04-001178 Florida Elections Commission vs. John J. Fugate Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, December 22, 2004.

Summary: Candidate for re-election admittedly violated the prohibition on using an official position to influence an employee`s vote, but the violation was technical and did not involve the required "willfullness" to support the imposition of a fine.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 04 - 1178

)

JOHN J. FUGATE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to noti ce, a formal hearing in the above - styled

case was held on June 21, 2004, in Arcadia, Florida, and on

July 26, 2004, in Tallahassee, Florida, before Lawrence P.

Stevenson, a duly - designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire

Florida Elections Commission

Collins Building, Suite 224

107 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

For Respondent: Keith C. Tischler, Esquire

Jolly & Peterson, P.A.

Post Office Box 37400

Tallahassee Florida 32315

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent, John J. F ugate, Sheriff of DeSoto

County, willfully violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida

Statutes (2003), which prohibits an officer or employee of the

state, or of any county or municipality, from using his or her

official authority or influence for the purpo se of interfering

with an election or a nomination of office or coercing or

influencing another person's vote or affecting the results

thereof.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 8, 2003, Petitioner, Florida Elections

Commission (the "Commission"), received a sworn complaint

alleging that Respondent, Sheriff John J. Fugate, violated

various provisions of Florida's election laws. On January 5,

2004, after an investigation, the Commission staff recommended

finding probable cause that Respondent violated Subsec tion

104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). On February 27, 2004,

the Commission issued an Order of Probable Cause finding

probable cause to believe Respondent violated Subsection

104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).

On March 31, 2004, Respondent, thr ough counsel, timely

filed a Petition for Initiation of Proceedings to contest the

Order of Probable Cause. On April 8, 2004, the case was

forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH")

for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to condu ct a

formal hearing. The case was set for final hearing on June 21

and 22, 2004, in Arcadia. By agreement of the parties, the

first day of the hearing was held as scheduled in Arcadia, but

the second day was rescheduled for July 26, 2004, in

Tallahassee.

At the final hearing, the Commission presented the

testimony of Sheriff Fugate and of Katherine Willcutts, finance

director of the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office. The

Commission's Exhibits 1 through 8 and 10 through 14 were

admitted into evidence.

Res pondent presented the testimony of nine witnesses:

Sheriff Fugate; David Scheid, candidate for DeSoto County

Sheriff and the complainant in this case; Deborah Ane Clifton, a

former employee of the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office; James M.

Stutler and Mark Lawrence, deputies for the DeSoto County

Sheriff's Office; Carol Williamson, a lieutenant in the DeSoto

County Sheriff's Office; William P. Wise, a major in the DeSoto

County Sheriff's Office; David K. Smith, investigator for the

Commission; and Barbara Li nthicum, the Commission's executive

director. Respondent's Exhibits 5, 6, 8 through 12, 18

through 21, 32A, 32C, 32E, and 33 were admitted into evidence.

Respondent's Exhibit 32B was proffered, but not admitted.

The final Transcript was filed at DOAH o n August 24, 2004.

By Order dated September 3, 2004, Respondent's unopposed motion

for enlargement of time was granted, and the parties were

directed to file their proposed recommended orders no later than

September 10, 2004. Both parties timely filed Pr oposed

Recommended Orders.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the

final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the

following findings of fact are made:

1. At the time of hearing, Respondent, John J. Fugate, was

the incumbent Sheriff of DeSoto County, Florida. He was first

elected in November 2000 and took office in January 2001. At

the times pertinent to this case, Sheriff Fugate was a candidate

for re - election, having filed the initial paperwork appointin g a

campaign treasurer and naming a depository for campaign

contributions on May 20, 2003.

2. Also on May 20, 2003, Sheriff Fugate submitted his

signed "Statement of Candidate," pursuant to Section 106.023,

Florida Statutes (2003). This document atteste d that Sheriff

Fugate had received, read, and understood "the requirements of

Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003)." These statutory

provisions were included in the "2000 Candidate Handbook On

Campaign Financing," published by the state Division of

Electi ons and given to Sheriff Fugate by the local Supervisor of

Elections, when Sheriff Fugate filed his paperwork for the 2000

election. The "2004 Candidate and Campaign Treasurer Handbook"

was given to Sheriff Fugate when he filed his re - election

paperwork w ith the local Supervisor of Elections and also

included the provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003).

During the Commission's investigation, Sheriff Fugate admitted

that he had also read Chapter 104, Florida Statutes (2003), and

believed he unde rstood its provisions.

3. Though Sheriff Fugate had filed the papers establishing

his candidacy for re - election, some Sheriff's Office employees

openly questioned whether he really intended to stand for

re - election. These questions stemmed from the fact that Sheriff

Fugate's teenage son had been killed in an automobile accident

in 2002. Sheriff Fugate was aware of these questions and was

concerned that loyal employees were unsure of his intentions.

4. For some time, Sheriff's Office employees had also been

discussing the status of Major William Wise, the second - in -

command to Sheriff Fugate. Major Wise had been the chief deputy

under Sheriff's Fugate's predecessor, was kept in that position

by Sheriff Fugate, and was very popular among the Sheriff's

Of fice employees. Major Wise was a participant in the State of

Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program ("DROP") , which he

believed would require him to separate from the Sheriff's Office

for one year upon his official retirement in October 2004.

Howev er, in October 2003, Major Wise learned that there was a

way for him to reduce his separation to 30 days and still retain

his full retirement benefit.

5. Sheriff Fugate decided to prepare a letter to all

Sheriff's Office employees that would convey both h is

re - election intentions and the good news concerning the fact

that Major Wise would not have to vacate his position. The

letter was written on stationery with a header reading, "Re -

Elect Fugate for Sheriff," along with Sheriff Fugate's mailing

address a nd phone number. The text of the letter read as

follows:

It hardly seems possible that the second

half of the third year of this term of

office is upon us and I can only concur with

the saying that "time stands still for no

one."

For those that have been here for a while,

we have made giant strides for the DeSoto

County Sheriff's Office in the past two and

a half years and for the newer employees,

with your help and our combined efforts, I

look forward to more success in the future.

Thank you for your he lp and I truly

appreciate the service given to the citizens

of DeSoto County.

In anticipation of running for a second term

of office and as legally required, I have

opened my official campaign account. This

is the first step in any campaign and this

anno uncement is not to be construed as a

request for a contribution to my campaign.

I, like you, have been in an employment

position when the incumbent was seeking

another term of office and can personally

relate to pressure applied to assist with

the campaig n. Please understand that I

will, and do value your support in any way

that you may be inclined to offer. I also

encourage anyone that feels that I have not

earned your support in any way in the

performance of my duty to feel free to talk

to me and you c an be assured that it will

remain professional and will not be made

personal.

On another note, I know that there has been

some question as to what was going to happen

to the position of Major due to Major Wise

being in the Drop program and it coming to

an end. It is with great pleasure that I

announce that a way has been found for Major

Wise to continue in his position and he has

made the decision to do so. Major Wise has

contributed a great deal to this office and

I am very pleased that he will be stayi ng

with us.

If anyone has any questions about this

letter, I remind you of our "open door"

policy and invite you to feel free to stop

by and visit with me. Again, thank you and

I look forward to our working together to

build a better office for the emplo yees and

the community.

Beneath Sheriff Fugate's signature was the following: "Pd. Pol.

Adv. Paid For In - Kind By John J. Fugate. Approved by John J.

Fugate (D)."

6. Sheriff Fugate's review of the Candidate Handbooks led

him to conclude that he should n ot use the Sheriff's Office or

DeSoto County resources in preparing or distributing his letter

and that none of the costs involved in preparing or distributing

the letter should be borne by the Sheriff's Office or the

County. Thus, Sheriff Fugate drafted the letter on his home

computer. He printed approximately 120 copies of the letter on

his home printer, using paper and ink that he purchased at Wal -

Mart. On his campaign treasurer's report for the third quarter

of 2003, Sheriff Fugate reported the cost of ink and paper

associated with this letter as an in - kind contribution from

himself to his campaign.

7. Sheriff Fugate brought the copies of the letter to the

Sheriff's Office and placed one copy in the pay envelope of each

Sheriff's Office employee. At the DeSoto County Sheriff’s

Office, it was common practice for items other than pay checks

to be included in the pay envelopes. Such items had included

advertising circulars and public service memoranda, but not

political advertisements. The Sheriff's O ffice had no specific

policy setting forth what may or may not be placed in the pay

envelopes, nor was there any particular procedure for obtaining

approval of what was to be placed in the pay envelopes. Neither

Sheriff Fugate, Major Wise, nor payroll sup ervisor Kathy

Willcutts could recall a request to place an item in the pay

envelopes ever having been denied.

8. The pay envelopes, including Sheriff Fugate's letter,

were distributed to the Sheriff's Office employees in the usual

manner, either at the f ront desk in the Records Division for

pickup or in the employee's mail slot. The employees received

Sheriff Fugate's letter upon retrieving their paychecks on or

about October 2, 2003.

9. Several Sheriff's Office employees testified at the

hearing. Non e of these employees felt that Sheriff Fugate was

attempting to influence their vote or pressuring them to make a

monetary contribution to his campaign. Lieutenant Carol

Williamson is a 28 - year Sheriff's Office employee and has worked

for five different s heriffs. Lt. Williamson testified that in

the past, she has been essentially ordered to campaign for her

bosses, but that she did not consider Sheriff Fugate's letter to

be anything other than informational. Deputy Mark Lawrence

testified that "I read it , said 'okay,' and threw it away."

10. Sheriff Fugate disclaimed any intent to influence his

employees' votes or pressure them for campaign contributions.

During his career, he had been forced to campaign for his

elected superiors. Because of this exper ience, Sheriff Fugate

did not wish to place his own employees in the position of

feeling coerced to support him.

11. Sheriff Fugate testified that he used campaign

letterhead and included the "paid political advertisement"

disclaimer because his reading of the statutes led him to

conclude that those items were legally required on any

correspondence referencing his campaign. Nevertheless, Sheriff

Fugate maintained that his letter was intended solely to convey

information, not to coerce or influence anyone 's vote.

12. Sheriff Fugate's testimony is supported by the letter

itself, which expressly stated that he was not seeking

contributions to his campaign and that employees should feel no

pressure to support his candidacy. Nonetheless, Sheriff

Fugate's let ter was clearly an attempt to favorably influence

his employees, albeit a low - key one that did not demand support

in the apparent manner of previous sheriffs. The letter

solicited the support of Sheriff's Office employees, "in any way

that you may be incl ined to offer." The letter may not have

been coercive, but it was disingenuous for Sheriff Fugate to

suggest that the letter was not designed to influence his

employees in the upcoming election.

13. Sheriff Fugate was cognizant of Section 104.31,

Flo rida Statutes (2003), and its prohibition on the use of

"official authority or influence for the purpose of . . .

coercing or influencing another person's vote . . . ." However,

Sheriff Fugate believed, mistakenly but in all good faith, that

his placement of the letters was allowed under another provision

of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003):

The provisions of this section shall not be

construed so as to prevent any person from

becoming a candidate for and actively

campaigning for any elective offi ce in this

state. All such persons shall retain the

right to vote as they may choose and to

express their opinions on all political

subjects and candidates.

For reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law below, Sheriff

Fugate's good faith belief that hi s actions were within the

ambit of the statute negates any suggestion that he "willfully"

violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).

14. Sheriff Fugate did not seek advice from the local

Supervisor of Elections or an advisory opinion fr om the state

Division of Elections pursuant to Subsection 106.23(2), Florida

Statutes (2003), because he believed that he understood the

application of the relevant statutes to his situation, including

Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003).

CONCLUSIONS O F LAW

15. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this

case. §§ 106.25(5), 120.57(1), and 120.569, Fla. Stat. (2004).

16. The Commission has the burden to prove its case by

clear and convincing evidence. Diaz de la Portilla v. Florida

Elections Commission , 857 So. 2d 913, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003),

review denied , 872 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2004). See also Department

of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern and Company , 670 So. 2d

932, 935 (Fla. 1996); L atham v. Florida Commission on Ethics ,

694 So. 2d 83, 84 - 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

17. In Evans Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services , 550 So. 2d 112, 116, n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA

1989), the Court defined clear and convincing evidence as

follows:

[C]lear and convincing evidence requires

that the evidence must be found to be

credible; the facts to which the witnesses

testify must be distinctly remembered; the

evidence must be precise and explicit and

the witnesses must be lacking in c onfusion

as to the facts in issue. The evidence must

be of such weight that it produces in the

mind of the trier of fact the firm belief of

conviction, without hesitancy, as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be

established. Slomowitz v. Walker , 4 29 So.

2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

18. Judge Sharp, in her dissenting opinion in Walker v.

Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 705

So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (Sharp, J., dissenting),

reviewed recent pronouncements on clear and convincing evidence:

Clear and convincing evidence requires

more proof than preponderance of evidence,

but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. In

re Inquiry Concerning a Judge re Graziano ,

696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997). It is an

intermediat e level of proof that entails

both qualitative and quantative [sic]

elements. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. ,

658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995), cert.

denied , 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S. Ct. 719, 133

L.Ed.2d 672 (1996). The sum total of

evidence must be sufficien t to convince the

trier of fact without any hesitancy. Id.

It must produce in the mind of the fact

finder a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be

established. Inquiry Concerning Davey , 645

So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994).

19. The Order of Probable Cause states:

On or about October 2, 2003, Respondent

violated Section 104.31(1)(a), Florida

Statutes, using his official authority or

influence for the purpose of influencing

another person's vote, when he included in

the pay envelopes of the employees of the

DeSoto County Sheriff's Office a political

advertisement advocating Respondent's re -

election to the office of Sheriff of DeSoto

County that was created by the Respondent

and was an in - kind contribution to his

campaign .

20. Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003), reads as

follows, in relevant part:

Political activities of state, county, and

municipal officers and employees. – -

(1) No officer or employee of the state,

or of any county or municipality thereof,

except as hereinafter exempted from

provisions hereof, shall:

(a) Use his or her official authority or

influence for the purpose of interfering

with an election or a nomination of office

or coercing or influencing another person's

vote or affecting th e result thereof.

* * *

The provisions of this section shall not

be construed so as to prevent any person

from becoming a candidate for and actively

campaigning for any elective office in this

state. All such persons shall retain the

right to vote as they may choose and to

express their opinions on all political

subjects and candidates. The provisions of

paragraph (a) shall not be construed so as

to limit the political activity in a

general, special, primary, bond, referendum,

or other electio n of any kind or nature, of

elected officials or candidates for public

office in the state or of any county or

municipality thereof; . . . .

21. Subsection 106.265(1), Florida Statutes (2003), reads

as follows:

(1) The commission is authorized upon t he

finding of a violation of this chapter or

chapter 104 to impose civil penalties in the

form of fines not to exceed $1,000 per

count. In determining the amount of such

civil penalties, the commission shall

consider, among other mitigating and

aggravatin g circumstances:

(a) The gravity of the act or omission;

(b) Any previous history of similar acts

or omissions;

(c) The appropriateness of such penalty

to the financial resources of the person,

political committee, committee of continuous

exist ence, or political party; and

(d) Whether the person, political

committee, committee of continuous

existence, or political party has shown good

faith in attempting to comply with the

provisions of this chapter or chapter 104.

22. Subsection 106.25(3) , Florida Statutes (2003), reads

as follows:

(3) For the purposes of commission

jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the

willful performance of an act prohibited by

this chapter or chapter 104 or the willful

failure to perform an act required by this

chap ter or chapter 104.

23. The Commission contends that Section 106.37, Florida

Statutes (2003), provides the correct standard for the

determination of "willfulness." Section 106.37, Florida

Statutes (2003), reads as follows:

A person willfully violates a provision of

this chapter if the person commits an act

while knowing that, or showing reckless

disregard for whether, the act is prohibited

under this chapter, or does not commit an

act while knowing that, or showing reckless

disregard for whether, the act is required

under this chapter. A person knows that an

act is prohibited or required if the person

is aware of the provision of this chapter

which prohibits or requires the act,

understands the meaning of that provision,

and performs the act that is p rohibited or

fails to perform the act that is required.

A person shows reckless disregard for

whether an act is prohibited or required

under this chapter if the person wholly

disregards the law without making any

reasonable effort to determine whether the

act would constitute a violation of this

chapter.

24. By its terms, Section 106.37, Florida Statutes (2003),

limits its application to "provision[s] of this chapter," in

contrast to Subsections 106.265(1) and 106.25(3), Florida

Statutes (2003), quoted above, both of which expressly apply to

provisions "of this chapter or chapter 104." Counsel for

Sheriff Fugate emphasizes this contrast to contend that Section

106.37, Florida Statutes (2003), cannot be applied to alleged

violations of provisions of Chap ter 104, Florida Statutes

(2003). The plain wording of the statute leads to the

conclusion that Section 106.37, Florida Statutes (2003), does

not apply in this case because the only alleged violation is of

Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). 1/

25. The determination of "willfulness" is a question of

fact. McGann v. Florida Elections Commission , 803 So. 2d 763,

764 (Fla. 2001). For purposes of this case, the term "willful,"

as used in Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes (2003), is

essen tially an undefined term. In Metropolitan Dade County v.

Department of Environmental Protection , 714 So. 2d 512, 516

(Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the court faced the question of interpreting

the undefined statutory term "willful violation" and reasoned as

follows:

In construing an undefined term, we must

look to the common or usual meaning of the

term. State Dept. of Administration v.

Moore , 524 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA

1988) . . . The court in [ Thunderbird

Drive - In Theatre, Inc. v. Reed , 571 So. 2d

1341, 1344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990] relied on W.

Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton

Handbook of the Law of Torts § 34, at 213

(5th ed. 1984), in concluding that the usual

meaning assigned to "willful" "[i]s that the

actor has intentionally done an act of an

unreasonabl e character in disregard of a

known or obvious risk that was so great as

to make it highly probable that harm would

follow . . ." Thus, the Thunderbird Drive -

In court concluded that when the legislature

uses the word "willful" in a statute it

demonstrates the legislature's intention

that the actor possess "more than mere

knowledge or awareness" for the statute to

be applicable.

. . . The Thunderbird Drive - In definition

is not an unusual or extraordinary

interpretation of the term "willful."

Black's La w Dictionary defines "willful" as:

An act or omission is 'willfully'

done, if done voluntarily and

intentionally and with the

specific intent to do something

the law forbids, or with the

specific intent to fail to do

something the law requires to be

done; that is to say, with bad

purpose either to disobey or to

disregard the law.

Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed.

1979)(same definition at 1599 (6th ed.

1990)). This definition mirrors the

Thunderbird Drive - In definition.

Other courts have ascribe d to a similar

definition of "willful violation." In Hazen

Paper Co. v. Biggins , 507 U.S. 604, 617, 113

S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), the

Supreme Court determined that a "willful"

violation, as the term is used in federal

statutes, requires a showin g that the actor

"either knew or showed reckless disregard

for the matter of whether its conduct was

prohibited...." This definition conveys the

same idea that the act be intentional and

accompanied by the "actor's intent and

purpose that the prohibited c onduct take

place." (Some citations omitted)

26. In State v Stuler , 122 So. 2d 1, 2 - 3 (Fla. 1960), the

Florida Supreme Court provided the controlling interpretation of

Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003):

The privilege of working for the public is

not an absolute right. It can be made

subject to such reasonable restrictions and

regulations as the Legislature under the

Constitution may prescribe. . . .

The obvious objective to be accomplished

by statutes of the type under consideration

is to pres erve the political purity of

public employment and to protect public

employees against harassment and political

annoyances as conditions to holding their

jobs. Likewise public employees are thereby

shielded against pressures or annoying

solicitations for political contributions in

order to curry favor with some elected

official charged with the supervision of the

particular employees. . . .

[Section 104.31, Florida Statutes], like

most of the statutes on this subject does

not preclude public employees from

exercising complete freedom of choice at the

ballot box. It specifically authorizes them

"to express their opinions on all political

subjects and candidates." The public

employees are merely prohibited while in the

public employ from doing certain specific

things which the Legislature has properly

concluded are opposed to the best interests

of the public service. (Citations omitted)

27. There is little question that Sheriff Fugate's

distribution of his campaign letter via the Sheriff's Office

pay check envelopes violated the terms of Subsection

104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), in that he was

attempting, however mildly, to influence the vote of his

subordinate employees. The only real issue is whether Sheriff

Fugate's violation was "willful."

28. Based on the facts found above, it cannot be said that

the Commission has demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that

Sheriff Fugate acted " with bad purpose either to disobey or to

disregard the law," or that it was his "intent and purpose that

th e prohibited conduct take place." Sheriff Fugate credibly

testified that he believed his actions were in accord with the

portion of Section 104.31, Florida Statutes (2003), providing

that nothing therein shall be construed to limit the right of a

candidat e to actively campaign for office. The Commission

offered no direct evidence to refute Sheriff Fugate's good faith

belief that his actions were within the law.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions

of Law, it is

RECOM MENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a

final order finding that Respondent, John J. Fugate, did not

violate Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), as

alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause.

DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd d ay of December, 2004, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 22nd day of December, 2004.

ENDNOTE

1/ This conclusion finds support in the legislative histories of

th e provisions at issue. Section 106.37, Florida Statutes

(2003), was enacted by Section 1, Chapter 97 - 13, Laws of

Florida, and has not been amended since its enactment. As of

1997, the applications of Subsections 106.25(3) and 106.265(1),

Florida Statutes (2003), were likewise limited to violations of

Chapter 106, Florida Statutes (2003). Sections 34 and 36 of

Chapter 98 - 129, Laws of Florida, amended Subsections 106.25(3)

and 106.265(1), Florida Statutes (2003), respectively, to apply

also to violations o f Chapter 104, Florida Statutes (2003). The

Legislature did not expand the scope of Section 106.37, Florida

Statutes (2003).

COPIES FURNISHED :

Eric M. Lipman, General Counsel

Florida Elections Commission

Collins Building, Suite 224

107 West Gaines Stre et

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

Keith C. Tischler, Esquire

Jolly & Peterson, P.A.

Post Office Box 27400

Tallahassee, Florida 32315

Patsy Rushing, Clerk

Florida Elections Commission

Collins Building, Suite 224

107 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Flor ida 32399 - 1050

Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director

Florida Elections Commission

Collins Building, Suite 224

107 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

Charles Finkel, General Counsel

Florida Elections Commission

Collins Building, Suite 224

107 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order sh ould be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.