05-001222PL Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Real Estate vs. Anthony Elgin Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, February 3, 2006.

Summary: The exclusion of the Respondent`s workfile from the supervising appraiser`s review of Respondent`s appraisal report does not depart from the applicable standard of care.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No . 05 - 1222PL

)

ANTHONY ELGIN, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Daniel Manry conducted the

formal hearing in this proceeding on August 16, 2005, in New

Port Richey, Florida, on behalf of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For P etitioner: Stacy N. Robinson Pierce, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801

Orlando, Florida 32801

For Respondent: John Parvi n, Esquire

630 Chestnut Street

Clearwater, Florida 33756

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues presented are whether Respondent reviewed the

appraisal report of an assistant appraiser in a manner that

departed from the stan dards of care in Subsections 475.624(14),

and (15), Florida Statutes (2001); and, if so, what penalty

should be imposed against Respondent's professional license.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 3, 2004, Petitioner filed an Administrative

Complaint , alle ging Respondent's review of an appraisal report

violated Subsections 475.624(2), (14), and (15), Florida

Statutes (2001). Respondent requested a formal hearing, and

Petitioner referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the hearing.

At the hearing, Petitione r presented the testimony of two

witnesses and submitted 10 exhibits for admission into evidence.

Respondent presented the testimony of three witnesses and

submitted no exhibits.

The identity of the witnesses and exhibits and the rulings

regarding each ar e reported in the two - volume Transcript of the

hearing filed with DOAH on November 3, 2005. Pursuant to an

order extending the time for filing proposed recommended orders

(PROs), the parties timely filed their PROs on January 6, 2005.

Petitioner's PRO c oncedes the evidence is insufficient to

prove the charge of misrepresentation or culpable negligence in

Subsection 475.624(2), Florida Statutes (2001). The remaining

charges are that Respondent departed from the standards of care

in Subsections 475.624(14 ) and (15), Florida Statutes (2001).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is the state agency authorized to regulate

certified general real estate appraisers (appraisers) and

assistant appraisers pursuant to Chapter 475, Part II, Florida

Statutes (2001). Re spondent and Ms. Deborah Hall are certified

appraisers pursuant to certificate numbers RZ - 1589 and RD - 4615.

2. On April 5, 2002, Respondent operated an appraisal

business located at 1727 Coachman Plaza Drive, Clearwater,

Florida. Respondent supervised approximately 14 assistant

appraisers, including Ms. Hall. 1 Ms. Hall was certified as an

assistant appraiser pursuant to certification number RI - 5557. 2

3. Ms. Hall developed a written appraisal report for

residential real estate located at 7415 Flound er Drive, Hudson,

Florida. Respondent reviewed the appraisal report and cosigned

it with Ms. Hall before she communicated it to the client.

4. The appraisal report complied with all applicable

standards of practice except one. The appraisal report i ncluded

incorrect values for three comparable properties.

5. The correct closing prices of the three comparables

were $73,000, $74,000, and $82,000. The appraisal report

included erroneous closing prices of $110,000, $116,000, and

$110,000; and inadver tently inflated the appraised value.

6. Omission of the comparable values from the appraisal

report was a substantial error. The error significantly

affected the appraisal according to statutorily adopted Uniform

Standards of Professional Appraisal Pra ctice, Appraisal

Standards Board, The Appraisal Foundation, 2002 ed. (USPAP),

Standards Rule 1 - 1(b), at page 15. (The terms USPAP and

"appraisal standards" are used synonymously and the abbreviation

"SR" refers to a specific Standards Rule, such as SR 1 - 1 (b)). 3

7. The "workfile" developed by Ms. Hall contained the

correct closing price for each comparable. The term "workfile"

is defined in USPAP, Definitions, at page 5. A workfile

consists of the "documentation necessary to support an

appraiser's anal ysis, opinions, and conclusions. " 4

8. The omission of the correct comparable values from the

appraisal report could not be discovered without reviewing the

"workfile" developed by Ms. Hall. It is undisputed that

Respondent did not include the workfile in his review of the

appraisal report; and that the workfile was located in the

appraisal office and was readily accessible.

9. Petitioner alleges the omission of the workfile from

Respondent's review of the appraisal report violated statutorily

adopted appraisal standards as well as the statutory requirement

to exercise reasonable diligence in Subsections 475.624(14) and

(15), Florida Statutes (2001) (the relevant statutes). The

parties agree no express requirement existed for Respondent to

review the workfile.

10. SR 2 - 3 discusses the standard of care applicable to

the supervision of assistant appraisers. In relevant part, the

standard states:

When a signing appraiser(s) has relied on

work done by others who do not sign the

certification, the si gning appraiser is

responsible for the decision to rely on

their work.

The signing appraiser(s) is required to have

a reasonable basis for believing that those

individuals performing the work are

competent and that their work is credible.

SR 2 - 3, USPAP a t 30 - 31.

11. Respondent did not rely on work done by an assistant

appraiser who did not sign the appraisal report. Ms. Hall

signed the appraisal report as the "Appraiser." Respondent

signed the appraisal report as the "Supervisory Appraiser."

12. O n April 5, 2002, Respondent had a reasonable basis,

within the meaning of SR 2 - 3, to believe that Ms. Hall was

competent and that her work was credible. Ms. Hall had

sufficient experience and demonstrated proficiency to develop

and communicate the apprais al report without the need for

Respondent to review her workfile.

13. Ms. Hall began appraising real estate in 1979 and had

been a certified appraiser in several states. On April 5, 2002,

she was certified in Florida and New York, had worked for

Respon dent for approximately three years, and had completed over

100 appraisals for Respondent. Ms. Hall was a Senior Resident

Appraiser in the Society of Real Estate Appraisers. Other than

enforcement action ancillary to this proceeding, Ms. Hall has no

disci plinary history against her professional license.

14. Respondent had sufficient experience and demonstrated

proficiency to continually evaluate the competence of Ms. Hall.

Respondent was first licensed as an appraiser in Kentucky in

1965 and became a l icensed appraiser in Indiana in 1967 where he

also taught appraisal courses.

15. Respondent moved to Florida in 1977 and continued his

career as an appraiser and appraiser instructor. In accordance

with statutory requirements enacted in 1990, Responden t became

certified in Florida as a General Real Estate Appraiser and is

authorized to appraise commercial, industrial, and residential

real estate. Respondent has developed and reviewed thousands of

real estate appraisals in Florida and has no disciplinar y

history against his professional license.

16. A footnote to SR 2 - 3 references Advisory Opinion AO - 5

on page 132 of USPAP. Advisory Opinion AO - 5 does not establish

new appraisal standards or interpret existing standards.

Rather, the Opinion illustrate s the applicability of appraisal

standards in specific situations and offers advice for the

resolution of appraisal issues and problems.

17. In the terms of Advisory Opinion A - 05, Respondent was

a principal on April 5, 2002, and Ms. Hall was an assistan t.

The extent of assistance that can be provided in the appraisal

process is directly related to the competence of the assistant.

As experience and demonstrated proficiency increase, it is

appropriate for the principal to place greater reliance on the

wo rk performed by the assistant.

18. It is appropriate for a principal to allow an

experienced assistant with demonstrated proficiency to develop

and communicate an appraisal. Such an assistant is competent to

inspect the property, take pictures, draft t he final appraisal

report, and cosign the appraisal report with the principal.

19. Advisory Opinion AO - 5, at page 134, lines 112 - 114,

lists only two minimum standards for the supervision of an

experienced assistant. The principal should inspect both the

exterior of the property and the photographs.

20. Respondent's review of the appraisal report exceeded

the express minimum standards for supervision of an assistant.

Respondent personally inspected the property and the photographs

and examined the ap praisal report to verify that the distances

of the comparables from the property were appropriate.

Respondent ensured that adjustments in the report between

comparables and the property were accurate and not excessive and

also validated the calculation of adjustments in the appraisal

report. Respondent reviewed maps of the area and verified dates

and legal descriptions in the appraisal report.

21. The omission of the workfile from Respondent's review

of the appraisal report did not violate the standard of practice

in the community in which Respondent and Ms. Hall practice. Two

certified real estate appraisers with significant experience

testified as peers in the community. Their testimony confirms

the practice followed by Respondent and Ms. Hall. 5

22. The community standard does not require a principal to

review the workfile of an experienced appraiser unless the

appraisal report is complex. The appraisal report that

Respondent reviewed was not complex.

23. Ms. Hall appraised a manufactured home i n an area

zoned for condominiums with no existing condominiums. A

variation between actual and zoned use does not make an

appraisal complex. As one peer explained in her testimony,

"That wouldn't have made it complex to me. Zoning is a simple

thing to m e."

24. The community standard of peers is an acceptable

measure of competence in the appraisal standards adopted by

statute. SR 1 - 2(f), USPAP at page 17, states that the scope of

work necessary to complete an assignment is acceptable when it

is c onsistent with the actions that peers would take in

performing the same assignment or a similar assignment.

25. A requirement for a principal to review the workfile

of an experienced appraiser would be problematic in the

community. Many experienced appr aisers work from home and do

not provide their principal with the workfile until after the

appraisal report is communicated to the client.

26. Even when a workfile is readily accessible, most

principals do not have time to personally review the workfile .

A principal must rely on administrative staff to perform that

task. Only larger appraisal companies with extra staff have the

luxury of reviewing workfiles.

27. One peer who testified at the hearing had previously

operated an appraisal company with sufficient staff to review

workfiles. The staff routinely reviewed only the workfiles of

assistants in training. Staff did not review the workfiles of

experienced assistants. 6

28. Respondent's signature on the appraisal report appears

under a "Superv isory Appraiser's Certification." In relevant

part, Respondent certified that he agreed to be bound by

Appraiser Certification numbers 4 - 7 in the appraisal report.

29. Appraiser Certification numbers 4 - 6 are neither

relevant nor material to the matter at issue. The

certifications address racial and other types of bias, an

interest in the property, and a predetermined appraised value.

30. Appraiser Certification number 7 certifies that

Ms. Hall performed the appraisal in compliance with applicable

appr aisal standards. Similarly, the Supervisory Appraiser's

Certification states that Respondent takes "full responsibility

for the appraisal and the appraisal report."

31. Petitioner interprets the quoted terms and similar

terms elsewhere in the appraisa l standards to mean that

Respondent certifies to Petitioner that Ms. Hall performed the

appraisal correctly and that Respondent is responsible to

Petitioner for her errors. Petitioner interprets the

certification of the "appraisal" to include the workfile .

32. The agency's interpretation of statutory terms

conflicts with the weight of the evidence. The term

"responsibility" is reasonably construed as acknowledging

responsibility to the client, rather than Petitioner, for the

acts or omissions of an assi stant.

33. If Respondent were to evade his responsibility to the

client, Respondent arguably may be responsible to Petitioner for

the evasion. However, there is no evidence that Respondent

attempted to evade his responsibility to the client. The

preci pitating complaint for this proceeding did not originate

from the client, and there is no evidence of harm to the client.

34. Ms. Hall does not know how the correct sales price

information was omitted from the appraisal report. There is no

evidence of intent or culpable knowledge by Ms. Hall.

35. The closing price of a comparable is not the type of

information that an appraiser would knowingly alter in an

appraisal report. The correct closing prices at issue were

matters of public record at the tim e and were so basic and

fundamental that their omission from the appraisal report is

patently inadvertent in the absence of contrary evidence.

36. Ms. Hall followed the normal appraisal procedure she

has used consistently over time. She utilized what i s

identified in the record as a clone appraisal. Ms. Hall

modified an appraisal she had previously completed with data

pertinent to the property being appraised. Either the computer

program did not accept the correct closing prices for the

comparables or Ms. Hall inadvertently failed to "input" them.

Respondent did not have constructive knowledge of facts unknown

to Ms. Hall at the time she drafted the appraisal report.

37. SR 1 - 1(c), USPAP at page 15, does not define

competency as perfection. Perfect ion is impossible to attain.

Rather, competency requires only that Respondent use due

diligence and due care in reviewing the appraisal report.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

38. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties in this proceeding. § § 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla.

Stat. (2005). DOAH provided the parties with adequate notice of

the formal hearing.

39. Petitioner bears the burden of proof. Petitioner must

show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's review

of an appraisal report departed from the standard of care in

each relevant statute and the reasonableness of the proposed

penalty. Department of Banking and Finance, Division of

Securities and Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern and Company ,

670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 19 96); Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So.

2d 292 (Fla. 1987); State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate

Commission , 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973).

40. The requirement for clear and convincing evidence

imposes an intermediate level of proof on Petitioner.

Petit ioner must prove material factual allegations by more than

a preponderance of the evidence, but the proof need not be

beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. Inquiry

Concerning a Judge No. 93 - 62 , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994);

Lee County v. S unbelt Equities, II, Limited Partnership , 619 So.

2d 996, 1006 n. 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

41. In order to satisfy the requirement for clear and

convincing evidence, inculpatory evidence must be credible,

material facts must be "distinctly remembered," and testimony

must be "precise" and "explicit." Inquiry Concerning a Judge ,

645 So. 2d at 404. The judicial definition of clear and

convincing evidence has been adopted by each District Court of

Appeal in the state. E.F. v. State , 889 So. 2d 135, 139 (Fla.

3d DCA 2004); K - Mart Corporation v. Collins , 707 So. 2d 753, 757

n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams , 706 So.

2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Kingsley v. Kingsley , 623 So.

2d 780, 786 - 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Slomowitz v. Walker , 429

So . 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

42. In determining whether the inculpatory evidence of

record was clear and convincing, the fact - finder resolved any

conflicts in the evidence and decided the issue one way or the

other. Dunham v. Highlands County Sch ool Board , 652 So. 2d 894,

896 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Heifetz v. Department of Business

Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco , 475 So.

2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Department of Professional

Regulation v. Wagner , 405 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla . 1st DCA 1981).

In resolving evidential conflicts, the fact - finder assessed the

credibility of witnesses and weighed the evidence. Bejarano v.

State, Department of Education, Division of Vocational

Rehabilitation , 901 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ; Hoover,

M.D. v. Agency for Health Care Administration , 676 So. 2d 1380,

1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Goss v. District School Board of St.

Johns County , 601 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

43. The sum total of evidence submitted by Petitioner is

less than clear and convincing. The evidence is not of

sufficient weight to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm conviction that Respondent departed from the standard of

care in either relevant statute.

44. Appraisal standards adopted by statute are statutory

terms, as is the statutory term "reasonable diligence."

Statutory terms that form the basis of proposed disciplinary

action must be construed strictly in favor of the licensee and

against the imposition of discipline. State ex. rel. Jordan v.

Pattishall , 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930); Ocampo v.

Department of Health , 806 So. 2d 633 (1st DCA Fla. 2002); Equity

Corp. Holdings, Inc. v. Department of Banking and Finance,

Division of Finance , 772 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000);

Jonas v. Flo rida Department of Business and Professional

Regulation , 746 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Loeffler v.

Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation , 739

So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Haggerty v. Florida Department

of Business and Professi onal Regulation , 716 So. 2d 873 (Fla.

1st DCA 1998); Elmariah v. Department of Professional

Regulation, Board of Medicine , 574 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA

1990); Rush v. Department of Professional Regulation , 448

So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Ferdego Discou nt Center v.

Department of Professional Regulation , 452 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1984); Bowling v. Department of Insurance , 394 So. 2d 165

(Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Lester v. Dept. of Professional and

Occupational Regulations , 348 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) .

45. The agency's interpretation of statutory terms is not

infused with policy considerations and is not entitled to

deference. The issue of whether Respondent breached the

standard of care in each relevant statute is a factual issue

susceptible to or dinary methods of proof. Gross v. Department

of Health , 819 So. 2d 997, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

46. The agency did not articulate in the record underlying

technical reasons for deference to agency expertise in the

interpretation of statutory terms. Jo hnston, M.D. v. Department

of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners , 456 So.

2d 939, 943 - 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Rather, the agency's

interpretation conflicts with the weight of the evidence.

47. If underlying reasons for deference to ag ency

expertise were articulated, the agency's interpretation of

statutory terms would be entitled to great weight unless it is

clearly erroneous. Ameristeel Corporation v. Clark , 691 So. 2d

473, 477 (Fla. 1997); Okeechobee Health Care v. Collins , 726 So.

2d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Morris v. Division of

Retirement , 696 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The agency's

interpretation is clearly erroneous for several reasons.

48. The agency's interpretation of statutorily adopted

appraisal standards conc erning the review of an appraisal report

is clearly erroneous. The scope of work necessary to complete

an assignment is acceptable when it is consistent with actions

that peers would take in performing the same or a similar

assignment. SR 1 - 2(f), USPAP a t 17. Respondent's peers do not

include the workfile of an experienced assistant in their review

of an appraisal report that is not complex.

49. The agency's interpretation of statutorily adopted

appraisal standards concerning the supervision of an e xperienced

assistant is clearly erroneous. Respondent satisfied the

statutorily adopted standard that requires Respondent to have a

reasonable basis for believing the assistant was competent and

that her work was credible. SR 2 - 3, USPAP at 30 - 31; A0 - 5.

50. The agency's interpretation of statutorily adopted

appraisal standards pertaining to a principal's certification of

responsibility is clearly erroneous. The interpretation

conflicts with judicial standards for imputing the negligence of

an employee t o an employer.

51. The legal standard of simple negligence imputes

knowledge or willfulness to a principal if it is shown that the

principal failed to properly supervise an employee. However,

the legal standard of simple negligence usually is not applie d

to discipline a professional license but is limited by the

weight of judicial authority to beverage licenses. Compare Bach

v. Florida State Board of Dentistry , 378 So. 2d 34, 36 - 37 (Fla.

1st DCA 1979)(for the stated proposition) with Lash, Inc. v.

State , Department of Business Regulation , 411 So. 2d 276, 278

(Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(revoking beverage license).

52. If the legal standard of simple negligence were

applied herein, it is less than clear and convincing that

Ms. Hall was an employee on April 5, 20 02, rather than an

independent contractor. If Ms. Hall were an employee, knowledge

of the workfile would be imputed to Respondent after repeated

and flagrant employee errors. Bach , 378 So. 2d at 36. The

record does not evidence repeated and flagrant con duct that

would impute notice to Respondent and require him to intercede.

53. It is less than clear and convincing that Respondent

was fully informed of the assistant's omission or otherwise

possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to either

authorize , acquiesce in, or ratify the conduct. Cf. Frankenmuth

Mutual Insurance Company v. Magaha , 769 So. 2d 1012, 1022 (Fla.

2000)(citing Bach for the stated general rule). Respondent was

not present when Ms. Hall developed her workfile. See Bach , 378

So. 2d at 35 - 36 (dentist was not present during unlicensed

activity of employee, and there was no evidence dentist ordered

unlicensed activity). The workfile was not within the exclusive

control of Respondent. See Prysi, M.D. v. Department of Health ,

823 So. 2d 823, 824 - 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(standing post -

operative prescription orders bearing signatures of nurses,

rather than physicians, were documents and procedures not in

exclusive control of respondent - physician).

54. The agency interpretation of "reasona ble diligence" is

clearly erroneous. Respondent's review of the appraisal report

and supervision of his assistant is recognized by two reasonably

prudent similar appraisers as being acceptable under similar

circumstances. Compare Gross , 819 So. 2d at 100 4 (physician

satisfies standard of care because he practiced with that level

of care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent

similar physician under similar circumstances).

55. The agency seeks to enforce a standard not found

within the l iteral terms of the relevant statutes and the

adopted appraisal standards. Neither DOAH nor the agency should

construe statutory terms in a manner that enlarges or expands

either relevant statute. § 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005).

56. The absence of expr ess statutory standards requiring a

principal to review the workfile of an assistant cannot be

construed as authority for agency action to fill the statutory

void without risking violation of the non - delegation doctrine.

Fla. Const., Art. 2, § 3. The non - delegation doctrine requires

the legislature to provide standards and guidelines in each

enactment that are ascertainable by reference to the terms of

the enactment. Bush v. Shiavo , 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004); B.H.

v. State , 645 So. 2d 987, 992 - 994 (Fla. 1994); Askew v. Cross

Key Waterways , 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978).

57. The absence of express statutory limits should not be

construed as authorizing unbridled agency discretion. See ,

e.g. , Von Stephens v. School Board of Sarasota County , 338 So.

2 d 890, 894 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)(avoiding statutory construction

that would authorize unbridled agency discretion even though

statute included no express limits). DOAH and the agency should

avoid an interpretation of statutory terms that exceeds the

standard s and guidelines enacted in each relevant statute.

Spurlin v. School Board of Sarasota County , 520 So. 2d 294,

296 - 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)

58. The agency does not cite a promulgated rule as

authority for the proposed enforcement action. If the agency

were to discover such a rule, the validity of the rule should be

preserved by construing the rule no further than the specific

powers and duties conferred by each relevant statute.

§ 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005). Similarly, an agency statement

of non - rul e policy should enforce only the specific standards

authorized in each statute. Id.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding

Respondent not guilty of the violations charged in the

Administrative Complaint and imposing no penalty against

Respondent's professional license.

DONE AND ENT ERED this 3rd day of February , 2006 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DANIEL MANRY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 3rd day of February , 2006 .

ENDNOTES

1/ Each assistant appraiser that Respondent supervised for a

period that included April 5, 2002, is identified in

Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (P - 5).

2/ The parties stipulate that the stat utory term "assistant"

remained in effect until the 2003 legislature replaced it with

the term "trainee."

3/ Effective July 1, 2001, Subsection 475.624(14), Florida

Statutes (2001), adopted the 2001 edition of USPAP that was in

effect from January 1 t hrough December 31, 2001. Petioner's

Exhibit 10 (P - 10) is the 2002 edition of USPAP in effect from

January 1 through December 31, 2002. The 2002 edition, P - 10,

could not have been adopted by the legislature on July 1, 2001,

because the 2002 edition was n ot published until January 1,

2002. However, the parties agree there were no material changes

to relevant portions of the USPAP between the 2001 and 2002

editions and agreed to rely on P - 10 in this proceeding.

4/ The Administrative Complaint uses the te rm "field file," but

the terms "field file" and "workfile" appear in the record

interchangeably. The trier of fact uses the term "workfile" to

be consistent with the USPAP.

5/ The remaining witnesses were Respondent, Ms. Hall, and

Petitioner's investiga tor.

6/ The definition section of the appraisal standards recognizes

that the scope of an appraisal review may include "all or part

of an appraisal report, workfile, or a combination of these."

USPAP at 1. The definition is instructive rather than

cont rolling because an appraisal review is a formal opinion

about the quality of another appraiser's work.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Stacy N. Robinson Pierce, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801

Orlan do, Florida 32801

John Parvin, Esquire

630 Chestnut Street

Clearwater, Florida 33756

Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

Mic hale E. Murphy, Acting Director

Division of Real Estate

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street, Suite 80 2 North

Orlando, Florida 32801

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit wri tten exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.