04-001593 Florida Commission On Human Relations, On Behalf Of Ida Heaps vs. Barbara Strickland Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, September 28, 2004.

Summary: The evidence showed that Respondent discriminated against Heaps, who is Caucasian, because her live-in boyfriend and the father of her children is African-American. Recommend the award of damages.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN )

RELATIONS, on behalf of IDA )

HEAPS, )

)

Petitioner, ) Case No. 04 - 1593

)

vs. )

)

BARBARA STRICKLAND, )

)

Respondent. )

)

R ECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, this case came on for formal hearing

before Administrative Law Judge Diane Cleavinger, on July 22,

2004, in Tavares, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Vicki D. Johnson, Esquire

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent: John Merrit, Esquire

1500 East Orange Avenue

Eustis, Florida 32726 - 4399

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the Respondent discriminated agains t Ida Heaps in

violation of the Fair Housing Act and entitlement to any award

therefor.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 15, 2002, Ida Heaps filed a complaint with

Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and with the U.S.

Department of Housing a nd Urban Development (HUD) alleging that,

Respondent Barbara Strickland, discriminated against her, on the

basis of race, in violation of Section 760.23(1), Florida

Statutes, and 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(a). An investigation of

the complaint was made by FCH R. On January 15, 2004, the

Commission issued its determination that there was reasonable

cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had

occurred in violation of Section 760.23(1), Florida Statutes.

On April 26, 2004, FCHR issued a Notice of Failure of

Conciliation. On April 26, 2004, the FCHR filed a Petition for

Relief on behalf of Ms. Heaps. The case was forwarded to the

Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing

on the matter.

At the hearing, the Petitioner p resented four witnesses and

offered five exhibits into evidence. The Respondent presented

three witnesses, but did not offer any exhibits into evidence.

After the hearing, both Petitioner and Respondent filed

Proposed Recommended Orders on August 10, 200 4, and August 11,

2004, respectively.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent Barbara Strickland owns several houses in

Sorrento, Florida. She has rented these houses for the past 15

to 20 years. During the entire period of time that

Ms. Strickland has rent ed property, she has rented to Hispanics,

but she has never rented to African - Americans.

2. Ms. Strickland placed an advertisement in the July 3,

2002, Triangle Shopping Guide . The advertisement listed a four -

bedroom, doublewide mobile home for rent, for $500 per month and

a $500 deposit. The subject house is located on Church Street

in Sorrento. Ms. Strickland and her husband had lived in the

house until 1997. It had recently been renovated and had new

carpet installed in preparation for renting th e home.

3. On July 4, 2002, Ida Heaps, who is white, and her

boyfriend, Al Greene, who is black, saw the ad in the newspaper

while shopping at a grocery store in Sorrento. Ms. Heaps went

to a pay phone at the grocery store, called the telephone number

listed in the ad and spoke with Ms. Strickland. Ms. Heaps held

the telephone so that Mr. Greene could hear the conversation.

4. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene live together and have a long -

term family relationship. They have four children ages 5 years,

2 and 1/2 years, 14 months, and 3 months.

5. During this phone conversation, Ms. Strickland gave

Ms. Heaps information about the house, including the address.

Ms. Heaps testified that Ms. Strickland asked whether Ms. Heaps

was black; and Ms. Strickland stated, "I do not rent to blacks,"

or words to that effect. Ms. Heaps told Ms. Strickland that she

was not black, but that her boyfriend was. Mr. Greene heard

this comment, became upset and walked away from the telephone.

He was no longer interested in the house because of

Ms. Strickland's comments about race. Ms. Heaps persuaded him

to, at least, go by to see the house.

6. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene drove to the address where the

subject house is located. The house was spacious, with enough

room for Mr. Greene to have an office for his lawn care business

and a large fenced yard that they felt would be ideal for their

small children. The house also was located in a central area

that provided easy access to major roadways and the areas where

Mr. Green e's lawn care customers are located.

7. Because of the home’s attributes Ms. Heaps talked

Mr. Greene into attempting to rent the house because she was

hoping that Ms. Strickland would see that "we were good people"

and would rent to them. Indeed, Ms. H eaps’ and Mr. Greene’s

rental history shows that they have rented houses for at least

five years before changing locations and have been at their

current residence for at least 2 years. Ms. Heaps returned to

the store to call Respondent. Ms. Heaps told M s. Strickland she

had seen the house and was very interested in renting the house

and was prepared to give Ms. Strickland a deposit on the house

immediately. However, because Ms. Strickland had to take a

family member to a medical appointment she could no t meet with

Ms. Heaps that day. Ms. Heaps told Ms. Strickland she would be

going out of town for a few days and she would call

Ms. Strickland upon her return to see if the house was still

available.

8. Sometime in early July 2002, Ms. Strickland was at the

Eagle Club, a social club, talking with her friend Carol Ann

Stone. Ms. Stone told her that she knew a lady, by the name of

Pat Williams Torres, who was looking for a place to rent.

Ms. Stone felt Ms. Torres was very responsible and would make a

goo d tenant for the Church Street house.

9. Ms. Strickland, Ms. Stone, and Ms. Torres met at the

house on July 8, 2002, so that Ms. Torres could see the house.

Ms. Torres was interested in renting the house, but had to leave

town to check on her property in South Dakota that was being

threatened by a large wild - fire. Ms. Strickland, tentatively,

agreed to hold the house for her.

10. Ms. Strickland agreed to hold the house for Ms. Torres

because she was not in a hurry to rent it since her son had

taken the air conditioner out of the house and she needed to

replace it. Ms. Strickland also preferred renting to Ms. Torres

instead of Ms. Heaps because she felt Ms. Torres would take

better care of the house. Ms. Strickland testified she was

reluctant to ren t to Ms. Heaps because Ms. Heaps "had small

children." Ms. Strickland testified that she did not know it

was illegal to discriminate against families with children.

However, no contract or deposit was placed on the house.

Therefore, Ms. Strickland felt free to rent the house to another

interested party.

11. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene stayed in Georgia for several

days. After returning from Georgia, on July 11, 2002, Ms. Heaps

called Ms. Strickland to inquire about the house. Ms. Heaps was

at home when s he made this call. Also present at the house were

Mr. Greene, and Ms. Heaps' mother, Marlene Heaps. Ms. Heaps

testified that Ms. Strickland told her and kept stressing that

she was holding the house for a lady named "Pat Torres," whose

mother or sister w as in a wheelchair. After speaking with

Ms. Strickland, Ms. Heaps talked with her mother and stated she

was suspicious of the reasons that Ms. Strickland was giving

about the house. Approximately 15 minutes after the first call

Ms. Heaps asked her mother if she could use her cell phone to

call Ms. Strickland back. Ms. Heaps called Ms. Strickland on

the cell phone, disguised her voice, identified herself as

Marlene and asked about the house. Ms. Strickland gave her

information about the house, including the address, and that the

house was available to rent. The cell phone records for

Ms. Heaps' mother's cell phone corroborate that Ms. Heaps call

to Ms. Strickland was made on July 11, 2002, at 11:26 a.m.

Ms. Heaps’ mother also corroborated the cell phone call and

ensuing conversation. Ms. Heaps then called Ms. Strickland

immediately back on her home phone and informed Ms. Strickland

that she had just called using Marlene's phone and stated that

Ms. Strickland did not want to rent to her because her boyfr iend

was black. She told Ms. Strickland she would not get by with

it. Ms. Heaps was upset and hung up the phone.

12. About one week after July 11, 2002, Ms. Heaps went on

the Internet and obtained information about housing

discrimination on HUD's webs ite. Ms. Heaps testified that she

submitted information to HUD and that several months later HUD

informed her that the case was being referred to FCHR for

investigation.

13. Ms. Torres left in late July 2002 and came back to

Florida in mid - August. Ms. T orres testified that while she was

in South Dakota, she had an unexpected truck repair. This

unexpected expense is the reason Ms. Torres did not have the

money to rent the house from Ms. Strickland.

14. Ms. Strickland testified Ms. Heaps called her sev eral

times after returning from Georgia inquiring about the house.

She thought the calls involving the cell phone occurred in

August. However, Ms. Strickland had also told the investigator

for FCHR that the cell phone call had occurred in July. After

Ms . Heaps called inquiring about the house, Ms. Strickland "got

to thinking" that maybe she should check with Ms. Torres to see

if Ms. Torres still wanted to rent the house. Ms. Strickland

testified she had misplaced Ms. Torres' phone number so she had

to c all Ms. Stone to get the number. After getting the phone

number Ms. Strickland called Ms. Torres, who told her she could

not rent the home. Ms. Strickland testified that about 15

minutes later, she received a call from "Marlene."

Ms. Strickland stated th at the house was now available, and she

informed "Marlene" of the home’s availability. Ms. Strickland

testified that a few minutes after this call, Ms. Heaps called

back and told her that her sister or mother, "Marlene," had just

called. However, Lisa Su therland, the investigator for FCHR,

reviewed Ms. Strickland's phone bills for the months of June,

July, and August 2002. There were no records of a long - distance

call to South Dakota in any of the reviewed months’ bills.

Given the cell phone records, Ms . Heaps' mother's corroboration

of Ms. Heaps' testimony, the conflicting statements made by

Ms. Strickland regarding the time of these calls and the lack of

any records of a call to South Dakota, Ms. Strickland is not

credible in regard to either the seque nce of events regarding

the cell phone call or the continued holding of the house for

Ms. Torres. Her rationale for the change in the availability of

the house in between the calls is simply pretextual.

15. Ms. Strickland’s husband met Aaron Hoffman, who worked

at an air - conditioning company. In September 2002,

Ms. Strickland rented the house to Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman is

white. After Mr. Hoffman moved out, Ms. Torres began renting

the subject house from Ms. Strickland for $510 in rent.

16. In Sept ember 2002, Ms. Heaps found a two - bedroom house

in Tavares that she rented for $620 per month and paid a $580

deposit. Her family continues to rent this property. Ms. Heaps

testified that if she had rented the house from Ms. Strickland,

she planned to li ve there for several years. The Tavares house

is not as large, costs more to rent, does not have a fenced

yard, and is about eight miles farther away from the areas where

Mr. Greene's customers are located. Ms. Heaps is entitled to

the difference in rent al and deposit values between the two

properties for the period of time she would have reasonably

rented Ms. Strickland’s property. However, the evidence did not

demonstrate that the eight - mile difference had any significant

impact on the mileage otherwis e driven by Ms. Heaps or

Mr. Greene. No other compensable damages were shown by the

evidence.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

17. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

proceedings. § 120.57(1), Fl a. Stat.

18. Under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (“Act”), Sections

760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes, it is unlawful to

discriminate in the sale or rental of housing. Section 760.23

states, in part:

(1) It is unlawful to refuse to sell or

rent af ter the making of a bona fide offer,

to refuse to negotiate for the sale or

rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable

or deny a dwelling to any person because of

race, color, national origin, sex, handicap,

familial status, or religion.

* * *

19. In t he instant case, Ms. Heaps has alleged, that

Ms. Strickland discriminated against her by declining to rent to

her because of her long - term family relationship with her

boyfriend, who is black.

20. In cases involving a claim of rental housing

discriminat ion on the basis of race, such as this one, the

complainant has the burden of proving a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. A prima

facie showing of rental housing discrimination can be made by

establishing that the comp lainant applied to rent an available

unit for which he or she was qualified, the application was

rejected, and, at the time of such rejection, the complainant

was a member of a class protected by the Act. See Soules v.

U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Deve lopment , 967 F.2d 817, 822

(2d Cir. 1992). Failure to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination ends the inquiry. See Ratliff v. State , 666 So.

2d 1008, 1012 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff’d , 679 So. 2d, 1183

(1996)( citing Arnold v. Burger Queen Systems , 5 09 So. 2d 958

(Fla. 2d DCA 1987)).

21. If, however, the complainant sufficiently establishes

a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Respondent to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action. If the Respondent satisfie s this burden, then the

complainant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the reason asserted by the Respondent is, in fact, merely a

pretext for discrimination. See Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1

& 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied , 513 U.S. 808, 115 S. Ct. 56, 130 L. Ed. 2d 15

(1994)(“Fair housing discrimination cases are subject to the

three - part test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,

411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 ( 1973).”);

Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, on

Behalf of Herron v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir.

1990)(“We agree with the ALJ that the three - part burden of proof

test developed in McDonnell Douglas [for claims brought under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act] governs in this case

[involving a claim of discrimination in violation of the federal

Fair Housing Act].”). Pretext can be shown by inconsistencies

and/or contradictions in testimony. Blackwell , supra ; Woodward

v. Fanboy , L.L.C. , 298 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002); Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133 S. Ct. 2097,

2108 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). "Discriminatory intent may be

established through direct or indirect circumstantial evidence."

Johnson v. Hamr ick , 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1377 ( N.D. Ga. 2001).

22. " Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to

inference or presumption." King v. La Playa - De Varadero

Restaurant , No. 02 - 2502, 2 003 WL 435084 (Fla. DOAH

2003)(Recommended Order).

23. "Direct evidence of intent is often unavailable."

Shealy v. City of Albany, Ga. , 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir.

1996). For this reason, those who claim to be victims of

discrimination "are permitted to establish their cases through

inferential and circumstantial proof." Kline v. Tennessee

Valley Authority , 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). However,

proof that, in essence, amounts to no more than mere speculation

and self - serving belief on the part of the complainant

concerning the motives of the Respondent is insufficient,

standing alone, to establish a prima facie case of intentional

discrimination. See Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc. , 270 F.3d 94, 104

(2d Cir. 2001) ("The record is barren of any direct e vidence of

racial animus. Of course, direct evidence of discrimination is

not necessary. However, a jury cannot infer discrimination from

thin air. Plaintiffs have done little more than cite to their

mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it mu st have

been related to their race. This is not sufficient.")( citations

omitted.); Reyes v. Pacific Bell , 21 F.3d 1115 (Table), 1994 WL

107994 *4 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994)("The only such evidence [of

discrimination] in the record is Reyes's own testimony that i t

is his belief that he was fired for discriminatory reasons.

This subjective belief is insufficient to establish a prima

facie case."); Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd. , 924 F.2d

93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991)(" Little points to his own subjective

belief tha t age motivated Boyd. An age discrimination

plaintiff's own good faith belief that his age motivated his

employer's action is of little value."); Elliott v. Group

Medical & Surgical Service , 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir.

1983)("We are not prepared to hold t hat a subjective belief of

discrimination, however genuine, can be the basis of judicial

relief."); Jackson v. Waguespack , 2002 WL 31427316 ( E.D. La.

2002) ("[T]he Plaintiff has no evidence to show Waguespack was

motivated by racial animus. Speculation and belief are

insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext nor can

pretext be established by mere conclusory statements of a

Plaintiff that feels she has been discriminated against. The

Plaintiff's evidence on this issue is entirely conclusory, she

was the only black person seated there. The Plaintiff did not

witness Defendant Waguespack make any racial remarks or racial

epithets."); Coleman v. Exxon Chemical Corp. , 162 F. Supp. 2d

593, 622 ( S.D. Tex. 2001)(" Plaintiff's conclusory, subjective

belief th at he has suffered discrimination by Cardinal is not

probative of unlawful racial animus."); Cleveland - Goins v. City

of New York , 1999 WL 673343 ( S.D. N.Y. 1999)(" Plaintiff has

failed to proffer any relevant evidence that her race was a

factor in defendant s' decision to terminate her. Plaintiff

alleges nothing more than that she 'was the only African -

American man [sic] to hold the position of administrative

assistant/secretary at Manhattan Construction.' (Compl.¶ 9.)

The Court finds that this single alleg ation, accompanied by

unsupported and speculative statements as to defendants'

discriminatory animus, is entirely insufficient to make out a

prima facie case or to state a claim under Title VII."); Umansky

v. Masterpiece International Ltd. , 1998 WL 433779 ( S.D. N.Y.

1998)(" Plaintiff proffers no support for her allegations of race

and gender discrimination other than her own speculations and

assumptions. The Court finds that plaintiff cannot demonstrate

that she was discharged in circumstances giving rise t o an

inference of discrimination, and therefore has failed to make

out a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination."); and

Lo v. F.D.I.C. , 846 F. Supp. 557, 563 ( S.D. Tex. 1994)(" Lo's

subjective belief of race and national origin discrimination is

legally insufficient to support his claims under Title VII.").

24. Under the direct evidence standard, a discriminatory

statement will support a finding of discrimination if there is a

causal link or nexus between the statement, and the prohibited

conduct , and the statement is not vague, ambiguous or isolated.

Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 285 F.3d 456, 478 (6th Cir. 2002).

A discriminatory statement may also be used as indirect evidence

of discrimination. Hasham v. California State Bd. of

Equalization , 200 F.3d 1035, 1049 - 50, (7th Cir. 2000). In

Hasham , the defendant argued that the manager's comment that he

couldn't understand the accent of a person from Pakistan was too

ambiguous to prove intentional discrimination. The Court stated

the defendant's a rgument might have some merit if it was solely

a direct proof case because remarks must be related to the

employment decision to evidence discriminatory intent. But, in

an "indirect" evidence case, "no one piece of evidence need

support a finding of "disc rimination, but rather the court must

take "the facts as a whole." Id. , citing Futrell v. JJ. Case ,

38 F.3d 342, 350 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, in a

circumstantial evidence case, a discriminatory comment by a non -

decision maker, along with the other e vidence in the case could

lead a jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination. Maggard v.

Danka Office Imaging Co. , 2000 WL 34030863 * 1 (N.D. Iowa 2000),

Madel v. FCI Marketing, Inc. , 116 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir.

1997), Hardin v. Hussmann Corp. , 45 F.3d 262, 266 (8th Cir.

1995). Unlike the employment situation involving frequent and

consistent contacts, in the housing context "where the parties

do not have such frequent and consistent contrac ts, in the

housing context," a so - called "isolated" remark is more

probative of racial animus than it might be in other

situations." Green v. Westgate Village , 2000 WL 562331 (N.D.

Ohio 2000)(manager made comment to white tenant that his friend

was a "bla ck whore"). See also Harris v. Itzhaki , 183 F.3d

1043, 1054 - 55 (9th Cir. 1999) (landlord's unpaid assistant made

comment that landlord did not rent to blacks).

25. In this case, there is direct evidence that

Ms. Strickland made a discriminatory statemen t. Both Ms. Heaps

and Mr. Greene testified that, during the initial call to

Ms. Strickland, Ms. Strickland asked, "Are you black?" and said

she did not rent to blacks.

26. The record also contains indirect evidence sufficient

to establish the four elem ents of a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination: 1) Ms. Heaps' boyfriend is a member of a

protected class; 2) Ms. Heaps applied for and was qualified to

rent the home; 3) Ms. Strickland did not approve the rental to

Ms. Heaps; and 4) The house remai ned available or was rented to

a person not in the protected category. See Blackwell , 908 F.2d

at 870.

27. There is undisputed testimony that Ms. Heaps wanted to

rent the house and offered to put a deposit on the house when

she spoke with Ms. Strickland. Ms. Heaps and Mr. Greene have

been making monthly rent payments of $620 since September 2002;

therefore, they were clearly qualified to rent Ms. Strickland's

house, which would have cost $120 per month less. It is also

undisputed that Ms. Strickland did not rent to Ms. Heaps and

Mr.Greene and ultimately rented the house to a white person.

28. Finally, Ms. Strickland’s assertion that she was

holding the subject property for Ms. Torres, who had indicated

an interest in the property is not credible and i s pretextual

based on the inconsistencies in the evidence, the corroboration

of Ms. Heaps' testimony and the lack of phone records regarding

a long - distance call to Ms. Torres. The evidence both direct

and circumstantial demonstrates that Ms. Strickland

d iscriminated against Ms. Heaps in violation of Chapter 760,

Florida Statutes. Therefore, Ms. Heaps is entitled to recover

any damages that she may have incurred as a result of

Ms. Strickland’s discriminatory behavior. See Woods - Drake v.

Lundy , 667 F.2d 1 198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982)(ruling that whites

have a cause of action when discriminatory actions are taken

against them because of their association with blacks;

Blackwell , 908 F.2d at 873 (holding white tenants to whom vendor

leased his house after refusin g to close purchase with black

purchasers were aggrieved persons under Fair Housing Act and

were entitled to recover damages).

29. FCHR seeks, on behalf of Ms. Heaps: 1) damages to

compensate Ms. Heaps for her economic loss; 2) attorney's fees

and costs; and 3) injunctive and equitable relief prohibiting

Ms. Strickland from violating the Fair Housing Act. Section

760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes, authorizes an award of

affirmative relief from the effects of a discriminatory

practice, including quantifiable damages and reasonable

attorney's fees and costs in addition to prohibition of further

discrimination.

30. Petitioner has shown that Ms. Heaps suffered economic

loss as a result of the discrimination. By denying Ms. Heaps

the opportunity to rent the sub ject house, Ms. Heaps was forced

to find alternative housing, which was less desirable and which

cost more in monthly rent and the required deposit. The

evidence demonstrated that since September, 2002, Ms. Heaps has

paid $120.00 more in rent than she wou ld have paid had she been

able to rent Ms. Strickland’s home. Ms. Heaps also had to pay

$80.00 more as a deposit on her current home. Based on

Ms. Heap's rental history, she would have more likely than not

have stayed at Ms. Strickland’s home for at leas t five years.

Therefore, Ms. Heaps should be awarded damages in the amount of

$7,200, which represents the monthly rent differential for 5

years plus $80 for the additional deposit. The evidence did not

reflect that the difference in location caused Ms. Heaps or

Mr. Greene to incur more mileage or vehicle expenses than they

otherwise would have. Therefore, no award should be made for

mileage.

31. Petitioner is also entitled to an award of attorney’s

fees and costs. Jurisdiction is reserved to determi ne

attorney's fees and costs should the parties be unable to agree

on such an award.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter an order finding Re spondent guilty of a discriminatory

housing practice against Ida Heaps in violation of Section

760.23(1), Florida Statutes, and prohibiting further unlawful

housing practices by Respondent; and directing Respondent to pay

to Ida Heaps within 30 business da ys from the date of the final

order $7,280.00.

DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2004, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

____ ________________________

DIANE CLEAVINGER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative H earings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 28th day of September, 2004.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Vicki D. Johnson, Esquire

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

John Merritt, Esquire

1500 East Orange Avenue

Eustis, Florida 32726 - 4399

Ida Heaps

15246 Old Hig hway 441

Tavares, Florida 32778

Cecil Howard, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.