04-002414RX Goode &Quot;Buddy&Quot; Yeoman vs. Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Friday, December 3, 2004.

Summary: An adopted rule repealed by the legislative action cannot be challenged under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. A related agency statement was not a rule.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GOODE “BUDDY” YEOMAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

and )

)

KENNETH GARY SMITH, )

)

Intervenor, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 04 - 2414RX

)

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY )

LICENSING BOARD, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

This case is pending before Administrative Law Judge

Michael Parrish of the Division of Administrative Hearings for

the preparation of a Final Order on the basis of stipulated

facts and stipulated documents, all parties having stipulated

to the waiver of an evidentiary hearing.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Timothy Atkinson, Esquire

Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Cole & Bryant, P.A.

Post Office Box 1110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 1110

For Intervenor: Martin P. McDonnell, Esquire

Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell

& Hoffman, P.A.

Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: Diane L. Guillemette, Esuqire

Lee Ann Gustafson, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

This is a rule challenge proceeding in which the

following specific issues are presented:

(1) Wheth er Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006

is an invalid delegation of legislative authority, and

(2) Whether application of the provisions of Section

112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by the Construction Industry

Licensing Board in its quasi - judicia l capacity constitutes an

agency statement of general applicability that requires

rulemaking by the agency.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The events leading up to the initial filing of this case

began when the Petitioner, Goode “Buddy” Yeoman, filed an

applicatio n for initial licensure as a contractor. That

application was denied based on his failure to provide proof

that his civil rights had been restored. Shortly following

notice of the denial of his application, the Petitioner filed

a challenge to Florida Adm inistrative Code Rule 61G4 -

12.006(2), as well as a challenge to an agency statement

defined as a rule. The events leading up to the Intervenor's

interest in this case began when the Intervenor, Kenneth Gary

Smith received a letter from the Department of B usiness and

Professional Regulation (DBPR) requesting additional documents

related to his application for licensure as a contractor. The

requested documents related to proof that his civil rights had

been restored. The Intervenor's interest in the outcom e of

this proceeding is, in essence, identical to the interest of

the Petitioner. The Intervenor has adopted the Petitioner's

position on all matters at issue in this case.

Shortly before the date scheduled for the final hearing,

a case management confer ence was conducted in this case.

Counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent participated in

the conference. At the time of the conference the Intervenor

had not yet been granted party status and, in any event,

counsel for the Intervenor was unable to attend the

conference. During the course of the case management

conference, counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent

agreed that this case could be submitted for disposition on a

stipulated record without the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Such co unsel also advised that they had no objection to the

proposed intervention and that they believed that the

Intervenor would be agreeable to all of the stipulations

proposed by the other two parties. Following the case

management conference, on August 24, 2004, the undersigned

issued an Order Canceling Hearing and Scheduling Future

Events. That order included the following:

The Petitioner and the Respondent have no

objection to the intervention sought by

Kenneth Gary Smith.

The Petitioner and the Resp ondent have

entered into an agreement to waive an

evidentiary hearing in this case and to

submit the case on a stipulated record

consisting of the pleadings in this case, a

stipulation of facts, and copies of

specific documents which will be filed with

the stipulation of facts. The Petitioner

and the Respondent have also agreed to

dates for the filing of the stipulated

facts and documents and for the submission

of their respective proposed final orders.

The Petitioner and the Respondent

believe, but are not certain, that the

Intervenor will join in the agreements

described above.

Upon consideration of all of the

foregoing, it is ORDERED:

* * *

3. That the Petitioner and the

Respondent shall file their stipulation of

facts with documents attache d by no later

than the close of business on Friday,

August 27, 2004.

4. That all parties shall file their

respective proposed final orders by no

later than the close of business on

Thursday, September 16, 2004.

5. That Kenneth Gary Smith is hereby

granted status as an Intervenor. The

Intervenor will be deemed to have agreed to

all matters to which the Petitioner and

Respondent have agreed and stipulated,

unless, by no later than August 31, 2004,

the Intervenor files and serves a written

notice sett ing forth the Intervenor's

specific disagreements.

6. The Petitioner and the Respondent

will be deemed to have stipulated that the

Intervenor applied for a license as a

general contractor, that the Board advised

the Intervenor that his application cann ot

be approved without "proof that civil

rights have been restored," that the

Intervenor has not supplied such proof, and

that the Board would have approved the

Intervenor's application for a license as a

general contractor, but for the failure of

the Inte rvenor to submit "proof that civil

rights have been restored," unless, by no

later than August 31, 2004, the Petitioner

and/or the Respondent files and serves a

written notice setting forth their specific

disagreements.

7. If any party files a notice o f the

type described in paragraphs 5 and 6 above,

a case management conference will be

conducted by telephone at the earliest

practicable time to fashion a process for

the resolution of any remaining factual

disputes.

Following the issuance of the August 24, 2004, order,

none of the parties filed any notice of any disagreement

regarding any of the matters addressed in the order. At the

request of the parties, the deadline for filing their

respective proposed final orders was extended to September 23,

200 4. Thereafter, all parties filed timely proposed final

orders, which have been carefully considered during the

preparation of this Final Order. 1

FINDINGS OF FACT 2

1. Petitioner, Goode “Buddy” Yeoman, is 64 years of age,

and is an individual who has appl ied to the CILB for an

individual certified general contracting license.

2. Petitioner Yeoman has a prior felony conviction and

his civil rights have not been restored.

3. Petitioner Yeoman's felony conviction was imposed

approximately 20 years ago i n 1985 and was unrelated to the

contracting practice or trade.

4. Petitioner Yeoman was required to, and did, submit a

completed form DBPR CILB 4359.

5. Petitioner’s application was denied by the

Construction Industry Licensing Board (“CILB” or “Board” ), and

on June 14, 2004, the CILB entered its “Notice of Intent to

Deny” Petitioner Yeoman’s application for initial certified

general contractor. Petitioner Yeoman has separately filed a

petition for administrative proceedings regarding the CILB's

denial of his initial certified general contractor license.

As such, by operation of law no final agency action has to

date been taken on Petitioner Yeoman's application. The

license denial proceeding has been continued. This will allow

the parties in that ca se to have the benefit of the final

order in this rule challenge case.

6. The sole basis for the denial of Petitioner Yeoman’s

application was that his civil rights had not been restored.

7. The CILB’s “Notice of Intent to Deny” stated: “You

have not provided proof to the Board that your civil rights

have been fully restored subsequent to a previous felony

conviction as required by Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida

Statutes.”

8. The requirement that a restoration of civil rights be

obtained which is exp ressed in the challenged existing rule

and the challenged agency statement defined as a rule

negatively affect Petitioner Yeoman’s substantial interests by

denying him a certified general contracting license. As such,

Petitioner Yeoman has standing to bri ng his challenge to

Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006(2) and the agency

statement defined as a rule (Form “DBPR CILB 4359").

9. Intervenor Smith's felony conviction was for a drug

offense in 1989 and was unrelated to the contracting business

o r trade.

10. Intervenor Smith filed an application with the CILB,

including form “DBPR CILB 4359.” On May 4, 2004, the CILB

refused to consider his application because his civil rights

have not been restored. As such, Intervenor Smith has

standing to b ring his challenge to Florida Administrative Code

Rule 61G4 - 12.006(2), and the agency statement defined as a

rule (Form "DBPR CILB 4359").

11. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006 was

adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, on

January 6, 1980, and lists and incorporates by reference

DBPR/CILB/025 (Rev. 01/01) entitled “Certifications:

Certification Change of Status.” This agency form is

applicable to applications for certified licenses and change

of status applications, and requires in dividuals applying for

initial contracting licenses to provide proof that their civil

rights have been restored if they have been convicted of a

felony. The form states in the “Financial

Responsibility/Background Questions” section: “NOTE: IF YOU,

THE APP LICANT/LICENSEE, HAVE HAD A FELONY CONVICTION, PROOF

THAT YOUR CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RESTORED WILL BE REQUIRED

PRIOR TO LICENSURE.”

12. Form “DBPR CILB 4359" has an effective date of

March 24, 2004, but has not been adopted as a rule under

Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The form is available for

download on the agency’s web - page as “Initial Issuance of

Licensure for Certified Contractor Application Package.”

Applicants for licensure as a contractor must submit form

“DBPR CILB 4359" to the DBPR.

13. W ithin the “DBPR CILB 4359" package is the form

“DBPR CILB 4357 - Qualified Business (QB) License Application

and Qualified Business Change of Status Application,” which

requires an applicant previously convicted of a felony to

provide proof that his/her ci vil rights have been restored.

This form states: “IF YOU HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY,

YOU MUST SUBMIT PROOF OF REINSTATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS,” and

also: “Note: If you, the applicant/licensee, have had a

felony conviction, proof that your civil right s have been

restored will be required prior to Licensure.”

14. Both the challenged Florida Administrative Code Rule

61G4 - 12.006(2) and the form “DBPR CILB 4359" are generally

applicable to every individual applying for a contracting

license from the CILB .

15. The CILB has previously approved applications for

initial licenses, and change of status licenses, to applicants

who did not have their civil rights fully restored, subject to

probation until the applicant's civil rights have been

restored.

16. N either the type of crime for which a felony

conviction has been imposed, the recency of the conviction,

nor the completion of any punishment, have been a factor in

the CILB’s denial of applications to individuals previously

convicted of a felony crime but whose civil rights have not

been fully restored. The sole reason for denial is the lack of

civil rights.

17. The lack of civil rights is the standard, expressed

in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006(2) and in

“DBPR CILB 4359," by which the CILB has denied contractor

license applications, including Petitioner Yeoman’s

application, and Intervenor Smith's application, under the

CILB’s interpretation of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida

Statutes.

18. The CILB has not revoked any previously granted

li censes due solely to a subsequent felony conviction and lack

of civil rights of any licensee.

19. The CILB is a collegial body composed of 18 members,

16 of whom are professionals and two of whom are consumer

members.

20. Each member is limited to two 4 - year terms, and no

member may serve more than two consecutive 4 - year terms.

21. If a member is appointed to fill an unexpired

vacancy, the new appointee may not serve for more than 11

years.

22. The current members of the Board, and their terms,

are as follows:

a. Elizabeth Karcher; term 01/10/02 - 10/31/04

b. Barry Kalmanson; term 11/01/02 - 10/31/07

c. Lee - En Chung; term 09/01/99 - 10/31/06

d. Paul Del Vecchio; term 01 - 10 - 02 - 10 - 31 - 05

e. Michelle Kane; term 01 - 10 - 02 - 10/31/05

f. Joan Brown ; term 03/14/00 - 10/31/07

g. Michael Blankenship; term 11/01/02 - 10/31/06

h. Carl Engelmeler; term 11/01/02 - 10/31/06

i. Jacqueline Watts; term 01/10/02 - 10/31/04

j. John Smith; term 11/01/02 - 10/31/06 (resigned

effective 11/01/04)

k. Raymo nd Holloway; term 01/10/02 - 10/31/05

l. Edward Weller; term 11/21/02 - 10/31/06

m. Thomas Thornton; term 08/16/04 - 10/31/07

n. Robert Stewart; term 08/16/04 - 10/31/07

o. Doris Bailey; term 08/16/04 - 10/31/05

23. A quorum (51 percent) of the appoint ed members of

the Board is necessary for the Board to conduct official

business.

24. The CILB meets 11 times each year.

25. On November 8, 1999, the CILB denied the application

of Michael A. Helish for the certification examination on the

grounds that his civil rights had not been restored. This

decision was per curiam affirmed in Helish v. Department of

Business and Professional Regulation , 766 So. 2d 1047 (Fla.

1st DCA 2000).

26. The CILB has previously approved applications for

initial licenses, a nd change of status licenses, to applicants

whose civil rights had not been fully restored, at times

subject to probation until the applicant’s civil rights have

been restored, as follows:

a. On June 14, 2004, the Respondent

granted an initial contracto r license to

Robert F. Jones, subject to probation until

his civil rights are fully restored.

b. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted

an initial contractor license to William P.

Campbell, subject to probation until his

civil rights are fully restore d.

c. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted

an initial contractor license to Glenn

Kasper, subject to probation until his

civil rights are fully restored.

d. On May 28, 2004, the Respondent granted

an initial contractor license to Danny

Mitchell, subject to probation until his

civil rights are fully restored.

e. On March 3, 2004, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

Timothy Burke, subject to probation until

his civil rights are fully restored.

f. On February 9, 2004, the R espondent

granted an initial contractor license to

Anthony Nicholas, Jr., subject to probation

and the condition that his civil rights be

fully restored within two years.

g. On June 25, 2003, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

Andr ew Dittenber, stating: “The Board

permitted licensure with conditions in this

case where applicant did not have his civil

rights restored, because of the number of

years that have passed since the conviction

and evidence that application for

restoration ha s been made.”

h. On June 25, 2003, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

Robert W. Fleming, stating: “The Board

permitted licensure with conditions in this

case where applicant did not have his civil

rights restored, because of the num ber of

years that have passed since the conviction

and evidence that application for

restoration has been made.”

i. On December 1, 2003, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

James D. Munroe, Jr., subject to probation

until his civil r ights are fully restored.

j. On October 21, 2002, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

Daryl F. Strickland subject to probation

and the condition that his civil rights be

fully restored within three years.

k. On September 4, 2001, the Respondent

granted an initial contractor license to

John Richard Brown, subject to probation

and the condition that his civil rights be

fully restored within three years. On June

24, 2004, the Respondent amended its

initial order and again placed John Richard

Brown’s license on probation until such

time as his civil rights are restored.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

27. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of

this case. §§ 120.56, 120.569, and 120 .57, Fla. Stat.

28. Both Petitioner Yeoman and Intervenor Smith have

standing to challenge Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 -

12.006 and the agency statement defined as a rule.

29. Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, with

exceptions not relevant h ere, defines the term "rule" as "each

agency statement of general applicability that implements,

interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the

procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes

any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any

information not specifically required by statute or by an

existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal

of a rule."

30. No agency has inherent rulemaking authority.

§ 120.54(1)(e), Fla. Stat.

31. Florida Administrative Co de Rule 61G4 - 12.006 is the

rule by which the Board incorporated forms to be used by

applicants for licensure. By Section 9 of Chapter 2001 - 278,

Laws of Florida, the Florida Legislature amended Section

455.213(1), Florida Statutes. The Legislature gave so le

authority to the DBPR to adopt forms to be submitted for

initial licensure and licensure renewal.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

the department is the sole authority for

determining the contents of any documents

to be submitted for initial licensure and

licensure renewal.

32. As a result of the amendment, the Board no longer

has legislative authority to adopt application forms for

licensure and licensure renewal. When a rule is superseded by

legislation enacted after the rule’s effective date, the rule

loses all force and effect as soon as such legislation becomes

law. As explained in Florida Department of Revenue v. A. Duda

& Sons, Inc. , 608 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), review

denied, 621 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1993):

. . . [A] confli ct between a statute and an

administrative rule, which rule was

promulgated prior to a statutory amendment

and enacted in reliance on case law

existing prior to the amendment, does not

give rise to an ambiguity in the statute.

In the event of a conflict b etween a

statute and an administrative regulation on

the same subject, the statute governs.

Nichol as v. Wainwright, 152 So.2d 458, 460

(Fla.1963) ; Canal Ins. Co. v. Continental

Casualty Co., 489 So.2d 136, 138 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1986) . A regulation is operative and

binding from its effective date "until it

is modified or superseded by subsequent

legislation . . . and it expires with the

repea l of the statute from which it gains

its life." Hulmes v. Division of

Retirement, Dept. of Admin., 418 So.2d 269,

270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) , review denied, 426

So.2d 26 (Fla.1983) . The regulation relied

on by Duda was superseded by the 1987

statutory amendment and was of no force or

effect on the date of Duda's conveyances.

Thus, no conf lict or ambiguity existed in

the instant case. To the contrary, the

plain statutory language governed.

33. The 2001 legislative amendment of Section

455.213(1), Florida Statutes, was, in effect, a legislative

repeal of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006. That

legislative amendment nullified the statutory provision that

authorized the Board to adopt the subject rule. The

nullification of the statutory authority for the rule of

necessity nullified the rule. In other words, as the court

said i n Duda , supra , the rule "expires with the repeal of the

statute from which it gains its life."

34. A rule that has no force or effect because it has

been modified or superseded by statute is, like a repealed

rule, no longer in existence in any meaningful sense. Section

120.56, Florida Statutes, does not authorize a challenge to a

rule that is no longer in existence. Department of Revenue v.

Sheraton Bal Harbour Association, Ltd. , 864 So. 2d 454 (Fla.

1st DCA 2003) Although Florida Administrative Code R ule 61G4 -

12.006 still appears in the text of the Florida Administrative

Code, for all practical purposes it is a nonexistent rule

because of the legislative amendment that had the effect of

repealing that rule. 3

35. The challenged text in Form DBPR CILB 4359 is not a

"rule" within the meaning of Section 120.52(15), Florida

Statutes, because it is not a "form which imposes any

requirement or solicits any information not specifically

required by statute or by an existing rule." Rather, Form

DBPR CILB 4359 is the means by which the Board obtains the

information it needs in order to comply with Section

112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Section 112.011(1)(b),

Florida Statutes, reads as follows, in pertinent part:

. . . [A] person whose civil rights have

been r estored shall not be disqualified to

practice, pursue, or engage in any

occupation, trade, vocation, profession, or

business for which a license, permit, or

certificate is required to be issued by

the state, any of its agencies or political

subdivisions, or any municipality solely

because of a prior conviction for a crime.

However, a person whose civil rights have

been restored may be denied a license,

permit, or certification to pursue,

practice, or engage in an occupation,

trade, vocation, profession, or business by

reason of the prior conviction for a crime

if the crime was a felony or first degree

misdemeanor and directly related to the

specific occupation, trade, vocation,

profession, or business for which the

license, permit, or certificate is sought.

(Emphasis supplied.)

36. The Board argues that the effect of the above - quoted

statutory provision is to disqualify from licensure applicants

who have lost their civil rights by reason of conviction of a

crime and who have not yet had their civil right s restored.

The Board's interpretation of the meaning of Section

112.011(1)(b) is reasonable, especially when note is taken of

the rule of statutory construction known as "expressio unius

est exclusio alterius." As stated in James v. Department of

Correc tions , 424 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983):

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a

general principle of statutory construction

which states that the mention of one thing

implies exclusion of another. Thus, where

the statute enumerates the things o n which

it is to operate, it is ordinarily

construed as excluding from its operation

all those not expressly mentioned.

37. To similar effect is the ancient rule of statutory

construction described in Alsop v. Pierce , 155 Fla. 185, 19

So. 2d 799 (Fla 19 44), as follows:

When the Legislature has prescribed the

mode, that mode must be observed. When the

controlling law directs how a thing shall

be done that is, in effect, a prohibition

against its being done in any other way.

State ex re. Murphy v. Barn es , 24 Fla. 29,

3 So. 433; State ex rel Church v. Yeates ,

74 Fla. 509, 77 So. 262; Weinberger v.

Board of Public Instruction , 93 Fla. 470,

112 So. 253.

For a more recent application of the above - quoted rule, see

Sun Coast International, Inc. v. Dept. of B usiness Regulation ,

596 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). ("[A] legislative

direction as to how a thing shall be done is, in effect, a

prohibition against its being done in any other way.")

38. Under the Board's interpretation of Section

112.011(1)(b), F lorida Statutes, the Board cannot lawfully

grant licenses to applicants who have lost their civil rights

and have not yet had them restored. 4 Such being the case, in

order to act in a manner consistent with Section

112.011(1)(b), the Board is required to know whether an

applicant has been convicted of a crime that involves the loss

of civil rights and, if so, whether the applicant's civil

rights have been restored. The requirement that the Board

obtain such information flows directly from the language of

the subject statutory provision. Because the statute makes it

necessary for the Board to know whether an applicant has been

convicted of a crime that involves the loss of civil rights

and, if so, whether those rights have been restored, it is the

statute that creates the requirement for that information.

Such being the case, the agency statement at issue here (Form

DBPR CILB 4359) is not a rule, because it does not solicit any

information not specifically required by the statute. 5

ORDER

In view of all of the foregoing it is ORDERED:

(1) That Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006 is

no longer an existing rule because it has been effectively

repealed by legislative action repealing the authority for the

rule.

(2) That a rule that has been effecti vely repealed by

legislative action cannot be the subject of a rule challenge

proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings.

(3) That the challenged agency statement contained in

Form DBPR CILB 4359 is not a rule within the meaning of

Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes.

(4) That for the reasons set forth above, the original

petition in this case and the petition to intervene in this

case are both hereby dismissed and all relief sought by the

Petitioner and the Intervenor is denied.

DONE AN D ORDERED this 3rd day of December, 2004, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

MICHAEL M. PARRISH

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9 675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 3rd day of December, 2004.

ENDNOTES

1/ The Petitioner and the Intervenor, because of the

alignment of their intere sts, filed a single proposed final

order in which they both joined. The Respondent, of course,

filed a separate proposed final order.

2/ Paragraphs 1 through 24 of the Findings of Fact are facts

which have been stipulated to by all parties.

3/ In the interest of clarity, it would probably be in the

best interest of all concerned for the Board to go through the

rule - making process to formally repeal Rule 61G4 - 12.006,

citing as grounds for the repeal that the Board no longer

possesses the statutory autho rity it had when the rule was

adopted. But with or without such formal action, the rule has

expired and no longer exists in any meaningful way.

4/ The Board orders described in the subparagraphs of

paragraph 26 of the Findings of Fact, above, indicate t hat the

Board sometimes acts in a manner inconsistent with its stated

interpretation of Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

Such inconsistencies may be problematic during administrative

proceedings challenging the Board's denial of license

applicatio ns on the basis of Section 112.001(1)(b), Florida

Statutes.

5/ On the basis of this line of reasoning, it is gratuitously

noted that, in view of the provisions of Section

112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, if the Board still had

statutory authority to prom ulgate application forms, Florida

Administrative Code Rule 61G4 - 12.006, would not be found to be

invalid on the record in this case.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Timothy P. Atkinson, Esquire

Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire

Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A.

Pos t Office Box 1110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 1110

Diane L. Guillemette, Esquire

Lee Ann Gustafson, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

Timothy Vaccaro, Director

Construction Industry Licens ing Board

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Martin P. McDonnell, Esquire

Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A.

Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Scott Boyd

Executiv e Director and General Counsel

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

120 Holland Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300

Diane Carr, Secretary

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallaha ssee, Florida 32399 - 0792

Leon Biegalski, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68,

Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are

commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with the

Cl erk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy,

accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the

District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District

Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party

resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of

rendition of the order to be reviewed.