perforation of

the tooth during root canal therapy, and by

failing to advise Patient A.S. that he had

perforated her tooth no. 31.

28. It is clear that the Respondent "attempte d to perform

root canal therapy on Patient A.S.'s tooth no. 31 even though

the required endodontics for tooth no. 31 was beyond his skill."

Such an attempt is a violation of Section 466.028(1)(x), Florida

Statutes. It is also clear that the Respondent "f ailed to

advise Patient A.S. that he had perforated her tooth." That

failure is also a violation of Section 466.028(1)(x), Florida

Statutes. Both of these failures are acts of negligence within

the meaning of Section 446.028(1)(x), Florida Statutes.

Acc ordingly, the Respondent should be found guilty of the

violations of Section 446.028(1)(x), Florida Statutes, which are

charged in Count Two of the Amended Administrative Complaint.

RECOMMENDATION

On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED

t hat a final order be issued in this case to the following

effect:

(1) Adopting all of the Findings of Fact

in this Recommended Order,

(2) Adopting all of the Conclusions of

Law in this Recommended Order,

(3) Dismissing the portion of Count One

o f the Administrative Complaint that is

based on allegations regarding the lack of a

treatment plan.

(4) Concluding that the Respondent is

guilty of a violation of Section

466.028(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by reason

of his failure to include in his treat ment

records that he had perforated the patient's

tooth.

(5) Concluding that the Respondent is

guilty of the violations of Section

466.028(1)(x), Florida Statutes, charged in

Count Two of the Amended Administrative

Complaint.

(6) Imposing the foll owing penalties: 7

(a) Administrative fines in the total

amount of $7,500.00;

(b) Probation for a period of one year on

terms to be determined by the Board of

Dentistry; and

(c) A requirement that the Respondent

attend a course in dental record - kee ping.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2005, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

MICHAEL M. PARRISH

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(85 0) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 31st day of January, 2004.

ENDNOTES

1/ There was some post - hearing ambiguity as to whether the

Respondent had also offered into evidence the transcripts of

three depositions. By Order issued on January 21, 2005, it was

concluded that the three deposition transcripts had not been

offered in evidence during the hearing. A motion for late

offering of the subje ct transcripts was denied.

2/ The facts set forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 of the

Findings of Fact in this Recommended Order were agreed to by the

parties in the Joint Pre - Hearing Statement filed on February 26,

2004.

3/ This Finding of Fact is based primarily on the Respondent's

admission of request for admission number 10 served on or about

June 20, 2003. Absent a motion seeking to be relieved of such

an admission, a party is bound by the admission, even though the

party may make subsequent assertio ns inconsistent with the

admission.

4/ This finding is based in large part on the Respondent's

admission in his undated letter to Investigator McKenna that was

received by the investigator in March of 2002. That admission

is more persuasive than other t estimony suggesting other times

and places the perforation might have occurred. Especially

lacking in persuasiveness and credibility is the testimony of

Robert J. Fish, D.D.S., suggesting that the perforation was

caused by Dr. Baker.

5/ The Board of Med icine views the matter otherwise. In its

Final Order issued on June 17, 2004, in Department of Health,

Board of Medicine v. Robert H. Hunsaker, M.D. , DOAH Case No. 03 -

1954PL, the Board of Medicine, in addressing the legal effect of

Section 20 of Chapter 2 003 - 416, Laws of Florida, stated: "The

said amendment addresses substantive rights of a licensee rather

than matters of procedure. Therefore the amendments to Section

456.073(5), Florida Statutes, are not applicable to the cases at

bar." See also the Fi nal Order issued on May 4, 2004, in

Department of Health, Board of Medicine v. Thomas Patrick

Trevisani, M.D. , DOAH Case No.03 - 1952PL.

6/ Some of my "determinations" as to whether Respondent "has

violated the laws and rules regulating the profession" are

located in the Findings of Fact portion of this Recommended

Order, and other such "determinations" are located in the

Conclusions of Law. The ALJ has tried to place such

determinations where he believes they belong, taking into

consideration both a long history of appellate court guidance on

such matters and the legislative amendments discussed in

paragraphs 19 through 21 of the Conclusions of Law, above. In

any event, the placement of such determinations in one part of

the Recommended Order or the other does not appear to be of any

great moment, because it is reasonable to expect that the

appellate courts will continue to be of the view that,

regardless of where placed and regardless of how characterized,

a fact will always be a fact and a conclusion of law will always

be a conclusion of law.

7/ In the course of formulating the recommended penalties in

this case, consideration has been given to the disciplinary

guidelines, including aggravating and mitigating factors, that

appear in Florida Administrati ve Code Rule 64B5 - 13.005. In this

regard a substantial mitigating factor is that there is no

allegation nor evidence that the ultimate fate of the subject

tooth would have been any different in the absence of the

Respondent's efforts.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Deirdre A. Farrington, Esquire

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265

Max R. Price, Esquire

Law Offices of Max R. Price, P.A.

6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 104

Miami, Florida 33143

Susan Foster, Executive Direc tor

Board of Dentistry

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

Dr. John O. Agwunobi, Secretary

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

R. S. Power, Agency Clerk

Dep artment of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

Quincy Page, Acting General Counsel

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.