05-001882RP
Bowling Centers Association Of Florida, Inc.; Shore Lanes, Inc.; Sanford Finklestein; And Sarah Lynch vs.
Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco
Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, December 7, 2005.
DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, December 7, 2005.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8BOWLING CENTERS ASSOCIATION OF )
13FLORIDA, INC.; SHORE LANES, )
18INC.; AND SANFORD FINKLESTEIN, )
23)
24Petitioners, )
26)
27vs. ) Case No. 05 - 1882RP
34)
35DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )
40PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )
43DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES )
48A ND TOBACCO, )
52)
53Respondent. )
55)
56FINAL ORDER
58Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held in
67this case before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge of
77the Division of Administrative Hearings, on August 30, 2005, in
87Tallahassee, Florida.
89APPEARANCES
90For Petitioner: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
97Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman
102Post Office Box 551
106Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551
111For Respondent: Renee Alsobrook, Esquire
116John Lockwood, Qualified Representative
120Department of Business and
124Professional Regulation
1261940 North Monroe Street
130Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202
135STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
139Whethe r the proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008,
153and 61A - 7.009, constitute a valid exercise of delegated
163legislative authority, as such term is defined in Subsection
172120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
176PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
178This matter was initiated on May 20, 2005, when Petitioners
188filed a Petition Challenging the Validity of Proposed Rules
197Noticed for Adoption ("Petition"). The Petition alleges that
207Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation,
214Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco's (Division),
221proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009
236constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
243authority as defined in Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes
251(2004).
252A Notice of Hearing was issued on May 25, 2 005, scheduling
264a formal hearing for June 16, 2005. On June 6, 2005, the
276hearing was placed in abeyance for a period of 30 days. A final
289Notice of Hearing was issued on July 18, 2005, scheduling a
300formal hearing for August 30, 2005. On August 18, 2005, John
311Lockwood was deemed a qualified representative of Respondent.
319The parties filed a Pre - Hearing Stipulation on August 26, 2005.
331At hearing, the parties agreed to the voluntary dismissal
340of Sarah Lynch as a Petitioner. Respondent went forward with
350the evidence and presented the testimony of Marie Carpenter,
359Debbie Pender, Michael Martinez, and Richard Law, certified
367public accountant. Petitioners presented the testimony of
374Brenda Olsen and Sanford Finkelstein as rebuttal witnesses.
382Petitioner's Exhib its numbered 1 through 8 were admitted into
392evidence, which consisted of: 1) a copy of the Final Order of
404Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Barbara J. Staros in Bowling
413Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Business
422and Professional Regulatio n, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
431Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH March 26, 2004); 2) a copy of
445Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution; 3) a copy of
457Chapter 386, Part II, Florida Statutes (2005); 4) a copy of
468Section 561.695, Florida Stat utes (2005); 5) a copy of proposed
479Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009; 6) a copy
496of the Division's Form ABT - 6039 and instruction sheet; 7) a copy
509of the Division's publication entitled "Frequently Asked
516Questions"; and 8) a copy of Marie Carpenter's deposition taken
526on January 26, 2004. Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1 through 3
536were admitted into evidence, which consist of: 1) a copy of the
548notice of rule development, notice of rulemaking, and the
557proposed rules as submitted to the Flor ida Administrative
566Weekly; 2) a copy of a Transcript from the rulemaking workshop
577held on July 29, 2005; 3) a copy of the Transcript of the rule
591development workshop held on May 13, 2005, with attachments.
600The Division filed a Motion to Take Official Reco gnition
610and orally supplemented with Sections 561.1105, 561.20, 565.02,
618and 565.045, Florida Statutes (2005), in addition to Florida
627Administrative Code Rules 61A - 3.0141 and 61A - 3.054. Official
638recognition was taken without objection.
643A Transcript consis ting of one volume was filed on
653September 9, 2005. The parties requested until October 10,
6622005, in which to submit proposed final orders. The request was
673granted, and each party timely filed their proposals.
681FINDINGS OF FACT
684Based on the evidence, the following findings of fact are
694determined:
6951. The State of Florida, Department of Business and
704Professional Regulation (Respondent), is the state agency
711responsible for adopting the proposed rules which are the
720subject matter of this proceeding.
7252. Th e Division is vested with general regulatory
734authority over the alcoholic beverage industry within the state.
7433. The Division issues both general and special alcoholic
752beverage licenses. The general licenses which permit
759consumption of alcoholic beverag es on the premises of a business
770are: 1 - COP licenses which permit consumption of beer and
781certain wine and distilled spirit products; 2 - COP licenses which
792permit consumption of beer, wine, and certain distilled spirit
801products; and 4 - COP licenses which pe rmit the consumption of
813beer, wine, and all distilled spirits.
8194. Quota licenses are issued based on the population of
829the county and are limited in number. In addition, a quota
840license allows consumption on the premises of beer, wine, and
850distilled spi rits.
853Standing and/or Identification of the Parties
8595. The parties stipulated in the Joint Pre - Hearing
869Stipulation to the standing of Bowling Centers Association of
878Florida, Inc. (BCAF), Shore Lanes, Inc., and Sanford
886Finklestein. The parties agreed at hearing that Sarah Lynch
895would be voluntarily dismissed as a Petitioner.
9026. BCAF is a non - profit Florida corporation with its
913principle place of business in Orlando, Florida. It is composed
923of owners of bowling centers throughout the State of Florida.
933Its purpose is representing the interests of its member bowling
943centers. This purpose includes matters of rule adoptions that
952would affect or concern bowling centers.
9587. All members of BCAF are bowling centers that may hold
969either a special bowling lic ense (SBX) or a general alcoholic
980beverage license.
9828. Shore Lanes, Inc., is the owner/operator of a bowling
992center located in Merritt Island, Florida. Shore Lanes, Inc.,
1001currently holds an SBX license, but is eligible to hold a
1012general alcoholic bevera ge license.
10179. Sanford Finklestein is the general manager and part -
1027owner of Shore Lanes, Inc., as well as the current president of
1039BCAF. Finklestein is substantially affected because
1045establishments holding general alcoholic beverage licenses are
1052classif ied as enclosed indoor workplaces.
1058Florida Clean Indoor Air Act
106310. Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution,
"1072the Florida Clear Indoor Act," was adopted by the electorate in
1083May 2002, as "a Florida health initiative to protect people from
1094the health hazards of second - hand tobacco smoke." It contains a
1106far - reaching prohibition against smoking in enclosed indoor
1115workplaces. A very limited exception from this general
1123prohibition was provided for "stand - alone bars," as such term
1134was defined in s ubsection (c)(8) of the amendment.
1143(8) "Stand - alone bar" means any place of
1152business devoted during any time of
1158operation predominately or totally to
1163serving alcoholic beverages, intoxicating
1167beverages, or intoxicating liquors, or any
1173combination thereo f, for consumption on the
1180licensed premises; in which the serving of
1187food, if any, is merely incidental to the
1195consumption of any such beverage; and that
1202is not located within, and does not share
1210any common entryway or common indoor area
1217with, any other en closed indoor workplace
1224including any business for which the sale of
1232food or any other product or service is more
1241than an incidental source of gross revenue.
1248The amendment further provided in subsection (d) for legislative
1257implementation of this amendment in a manner which could be
1267more, but not less, restrictive than the provisions of the
1277amendment.
127811. On June 23, 2003, the Governor of Florida signed House
1289Bill 63 - A into law to implement Article X, Section 20 of the
1303Florida Constitution. It was denomina ted as Chapter 2003 - 398,
1314Laws of Florida, and this statute substantially revises
1322Chapter 386, Florida Statutes (2002), which is commonly referred
1331to as the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act.
133912. Section 386.2125, Florida Statutes (2003), requires
1346the Departmen t of Health and Respondent, in consultation with
1356the state fire marshal, to adopt rules pursuant to Subsection
1366120.536(1) and Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (2003), to
1374implement the provisions of Chapter 386, Part II, Florida
1383Statutes (2003), within each agency's specific areas of
1391regulatory authority.
139313. The Legislature, in implementing Article X, Section 20
1402of the Florida Constitution, enacted Section 386.204, Florida
1410Statutes (2003), which prohibits smoking in enclosed indoor
1418workplaces, except as pr ovided in Section 386.2045, Florida
1427Statutes (2003). Section 386.2045, Florida Statutes (2003),
1434provides that smoking may be permitted in a:
1442(4) Stand - Alone Bar -- A business that meets
1452the definition of a stand - alone bar as
1461defined in s. 386.203(11) and o therwise
1468complies with all applicable provisions of
1474the Beverage Law and this part.
148014. A stand - alone bar is defined in Subsection
1490386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2003), as follows:
1496(11) "Stand - alone bar" means any licensed
1504premises devoted during any time of
1510operation predominantly or totally to
1515serving alcoholic beverages, intoxicating
1519beverages, or intoxicating liquors, or any
1525combination thereof, for consumption on the
1531licensed premises; in which the serving of
1538food, if any, is merely incidental to the
1546consumption of any such beverage; and the
1553licensed premises is not located within, and
1560does not share any common entryway or common
1568indoor area with, any other enclosed indoor
1575workplace, including any business for which
1581the sale of food or any other pr oduct or
1591service is more than an incidental source of
1599gross revenue. A place of business
1605constitutes a stand - alone bar in which the
1614service of food is merely incidental in
1621accordance with this subsection if the
1627licensed premises derive no more than 10
1634per cent of its gross revenue from the sale
1643of food consumed on the licensed premises.
1650Prior Litigation
165215. The Division previously was involved in rule challenge
1661proceedings concerning the stand - alone bar exemption. Bowling
1670Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Business
1679and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
1687Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH March 26, 2004). In that
1699case, ALJ Staros concluded that the Division exceeded its grant
1709of rulemaking authority in three of the four rules proposed at
1720the prior hearing. ALJ Staros found three of the proposed rules
1731to be arbitrary by failing to take into consideration a
1741licensee's predominate business and, also, by permitting the use
1750of gross revenue from sources other than t he sale of food and
1763alcoholic beverages to render the provision "predominately or
1771totally devoted" to serving alcoholic beverages.
177716. The text of the invalidated proposed rules as
1786published in their final form in the Florida Administrative Code
1796Weekly on October 10, 2003, is as follows:
180461A - 7.007 Formula for Compliance With
1811Required Percentage of Gross Food Sales
1817Revenues
1818In order to determine compliance, the
1824division shall use the formula of gross food
1832sales revenue, including but not limited to
1839non - alcoholic beverages, divided by gross
1846total sales revenue, in any consecutive six -
1854month period. The results of the formula
1861will represent the percentage of food sales
1868revenues as defined herein as in s. 561.695,
1876Florida Statutes.
1878Specific Authority 386.2 125, 561.695(9), FS.
1884Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
1889History - New
189261A - 7.008 For Percentage of Gross Alcohol
1900Sales Revenue Formula.
1903In order to determine compliance, the
1909division shall use the formula of gross
1916alcohol sales revenue divided by gross total
1923sales revenue, in any consecutive six - month
1931period.
1932Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.
1937Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
1942History - New
194561A - 7.009 Method Used to Determine Whether
1953an Establishment is Predominantly Dedic ated
1959to the Serving of Alcoholic Beverages.
1965In order to determine whether an
1971establishment, other than one holding a
1977specialty license designated in Rule
198261A - 7.003, F.A.C., is predominantly
1988dedicated to the serving of alcoholic
1994beverages, the division sha ll compare the
2001percentage of gross food sales revenue with
2008the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2014revenue. If the percentage of gross alcohol
2021sales revenue is greater than that of the
2029gross food sales revenue, an establishment
2035is deemed predominantly dedic ated to the
2042serving of alcoholic beverages.
2046Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9) FS.
2051Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
2056History - New
205929 Fla. Admin. W. 4021 - 4022 (October 10, 2003).
2069The Proposed Rules
207217. The revised proposed Rules 61A - 7. 006, 61A - 7.007,
208461A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009 were drafted in response to legislation
2097that implemented Article X, Section 20 of the Florida
2106Constitution.
210718. The basis for the proposed rules is information
2116derived from telephone calls, committee hearings, legi slative
2124staff interaction, town hall meetings, rule workshops, rule
2132hearings, senators, and representatives.
213619. The text of the proposed rules as published in their
2147final form in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 11,
21572005, is a follows:
216161A - 7.00 6 Records Required to Maintain the
2170Designation
2171(1) Stand - alone bars holding an "ss" or
"2180ssf" designation shall maintain records to
2186substantiate reports, affidavits and
2190designation qualifications. Records of all
2195purchases of food, all gross retail sales of
2203alcohol for consumption on the licensed
2209premises, all gross retail sales of alcohol
2216for consumption off the licensed premises,
2222all gross retail sales of food sold for
2230consumption on the premises, all gross
2236retail sales of food sold for consumption
2243off the premises, and gross revenue from all
2251other sales shall be separately documented.
2257(2) Stand - alone bars holding an "ss" or
"2266ssf" designation shall maintain complete
2271and accurate records of all sales and
2278purchases. Records shall include, but are
2284not li mited to, purchase invoices, sales
2291tickets, inventory records, receiving
2295records, cash register journal tapes, on
2301premises food sales records, computer
2306records generated from automatic dispensing
2311devices, Department of Revenue Sales Tax
2317Returns, and any ot her record documenting
2324sales. Sales records shall be sequentially
2330organized by month and year and include a
2338monthly statement summarizing the total
2343sales revenue, food revenue and percentage
2349of food revenue for each month.
2355Specific Authority 386.2125, 56 1.695(9), FS.
2361Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
2366History - New
236961A - 7.007 Formula for Compliance With
2376Required Percentage of Gross Food Sales
2382Revenues.
2383In order to determine compliance, the
2389division shall use the formula of gross food
2397sales reve nue from the sale of food the
2406licensee sells for consumption on premises,
2412including but not limited to non - alcoholic
2420beverages, divided by gross total sales
2426revenue, in any consecutive two month
2432period. The results of the formula will
2439represent the percen tage of food sales
2446revenues as defined herein and in Section
2453561.695, Florida Statutes.
2456Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.
2461Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
2466History - New
246961A - 7.008 For Percentage of Gross Alcohol
2477Sales for Consumpti on on the Licensed
2484Premises Revenue Formula
2487In order to determine compliance, the
2493division shall use the formula of gross
2500alcohol sales revenue from the sale of
2507alcohol the licensee sells for consumption
2513on premises, divided by gross total sales
2520revenue, in any consecutive two - month
2527period.
2528Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.
2533Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
2538History - New
254161A - 7.009 Method Used to Determine Whether
2549an Establishment is Predominately Dedicated
2554to the Serving of Alcohol ic Beverages.
2561In order to determine whether an
2567establishment, other than one holding a
2573specialty license designated in rule
257861A - 7.003, F.A.C., is predominately
2584dedicated to the serving of alcoholic
2590beverages for consumption on the licensed
2596premises, the d ivision shall compare the
2603percentage of gross alcohol revenue from the
2610sale of alcohol the licensee sells for
2617consumption on the premises with the
2623following categories of revenue:
2627(1) For stand - alone bars holding the "ss"
2636designation:
2637(a) the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2644revenue from the sale of alcohol the
2651licensee sells for consumption off the
2657premises where the purchaser is required to
2664enter,
2665(b) the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2672revenue from the sale of alcohol the
2679licensee sells for consu mption off the
2686premises where the purchaser is not required
2693to enter the premises, and
2698(c) the percentage of gross revenue from
2705any source not included in the alcohol
2712categories above.
2714If the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2721revenue from the sale of alcohol the
2728licensee sells for consumption on premises
2734is greater than that of the gross sales
2742revenue from each individual category of
2748gross sales in 61A - 7.009(1)(a) - (c), an
2757establishment is deemed predominately
2761dedicated to the serving of alcoholic
2767bever ages.
2769(2) For stand - alone bars holding the "ssf"
2778designation:
2779(a) the percentage of gross food sales
2786revenue from the sale of food the licensee
2794sells for consumption on premises,
2799(b) the percentage of gross food sales
2806revenue from the sale of food t he licensee
2815sales for consumption off premises,
2820(c) the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2827revenue from the sale of alcohol the
2834licensee sells for consumption off the
2840premises, and
2842(d) the percentage of gross revenue from
2849any source not included in the food and
2857alcohol categories above.
2860If the percentage of gross alcohol sales
2867revenue from the sale of alcohol the
2874licensee sells for consumption on premises
2880is greater than that of the gross sales
2888revenue from each individual category of
2894gross sales in 61 A - 7.009(2)(a) - (d), an
2904establishment is deemed predominately
2908dedicated to the serving of alcoholic
2914beverages.
2915Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.
2920Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.
2925History - New
292831 Fla. Admin. W. 964 - 965 (March 11, 2005 ).
2939Applicable Statutes
294120. The provision within the Florida Statutes that
2949outlines the "12 - month affidavit" reads as follows:
2958(5) After the initial designation, to
2964continue to qualify as a stand - alone bar the
2974licensee must provide to the division
2980ann ually, on or before the licensee's annual
2988renewal date, an affidavit that certifies,
2994with respect to the preceding 12 - month
3002period, the following:
3005(a) No more than 10 percent of the gross
3014revenue of the business is from the sale of
3023food consumed on th e licensed premises as
3031defined in s. 386.203(11).
3035(b) Other than customary bar snacks as
3042defined by rule of the division, the
3049licensed vendor does not provide or serve
3056food to a person on the licensed premises
3064without requiring the person to pay a
3071sep arately stated charge for food that
3078reasonably approximates the retail value of
3084the food.
3086(c) The licensed vendor conspicuously
3091posts signs at each entrance to the
3098establishment stating that smoking is
3103permitted in the establishment.
3107The division s hall establish by rule the
3115format of the affidavit required by this
3122subsection.
3123§ 561.695(5), Fla. Stat. (2005).
312821. The provision within the Florida Statutes that
3136outlines the "36 - month certified public accountant evaluation"
3145reads as follows:
3148(6) E very third year after the initial
3156designation, on or before the licensee's
3162annual license renewal, the licensed vendor
3168must additionally provide to the division an
3175agreed upon procedures report in a format
3182established by rule of the department from a
3190Flori da certified public accountant that
3196attests to the licensee's compliance with
3202the percentage requirement of s. 386.203(11)
3208for the preceding 36 - month period. Such
3216report shall be admissible in any proceeding
3223pursuant to s. 120.57. This subsection does
3230no t apply to a stand - alone bar if the only
3242food provided by the business, or in any
3250other way present or brought onto the
3257premises for consumption by patrons, is
3263limited to nonperishable snack food items
3269commercially prepackaged off the premises of
3275the stand - alone bar and served without
3283additions or preparation; except that a
3289stand - alone bar may pop popcorn for
3297consumption on its premises, provided that
3303the equipment used to pop the popcorn is not
3312used to prepare any other food for patrons.
3320§ 561.695(6), Fla . Stat. (2005).
332622. The provision within the Florida Statutes that
3334authorizes the Division to promulgate rules regarding the
3342enforcement and administration of Section 561.695, Florida
3349Statutes (2005), and Chapter 386, Part II, Florida Statutes
3358(2005), re ads as follows:
3363(9) The division shall adopt rules
3369governing the designation process, criteria
3374for qualification, required recordkeeping,
3378auditing, and all other rules necessary for
3385the effective enforcement and administration
3390of this section and part I I of chapter 386.
3400The division is authorized to adopt
3406emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54(4) to
3413implement the provisions of this section.
3419§ 561.695(9), Fla. Stat. (2005).
342423. The provision within the Florida Statutes that defines
3433an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" reads,
3441in pertinent part, as follows:
3446(8) "Invalid exercise of delegated
3451legislative authority" means action which
3456goes beyond the powers, functions, and
3462duties delegated by the Legislature. A
3468proposed or existing r ule is an invalid
3476exercise of delegated legislative authority
3481if any one of the following applies:
3488* * *
3491(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or
3497contravenes the specific provisions of law
3503implemented, citation to which is required
3509by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;
3512* * *
3515(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.
3522A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported
3531by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is
3540capricious if it is adopted without thought
3547or reason or is irrational; . . . .
3556§ 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005).
3561Objections of Petitioner
356424. Petitioners challenge the proposed rules in the
3572present case as constituting an invalid exercise of delegated
3581legislative authority. Petitioners argue that Subsection
3587386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), limits a stand - alon e bar
3598to selling only alcoholic beverages and food for consumption on
3608the premises. Petitioners assert that proposed Rule 61A - 7.006
3618constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
3625authority by authorizing the receipt of gross revenues from and
3635th e consideration of records regarding sales by a stand - alone
3647bar received from other than the sale of food or alcoholic
3658beverages for consumption on the premises.
366425. Petitioners also assert that proposed Rules 61A - 7.007
3674and 61A - 7.008 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative
3684authority for the reason that the two - month period for
3695determining compliance with the stand - alone bar requirement of
3705Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), is contrary to
3713such statute's directive that compliance must be maintained "at
3722any time"; would permit a stand - alone bar to violate on repeated
3735occasions during the audit period, the "incidentals sales"
3743requirement that no more than 10 percent of gross revenues be
3754from the sale of food for consumption on the premises; and is
3766contrary to the prior Final Order in DOAH Case No. 03 - 4776RP,
3779which found that a substantially identical proposed rule, in
3788which the audit period was six months, constituted an invalid
3798exercise of delegated legislative authority.
380326. Petitioners f urther assert that proposed Rule
381161A - 7.009 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
3821authority in that it violates the statutory requirements of
3830Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), that a stand -
3839alone bar sell only alcoholic beverages and food for consumption
3849on the premises; permits a stand - alone bar to derive
3860approximately 25 percent or less of its gross revenue from the
3871sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises and
3881be deemed by the Division to be "predominantly devoted " to the
3892sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, and
3902is only a non - substantive, cosmetic change from the previous
3913proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 held invalid in DOAH Case No. 03 - 4776RP.
392727. Based on the testimony of Brenda Olsen, assistant C EO
3938for the American Lung Association of Florida and director of
3948Governmental Affairs, during the 2003 legislative session in
3956which House Bill 63 - A was passed, the Florida House of
3968Representatives and Senate had conflicting views of the
3976legislation at first . The House version contemplated
3984eliminating the stand - alone bar exemption while the Senate
3994version would allow 25 percent food sales.
400128. Tampa Lanes is a bowling alley in the Tampa area that
4013has purchased a quota liquor license in order to operate as a
4025stand - alone bar, and is a 50 - lane bowling center that consists
4039of around 175 game machines, which is one of the larger machine
4051set - ups in the bowling industry.
4058The Division's Position
406129. The Division's proposed two - month auditing period is
4071analogous to the method in which the Division currently audits
4081SRX licensed premises.
408430. There are statutory restrictions on what may be sold
4094in some establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, but
4103no statutory limits exist specifically for stand - alone bars .
411431. Richard Law has been a CPA in Florida since 1977 and
4126has been qualified as an expert in accountancy in state
4136administrative hearings, federal administrative hearings,
4141federal district court, and the circuit court. Law was
4150recognized as an expert. Based on his testimony, the typical
4160audit period is a year. A yearly audit is a true and accurate
4173representation of a business's practice. A daily audit would be
4183susceptible to skewed results. For example, a tour bus may stop
4194alongside a bar resulting i n that particular days' food sales
4205being abnormally high. Those particular days' sales would not
4214be representative of the true nature of the bar's business
4224practices.
422532. Michael Martinez, special counsel to the Department of
4234Business and Professional Re gulation, was involved with the
4243legislative process in drafting legislation that implemented
4250Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. In addition
4260to the input received from the Legislature, there was input from
4271public workshops, public hearings, and numerous telephone calls
4279from concerned business owners.
4283CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
4286Jurisdiction
428733. The Division of Administrative Hearings has
4294jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
4304proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Sta tutes (2005).
431334. Petitioners consist of an association, a company, and
4322an individual whose substantial interests will be affected by
4331the proposed rules, and they have standing to bring this rule
4342challenge.
4343Burden of Proof
434635. Initially, Petitioners "sh all state with particularity
4354the objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the
4365proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
4374authority." § 120.56(2)(a), Fla. Stat (2005). Then, the
4382Division "has the burden to prove by a prepond erance of the
4394evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of
4405delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised."
4413Id. ; see also Southwest Florida Water Management District v.
4422Charlotte County , 774 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 2nd DCA
44322001 )("Nothing in section 120.56(2) requires the agency to carry
4443the burden of presenting evidence to disprove an objection
4452alleged in a petition challenging a proposed rule. Instead a
4462party challenging a proposed rule has the burden of establishing
4472a factual basis for the objections to the rule, and then the
4484agency has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the
4495proposed rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative
4504authority."), citing St. Johns River Water Management District
4513v. Consolidated - Tomo ka Land Co. , 717 So. 2d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA
45281998). The court in Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , declined to
4539require the agency to go forward with evidence to disprove every
4550objection made in the petition. Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. ,
4560717 So. 2d at 76. I nstead, the court adopted a practical
4572approach that requires the party challenging the proposed rule
4581to establish a factual basis for the objections put forth in the
4593petition. Id. at 77.
459736. A rule may not be declared invalid on any other ground
4609without impermissibly extending the authority of the
4616Administrative Law Judge. See Schiffman v. Department of
4624Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy , 581 So. 2d 1375,
46331379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)("An administrative agency has only the
4644authority that the legislatu re has conferred it by statute.")
4655Thus, a proposed rule may not be invalidated simply because the
4666ALJ believes it is not the wisest or best choice. See Bd. of
4679Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Levy , 656 So. 2d 1359,
46901364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)("The i ssue before the hearing officer
4702in this [rule challenge] case was not whether the Trustees made
4713the best choice . . . or whether their choice is one that the
4727appellee finds desirable . . . ."); Dravo Basic Materials Co.,
4739Inc. v. Department of Transportatio n , 602 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla.
47512nd DCA 1992)("It is not our task, however, to write the best
4764rule for DOT. That was not the task of the hearing officer.").
4777Statutory Construction
477937. Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a
4788court's statutory cons truction analysis. Reynolds v. State , 842
4797So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 2002). In determining the Legislature's
4807intent in using a particular word in a statute, the courts may
4819examine other uses of the word in similar contexts. Hankey v.
4830Yarian , 755 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 2000).
483838. Statutory phrases are not to be read in isolation, but
4849rather within the context of the entire section. Jones v. ETS
4860of New Orleans, Inc. , 793 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2001). The
4872legislative use of different terms in different sections is
4881strong evidence that different meanings were intended.
4888Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical
4895Examiners v. Durrani , 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
490739. When the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed
4917to know existing statu tes and the case law construing them.
4928Williams v. Christian , 335 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
494040. The statutory construction principle in pari materia
4948requires two statutes relating to the same thing or subject to
4959be construed together "so as to harmonize both statutes and give
4970effect to the Legislature's intent." Maggio v. Florida
4978Department of Labor and Employment , 899 So. 2d 1074, 1078 (Fla.
49892005.
4990Agency Interpretation
499241. It is widely recognized that "[a]gencies are to be
5002accorded wide disc retion in the exercise of their lawful
5012rulemaking - authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and
5021consistent with the agency's general statutory duties."
5028Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield Development
5035Company , 581 So. 2d 193, 197 (Fla. 1st DC A 1991).
504642. The Division is to be "accord[ed] great deference to
5056administrative interpretations of statutes which the . . .
5065agency is required to enforce." Department of Environmental
5073Regulation v. Goldring , 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985).
508343. "[T]he agency's interpretation of a statute need not
5092be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable
5102one; it need only be within the range of possible
5112interpretations." Department of Professional Regulation, Board
5118of Medicine Examiners v. Durrani , 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st
5130DCA 1984). See Board of Podiatric Medicine v. Florida Medical
5140Association , 779 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (upholding
5151agency's definition "[i]n light of the broad discretion and
5160deference which is accorded an agency in the interpretation of a
5171statute which it administers, and because such an interpretation
5180should be upheld when it is within the range of permissible
5191interpretations[.]").
519344. The ALJ has the discretion to declare the proposed
5203rule wholly or partly inva lid. § 120.56(2)(b), Fla. Stat.
5213(2005).
5214Statutory Exemptions
521645. Statutory exceptions to general statutory provisions
5223are to be strictly construed against one attempting to take
5233advantage of the exception. See Heburn v. Department of
5242Children and Famil ies , 772 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In
5255Heburn , the appellant had been disqualified from a "position of
5265trust" because of two offenses involving possession of marijuana
5274on school property and armed robbery. Heburn , 772 So. 2d at
5285562. Appellant sough t relief under a statutory provision that
5295would allow an exemption if it was proven by clear and
5306convincing evidence that a disqualification was not required.
5314Id. The Department of Children and Families issued a final
5324order denying Appellant the exemptio n. Id. The District Court
5334of Appeal, upholding the denial, found that "[a]n exemption from
5344a statute, enacted to protect the public welfare, is strictly
5354construed against the person claiming the exemption, and the
5363Department was not required to grant Heb urn any benefits under
5374the exemption." Id. at 563, citing State v. Nourse , 340 So. 2d
5386966, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
539246. In Nourse , 340 So. 2d at 968 - 969, the appellee sought
5405an exception to a broad prohibition against possession of under -
5416sized crawfish. The appellee attempted to take advantage of an
5426exception that related to the right to bait traps ten days
5437before crawfish season. Id. at 969. The court ruled against
5447the appellee finding that an exception to a general prohibition
5457is strictly construed ag ainst an individual seeking to take
5467advantage of the exception. Id.
547247. Petitioners have failed to establish how this widely -
5482accepted rule of statutory construction alters the Division's
5490discretion in promulgating rules. Furthermore, Petitioners have
5497c ited no legal authority that has applied this rule to a
5509scenario in which neither party is seeking an exemption.
5518Invalid Exercise of Delegated Legislative Authority
552448. The ultimate question in a proposed rule challenge is
5534whether the rule is "an invalid exercise of delegated
5543legislative authority." § 120.56(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).
5550Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2005), defines the term
5558as an "action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and
5568duties delegated by the Legislature."
557349. In 1999, the Legislature revised the closing paragraph
5582of Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, after the decision in
5591Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , which held that "[a] rule is a
5603valid exercise of delegated legislative authority if it
5611regulates a matter directly within the class of powers and
5621duties identified in the statute to be implemented."
5629Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , 717 So. 2d at 80. The language of
5642Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, was amended to read:
5650A grant of rulemaking authority is
5656necessar y but not sufficient to allow an
5664agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be
5674implemented is also required. An agency may
5681adopt only rules that implement or interpret
5688the specific powers and duties granted by
5695the enabling statute. No agency shall have
5702au thority to adopt a rule only because it is
5712reasonably related to the purpose of the
5719enabling legislation and is not arbitrary
5725and capricious or is within the agency's
5732class of powers and duties, nor shall an
5740agency have the authority to implement
5746statutory provisions setting forth general
5751legislative intent or policy. Statutory
5756language granting rulemaking authority or
5761generally describing the powers and
5766functions of an agency shall be construed to
5774extend no further than implementing or
5780interpreting the sp ecific powers and duties
5787conferred by the same statute. (Emphasis
5793supplied.)
5794§ 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005). See Board of Trustees of the
5805Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Association, Inc. ,
5814794 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); See also South west Florida
5827Water Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc. ,
5836773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
584450. The test for invalid delegation of legislative
5852authority is whether a rule gives effect to a "specific law to
5864be implemented" and whether the ru le implements or interprets
"5874specific powers and duties." Day Cruise , 794 So. 2d at 704.
588551. The court in Day Cruise discussed the importance of
5895the 1999 Administrative Procedure Act (the "Act") amendments as
5905follows:
5906Under the 1996 and 1999 amendments t o the
5915APA, it is now clear, agencies have
5922rulemaking authority only where the
5927Legislature has enacted a specific statute,
5933and authorized the agency to implement it,
5940and then only if the proposed rule
5947implements or interprets specific powers or
5953duties, as o pposed to improvising in an area
5962that can be said to fall only generally
5970within some class of powers or duties the
5978Legislature has conferred on the agency.
5984Day Cruise , 794 So. 2d at 700. See generally Save the Manatee
5996Club, Inc. , 773 So. 2d at 598 - 599 (i nterpreting Subsection
6008120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1999), as removing an agency of the
6018authority to adopt a rule merely because it is with the agency's
6030class of powers and duties).
6035Applicability of Res Judicata
603952. It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata
6050may be implied in administrative proceedings. See Thomson v.
6059Department of Environmental Regulation , 511 So. 2d 989 (Fla.
60681987); Wager v. City of Green Cove Springs , 261 So. 2d 827 (Fla.
60811972); Metropolitan Dade Co. Board of County Commiss ioners v.
6091Rockmatt Corporation , 231 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
610153. However, the principles upon which res judicata
6109applies do not always fit neatly within the scope of
6119administrative proceedings. Thomson , 511 So. 2d at 991. The
6128doctrine of res judic ata is to be applied with "great caution"
6140in proceedings before administrative bodies. Id. , citing Coral
6148Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co. , 410 So. 648 (Fla. 3d DCA
61601982).
616154. Furthermore, the doctrine is inapplicable where there
6169has been a change in c ircumstances or facts relating to the
6181subject matter. Metropolitan Dade Co. Board of County
6189Commissioners v. Rockmatt Corp. , 231 So. 2d at 44.
619855. There is a significant difference between the prior
6207rules and the proposed rules. For example, the prior r ules only
6219required the alcohol sales to be greater than the food sales in
6231order to be deemed predominately dedicated to the serving of
6241alcoholic beverages. The difference results in a substantial
6249change in circumstances that renders the doctrine of res
6258ju dicata inapplicable to the present proceeding.
6265Merits
626656. Sections 386.2125 and 561.695 and Subsection
6273386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), give the Division
6280sufficient specific rulemaking authority regarding the
6286designation process, criteria for qualif ication, required
6293record - keeping, auditing, and all other rules necessary for the
6304effective enforcement of Chapter 561 and Part II of Chapter 386,
6315Florida Statutes (2005).
631857. Petitioners raised the objection that the Division has
6327arbitrarily interpreted the statutory language of Subsection
6334386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005). Specifically, Petitioners
6340allege that the statute only allows for the sale of alcoholic
6351beverages and food in a stand - alone bar. Not only do
6363Petitioners mistake the language of th e statute as an express
6374limitation on what a stand - alone bar may sell, but Petitioners
6386failed to support this objection with factual evidence presented
6395at hearing. Petitioners cited no law and presented no testimony
6405to establish that the Legislature inten ded to limit what could
6416be sold in a stand - alone bar.
642458. Proposed Rule 61A - 7.006 requires a licensee to
6434maintain records in a separate manner that will allow
6443computation by the use of proposed Rule 61A - 7.009. This is a
6456reasonable and consistent interpre tation of the statutory
6464language and does not modify, enlarge, or contravene the
6473implementing statute.
647559. Petitioners raised the objection that the Division has
6484arbitrarily interpreted the phrase "during any time of
6492operation." Specifically, Petitioners allege that the
6498Legislature clearly intended this phrase to mean a daily basis.
6508However, Petitioners fail to note that Section 561.695, Florida
6517Statutes (2005), requires the licensee to submit a "12 - month
6528affidavit" and a "36 - month certified public accou ntant
6538evaluation." See § 561.695, Fla. Stat. (2005). Neither the
6547affidavit, nor the evaluation, contemplates a daily review of
6556sales. See Id. Interpreting the statute in a manner that would
6567require daily compliance contravenes the language of the
6575speci fic statutes and, thus, the legislative intent. See
6584§ 561.695(5), Fla. Stat. (2005)(requiring the licensee to
6592certify that the stand - alone bar criteria was met for the
6604preceding 12 - month period); § 561.695(6), Fla. Stat.
6613(2005)(requiring the licensee to s ubmit a report from a Florida
6624CPA that attests to the licensee's compliance with the
6633ten - percent requirement for the preceding 36 - month period).
6644Petitioners' objection is lacking a factual basis as none of the
6655statutes pertaining to this exemption contain s the language
"6664daily." Petitioners put forth neither statutory cites, nor
6672evidence that would support such an interpretation. Further, a
6681daily review of sales by the Division would be practically
6691impossible to achieve.
669460. Proposed Rules 61A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 properly
6705implement Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), by
6712utilizing a two - month averaging period that will obtain a
6723reasonable representation of the business in question. These
6731rules would be used as an enforcement tool to verify th e
6743business's compliance with the "12 - month affidavit" and
"675236 - month certified public account evaluation" requirements of
6761Section 561.695, Florida Statutes (2005). Neither provision
6768requires the audit period to be examined on a daily basis. See
6780§ 561.695( 5) and (6), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the Legislature had
6792contemplated the stand - alone bar exception to be met on a daily
6805basis, they would have so stated in the "12 - month affidavit" or
6818the "36 - month certified public accountant evaluation"
6826requirements of the statute. "Daily" was not used in the
6836definition of a stand - alone bar or in any other provision of the
6850statute related thereto.
685361. Petitioners presented no evidence that would support
6861its contention that the Legislature intended the phrase "during
6870any t ime of operation" to mean on a daily basis. Martinez
6882testified that the phrase "during any time of operation" could
6892be interpreted to mean "every single sale." Both
6900interpretations lead to an absurd result which is to be
6910disfavored when discerning legisl ative intent. State v. Webb ,
6919398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981). The Division stresses that proposed
6930Rules 61A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 are enforcement tools that will
6943ensure the provisions of Section 561.695, Florida Statutes
6951(2005), are being met. These rules in n o way serve as a method
6965of obtaining qualification as a stand - alone bar.
697462. Petitioners raise a final objection pertaining to the
6983Division's authority to create categories in order to determine
6992whether the premises are dedicated predominately or totally to
7001the serving of alcoholic beverages. Petitioners argue that the
7010Legislature placed an express limitation on what a stand - alone
7021bar may sell. If the Legislature had envisioned such a
7031limitation on what a stand - alone bar may sell, then the final
7044sentence in the "stand - alone bar" exemption would have required
7055the ten percent requirement to be compared to alcoholic beverage
7065sales, rather than total gross revenue. See § 386.203(11),
7074Fla. Stat. (2005)("A place of business constitutes a stand - alone
7086bar in whi ch the service of food is merely incidental in
7098accordance with this subsection if the licensed premises derives
7107no more than ten percent of its gross revenue from the sale of
7120food consumed on the licensed premises"). (Emphasis supplied.)
7129At hearing, Petit ioners failed to present any factual evidence
7139or point to the express limitation in the statute that would
7150support such a contention.
715463. Proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 takes into consideration a
7164licensee's predominate business by requiring the sale of alcohol
7173f or consumption on the premises to be the highest grossing
7184category of revenue. The implementing statute does not prohibit
7193the licensee from selling items other than alcoholic beverages
7202and food. Petitioners failed to offer testimony to establish
7211otherwis e. The Division's interpretation is consistent with the
7220dictionary definition and within the range of reasonable
7228interpretations. Therefore, it follows that the interpretation
7235is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
724464. Petitioner 's evidence presented at trial falls short
7253of that required to shift the burden to the Division.
7263Petitioners' opening statement and subsequent witnesses fail to
7271support the objections raised in the petition. Petitioners'
7279opening statement cannot be consi dered as factual basis for
7289objections put forth in the petition. The purpose of the
7299attorney's opening statement is to outline what is expected to
7309be established by the evidence. See Occhicone v. State , 570
7319So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990) ("Opening remarks a re not evidence,
7332and the purpose of opening argument is to outline what an
7343attorney expects to be established by the evidence."), citing
7353Whitted v. State , 362 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1978).
736265. Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), does
7369not require a licensee to meet the ten percent threshold on a
7381daily basis. Such an interpretation is neither reasonable, nor
7390supported by the evidence presented at trial. Proposed Rules
739961A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 are rules setting forth the requirements
7412to obtain a desig nation as a stand - alone bar. These rules will
7426be used for enforcement purposes to ensure that the
7435establishment is meeting the requirements imposed by Section
7443561.695, Florida Statutes (2005).
744766. Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), does
7454n ot prohibit the licensee from selling items other than
7464alcoholic beverages and food. Such interpretation would require
7472words to be read into the statute and impermissibly modify the
7483legislative intent. Petitioners are correct in pointing out
7491that the Leg islature made an express limitation on what a
"7502retail tobacco shop" could sell; however, there is no such
7512express limitation for the "stand - alone bar" statute.
752167. The Division's proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 takes into
7531consideration a licensee's predominate bu siness by requiring the
7540sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises (the service of
7551alcoholic beverages) to be the highest grossing category of
7560revenue. This is a reasonable interpretation that does not
7569modify, contravene, or expand the specific provi sions of the
7579implementing law. Furthermore, this categorical scheme cures
7586the deficiency found by ALJ Staros in the prior rule challenge.
7597See Bowling Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Florida
7606Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Divi sion of
7615Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH
7625March 26, 2004).
762868. Petitioners have failed to meet the burden of
7637establishing a factual basis for the objections to the rule.
7647While the Petition raised objections, the testimony and evid ence
7657presented at trial did not establish a factual basis for the
7668objections raised.
767069. Additionally, there was no evidence presented by
7678Petitioners to show that either the rules were not supported by
7689logic or that they were adopted without thought or re ason. To
7701the contrary, the Division has shown that numerous workshops,
7710hearings, and thousands of telephone calls from concerned
7718citizens were taken into account when drafting the proposed
7727rules.
772870. In conclusion, the Division has shown by a
7737preponderan ce of the evidence that the proposed rules challenged
7747by Petitioners are not invalid exercises of the authority
7756delegated to the Division by the Legislature. The proposed
7765rules do not enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific statute
7775to be implemented. The rules are consistent with the statute,
7785they lawfully implement the specific statute, and they serve a
7795reasonable interpretation of the specific powers and duties
7803outlined within the applicable statutes. The designation as a
7812stand - alone bar requires, for renewal of the annual license, the
7824submission of an affidavit that for the proceeding year the
7834business met the criteria for the designation. The two - month
7845audit set forth in the proposed rule is used for other license
7857types with percent of sales rest rictions. The two - month audit
7869accomplishes the intent of the legislation without imposing
7877arbitrary requirements on a business. The proposed rule does
7886not contravene the requirements for the designation "any time,"
7895it merely gives notice as to the Divisi on's enforcement
7905procedures as required and authorized by the specific authority
7914granted in Subsection 561.569(9), Florida Statutes (2005). The
7922rule provides that the business be, if not totally,
7931predominately devoted to serving alcoholic beverages.
7937Pred ominate, or to be, or have a greater quantity than other
7949sales is required by the proposed rule. Sales of other than
7960alcoholic beverages are not prohibited by statute.
7967ORDER
7968Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
7978Law, it is
7981ORDERED that proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007,
799161A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009 are not an invalid exercises of
8004delegated legislative authority and the Petition is denied.
8012DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of December, 2005, in
8022Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
8026S
8027DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
8030Administrative Law Judge
8033Division of Administrative Hearings
8037The DeSoto Building
80401230 Apalachee Parkway
8043Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
8048(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675
8056Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
8062www.doah.stat e.fl.us
8064Filed with the Clerk of the
8070Division of Administrative Hearings
8074this 7th day of December, 2005.
8080COPIES FURNISHED :
8083Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
8088Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman
8093Post Office Box 551
8097Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551
8102Renee Also brook, Esquire
8106Department of Business and
8110Professional Regulation
81121940 North Monroe Street
8116Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202
8121John Lockwood, Qualified Representative
8125Department of Business and
8129Professional Regulation
81311940 North Monroe Street
8135Tallahassee , Florida 32399 - 2202
8140Leon Biegalsi, General Counsel
8144Department of Business and
8148Professional Regulation
81501940 North Monroe Street
8154Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202
8159Scott Boyd, Executive Director
8163and General Counsel
8166Joint Administrative Procedures Commi ttee
8171120 Holland Building
8174Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300
8179Liz Cloud, Program Administrator
8183Bureau of Administrative Code
8187Department of State
8190R.A. Gray Building, Suite 101
8195Tallahassee, FL 32399 - 0250
8200NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
8206A party who is ad versely affected by this Final Order is
8218entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida
8227Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules
8236of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by
8244filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency Clerk of
8255the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied
8264by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of
8275Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in
8286the Appellate District where the p arty resides. The notice of
8297appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to
8310be reviewed.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 12/06/2006
- Proceedings: Transmittal letter to J. Tamayo from Ann Cole forwarding the transcript and the exhibits to the agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 04/21/2006
- Proceedings: Index, Record, and Certificate of Record sent to the District Court of Appeal.
- PDF:
- Date: 04/07/2006
- Proceedings: Supplemental Index (of the Record) sent to the parties of record.
- PDF:
- Date: 04/04/2006
- Proceedings: Letter to E. Williams from S. Young enclosing Petitioner`s Exhibits introduced at the final hearing filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 03/14/2006
- Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appellant`s motion filed March 3, 2006, for extension of time is granted.
- PDF:
- Date: 01/06/2006
- Proceedings: Letter to Ann Cole from Jon Wheeler acknowledging receipt of Notice of Appeal, DCA Case No. 1D06-32.
- PDF:
- Date: 01/04/2006
- Proceedings: Certified Copy of Notice of Administrative Appeal sent to the First District Court of Appeal.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/14/2005
- Proceedings: Order (Motion to Accept Filing of Petitioner`s Proposed Final Order granted).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/13/2005
- Proceedings: Motion to Accept Filing of Petitioner`s Proposed Final Order filed.
- Date: 09/09/2005
- Proceedings: Final Hearing (transcript) filed.
- Date: 08/30/2005
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/26/2005
- Proceedings: Memorandum in Support of Respondent`s Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/26/2005
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Request to take Judicial Notice of Statutory Provisions of the Florida Beverage Law and Florida Administrative Code filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 08/18/2005
- Proceedings: Order (J. Lockwood is authorized to appear in this administrative proceedings as the qualified representative of Respondent).
- PDF:
- Date: 07/18/2005
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for August 30, 2005; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 06/06/2005
- Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Placing Case in Abeyance (parties to advise status by July 15, 2005).
- PDF:
- Date: 05/25/2005
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for June 16, 2005; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
Case Information
- Judge:
- DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
- Date Filed:
- 05/20/2005
- Date Assignment:
- 05/24/2005
- Last Docket Entry:
- 12/06/2006
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- Department of Business and Professional Regulation
- Suffix:
- RP
Counsels
-
E. Renee Alsobrook, Acting General Counsel
Address of Record -
John Lockwood, Qualified Representative
Address of Record -
Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire
Address of Record -
E. Renee Alsobrook, Esquire
Address of Record