05-001882RP Bowling Centers Association Of Florida, Inc.; Shore Lanes, Inc.; Sanford Finklestein; And Sarah Lynch vs. Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Division Of Alcoholic Beverages And Tobacco
 Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, December 7, 2005.


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Summary: Respondent corrected deficiencies found in a prior rule challenge. The proposed rules are not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The challenge is denied.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8BOWLING CENTERS ASSOCIATION OF )

13FLORIDA, INC.; SHORE LANES, )

18INC.; AND SANFORD FINKLESTEIN, )

23)

24Petitioners, )

26)

27vs. ) Case No. 05 - 1882RP

34)

35DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

40PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, )

43DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES )

48A ND TOBACCO, )

52)

53Respondent. )

55)

56FINAL ORDER

58Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held in

67this case before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge of

77the Division of Administrative Hearings, on August 30, 2005, in

87Tallahassee, Florida.

89APPEARANCES

90For Petitioner: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

97Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman

102Post Office Box 551

106Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551

111For Respondent: Renee Alsobrook, Esquire

116John Lockwood, Qualified Representative

120Department of Business and

124Professional Regulation

1261940 North Monroe Street

130Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

135STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

139Whethe r the proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008,

153and 61A - 7.009, constitute a valid exercise of delegated

163legislative authority, as such term is defined in Subsection

172120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004).

176PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

178This matter was initiated on May 20, 2005, when Petitioners

188filed a Petition Challenging the Validity of Proposed Rules

197Noticed for Adoption ("Petition"). The Petition alleges that

207Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation,

214Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco's (Division),

221proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009

236constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

243authority as defined in Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes

251(2004).

252A Notice of Hearing was issued on May 25, 2 005, scheduling

264a formal hearing for June 16, 2005. On June 6, 2005, the

276hearing was placed in abeyance for a period of 30 days. A final

289Notice of Hearing was issued on July 18, 2005, scheduling a

300formal hearing for August 30, 2005. On August 18, 2005, John

311Lockwood was deemed a qualified representative of Respondent.

319The parties filed a Pre - Hearing Stipulation on August 26, 2005.

331At hearing, the parties agreed to the voluntary dismissal

340of Sarah Lynch as a Petitioner. Respondent went forward with

350the evidence and presented the testimony of Marie Carpenter,

359Debbie Pender, Michael Martinez, and Richard Law, certified

367public accountant. Petitioners presented the testimony of

374Brenda Olsen and Sanford Finkelstein as rebuttal witnesses.

382Petitioner's Exhib its numbered 1 through 8 were admitted into

392evidence, which consisted of: 1) a copy of the Final Order of

404Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Barbara J. Staros in Bowling

413Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Business

422and Professional Regulatio n, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and

431Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH March 26, 2004); 2) a copy of

445Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution; 3) a copy of

457Chapter 386, Part II, Florida Statutes (2005); 4) a copy of

468Section 561.695, Florida Stat utes (2005); 5) a copy of proposed

479Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007, 61A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009; 6) a copy

496of the Division's Form ABT - 6039 and instruction sheet; 7) a copy

509of the Division's publication entitled "Frequently Asked

516Questions"; and 8) a copy of Marie Carpenter's deposition taken

526on January 26, 2004. Respondent's Exhibits numbered 1 through 3

536were admitted into evidence, which consist of: 1) a copy of the

548notice of rule development, notice of rulemaking, and the

557proposed rules as submitted to the Flor ida Administrative

566Weekly; 2) a copy of a Transcript from the rulemaking workshop

577held on July 29, 2005; 3) a copy of the Transcript of the rule

591development workshop held on May 13, 2005, with attachments.

600The Division filed a Motion to Take Official Reco gnition

610and orally supplemented with Sections 561.1105, 561.20, 565.02,

618and 565.045, Florida Statutes (2005), in addition to Florida

627Administrative Code Rules 61A - 3.0141 and 61A - 3.054. Official

638recognition was taken without objection.

643A Transcript consis ting of one volume was filed on

653September 9, 2005. The parties requested until October 10,

6622005, in which to submit proposed final orders. The request was

673granted, and each party timely filed their proposals.

681FINDINGS OF FACT

684Based on the evidence, the following findings of fact are

694determined:

6951. The State of Florida, Department of Business and

704Professional Regulation (Respondent), is the state agency

711responsible for adopting the proposed rules which are the

720subject matter of this proceeding.

7252. Th e Division is vested with general regulatory

734authority over the alcoholic beverage industry within the state.

7433. The Division issues both general and special alcoholic

752beverage licenses. The general licenses which permit

759consumption of alcoholic beverag es on the premises of a business

770are: 1 - COP licenses which permit consumption of beer and

781certain wine and distilled spirit products; 2 - COP licenses which

792permit consumption of beer, wine, and certain distilled spirit

801products; and 4 - COP licenses which pe rmit the consumption of

813beer, wine, and all distilled spirits.

8194. Quota licenses are issued based on the population of

829the county and are limited in number. In addition, a quota

840license allows consumption on the premises of beer, wine, and

850distilled spi rits.

853Standing and/or Identification of the Parties

8595. The parties stipulated in the Joint Pre - Hearing

869Stipulation to the standing of Bowling Centers Association of

878Florida, Inc. (BCAF), Shore Lanes, Inc., and Sanford

886Finklestein. The parties agreed at hearing that Sarah Lynch

895would be voluntarily dismissed as a Petitioner.

9026. BCAF is a non - profit Florida corporation with its

913principle place of business in Orlando, Florida. It is composed

923of owners of bowling centers throughout the State of Florida.

933Its purpose is representing the interests of its member bowling

943centers. This purpose includes matters of rule adoptions that

952would affect or concern bowling centers.

9587. All members of BCAF are bowling centers that may hold

969either a special bowling lic ense (SBX) or a general alcoholic

980beverage license.

9828. Shore Lanes, Inc., is the owner/operator of a bowling

992center located in Merritt Island, Florida. Shore Lanes, Inc.,

1001currently holds an SBX license, but is eligible to hold a

1012general alcoholic bevera ge license.

10179. Sanford Finklestein is the general manager and part -

1027owner of Shore Lanes, Inc., as well as the current president of

1039BCAF. Finklestein is substantially affected because

1045establishments holding general alcoholic beverage licenses are

1052classif ied as enclosed indoor workplaces.

1058Florida Clean Indoor Air Act

106310. Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution,

"1072the Florida Clear Indoor Act," was adopted by the electorate in

1083May 2002, as "a Florida health initiative to protect people from

1094the health hazards of second - hand tobacco smoke." It contains a

1106far - reaching prohibition against smoking in enclosed indoor

1115workplaces. A very limited exception from this general

1123prohibition was provided for "stand - alone bars," as such term

1134was defined in s ubsection (c)(8) of the amendment.

1143(8) "Stand - alone bar" means any place of

1152business devoted during any time of

1158operation predominately or totally to

1163serving alcoholic beverages, intoxicating

1167beverages, or intoxicating liquors, or any

1173combination thereo f, for consumption on the

1180licensed premises; in which the serving of

1187food, if any, is merely incidental to the

1195consumption of any such beverage; and that

1202is not located within, and does not share

1210any common entryway or common indoor area

1217with, any other en closed indoor workplace

1224including any business for which the sale of

1232food or any other product or service is more

1241than an incidental source of gross revenue.

1248The amendment further provided in subsection (d) for legislative

1257implementation of this amendment in a manner which could be

1267more, but not less, restrictive than the provisions of the

1277amendment.

127811. On June 23, 2003, the Governor of Florida signed House

1289Bill 63 - A into law to implement Article X, Section 20 of the

1303Florida Constitution. It was denomina ted as Chapter 2003 - 398,

1314Laws of Florida, and this statute substantially revises

1322Chapter 386, Florida Statutes (2002), which is commonly referred

1331to as the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act.

133912. Section 386.2125, Florida Statutes (2003), requires

1346the Departmen t of Health and Respondent, in consultation with

1356the state fire marshal, to adopt rules pursuant to Subsection

1366120.536(1) and Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (2003), to

1374implement the provisions of Chapter 386, Part II, Florida

1383Statutes (2003), within each agency's specific areas of

1391regulatory authority.

139313. The Legislature, in implementing Article X, Section 20

1402of the Florida Constitution, enacted Section 386.204, Florida

1410Statutes (2003), which prohibits smoking in enclosed indoor

1418workplaces, except as pr ovided in Section 386.2045, Florida

1427Statutes (2003). Section 386.2045, Florida Statutes (2003),

1434provides that smoking may be permitted in a:

1442(4) Stand - Alone Bar -- A business that meets

1452the definition of a stand - alone bar as

1461defined in s. 386.203(11) and o therwise

1468complies with all applicable provisions of

1474the Beverage Law and this part.

148014. A stand - alone bar is defined in Subsection

1490386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2003), as follows:

1496(11) "Stand - alone bar" means any licensed

1504premises devoted during any time of

1510operation predominantly or totally to

1515serving alcoholic beverages, intoxicating

1519beverages, or intoxicating liquors, or any

1525combination thereof, for consumption on the

1531licensed premises; in which the serving of

1538food, if any, is merely incidental to the

1546consumption of any such beverage; and the

1553licensed premises is not located within, and

1560does not share any common entryway or common

1568indoor area with, any other enclosed indoor

1575workplace, including any business for which

1581the sale of food or any other pr oduct or

1591service is more than an incidental source of

1599gross revenue. A place of business

1605constitutes a stand - alone bar in which the

1614service of food is merely incidental in

1621accordance with this subsection if the

1627licensed premises derive no more than 10

1634per cent of its gross revenue from the sale

1643of food consumed on the licensed premises.

1650Prior Litigation

165215. The Division previously was involved in rule challenge

1661proceedings concerning the stand - alone bar exemption. Bowling

1670Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Business

1679and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and

1687Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH March 26, 2004). In that

1699case, ALJ Staros concluded that the Division exceeded its grant

1709of rulemaking authority in three of the four rules proposed at

1720the prior hearing. ALJ Staros found three of the proposed rules

1731to be arbitrary by failing to take into consideration a

1741licensee's predominate business and, also, by permitting the use

1750of gross revenue from sources other than t he sale of food and

1763alcoholic beverages to render the provision "predominately or

1771totally devoted" to serving alcoholic beverages.

177716. The text of the invalidated proposed rules as

1786published in their final form in the Florida Administrative Code

1796Weekly on October 10, 2003, is as follows:

180461A - 7.007 Formula for Compliance With

1811Required Percentage of Gross Food Sales

1817Revenues

1818In order to determine compliance, the

1824division shall use the formula of gross food

1832sales revenue, including but not limited to

1839non - alcoholic beverages, divided by gross

1846total sales revenue, in any consecutive six -

1854month period. The results of the formula

1861will represent the percentage of food sales

1868revenues as defined herein as in s. 561.695,

1876Florida Statutes.

1878Specific Authority 386.2 125, 561.695(9), FS.

1884Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

1889History - New

189261A - 7.008 For Percentage of Gross Alcohol

1900Sales Revenue Formula.

1903In order to determine compliance, the

1909division shall use the formula of gross

1916alcohol sales revenue divided by gross total

1923sales revenue, in any consecutive six - month

1931period.

1932Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.

1937Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

1942History - New

194561A - 7.009 Method Used to Determine Whether

1953an Establishment is Predominantly Dedic ated

1959to the Serving of Alcoholic Beverages.

1965In order to determine whether an

1971establishment, other than one holding a

1977specialty license designated in Rule

198261A - 7.003, F.A.C., is predominantly

1988dedicated to the serving of alcoholic

1994beverages, the division sha ll compare the

2001percentage of gross food sales revenue with

2008the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2014revenue. If the percentage of gross alcohol

2021sales revenue is greater than that of the

2029gross food sales revenue, an establishment

2035is deemed predominantly dedic ated to the

2042serving of alcoholic beverages.

2046Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9) FS.

2051Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

2056History - New

205929 Fla. Admin. W. 4021 - 4022 (October 10, 2003).

2069The Proposed Rules

207217. The revised proposed Rules 61A - 7. 006, 61A - 7.007,

208461A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009 were drafted in response to legislation

2097that implemented Article X, Section 20 of the Florida

2106Constitution.

210718. The basis for the proposed rules is information

2116derived from telephone calls, committee hearings, legi slative

2124staff interaction, town hall meetings, rule workshops, rule

2132hearings, senators, and representatives.

213619. The text of the proposed rules as published in their

2147final form in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 11,

21572005, is a follows:

216161A - 7.00 6 Records Required to Maintain the

2170Designation

2171(1) Stand - alone bars holding an "ss" or

"2180ssf" designation shall maintain records to

2186substantiate reports, affidavits and

2190designation qualifications. Records of all

2195purchases of food, all gross retail sales of

2203alcohol for consumption on the licensed

2209premises, all gross retail sales of alcohol

2216for consumption off the licensed premises,

2222all gross retail sales of food sold for

2230consumption on the premises, all gross

2236retail sales of food sold for consumption

2243off the premises, and gross revenue from all

2251other sales shall be separately documented.

2257(2) Stand - alone bars holding an "ss" or

"2266ssf" designation shall maintain complete

2271and accurate records of all sales and

2278purchases. Records shall include, but are

2284not li mited to, purchase invoices, sales

2291tickets, inventory records, receiving

2295records, cash register journal tapes, on

2301premises food sales records, computer

2306records generated from automatic dispensing

2311devices, Department of Revenue Sales Tax

2317Returns, and any ot her record documenting

2324sales. Sales records shall be sequentially

2330organized by month and year and include a

2338monthly statement summarizing the total

2343sales revenue, food revenue and percentage

2349of food revenue for each month.

2355Specific Authority 386.2125, 56 1.695(9), FS.

2361Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

2366History - New

236961A - 7.007 Formula for Compliance With

2376Required Percentage of Gross Food Sales

2382Revenues.

2383In order to determine compliance, the

2389division shall use the formula of gross food

2397sales reve nue from the sale of food the

2406licensee sells for consumption on premises,

2412including but not limited to non - alcoholic

2420beverages, divided by gross total sales

2426revenue, in any consecutive two month

2432period. The results of the formula will

2439represent the percen tage of food sales

2446revenues as defined herein and in Section

2453561.695, Florida Statutes.

2456Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.

2461Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

2466History - New

246961A - 7.008 For Percentage of Gross Alcohol

2477Sales for Consumpti on on the Licensed

2484Premises Revenue Formula

2487In order to determine compliance, the

2493division shall use the formula of gross

2500alcohol sales revenue from the sale of

2507alcohol the licensee sells for consumption

2513on premises, divided by gross total sales

2520revenue, in any consecutive two - month

2527period.

2528Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.

2533Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

2538History - New

254161A - 7.009 Method Used to Determine Whether

2549an Establishment is Predominately Dedicated

2554to the Serving of Alcohol ic Beverages.

2561In order to determine whether an

2567establishment, other than one holding a

2573specialty license designated in rule

257861A - 7.003, F.A.C., is predominately

2584dedicated to the serving of alcoholic

2590beverages for consumption on the licensed

2596premises, the d ivision shall compare the

2603percentage of gross alcohol revenue from the

2610sale of alcohol the licensee sells for

2617consumption on the premises with the

2623following categories of revenue:

2627(1) For stand - alone bars holding the "ss"

2636designation:

2637(a) the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2644revenue from the sale of alcohol the

2651licensee sells for consumption off the

2657premises where the purchaser is required to

2664enter,

2665(b) the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2672revenue from the sale of alcohol the

2679licensee sells for consu mption off the

2686premises where the purchaser is not required

2693to enter the premises, and

2698(c) the percentage of gross revenue from

2705any source not included in the alcohol

2712categories above.

2714If the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2721revenue from the sale of alcohol the

2728licensee sells for consumption on premises

2734is greater than that of the gross sales

2742revenue from each individual category of

2748gross sales in 61A - 7.009(1)(a) - (c), an

2757establishment is deemed predominately

2761dedicated to the serving of alcoholic

2767bever ages.

2769(2) For stand - alone bars holding the "ssf"

2778designation:

2779(a) the percentage of gross food sales

2786revenue from the sale of food the licensee

2794sells for consumption on premises,

2799(b) the percentage of gross food sales

2806revenue from the sale of food t he licensee

2815sales for consumption off premises,

2820(c) the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2827revenue from the sale of alcohol the

2834licensee sells for consumption off the

2840premises, and

2842(d) the percentage of gross revenue from

2849any source not included in the food and

2857alcohol categories above.

2860If the percentage of gross alcohol sales

2867revenue from the sale of alcohol the

2874licensee sells for consumption on premises

2880is greater than that of the gross sales

2888revenue from each individual category of

2894gross sales in 61 A - 7.009(2)(a) - (d), an

2904establishment is deemed predominately

2908dedicated to the serving of alcoholic

2914beverages.

2915Specific Authority 386.2125, 561.695(9), FS.

2920Law Implemented 386.203(11), 561.695(6), FS.

2925History - New

292831 Fla. Admin. W. 964 - 965 (March 11, 2005 ).

2939Applicable Statutes

294120. The provision within the Florida Statutes that

2949outlines the "12 - month affidavit" reads as follows:

2958(5) After the initial designation, to

2964continue to qualify as a stand - alone bar the

2974licensee must provide to the division

2980ann ually, on or before the licensee's annual

2988renewal date, an affidavit that certifies,

2994with respect to the preceding 12 - month

3002period, the following:

3005(a) No more than 10 percent of the gross

3014revenue of the business is from the sale of

3023food consumed on th e licensed premises as

3031defined in s. 386.203(11).

3035(b) Other than customary bar snacks as

3042defined by rule of the division, the

3049licensed vendor does not provide or serve

3056food to a person on the licensed premises

3064without requiring the person to pay a

3071sep arately stated charge for food that

3078reasonably approximates the retail value of

3084the food.

3086(c) The licensed vendor conspicuously

3091posts signs at each entrance to the

3098establishment stating that smoking is

3103permitted in the establishment.

3107The division s hall establish by rule the

3115format of the affidavit required by this

3122subsection.

3123§ 561.695(5), Fla. Stat. (2005).

312821. The provision within the Florida Statutes that

3136outlines the "36 - month certified public accountant evaluation"

3145reads as follows:

3148(6) E very third year after the initial

3156designation, on or before the licensee's

3162annual license renewal, the licensed vendor

3168must additionally provide to the division an

3175agreed upon procedures report in a format

3182established by rule of the department from a

3190Flori da certified public accountant that

3196attests to the licensee's compliance with

3202the percentage requirement of s. 386.203(11)

3208for the preceding 36 - month period. Such

3216report shall be admissible in any proceeding

3223pursuant to s. 120.57. This subsection does

3230no t apply to a stand - alone bar if the only

3242food provided by the business, or in any

3250other way present or brought onto the

3257premises for consumption by patrons, is

3263limited to nonperishable snack food items

3269commercially prepackaged off the premises of

3275the stand - alone bar and served without

3283additions or preparation; except that a

3289stand - alone bar may pop popcorn for

3297consumption on its premises, provided that

3303the equipment used to pop the popcorn is not

3312used to prepare any other food for patrons.

3320§ 561.695(6), Fla . Stat. (2005).

332622. The provision within the Florida Statutes that

3334authorizes the Division to promulgate rules regarding the

3342enforcement and administration of Section 561.695, Florida

3349Statutes (2005), and Chapter 386, Part II, Florida Statutes

3358(2005), re ads as follows:

3363(9) The division shall adopt rules

3369governing the designation process, criteria

3374for qualification, required recordkeeping,

3378auditing, and all other rules necessary for

3385the effective enforcement and administration

3390of this section and part I I of chapter 386.

3400The division is authorized to adopt

3406emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54(4) to

3413implement the provisions of this section.

3419§ 561.695(9), Fla. Stat. (2005).

342423. The provision within the Florida Statutes that defines

3433an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" reads,

3441in pertinent part, as follows:

3446(8) "Invalid exercise of delegated

3451legislative authority" means action which

3456goes beyond the powers, functions, and

3462duties delegated by the Legislature. A

3468proposed or existing r ule is an invalid

3476exercise of delegated legislative authority

3481if any one of the following applies:

3488* * *

3491(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or

3497contravenes the specific provisions of law

3503implemented, citation to which is required

3509by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

3512* * *

3515(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.

3522A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported

3531by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is

3540capricious if it is adopted without thought

3547or reason or is irrational; . . . .

3556§ 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005).

3561Objections of Petitioner

356424. Petitioners challenge the proposed rules in the

3572present case as constituting an invalid exercise of delegated

3581legislative authority. Petitioners argue that Subsection

3587386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), limits a stand - alon e bar

3598to selling only alcoholic beverages and food for consumption on

3608the premises. Petitioners assert that proposed Rule 61A - 7.006

3618constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

3625authority by authorizing the receipt of gross revenues from and

3635th e consideration of records regarding sales by a stand - alone

3647bar received from other than the sale of food or alcoholic

3658beverages for consumption on the premises.

366425. Petitioners also assert that proposed Rules 61A - 7.007

3674and 61A - 7.008 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative

3684authority for the reason that the two - month period for

3695determining compliance with the stand - alone bar requirement of

3705Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), is contrary to

3713such statute's directive that compliance must be maintained "at

3722any time"; would permit a stand - alone bar to violate on repeated

3735occasions during the audit period, the "incidentals sales"

3743requirement that no more than 10 percent of gross revenues be

3754from the sale of food for consumption on the premises; and is

3766contrary to the prior Final Order in DOAH Case No. 03 - 4776RP,

3779which found that a substantially identical proposed rule, in

3788which the audit period was six months, constituted an invalid

3798exercise of delegated legislative authority.

380326. Petitioners f urther assert that proposed Rule

381161A - 7.009 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

3821authority in that it violates the statutory requirements of

3830Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), that a stand -

3839alone bar sell only alcoholic beverages and food for consumption

3849on the premises; permits a stand - alone bar to derive

3860approximately 25 percent or less of its gross revenue from the

3871sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises and

3881be deemed by the Division to be "predominantly devoted " to the

3892sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, and

3902is only a non - substantive, cosmetic change from the previous

3913proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 held invalid in DOAH Case No. 03 - 4776RP.

392727. Based on the testimony of Brenda Olsen, assistant C EO

3938for the American Lung Association of Florida and director of

3948Governmental Affairs, during the 2003 legislative session in

3956which House Bill 63 - A was passed, the Florida House of

3968Representatives and Senate had conflicting views of the

3976legislation at first . The House version contemplated

3984eliminating the stand - alone bar exemption while the Senate

3994version would allow 25 percent food sales.

400128. Tampa Lanes is a bowling alley in the Tampa area that

4013has purchased a quota liquor license in order to operate as a

4025stand - alone bar, and is a 50 - lane bowling center that consists

4039of around 175 game machines, which is one of the larger machine

4051set - ups in the bowling industry.

4058The Division's Position

406129. The Division's proposed two - month auditing period is

4071analogous to the method in which the Division currently audits

4081SRX licensed premises.

408430. There are statutory restrictions on what may be sold

4094in some establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, but

4103no statutory limits exist specifically for stand - alone bars .

411431. Richard Law has been a CPA in Florida since 1977 and

4126has been qualified as an expert in accountancy in state

4136administrative hearings, federal administrative hearings,

4141federal district court, and the circuit court. Law was

4150recognized as an expert. Based on his testimony, the typical

4160audit period is a year. A yearly audit is a true and accurate

4173representation of a business's practice. A daily audit would be

4183susceptible to skewed results. For example, a tour bus may stop

4194alongside a bar resulting i n that particular days' food sales

4205being abnormally high. Those particular days' sales would not

4214be representative of the true nature of the bar's business

4224practices.

422532. Michael Martinez, special counsel to the Department of

4234Business and Professional Re gulation, was involved with the

4243legislative process in drafting legislation that implemented

4250Article X, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. In addition

4260to the input received from the Legislature, there was input from

4271public workshops, public hearings, and numerous telephone calls

4279from concerned business owners.

4283CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

4286Jurisdiction

428733. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

4294jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

4304proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Sta tutes (2005).

431334. Petitioners consist of an association, a company, and

4322an individual whose substantial interests will be affected by

4331the proposed rules, and they have standing to bring this rule

4342challenge.

4343Burden of Proof

434635. Initially, Petitioners "sh all state with particularity

4354the objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the

4365proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

4374authority." § 120.56(2)(a), Fla. Stat (2005). Then, the

4382Division "has the burden to prove by a prepond erance of the

4394evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of

4405delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised."

4413Id. ; see also Southwest Florida Water Management District v.

4422Charlotte County , 774 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 2nd DCA

44322001 )("Nothing in section 120.56(2) requires the agency to carry

4443the burden of presenting evidence to disprove an objection

4452alleged in a petition challenging a proposed rule. Instead a

4462party challenging a proposed rule has the burden of establishing

4472a factual basis for the objections to the rule, and then the

4484agency has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the

4495proposed rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative

4504authority."), citing St. Johns River Water Management District

4513v. Consolidated - Tomo ka Land Co. , 717 So. 2d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA

45281998). The court in Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , declined to

4539require the agency to go forward with evidence to disprove every

4550objection made in the petition. Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. ,

4560717 So. 2d at 76. I nstead, the court adopted a practical

4572approach that requires the party challenging the proposed rule

4581to establish a factual basis for the objections put forth in the

4593petition. Id. at 77.

459736. A rule may not be declared invalid on any other ground

4609without impermissibly extending the authority of the

4616Administrative Law Judge. See Schiffman v. Department of

4624Professional Regulation, Board of Pharmacy , 581 So. 2d 1375,

46331379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)("An administrative agency has only the

4644authority that the legislatu re has conferred it by statute.")

4655Thus, a proposed rule may not be invalidated simply because the

4666ALJ believes it is not the wisest or best choice. See Bd. of

4679Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Levy , 656 So. 2d 1359,

46901364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)("The i ssue before the hearing officer

4702in this [rule challenge] case was not whether the Trustees made

4713the best choice . . . or whether their choice is one that the

4727appellee finds desirable . . . ."); Dravo Basic Materials Co.,

4739Inc. v. Department of Transportatio n , 602 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla.

47512nd DCA 1992)("It is not our task, however, to write the best

4764rule for DOT. That was not the task of the hearing officer.").

4777Statutory Construction

477937. Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a

4788court's statutory cons truction analysis. Reynolds v. State , 842

4797So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 2002). In determining the Legislature's

4807intent in using a particular word in a statute, the courts may

4819examine other uses of the word in similar contexts. Hankey v.

4830Yarian , 755 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 2000).

483838. Statutory phrases are not to be read in isolation, but

4849rather within the context of the entire section. Jones v. ETS

4860of New Orleans, Inc. , 793 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2001). The

4872legislative use of different terms in different sections is

4881strong evidence that different meanings were intended.

4888Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical

4895Examiners v. Durrani , 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

490739. When the Legislature enacts a statute, it is presumed

4917to know existing statu tes and the case law construing them.

4928Williams v. Christian , 335 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

494040. The statutory construction principle in pari materia

4948requires two statutes relating to the same thing or subject to

4959be construed together "so as to harmonize both statutes and give

4970effect to the Legislature's intent." Maggio v. Florida

4978Department of Labor and Employment , 899 So. 2d 1074, 1078 (Fla.

49892005.

4990Agency Interpretation

499241. It is widely recognized that "[a]gencies are to be

5002accorded wide disc retion in the exercise of their lawful

5012rulemaking - authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and

5021consistent with the agency's general statutory duties."

5028Department of Natural Resources v. Wingfield Development

5035Company , 581 So. 2d 193, 197 (Fla. 1st DC A 1991).

504642. The Division is to be "accord[ed] great deference to

5056administrative interpretations of statutes which the . . .

5065agency is required to enforce." Department of Environmental

5073Regulation v. Goldring , 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985).

508343. "[T]he agency's interpretation of a statute need not

5092be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable

5102one; it need only be within the range of possible

5112interpretations." Department of Professional Regulation, Board

5118of Medicine Examiners v. Durrani , 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st

5130DCA 1984). See Board of Podiatric Medicine v. Florida Medical

5140Association , 779 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (upholding

5151agency's definition "[i]n light of the broad discretion and

5160deference which is accorded an agency in the interpretation of a

5171statute which it administers, and because such an interpretation

5180should be upheld when it is within the range of permissible

5191interpretations[.]").

519344. The ALJ has the discretion to declare the proposed

5203rule wholly or partly inva lid. § 120.56(2)(b), Fla. Stat.

5213(2005).

5214Statutory Exemptions

521645. Statutory exceptions to general statutory provisions

5223are to be strictly construed against one attempting to take

5233advantage of the exception. See Heburn v. Department of

5242Children and Famil ies , 772 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In

5255Heburn , the appellant had been disqualified from a "position of

5265trust" because of two offenses involving possession of marijuana

5274on school property and armed robbery. Heburn , 772 So. 2d at

5285562. Appellant sough t relief under a statutory provision that

5295would allow an exemption if it was proven by clear and

5306convincing evidence that a disqualification was not required.

5314Id. The Department of Children and Families issued a final

5324order denying Appellant the exemptio n. Id. The District Court

5334of Appeal, upholding the denial, found that "[a]n exemption from

5344a statute, enacted to protect the public welfare, is strictly

5354construed against the person claiming the exemption, and the

5363Department was not required to grant Heb urn any benefits under

5374the exemption." Id. at 563, citing State v. Nourse , 340 So. 2d

5386966, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).

539246. In Nourse , 340 So. 2d at 968 - 969, the appellee sought

5405an exception to a broad prohibition against possession of under -

5416sized crawfish. The appellee attempted to take advantage of an

5426exception that related to the right to bait traps ten days

5437before crawfish season. Id. at 969. The court ruled against

5447the appellee finding that an exception to a general prohibition

5457is strictly construed ag ainst an individual seeking to take

5467advantage of the exception. Id.

547247. Petitioners have failed to establish how this widely -

5482accepted rule of statutory construction alters the Division's

5490discretion in promulgating rules. Furthermore, Petitioners have

5497c ited no legal authority that has applied this rule to a

5509scenario in which neither party is seeking an exemption.

5518Invalid Exercise of Delegated Legislative Authority

552448. The ultimate question in a proposed rule challenge is

5534whether the rule is "an invalid exercise of delegated

5543legislative authority." § 120.56(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).

5550Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2005), defines the term

5558as an "action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and

5568duties delegated by the Legislature."

557349. In 1999, the Legislature revised the closing paragraph

5582of Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, after the decision in

5591Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , which held that "[a] rule is a

5603valid exercise of delegated legislative authority if it

5611regulates a matter directly within the class of powers and

5621duties identified in the statute to be implemented."

5629Consolidated - Tomoka Land Co. , 717 So. 2d at 80. The language of

5642Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, was amended to read:

5650A grant of rulemaking authority is

5656necessar y but not sufficient to allow an

5664agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be

5674implemented is also required. An agency may

5681adopt only rules that implement or interpret

5688the specific powers and duties granted by

5695the enabling statute. No agency shall have

5702au thority to adopt a rule only because it is

5712reasonably related to the purpose of the

5719enabling legislation and is not arbitrary

5725and capricious or is within the agency's

5732class of powers and duties, nor shall an

5740agency have the authority to implement

5746statutory provisions setting forth general

5751legislative intent or policy. Statutory

5756language granting rulemaking authority or

5761generally describing the powers and

5766functions of an agency shall be construed to

5774extend no further than implementing or

5780interpreting the sp ecific powers and duties

5787conferred by the same statute. (Emphasis

5793supplied.)

5794§ 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2005). See Board of Trustees of the

5805Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Association, Inc. ,

5814794 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); See also South west Florida

5827Water Management District v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc. ,

5836773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

584450. The test for invalid delegation of legislative

5852authority is whether a rule gives effect to a "specific law to

5864be implemented" and whether the ru le implements or interprets

"5874specific powers and duties." Day Cruise , 794 So. 2d at 704.

588551. The court in Day Cruise discussed the importance of

5895the 1999 Administrative Procedure Act (the "Act") amendments as

5905follows:

5906Under the 1996 and 1999 amendments t o the

5915APA, it is now clear, agencies have

5922rulemaking authority only where the

5927Legislature has enacted a specific statute,

5933and authorized the agency to implement it,

5940and then only if the proposed rule

5947implements or interprets specific powers or

5953duties, as o pposed to improvising in an area

5962that can be said to fall only generally

5970within some class of powers or duties the

5978Legislature has conferred on the agency.

5984Day Cruise , 794 So. 2d at 700. See generally Save the Manatee

5996Club, Inc. , 773 So. 2d at 598 - 599 (i nterpreting Subsection

6008120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1999), as removing an agency of the

6018authority to adopt a rule merely because it is with the agency's

6030class of powers and duties).

6035Applicability of Res Judicata

603952. It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata

6050may be implied in administrative proceedings. See Thomson v.

6059Department of Environmental Regulation , 511 So. 2d 989 (Fla.

60681987); Wager v. City of Green Cove Springs , 261 So. 2d 827 (Fla.

60811972); Metropolitan Dade Co. Board of County Commiss ioners v.

6091Rockmatt Corporation , 231 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).

610153. However, the principles upon which res judicata

6109applies do not always fit neatly within the scope of

6119administrative proceedings. Thomson , 511 So. 2d at 991. The

6128doctrine of res judic ata is to be applied with "great caution"

6140in proceedings before administrative bodies. Id. , citing Coral

6148Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co. , 410 So. 648 (Fla. 3d DCA

61601982).

616154. Furthermore, the doctrine is inapplicable where there

6169has been a change in c ircumstances or facts relating to the

6181subject matter. Metropolitan Dade Co. Board of County

6189Commissioners v. Rockmatt Corp. , 231 So. 2d at 44.

619855. There is a significant difference between the prior

6207rules and the proposed rules. For example, the prior r ules only

6219required the alcohol sales to be greater than the food sales in

6231order to be deemed predominately dedicated to the serving of

6241alcoholic beverages. The difference results in a substantial

6249change in circumstances that renders the doctrine of res

6258ju dicata inapplicable to the present proceeding.

6265Merits

626656. Sections 386.2125 and 561.695 and Subsection

6273386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), give the Division

6280sufficient specific rulemaking authority regarding the

6286designation process, criteria for qualif ication, required

6293record - keeping, auditing, and all other rules necessary for the

6304effective enforcement of Chapter 561 and Part II of Chapter 386,

6315Florida Statutes (2005).

631857. Petitioners raised the objection that the Division has

6327arbitrarily interpreted the statutory language of Subsection

6334386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005). Specifically, Petitioners

6340allege that the statute only allows for the sale of alcoholic

6351beverages and food in a stand - alone bar. Not only do

6363Petitioners mistake the language of th e statute as an express

6374limitation on what a stand - alone bar may sell, but Petitioners

6386failed to support this objection with factual evidence presented

6395at hearing. Petitioners cited no law and presented no testimony

6405to establish that the Legislature inten ded to limit what could

6416be sold in a stand - alone bar.

642458. Proposed Rule 61A - 7.006 requires a licensee to

6434maintain records in a separate manner that will allow

6443computation by the use of proposed Rule 61A - 7.009. This is a

6456reasonable and consistent interpre tation of the statutory

6464language and does not modify, enlarge, or contravene the

6473implementing statute.

647559. Petitioners raised the objection that the Division has

6484arbitrarily interpreted the phrase "during any time of

6492operation." Specifically, Petitioners allege that the

6498Legislature clearly intended this phrase to mean a daily basis.

6508However, Petitioners fail to note that Section 561.695, Florida

6517Statutes (2005), requires the licensee to submit a "12 - month

6528affidavit" and a "36 - month certified public accou ntant

6538evaluation." See § 561.695, Fla. Stat. (2005). Neither the

6547affidavit, nor the evaluation, contemplates a daily review of

6556sales. See Id. Interpreting the statute in a manner that would

6567require daily compliance contravenes the language of the

6575speci fic statutes and, thus, the legislative intent. See

6584§ 561.695(5), Fla. Stat. (2005)(requiring the licensee to

6592certify that the stand - alone bar criteria was met for the

6604preceding 12 - month period); § 561.695(6), Fla. Stat.

6613(2005)(requiring the licensee to s ubmit a report from a Florida

6624CPA that attests to the licensee's compliance with the

6633ten - percent requirement for the preceding 36 - month period).

6644Petitioners' objection is lacking a factual basis as none of the

6655statutes pertaining to this exemption contain s the language

"6664daily." Petitioners put forth neither statutory cites, nor

6672evidence that would support such an interpretation. Further, a

6681daily review of sales by the Division would be practically

6691impossible to achieve.

669460. Proposed Rules 61A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 properly

6705implement Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), by

6712utilizing a two - month averaging period that will obtain a

6723reasonable representation of the business in question. These

6731rules would be used as an enforcement tool to verify th e

6743business's compliance with the "12 - month affidavit" and

"675236 - month certified public account evaluation" requirements of

6761Section 561.695, Florida Statutes (2005). Neither provision

6768requires the audit period to be examined on a daily basis. See

6780§ 561.695( 5) and (6), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the Legislature had

6792contemplated the stand - alone bar exception to be met on a daily

6805basis, they would have so stated in the "12 - month affidavit" or

6818the "36 - month certified public accountant evaluation"

6826requirements of the statute. "Daily" was not used in the

6836definition of a stand - alone bar or in any other provision of the

6850statute related thereto.

685361. Petitioners presented no evidence that would support

6861its contention that the Legislature intended the phrase "during

6870any t ime of operation" to mean on a daily basis. Martinez

6882testified that the phrase "during any time of operation" could

6892be interpreted to mean "every single sale." Both

6900interpretations lead to an absurd result which is to be

6910disfavored when discerning legisl ative intent. State v. Webb ,

6919398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981). The Division stresses that proposed

6930Rules 61A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 are enforcement tools that will

6943ensure the provisions of Section 561.695, Florida Statutes

6951(2005), are being met. These rules in n o way serve as a method

6965of obtaining qualification as a stand - alone bar.

697462. Petitioners raise a final objection pertaining to the

6983Division's authority to create categories in order to determine

6992whether the premises are dedicated predominately or totally to

7001the serving of alcoholic beverages. Petitioners argue that the

7010Legislature placed an express limitation on what a stand - alone

7021bar may sell. If the Legislature had envisioned such a

7031limitation on what a stand - alone bar may sell, then the final

7044sentence in the "stand - alone bar" exemption would have required

7055the ten percent requirement to be compared to alcoholic beverage

7065sales, rather than total gross revenue. See § 386.203(11),

7074Fla. Stat. (2005)("A place of business constitutes a stand - alone

7086bar in whi ch the service of food is merely incidental in

7098accordance with this subsection if the licensed premises derives

7107no more than ten percent of its gross revenue from the sale of

7120food consumed on the licensed premises"). (Emphasis supplied.)

7129At hearing, Petit ioners failed to present any factual evidence

7139or point to the express limitation in the statute that would

7150support such a contention.

715463. Proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 takes into consideration a

7164licensee's predominate business by requiring the sale of alcohol

7173f or consumption on the premises to be the highest grossing

7184category of revenue. The implementing statute does not prohibit

7193the licensee from selling items other than alcoholic beverages

7202and food. Petitioners failed to offer testimony to establish

7211otherwis e. The Division's interpretation is consistent with the

7220dictionary definition and within the range of reasonable

7228interpretations. Therefore, it follows that the interpretation

7235is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

724464. Petitioner 's evidence presented at trial falls short

7253of that required to shift the burden to the Division.

7263Petitioners' opening statement and subsequent witnesses fail to

7271support the objections raised in the petition. Petitioners'

7279opening statement cannot be consi dered as factual basis for

7289objections put forth in the petition. The purpose of the

7299attorney's opening statement is to outline what is expected to

7309be established by the evidence. See Occhicone v. State , 570

7319So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990) ("Opening remarks a re not evidence,

7332and the purpose of opening argument is to outline what an

7343attorney expects to be established by the evidence."), citing

7353Whitted v. State , 362 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1978).

736265. Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), does

7369not require a licensee to meet the ten percent threshold on a

7381daily basis. Such an interpretation is neither reasonable, nor

7390supported by the evidence presented at trial. Proposed Rules

739961A - 7.007 and 61A - 7.008 are rules setting forth the requirements

7412to obtain a desig nation as a stand - alone bar. These rules will

7426be used for enforcement purposes to ensure that the

7435establishment is meeting the requirements imposed by Section

7443561.695, Florida Statutes (2005).

744766. Subsection 386.203(11), Florida Statutes (2005), does

7454n ot prohibit the licensee from selling items other than

7464alcoholic beverages and food. Such interpretation would require

7472words to be read into the statute and impermissibly modify the

7483legislative intent. Petitioners are correct in pointing out

7491that the Leg islature made an express limitation on what a

"7502retail tobacco shop" could sell; however, there is no such

7512express limitation for the "stand - alone bar" statute.

752167. The Division's proposed Rule 61A - 7.009 takes into

7531consideration a licensee's predominate bu siness by requiring the

7540sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises (the service of

7551alcoholic beverages) to be the highest grossing category of

7560revenue. This is a reasonable interpretation that does not

7569modify, contravene, or expand the specific provi sions of the

7579implementing law. Furthermore, this categorical scheme cures

7586the deficiency found by ALJ Staros in the prior rule challenge.

7597See Bowling Centers Association of Florida, Inc. v. Florida

7606Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Divi sion of

7615Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco , Case No. 03 - 4776RP (DOAH

7625March 26, 2004).

762868. Petitioners have failed to meet the burden of

7637establishing a factual basis for the objections to the rule.

7647While the Petition raised objections, the testimony and evid ence

7657presented at trial did not establish a factual basis for the

7668objections raised.

767069. Additionally, there was no evidence presented by

7678Petitioners to show that either the rules were not supported by

7689logic or that they were adopted without thought or re ason. To

7701the contrary, the Division has shown that numerous workshops,

7710hearings, and thousands of telephone calls from concerned

7718citizens were taken into account when drafting the proposed

7727rules.

772870. In conclusion, the Division has shown by a

7737preponderan ce of the evidence that the proposed rules challenged

7747by Petitioners are not invalid exercises of the authority

7756delegated to the Division by the Legislature. The proposed

7765rules do not enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific statute

7775to be implemented. The rules are consistent with the statute,

7785they lawfully implement the specific statute, and they serve a

7795reasonable interpretation of the specific powers and duties

7803outlined within the applicable statutes. The designation as a

7812stand - alone bar requires, for renewal of the annual license, the

7824submission of an affidavit that for the proceeding year the

7834business met the criteria for the designation. The two - month

7845audit set forth in the proposed rule is used for other license

7857types with percent of sales rest rictions. The two - month audit

7869accomplishes the intent of the legislation without imposing

7877arbitrary requirements on a business. The proposed rule does

7886not contravene the requirements for the designation "any time,"

7895it merely gives notice as to the Divisi on's enforcement

7905procedures as required and authorized by the specific authority

7914granted in Subsection 561.569(9), Florida Statutes (2005). The

7922rule provides that the business be, if not totally,

7931predominately devoted to serving alcoholic beverages.

7937Pred ominate, or to be, or have a greater quantity than other

7949sales is required by the proposed rule. Sales of other than

7960alcoholic beverages are not prohibited by statute.

7967ORDER

7968Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

7978Law, it is

7981ORDERED that proposed Rules 61A - 7.006, 61A - 7.007,

799161A - 7.008, and 61A - 7.009 are not an invalid exercises of

8004delegated legislative authority and the Petition is denied.

8012DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of December, 2005, in

8022Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

8026S

8027DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

8030Administrative Law Judge

8033Division of Administrative Hearings

8037The DeSoto Building

80401230 Apalachee Parkway

8043Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

8048(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

8056Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

8062www.doah.stat e.fl.us

8064Filed with the Clerk of the

8070Division of Administrative Hearings

8074this 7th day of December, 2005.

8080COPIES FURNISHED :

8083Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

8088Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman

8093Post Office Box 551

8097Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 0551

8102Renee Also brook, Esquire

8106Department of Business and

8110Professional Regulation

81121940 North Monroe Street

8116Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

8121John Lockwood, Qualified Representative

8125Department of Business and

8129Professional Regulation

81311940 North Monroe Street

8135Tallahassee , Florida 32399 - 2202

8140Leon Biegalsi, General Counsel

8144Department of Business and

8148Professional Regulation

81501940 North Monroe Street

8154Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

8159Scott Boyd, Executive Director

8163and General Counsel

8166Joint Administrative Procedures Commi ttee

8171120 Holland Building

8174Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1300

8179Liz Cloud, Program Administrator

8183Bureau of Administrative Code

8187Department of State

8190R.A. Gray Building, Suite 101

8195Tallahassee, FL 32399 - 0250

8200NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

8206A party who is ad versely affected by this Final Order is

8218entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida

8227Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

8236of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

8244filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency Clerk of

8255the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied

8264by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of

8275Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in

8286the Appellate District where the p arty resides. The notice of

8297appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to

8310be reviewed.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 12/06/2006
Proceedings: Transmittal letter to J. Tamayo from Ann Cole forwarding the transcript and the exhibits to the agency.
PDF:
Date: 10/18/2006
Proceedings: Opinion filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/18/2006
Proceedings: Mandate filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/17/2006
Proceedings: Mandate
PDF:
Date: 09/29/2006
Proceedings: Opinion
PDF:
Date: 04/21/2006
Proceedings: Index, Record, and Certificate of Record sent to the District Court of Appeal.
PDF:
Date: 04/07/2006
Proceedings: Supplemental Index (of the Record) sent to the parties of record.
PDF:
Date: 04/04/2006
Proceedings: Letter to E. Williams from S. Young enclosing Petitioner`s Exhibits introduced at the final hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/14/2006
Proceedings: BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Appellant`s motion filed March 3, 2006, for extension of time is granted.
PDF:
Date: 03/03/2006
Proceedings: Statement of Service for Preparation of Record.
PDF:
Date: 03/03/2006
Proceedings: Index (of the Record) sent to the parties of record.
PDF:
Date: 01/06/2006
Proceedings: Letter to Ann Cole from Jon Wheeler acknowledging receipt of Notice of Appeal, DCA Case No. 1D06-32.
PDF:
Date: 01/04/2006
Proceedings: Certified Copy of Notice of Administrative Appeal sent to the First District Court of Appeal.
PDF:
Date: 01/03/2006
Proceedings: Notice of Administrative Appeal filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/07/2005
Proceedings: DOAH Final Order
PDF:
Date: 12/07/2005
Proceedings: Final Order (hearing held August 30, 2005). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 10/14/2005
Proceedings: Order (Motion to Accept Filing of Petitioner`s Proposed Final Order granted).
PDF:
Date: 10/13/2005
Proceedings: Motion to Accept Filing of Petitioner`s Proposed Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/11/2005
Proceedings: (Petitioner`s) Proposed Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/10/2005
Proceedings: Respondent`s Proposed Final Order filed.
Date: 09/09/2005
Proceedings: Final Hearing (transcript) filed.
Date: 08/30/2005
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 08/26/2005
Proceedings: Memorandum in Support of Respondent`s Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/26/2005
Proceedings: Joint Response to Order of Pre-hearing Instructions filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/26/2005
Proceedings: Respondent`s Request to take Judicial Notice of Statutory Provisions of the Florida Beverage Law and Florida Administrative Code filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
PDF:
Date: 08/18/2005
Proceedings: Order (J. Lockwood is authorized to appear in this administrative proceedings as the qualified representative of Respondent).
PDF:
Date: 08/17/2005
Proceedings: Affidavit of John Lockwood filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/17/2005
Proceedings: Respondent`s Motion to Accept Qualified Representative filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/18/2005
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 07/18/2005
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for August 30, 2005; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 07/13/2005
Proceedings: Response to July 6, 2005 Order Granting Abeyance filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/06/2005
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Placing Case in Abeyance (parties to advise status by July 15, 2005).
PDF:
Date: 05/27/2005
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/27/2005
Proceedings: Joint Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/25/2005
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 05/25/2005
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for June 16, 2005; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 05/24/2005
Proceedings: Order of Assignment.
PDF:
Date: 05/23/2005
Proceedings: Rule Challenge transmittal letter to Liz Cloud from Ann Cole copying Scott Boyd and the Agency General Counsel.
PDF:
Date: 05/20/2005
Proceedings: Petition Challenging the Validity of Proposed Rules Noticed for Adoption filed.

Case Information

Judge:
DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
Date Filed:
05/20/2005
Date Assignment:
05/24/2005
Last Docket Entry:
12/06/2006
Location:
Tallahassee, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
Department of Business and Professional Regulation
Suffix:
RP
 

Related Florida Statute(s) (14):