04-001319 Alonzo C. Brown vs. Heritage Paper, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 19, 2005.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that his termination as warehouse supervisor was based upon his race. Respondent articulated legitimate reasons for Petitioner`s discharge because of his failure to perform his duties properly. Recommend dismissal of petition.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ALONZO C. BROWN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 04 - 1319

)

HERITAGE PAPER, INC., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal hearing was hel d before the Division of

Administrative Hearings by Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative

Law Judge, on October 7, 2004, in Orlando, Florida. The

following appearances were entered:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Alonzo C. Brown, pro se

7230 Plantain Drive

Orlando, Florida 32818

For Respondent: Robert T. Devine, Esquire

Alva L. Cross, Esquire

Coffman, Coleman, Andrews

& Grogan, P.A.

Post Office Box 40089

Jacksonville, Florida 32203

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner was terminated from his position with

Respondent as a warehouse supervisor on or about August 9, 2002,

on the basis of his race (African - American), in violation of

Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner, Alonzo C. Brown, filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(FCHR) charging Respondent, Heritage Paper Company, Inc., with

employment discrimination on or about July 16, 2003, alleging

race and handicap discrimination and retaliation. On July 31,

20 03, Petitioner filed an amended charge alleging only race and

handicap discrimination. On or about March 12, 2004, a no cause

determination was issued by the FCHR. Petitioner timely filed a

Petition for Relief with the FCHR alleging that he had been

"for ce[d] out" on the basis of race and requested a formal

hearing. Although Petitioner's Amended FCHR Charge of

Discrimination indicates that he was discriminated against on

the basis of race and disability/handicap, his Petition for

Relief indicates that he was terminated on the basis of race.

This matter was subsequently referred by the FCHR to the

Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for a formal hearing,

de novo , on April 13, 2004, and was set for hearing. Petitioner

filed a Motion for Leave to Am end Petition on October 1, 2004.

Petitioner's motion was denied. As such, the only issue in this

case is Petitioner's assertion that he was terminated because of

his race. Following discovery, a formal hearing was commenced

on October 7, 2004.

At the hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se and testified in

his own behalf. Petitioner presented the testimony of five

witnesses and submitted 11 exhibits (P - 1 through P - 11), which

were admitted into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony

of four witnesse s and submitted five exhibits (numbered R - 2

through R - 6), which were admitted into evidence. A Transcript

was ordered and was filed on December 13, 2004. The parties

were allowed ten days from the hearing in which to file proposed

findings of fact and co nclusions of law. Petitioner has not

filed proposed findings as of the date of this Recommended

Order. Respondent filed Proposed Findings on December 23, 2004.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based upon all of the evidence, the following Findings of

Fact are determined :

1. Respondent, Heritage Paper Company, Inc. (Respondent),

is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil

Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Respondent is a wholesale

distributor of paper and plastic products.

2. Petitioner, Alonzo C. Brown, is an African - American

male and is a member of a protected class.

3. Petitioner was employed in the warehouse at

Respondent's Orlando facility from 1998 until he was terminated

on or about August 9, 2002.

4. Dan Patterson ("Patterson"), who was the gener al

manager at the Orlando facility during the relevant time period,

supervised Petitioner throughout his employment with Respondent.

Patterson made the decision to hire Petitioner, made the

decision to promote Petitioner to warehouse supervisor, and made

the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment.

5. In November 1999, Petitioner was officially promoted

from warehouseman to warehouse supervisor. Petitioner's job

duties as warehouse supervisor included supervising the drivers,

receiving inventory, p utting away inventory, pulling orders, and

ensuring that the trucks were loaded. Petitioner was

responsible for assigning work to his assistants, ensuring that

the runs were pulled, and ensuring that the merchandise ordered

by customers was actually on th e trucks for delivery. He was

also responsible for the overall condition of the warehouse.

6. Petitioner's performance deteriorated during

approximately the last five months of his employment. When

Petitioner got behind in the warehouse, Patterson assis ted him

and even hired an assistant to help Petitioner in the warehouse

with inventory control and other assistance, where necessary.

7. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he was

discriminated against based on his race in retaliation for

fili ng a workers' compensation claim and for disagreeing with

his supervisor's instruction to put matches on a truck during a

fire inspection.

8. Petitioner was responsible for ensuring that the trucks

left on time in the morning and for pulling the runs th e

previous afternoon. Even though an assistant was hired to help

Petitioner in the warehouse at times, Petitioner refused to

assign tasks to his assistant.

9. Patterson wrote a note to Petitioner on May 1, 2002,

telling Petitioner that he could not send items to the customer,

NSC Northport, without matching up purchase order numbers. NCS

Northport had very strict delivery requirements and would refuse

delivery if Respondent did not comply with their delivery

procedures.

10. The evidence demonstrates that Patterson notified

Petitioner on May 1, 2002, that Respondent's procedure with

regard to NSC Northport was not followed. Although Petitioner

introduced testimony that he did not write the information on

the NSC Northport invoice, Patterson reasonably bel ieved that it

was Petitioner's handwriting and testified that Petitioner never

informed him that he did not write the information on that

invoice. Further, Marissa Moore, Petitioner's own witness,

identified the handwriting as Petitioner's.

11. When probl ems in the warehouse first arose, Patterson

spoke with Petitioner regarding Respondent's policies and

procedures for the warehouse. Patterson wrote another note to

Petitioner on May 13, 2002, regarding excessive overtime and the

importance of having runs pulled the previous afternoon to

prevent overtime.

12. Patterson wrote a third note to Petitioner and his

assistant, Keynon Turner, on June 27, 2002, reiterating the

importance of having the runs pulled in the afternoon and

reminding them that the runs mus t be pulled by 4:00 p.m.

13. Petitioner's explanation for the overall condition of

the warehouse from May through August 2002 is not credible.

14. Bob Purser, Sr., Respondent's chairman, CEO, and

founder testified that in a conversation with Patterson, he told

him that if Petitioner was unable to keep the warehouse

organized, minimize the overtime, and get the trucks out on

time, then they would have to get someone in the warehouse who

would be able to do so. When Purser found out that incorrect

merchandis e was delivered to customers, he told Patterson to

personally review the orders before the trucks were loaded.

15. Purser visited the warehouse where Petitioner was

employed prior to his termination and found that the warehouse

was in disarray. He observe d the aisles were blocked with

merchandise and that the forklifts were unable to move up and

down the aisles.

16. Denis Nieves, the current warehouse supervisor for

Respondent's Orlando facility, was hired on August 12, 2002,

three days after Petitioner's employment was terminated. When

he was hired, the warehouse was disorganized and cluttered,

inventory blocked some of the aisles, the bay doors, and the

exits and that it was sometimes difficult to locate inventory.

It took him approximately six to eight weeks to reorganize the

warehouse, unblock the aisles, put the inventory on racks, and

unblock the bay doors and the exits.

17. Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity policy

states that Respondent will provide equal employment opportunity

to all qualif ied employees and applicants for employment

regardless of race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin,

handicap, marital status, and status as a disabled veteran or

veterans of the Vietnam era. This policy was in effect when

Petitioner was hired, and he received a copy of Respondent's

employee handbook at the time of his hire, which contained the

Equal Employment Opportunity policy prohibiting all types of

unlawful discrimination.

18. Petitioner knew of Respondent's Equal Employment

Opportunity policy . He was aware of the procedures for mailing

a complaint about racial discrimination and/or harassment.

19. Respondent also maintained an open - door policy where

employees could speak with Purser regarding any perceived

problems.

20. Petitioner was aware o f this open - door policy. Other

employees took advantage of Respondent's open - door policy to

address their concerns with Patterson and/or Purser.

21. Petitioner never complained to Purser about

Patterson's alleged discriminatory treatment. Purser confirme d

that Petitioner never addressed any concerns about race

discrimination or any retaliatory actions by Patterson with him.

22. Petitioner testified that he did not feel that he was

ever discriminated against at any time during his employment

with Responden t, except when Patterson terminated his

employment. Although Petitioner raised various instances of

perceived unfairness throughout his employment with Respondent,

such as being paged to the front office and having his uniform

"stripped" from him, he test ified that the only point he

believed he was discriminated against because of his race was

when Patterson terminated his employment.

23. Petitioner's witnesses, Ralph McDaniel and Ricky

Vaughn, admitted that they never noticed any discriminatory acts

or ra cial inequalities against anyone while they were employed

with Respondent. Moore testified that she never heard any

discriminatory comments about Petitioner. Andrew Mitchell

testified that he never noticed any discriminatory acts during

his employment wi th Respondent.

24. Petitioner's only other witness, Kenyon Turner,

testified that the only perceived discriminatory actions he

experienced while employed at Respondent was Patterson's

"getting mad and cursing [him] out every once in a while."

When asked i f Patterson cursed at others as well, Turner

answered affirmatively stating, "[o]f course he cursed out the

other people that was there," meaning all employees, regardless

of race. This does not constitute evidence of racial

discrimination.

25. Purser tes tified that his company does not

discriminate against its employees on the basis of race and

Patterson testified that he did not consider Petitioner's race

in making the decision to terminate his employment.

26. Through Mitchell's testimony, Petitioner att empted to

establish that he was a "good employee" and that he was a

"capable and knowledgeable" warehouse supervisor, but offered no

additional evidence demonstrating that he was doing a good job.

27. The greater weight of evidence supports the fact that

P atterson made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment

based on the continuing problems in the warehouse and a load

factor decline of approximately 22 percent. The load factor is

a percentage used to determine how many customer orders are

being a ccurately filled.

28. At the time of Petitioner's termination, he was

earning $11.72 per hour. Petitioner testified that he did not

begin looking for work until the first part of 2003. Petitioner

worked sporadically for Florida Courier and that he earn ed

approximately $11,000.00 in 2003. Petitioner did not work many

hours and did not seek alternative employment during the summer

months. Petitioner is also a full - time pastor, and his church

pays his mortgage payment, which is approximately $1,000.00 pe r

month. Petitioner testified that he has submitted "a couple of

applications" to prospective employers, but has not really been

interested in working for someone else.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

29. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the

parties thereto pursuant to Section 120.569 and Subsection

120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative

Code Rule 60Y - 4.016(1).

30. The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme

containe d in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003), incorporates

and adopts the legal principles and precedents established in

the federal anti - discrimination laws specifically set forth

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

42 U.S.C Section 2000e, et seq . The Florida law prohibiting

unlawful employment practices is found in Section 760.10,

Florida Statutes (2003). This section prohibits discrimination

against any individual with respect to compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because of such

individual's race and/or sex. § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

(2003) . The FCHR and the Florida courts interpreting the

provisions of the FCRA have determined that federal

discrimination laws should be used as guidance when construin g

provisions of the Act. See Brand v. Florida Power Corp. 633

So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Florida Department of

Community Affairs v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA

1991); Cooper v. Lakeland Regional Medical Center , 16 F.A.L.R.

567, 574 (FC HR 1993).

31. Petitioner has the ultimate burden to prove

discrimination either by direct or indirect evidence. Direct

evidence is evidence which, if believed, would prove the

existence of discrimination without inference or presumption.

Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 581 - 82 (11th Cir. 1989).

Blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate, constitute direct evidence of discrimination. See

Earley v. Champion International Corporation , 907 F.2d 1077,

1081 (11th Cir. 199 0). There is no record of any direct

evidence of discrimination on the part of Petitioner's

supervisor. There is no evidence Patterson made any race -

related comments or slurs. Petitioner has not presented any

documentary evidence which would constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.

32. Absent any direct evidence of discrimination, the

Supreme Court established, and later clarified, the burden of

proof in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Texas Depa rtment of Community

Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and again in the case

of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct.

2742 (1993). The FCHR has adopted this evidentiary model.

Kilpatrick v. Howard Johnson Co. , 7 F.A.L.R. 5468, 5475 (FCHR

1985). McDonnell Douglas places upon Petitioner the initial

burden of proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

See also Davis v. Humana of Florida, Inc. , 15 F.A.L.R. 231 (FCHR

1992); Laroche v. Department of Labor and Employment Se curity ,

13 F.A.L.R. 4121 (FCHR 1991).

33. Judicial authorities have established the burden of

proof for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory

treatment. Petitioner must show that:

a. Petitioner is a member of a protected

group;

b. The employee is qualified for the

position;

c. The employee was subject to an adverse

employment decision (Petitioner was

terminated);

d. The position was filled by a person of

another race or that he was treated less

favorably than similarly - situated persons

outside the protected class:

Jones v. Winn - Dixie Stores, Inc. , 75 F. Supp. 2d 1357,

1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

34. Proving a prima facie case serves to eliminate the

most common nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner's disparate

treatment. See In ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S. ,

431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44 (1977). It is not, however, the

equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination. It is simply

proof of actions taken by the employer from which discriminatory

animus is inferred bec ause experience has proved that, in the

absence of any other explanation, it is more likely than not

that those actions were bottomed on impermissible

considerations. The presumption is that more often than not

people do not act in a totally arbitrary man ner, without any

underlying reason, in a business setting. Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).

35. Once Petitioner has succeeded in proving all the

elements necessary to establish a prima facie case, the employer

must then arti culate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the challenged employment decision. The employer is

required only to "produce admissible evidence which would allow

the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment

decision had not been mot ivated by discriminatory animus ."

Burdine , 450 U.S. at 257. The employer "need not persuade the

court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons .

. . [i]t is sufficient if the [employer's] evidence raises a

genuine issue of fact as to wheth er it discriminated against the

plaintiff." Burdine , 450 U.S. at 254. This burden is

characterized as "exceedingly light." Perryman v. Johnson

Products Co., Inc. , 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983).

36. Once the employer articulates a legitimate reas on for

the action taken, the evidentiary burden shifts back to

Petitioner who must prove that the reason offered by the

employer for its decision is not the true reason, but is merely

a pretext. The employer need not prove that it was actually

motivated b y the articulated nondiscriminatory reasons or that

the replacement was more qualified than Petitioner. Burdine ,

450 U.S. at 257 - 8.

37. In Burdine , the Supreme Court emphasized that the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Respondent

inte ntionally discriminated against Petitioner remains at all

times with Petitioner. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. The Court

confirmed this principle again in Hicks , supra .

38. In the case sub judice , Petitioner has established

that he is a member of a protecte d class. He has established

that he was qualified for the position at the time he was hired

and when he was promoted and that he was subjected to an adverse

employment decision when he was terminated. However, Petitioner

has failed to come forward with c redible evidence that there is

a causal connection between his race and his termination.

Petitioner has failed to show that similarly - situated persons

outside the protected class received more favorable treatment

under similar circumstances. Therefore, t here can be no

inference of discrimination. Roud v. Stone , 945 F.2d 796 (4th

Cir. 1991). "Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a

disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's

protected trait actually played a role in that proc ess and had a

determinative influence on the outcome." Hazen Paper Co. v.

Biggins , 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993). This

standard requires Petitioner to establish that "but for" his

protected class and the employer's intent to discriminat e, he

would not have been terminated. Petitioner has failed to came

forward with sufficient evidence to meet his initial burden of

proof on the issue of racial discrimination.

39. Assuming Petitioner was qualified for the position of

warehouse supervisor at the time of his promotion, he failed to

meet the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Petitioner has not introduced any evidence to create an

inference of discrimination. He has failed to cite any non -

minority employees who were treated differently than he was

treated under similar circumstances. In order to make a prima

facie case, Petitioner must demonstrate there were employees

outside of the protected class who engaged in similar conduct,

but were not terminated. Maniccia v. Brown , 171 F.3d 1364, 1368

(11th Cir. 1998). The most important factors in comparing

disciplinary actions imposed on employees are the nature of the

offenses in relation to the punishment imposed. "We require

that the quantity and quality of the comparator's mi sconduct be

nearly identical to prevent courts from second - guessing

employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with

oranges." Id. Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence

whatsoever to support the fourth and most important element in

proving any claim of discrimination through indirect evidence.

The hearing record is completely devoid of any evidence which

would create even an inference that employees who were outside

of a protected class were treated differently than Petitioner.

Jones , 75 F. Supp. at 1365.

40. In addition, Patterson made the decision to hire

Petitioner, promote Petitioner to warehouse supervisor, and to

terminate Petitioner's employment. Under the same factor

inference, because Petitioner was hired, promoted, and fired by

Patterson, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his race was a

factor in Respondent's decision to terminate his employment.

See Williams v. Vitro Services Corp. , 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th

Cir. 1998) (noting where the same person hires and fires an

employee, a "permissible inference" arises that discrimination

was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the

employer.)

41. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had met his

initial burden, the sequence of presentation of evidence then

required Re spondent to come forward and articulate valid,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the resulting termination

decision. Respondent has done so. The burden to articulate a

legitimate business reason for the action is one of production,

not of persuasion. The co urt need not weigh the credibility of

the nondiscriminatory reason at this stage of the burden -

shifting analysis. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. ,

530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); Hicks , 509 U.S.

at 509. Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment because,

under Petitioner's supervision, the warehouse was disorganized,

and Respondent was incurring excessive overtime since the runs

were not pulled and ready for loading the previous afternoon, as

required; and thus, the trucks were late in leaving the

warehouse the following morning. Patterson repeatedly reminded

Petitioner of his duties as warehouse supervisor and other

company policies. Three witnesses testified that the warehouse

was disorganized, inventory was not put away , inventory was

difficult to locate, bay doors were blocked, exit doors were

blocked, and the aisles were blocked so that the forklift was

unable to maneuver down the aisles. Respondent had a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for terminating him. See

D avidson v. Time, Inc. , 972 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)

(discrimination laws should not be used as a vehicle for second

guessing an employer's business judgment).

42. The record in this case is undisputed. Petitioner

failed to introduce any evidence to su ggest that the basis

offered for his termination by his employer was false or that

the real basis was invidious discrimination. To the extent that

Petitioner attempts to prove intentional discrimination by

presenting evidence that he was a "good employee" and a

"competent and knowledgeable" warehouse supervisor, Petitioner's

attempt to elicit this information through Mitchell's testimony

is insufficient to rebut the articulated reasons for

Respondent's employment decision. First, Mitchell's testimony

esta blished that he was employed with Respondent from

September 26, 2000, until February 16, 2001. Patterson

testified that there were no issues with Petitioner's

performance until approximately March of 2002. At the time of

Mitchell's departure from Respond ent's employ, approximately 18

months prior to Petitioner's termination, Patterson did not have

any issues with Petitioner's performance. Second, Mitchell was

not in a position during his employment with Respondent to

evaluate Petitioner's performance.

43. Petitioner's own subjective feelings, without evidence

of racial bias, are insufficient to support a claim of

discrimination. Wright v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's

Department , 963 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Kan. 1997). The law is clear

that "[t]he inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer's

beliefs and not the employee's own perception of his

performance." LeBlanc v. TJX Companies, Inc. , 214 F. Supp. 2d

1319, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Webb v. R&B Holding Co.,

Inc. , 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("The fact that

an employee disagrees with an employer's evaluation of him does

not prove pretext.")

44. Petitioner has the continuing burden of persuading the

trier of fact that Respondent intentionally discriminated

against him. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. When a Petitioner

alleges disparate treatment, "liability depends on whether the

protected trait actually motivated the employer's decision."

Hazen Paper Co. v. Briggins , 507 U.S. at 610. The plaintiff's

race must have actually played a role in the employer's

decision - making process and had a determinative influence on the

outcome. Petitioner simply cannot prevail on his claims of

disparate treatment unless he can demonstrate that Respondent

intentionally discriminated against him. Cason Enter prises,

Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County , 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337

(S.D. Fla. 1998). An employer may terminate an employee fairly

or unfairly and for any reason or no reason at all without

incurring Title VII liability unless its decision was motivated

b y invidious discrimination. Kossow v. St. Thomas University,

Inc. , 42 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Fucci v.

Graduate Hospital , 969 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

45. Petitioner worked for Respondent for approximately

four years, first as a ware houseman, then as the warehouse

supervisor. Two of Petitioner's supervisors had a good - faith

belief that Petitioner's performance was poor in the second and

third quarter of 2002 and that his employment should be

terminated. There is no evidence to demon strate that his

termination was a result of his race. Petitioner failed to

introduce any evidence to prove that Respondent's stated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for his termination was a

pretext for discrimination.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foreg oing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2005, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www. doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 19th day of January, 2005.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florid a 32301

Alonzo C. Brown

7230 Plantain Drive

Orlando, Florida 32818

Robert T. Devine, Esquire

Alva L. Cross, Esquire

Coffman, Coleman, Andrews

& Grogan, P.A.

Post Office Box 40089

Jacksonville, Florida 32203

Cecil Howard, General Counsel

Florida Co mmission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptio ns

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.