04-001444 Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Real Estate vs. Nicholas Anthony Musashe And The Jander Group, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, August 11, 2004.

Summary: The Florida Real Estate Commission changed its interpretation of the statute which effects the Landlord/Tenant Act and Section 475.25(1) without notice to the brokers creating an estoppel. Respondents broker and corporation are not guilty of the charges.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 04 - 1444

)

NICHOLAS ANTHONY MUSASHE AND )

THE JANDER GROUP, INC., )

)

Respondents. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, this case came on for formal hearing

before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings, on July 2, 2004, by video

t eleconference with sites in Orlando and Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Jason W. Holtz, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street

Suite 801, North Tower

Orlando, Florida 32801

F or Respondent: William M. Furlow, Esquire

Akerman Senterfitt

106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether Respondent, Nicholas Anthony Musashe (Respondent

Musashe), is guilty of failure to ac count or deliver funds and

failure to follow procedures as required by Subsection

475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2003).

Whether Respondent Musashe is guilty of failure to provide

written notification to the Florida Real Estate Commission

(FREC) within 1 5 days of the last party's demand as required by

Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2 - 10.032(1)(a).

Whether Respondent Musashe is guilty of culpable negligence

or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of

Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003).

Whether Respondent, The Jander Group, Inc. (Jander Group),

is guilty of failure to account or deliver funds and failure to

follow procedures, as required by Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1.,

Florida Statutes (2003).

Whether the Jander Group is g uilty of failure to provide

written notification to the FREC within 15 days of the last

party's demand as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule

61J2 - 10.032(1)(a).

Whether the Jander Group is guilty of culpable negligence

or breach of trust in any bu siness transaction in violation of

Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On May 20, 2003, the Department of Business and

Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, filed a

24 - count Amended Administrative Complain t against Respondents,

Nicholas Anthony Musashe and The Jander Group, Inc., alleging

violations of Subsections 475.25(1)(d), (1)(e), and (1)(b),

Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule

61J2 - 10.032(1)(a) in their handling of three diff erent rental

deposit disputes. Respondents raised affirmative defenses and

requested a formal hearing. This matter was referred to the

Division of Administrative Hearings on April 20, 2004.

Following discovery and the filing of a Joint Response to Pre -

H earing Order, a formal hearing was conducted on July 2, 2004,

by video teleconference.

Petitioner presented the testimony of one witness, Tiffnye

Castro, and 11 exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Respondents presented the testimony of James R. Mitchel l,

Esquire, and Respondent Musashe; and one exhibit was admitted

into evidence. The parties agreed that the time for filing

p roposed recommended orders was ten days from the filing of the

transcript. The Transcript was filed on July 23, 2004. Each of

th e parties timely filed Proposed Recommended Order s on July 30,

2004, which have been carefully considered in the preparation of

this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency

charged with the responsib ility and duty to investigate

administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and

Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2003), and the rules

promulgated thereunder.

2. Respondent Musashe is, and has been at all times

material, a licensed real esta te broker, having been issued

license no. 265400 and license no. 3010224. He is the owner of

the Jander Group, which is also a licensed real estate broker,

and its business address is located at 1440 Howell Branch Road,

Winter Park, Florida 32789. At all times material hereto,

Respondent Musashe was licensed and operating as the qualifying

broker for the Jander Group. The Jander Group manages rental

property exclusively and is not involved in the sale of real

estate.

3. Respondent Musashe has been mana ging rental properties

in Florida since 1990. He, through his company, the Jander

Group, manages about 500 properties. He enters into contracts

with property owners to provide property management services.

He meets with the property owners to advise the m on improvements

to accommodate rentals. He advertises vacant properties;

interviews prospective residents; shows properties; takes

applications; screens applicants; and, upon ascertaining that

the applicant meets the minimum standards, enters into lease

agreements with tenants. He also performs the day - to - day

functions of collecting rent, accounting, paying bills,

accounting to the owner, and paying the owner the rental

proceeds. He keeps a percentage of the rent for his services.

4. From time to tim e, in the property management business,

a dispute develops between a tenant and a property owner. This

can involve a deposit by a prospective tenant or a security

deposit pursuant to a lease. In the early 1990's, the

Legislature amended Chapter 83, Flori da Statutes (2003), the

"Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act" (Landlord - Tenant

Act). Among other changes, it relieved licensed real estate

brokers from the requirements of reporting escrow disputes and

instituting settlement procedures as outlined in Subsection

475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), when there were deposit

disputes between residential landlords and tenants. Thereafter,

and until late 2001, the FREC's position on rental property

deposit disputes was that such disputes were addresse d by the

Landlord - Tenant Act and not subject to the provisions of Chapter

475, Florida Statutes (2003). This applied to disputes over

security deposits, as well as disputes over deposits by

prospective tenants.

5. In late 2001, without notice to brokers and associates

or rulemaking, the FREC changed its legal interpretation of

Subsections 475.25(1)(d) and 83.49(3)(d), Florida Statutes

(2003), with respect to disputes over pre - lease deposits on

rental property. In this case and at least one other case,

a dministrative complaints were filed against brokers who, faced

with a dispute between a prospective tenant and a property

owner, failed to give the FREC notice of the dispute and

requested one of the settlement procedures set forth in

Subsection 475.25(1)( d), Florida Statutes (2003).

6. In the early to mid - 1990s, in his business of managing

rental properties, when confronted with disputes between

prospective tenants and property owners, Respondent Musashe

routinely sent notice to the FREC and requested an escrow

disbursement order (EDO) to assist in determining how to settle

the dispute in accordance with Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida

Statutes (2003). The FREC responded that disputes involving

rental properties were to be resolved in accordance with th e

Landlord - Tenant Act and did not issue an EDO.

7. James Mitchell was the legal advisor to the FREC for

several years while in the Attorney General's (AG) office in the

1990s; and since that time, is the author of continuing

education materials which are approved by the FREC. In his

materials, he instructs real estate brokers that disputes

involving any type of rental deposits should be handled pursuant

to the Landlord - Tenant Act, and not in accordance with the

notice and settlement procedures set forth in Subsection

475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003). Mitchell is not familiar

with the particular facts or documents at issue in this case.

He did not give an opinion as to whether or not the facts of the

present case created a landlord and tenant relati onship between

Respondents and Tiffnye Castro.

8. During his tenure with the AG's office, Mitchell

applied Chapter 83, Florida Statutes (2003), to escrow dispute

issues in a manner consistent with the statutes' definition of

"tenant" and "rental agreemen t."

9. Section 83.49, Florida Statutes (2003), applies

"whenever money is deposited or advanced by a tenant on a rental

agreement or as advanced rent for other than the next immediate

rental period." Chapter 83, Florida Statutes (2003), defines,

"tenant " as "any person entitled to occupy a dwelling under a

rental agreement."

10. On May 10, 2002, Castro signed a rental application

with the Jander Group to rent a duplex at 12034 Waldenwoods in

Orlando. She gave the Jander Group a check for $25.00 as an

a pplication fee and $585.00 as a holding deposit.

11. According to the terms of the application, the holding

deposit was to be held by the broker while the application was

being processed. If the prospective tenant was deemed

qualified, she would receive a lease. During the time that the

broker was checking on the tenant's qualifications, the property

would be taken off of the rental market. If the tenant did not

meet the qualifications for renting the property, the holding

deposit would be returned to her. If the prospective tenant

qualified, but changed her mind and decided not to rent the

property, the property owner was entitled to keep the holding

deposit as liquidated damages for holding the property off the

rental market.

12. Subsequent to filli ng out the application, Castro was

approved as a tenant. In a dispute over the amount of rent to

be charged for the unit, Castro decided not to rent the property

and sent a demand letter to Respondent seeking the return of her

deposit. On June 20, 2002, the Jander Group sent Castro a

letter, in conformance with Subsection 83.49(3), Florida

Statutes (2003), giving her notice of its intent to keep her

deposit. Respondents accounted for the deposit to both parties

in the transaction; and subsequently, deliv ered the deposit to

the property owner.

13. Castro never signed a lease or possessed keys, and she

never had the right to occupy the property in question.

14. Respondent predicated the handling of the escrow

deposit on the assumption that he had a landlo rd and tenant

relationship with Castro.

15. Respondents never petitioned the FREC for a

declaratory statement regarding a dispute over a deposit by a

non - tenant on a lease application, rather than a rental

agreement.

16. Respondent Musashe elected not to follow Subsection

475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2003), requirements for five

reasons: his opinion that the issue was contractual; his own

reading of the law; his experience with professional education;

advice of private counsel; and the statements of law issued by

the AG's office regarding EDOs.

17. There is no evidence that Respondent Musashe was ever

specifically advised by a state agency that the landlord and

tenant procedure in Section 83.49, Florida Statutes (2003), was

applicable to earnest mon ey deposits made by a non - tenant as

part of an application that did not create a lease obligation.

18. Petitioners presented no evidence relative to

paragraphs 15 through 22 and 25 through 32 of the Amended

Administrative Complaint.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

19. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in this

proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.60 and

Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2003).

20. Petitioner is charged with the regulation of licensed

real estate brokers pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes

(2003), and is authorized to discipline those licensed

thereunder who violate the law.

21. License disciplinary proceedings are penal in nature,

State ex. rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission , 281

So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973), and must be construed strictly in favor

of the one against whom the penalty would be imposed. Munch v.

Department of Profession Regulation, Division of Real Estate ,

592 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Fleisc hmann v. Department

of Professional Regulation , 441 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

The standard of proof required in this matter is that relevant

and material findings of fact must be supported by clear and

convincing evidence of record. Department of B anking and

Finance v. Osborne Stern & Co ., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996).

Petitioner has the burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence each of the allegations in the Administrative

Complaint. Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

22. S ubsections 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes

(2003), as it pertains to the alleged facts in this matter,

reads in pertinent part:

(1) The commission may deny an

application for licensure, registration, or

permit, or renewal thereof; may place a

lic ensee, registrant, or permittee on

probation; may suspend a license,

registration, or permit for a period not

exceeding 10 years; may revoke a license,

registration, or permit; may impose an

administrative fine not to exceed $1,000 for

each count or separa te offense; and may

issue a reprimand, . . . if it finds that

the licensee: . . . .

* * *

(b) Has been guilty of fraud,

misrepresentation, concealment, false

promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing

by trick, scheme, or device, culpable

negligenc e, or breach of trust in any

business transaction . . . .

* * *

(d)1. Has failed to account or deliver to

any person, including a licensee under this

chapter, at the time which has been agreed

upon or is required by law or, in the

absence of a fixed t ime, upon demand of the

person entitled to such accounting and

delivery, any personal property such as

money, fund, deposit, check, draft, abstract

of title, mortgage, conveyance, lease, or

other document or thing of value, including

a share of a real esta te commission if a

civil judgment relating to the practice of

the licensee's profession has been obtained

against the licensee and said judgment has

not been satisfied in accordance with the

terms of the judgment within a reasonable

time, or any secret or illegal profit, or

any divisible share or portion thereof,

which has come into the licensee's hands and

which is not the licensee's property or

which the licensee is not in law or equity

entitled to retain under the circumstances.

However, if the licensee, in good faith,

entertains doubt as to what person is

entitled to the accounting and delivery of

the escrowed property, or if conflicting

demands have been made upon the licensee for

the escrowed property, which property she or

he still maintains in her or his escrow or

trust account, the licensee shall promptly

notify the commission of such doubts or

conflicting demands and shall promptly:

a. Request that the commission issue an

escrow disbursement order determining who is

entitled to the escrowed pro perty;

b. With the consent of all parties,

submit the matter to arbitration;

c. By interpleader or otherwise, seek

adjudication of the matter by a court; or

d. With the written consent of all

parties, submit the matter to mediation.

The dep artment may conduct mediation or may

contract with public or private entities for

mediation services. However, the mediation

process must be successfully completed

within 90 days following the last demand or

the licensee shall promptly employ one of

the o ther escape procedures contained in

this section. Payment for mediation will be

as agreed to in writing by the parties. The

department may adopt rules to implement this

section.

If the licensee promptly employs one of

the escape procedures contained herein and

abides by the order or judgment resulting

therefrom, no administrative complaint may

be filed against the licensee for failure to

account for, deliver, or maintain the

escrowed property. Under certain

circumstances, which the commission shall

s et forth by rule, a licensee may disburse

property from the licensee's escrow account

without notifying the commission or

employing one of the procedures listed in

sub - subparagraphs a. - d. If the buyer of a

residential condominium unit delivers to a

licens ee written notice of the buyer's

intent to cancel the contract for sale and

purchase, as authorized by s. 718.503, or if

the buyer of real property in good faith

fails to satisfy the terms in the financing

clause of a contract for sale and purchase,

the li censee may return the escrowed

property to the purchaser without notifying

the commission or initiating any of the

procedures listed in sub - subparagraphs a. - d.

2. Has failed to deposit money in an

escrow account when the licensee is the

purchaser of r eal estate under a contract

where the contract requires the purchaser to

place deposit money in an escrow account to

be applied to the purchase price if the sale

is consummated. . . .

23. Chapter 83, Florida Statutes (2003), the Landlord -

Tenant Act, sets forth a procedure for handling deposits in

landlord - tenant transactions. It requires a landlord to write a

letter to the tenant in a form set forth in the statute,

advising them of any claims against the deposit. Subsection

83.49(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), further specifically

provides:

(d) Compliance with this section by an

individual or business entity authorized to

conduct business in this state, including

Florida - licensed real estate brokers and

sales associates, shall constitute

compliance w ith all other relevant Florida

Statutes pertaining to security deposits

held pursuant to a rental agreement or other

landlord - tenant relationship. Enforcement

personnel shall look solely to this section

to determine compliance. This section

prevails over any conflicting provisions in

chapter 475 and in other sections of the

Florida Statutes, and shall operate to

permit licensed real estate brokers to

disburse security deposits and deposit money

without having to comply with the notice and

settlement proce dures contained in

s. 475.25(1)(d).

24. The language of Section 83.49, Florida Statutes

(2003), is not the model of clarity with regard to whether it

applies to pre - lease deposits. It is clear that its provisions

preempt any other contrary rental agree ment or other landlord -

tenant relationship. Further, the FREC's earlier interpretation

would indicate that this section does apply to pre - rental

deposits.

25. However, Petitioner now argues that since a lease was

never signed, there was no landlord and tenant relationship; and

thus, this provision of the Landlord - Tenant Act would not apply.

Certainly, the FREC is entitled to change its interpretation of

the statute that it administers.

26. A party who seeks an exemption to a statute bears the

burden o f proving those facts that would bring him within the

defined exception. Armstrong v. Ormond in the Pines , 734 So. 2d

596, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Respondents take the position

that since the application clearly evidences the parties' intent

to create a landlord and tenant relationship, the fact that the

lease was not executed does not change the nature of the

transaction in question. It was the first step in creating a

landlord and tenant relationship.

27. In addition, Respondent seeks to invoke est oppel

against a government entity and relies on Council Brothers v.

City of Tallahassee , 634 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), wherein

the First District Court of Appeal held:

The elements which must be present for

application of estoppel are: "(1) a

rep resentation as to a material fact that is

contrary to a later - asserted position;

(2) reliance on that representation; and

(3) a change in position detrimental to the

party claiming estoppel, caused by the

representation and reliance thereon . . ."

As a ge neral rule, estoppel will not apply

to mistaken statements of the law, . . . but

may be applied to erroneous representations

of fact . . . Equitable estoppel will

apply against a governmental entity "only

in rare instances and under exceptional

circumstan ces . . ." In proper

circumstances, the doctrine "may be

invoked against a municipality as if it

were an individual . . ." The reasonable

expectation of every citizen "that he will

be dealt with fairly by his government," can

form the basis for applicati on of equitable

estoppel against a government entity . . .

One seeking to invoke the doctrine of

estoppel against the government first must

establish the usual elements of estoppel,

and then must demonstrate the existence of

affirmative conduct by the gov ernment which

goes beyond mere negligence, must show that

the governmental conduct will cause serious

injustice, and must show that the

application of estoppel will not unduly harm

the public interest . . . .

Id. at 266 (citations omitted). The court app lied the principle

of estoppel to the appellee because its official told the

appellant, a building contractor, that it was exempt from system

charges on future construction and the appellant detrimentally

relied upon that representation. Id. at 267. Late r, the

appellee changed its position and sought to impose the charges.

Id. The court determined that the elements of estoppel were

met, and the appellee was estopped from imposing the charges.

Id.

28. Respondents also rely on Lamar Advertising v.

Depar tment of Transportation , 559 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA

1990). In this case, the appellee notified appellant that its

sign permit, issued three years earlier, would be revoked

because the sign violated Subsection 479.11(4), Florida Statutes

(2003), prohibit ing signs within 100 feet of a public park.

Id. at 241. The evidence showed that the appellee's method of

measuring had changed between 1985 and 1988. Id. at 243. The

court found that the fact scenario of the case brought:

[I]s within the purview of th e principle of

[equitable estoppel] law enunciated in Tri -

State Systems, Inc. v. Department of

Transportation , 500 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA

1986), and cases cited therein. That is,

"[a]lthough DOT may revoke a permit for the

reasons stated in the statute, it may not do

so because DOT's interpretation of that

statute has subsequently changed." 500

So. 2d at 183.

Id.

29. In the cases above, the government was estopped, as to

the appellant, from changing its interpretation or application

of a statute. See Council Brothers , 634 So. 2d at 265 (where

the record indicated confusion both in the construction industry

generally and in various departments of the appellee, as to the

applicability under Section 235.26, Florida Statutes (2003), of

systems charges to projects having an educational purpose).

Additionally, as in the cases above, each of the elements of

estoppel is present.

30. The FREC, by earlier taking the position that brokers

need not comply with the notice and settlement provisions of

Subsection 4 67.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), made a

material statement of fact that is contrary to its current

position. Respondent Musashe, in reliance on this statement of

fact, did not follow the provisions in Section 475.25, Florida

Statutes (2003). He inst ead complied with the Landlord - Tenant

Act related to deposits. Clearly, it would be unjust to

penalize Respondent Musashe for conduct when he had been told by

the FREC that such conduct was proper. Finally, because the

FREC seeks to penalize Respondent M usashe for prior conduct,

application of estoppel in this case will not cause public harm.

31. The Amended Administrative Complaint sets forth

descriptions of three separate, but similar, rental deposit

transactions involving three different prospective t enants.

Each one of those factual scenarios is followed by four

statutory charges against the Jander Group. The four charges,

which are repeated six times (three for each Respondent), are as

follows:

A. Failing to account and deliver funds in

violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida

Statutes (2003).

B. Failure to provide written notification to

the FREC within 15 business days of the party's last

demand in violation of Florida Administrative Code

Rule 61J2 - 10.32(1)(a) and, therefore, in violati on of

Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2003).

C. Failure to institute use of the settlement

procedures as set forth in Subsection 475.25(1)(d)1.,

Florida Statutes (2003), within 30 business days after

the last demand in violation of Florida Adm inistrative

Code Rule 61J2 - 10.032(1)(a) and, therefore, in

violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes

(2003).

D. Fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false

pretenses, and dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or

devise, culpable negligence, o r breach of trust in any

business transaction in violation of Subsection

475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003).

32. For the reasons set forth above, Respondents cannot be

disciplined for failing to notify the FREC of the rental deposit

disputes or for fai ling to institute one of the settlement

procedures, as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint

in Counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 14. Respondents complied with

the provisions of the Landlord - Tenant Act, which specifically

preempt compliance with th e notice and settlement procedures set

forth in Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003).

Further, the FREC is estopped from taking action for conduct,

which it earlier condoned.

33. With respect to Counts 1, 5, 9, and 13 (failure to

account and deliver), Respondents likewise cannot be found

guilty. The evidence failed to show any failure to account or

deliver funds, and there was no allegation in the factual

recitation of the Amended Administrative Complaint that either

of Respondents failed to properly account or deliver funds. A

"failure to account" violation requires an allegation and proof

that the person making the demand was, in fact, entitled to

deliver funds. Golub v. Department of Professional Regulation ,

450 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1 984). There was no such

allegation, nor proof offered. And further, in order to find

that a real estate broker has violated this statute, an

intentional act must be proven before a violation can be found.

Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real

Estate , 592 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The evidence does

not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents

committed an intentional act in violation of the statutes.

34. With respect to the remaining counts, Counts 9

through 24, all charging Respondents with fraud,

misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses,

and dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable

negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, the

allegations, as we ll as the proof, cannot support a finding of

such violations. There were no factual allegations in the

Amended Administrative Complaint alleging such misconduct, and

the evidence submitted at hearing did not show any such

violations.

RECOMMENDATION

Base d on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and

Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final

order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed

against Responde nts Nicholas Anthony Musashe and The Jander

Group, Inc.

DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2004, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative He arings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 11th day of August, 200 4.

COPIES FURNISHED :

William M. Furlow, Esquire

Akerman Senterfitt

106 East College Avenue, Suite 1200

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Jason W. Holtz, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street

Suite N - 801, North Tower

Orlando, Florida 32801 - 1757

Juana Watkins, Acting Director

Division of Real Estate

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street

Suite 802, North

Orlando, Florida 32801

Leon Biegalski, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. A ny exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.