05-004070 Edward Daniel Winton vs. Office Of Financial Regulation Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, March 16, 2006.

Summary: The application for a mortgage broker`s license should be denied. Applicant is still on probation for molestating his stepdaughter; he misstated his criminal history on the application; and he failed to prove that he is rehabilitated.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

EDWARD DANIEL WINTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 05 - 4070

)

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A duly - not iced final hearing w as held in this case by

Administrative Law Judge T. Kent Wetherell, II, on January 18,

2006, in Tampa, Florida .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Mark Neumaier, Esquire

334 - B West Bearss Avenue

Tampa, Florida 33613

For Respon dent: Robert Vandiver, Esquire

Robert Schott, Esquire

Office of Financial Regulation

200 East Gaines Street , Suite 526

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether the Office of Financial Regulation

should approve Petitioner’s application for licensure as a

mortgage broker .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By letter dated November 3, 2004, the Office of Financial

Regulation (Office) informed Petitioner that his application for

licensure as a mortgage broker was denied. O n or about

December 8, 2004, Petitioner requested a hearing on the denial

of his application.

The case was originally set for hearing before the Office

pursuant to Section 1 20.57(2), Florida Statutes, but after

disputed facts were identified, t he case was refe rred to the

Division of Administrative Hearings (D OAH ) for the assignment of

an A dministrative L aw J udge to conduct a hearing pursuant to

Secti on 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. See Fla. Admin. Code R.

28 - 106.305(2). The case was received by DOAH on Novembe r 7,

2005.

By Order dated December 7, 2005, the Office was granted

leave to amend its letter denying Petitioner’s license

application based upon new facts that came to light during

discovery . The Office filed an Amended Notice of Denial of

Application on December 16, 2005.

At the final hearing, Petitioner testified in his own

behalf and also presented the testimony of Traci Leigh Romkey,

Fran z Gessner, Andrew Madkins, H eather Fisher, and Desiree

Washington. Petitioner's Exhibits A through D were received

into evidence. The Office presented the testimony of Sherrie

Connelly and William Sims. The Office’s Exhibits 1 through 5,

6 - A, 6 - B, 8 through 10, and 15, were received into evidence.

Official recognition was taken of the Judgment entered in

State of Flo rida v. Edward D. Wint on , No. CRC 96 - 20078 CFANO - I,

on October 21, 1997, by the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial

Circuit, in and for Pinellas County, Florida, and the Warrant

issued on October 25, 2005, in Doc ket No. CRC 96 - 20078 CFANO - I.

Those documents wer e also received into evidence as the Office’s

Exhibits 5 and 9 , respectively .

The two - volume Transcript (Tr.) of the final hearing was

filed on January 30, 2006 . The parties requested and were given

30 days from that date to file their proposed recommende d orders

(PROs). The Office timely filed its PRO on March 1, 2006.

Petitioner did not file a PRO. The Office’s PRO has been given

due consideration.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is 42 y ear s old. He served 10 years in the

United States Air Force and is a veteran of the first Gulf War.

2. Petitioner i s a partner in a small business that offers

executive recruiting services , Internet - based real estate

advertising services , and mortgage brokerage service s .

Petitioner’s role in the business is “more o n the IT side” and

involves “a lot of phone work” as well as “the website, data

base ma nagement [and] things like that. ”

3. On October 14 , 2003, Petitioner submitted to the Office

an application for licensure as a mortgage broker.

4. Q uestion No. 5 on the application ask s whether the

applicant has “ pleaded nolo contendere, been convicted , or found

guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime involving fraud,

dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude . ”

5. Petitioner answered “no” to Quest ion No. 5.

6. Petitioner ’s negative answer to Question No. 5 was

based upon his understanding that the question was referring

only to financial crimes, such as stealing money or extortion,

and crimes involving drugs.

7. Petitioner was not attempting to conceal his criminal

history from the Office through his ne gative answer to Question

No. 5. Indeed, a t the time he submitted the application,

Petitioner knew that the Office would conduct a background

screening and learn of his criminal history because h e was

required to , and did, submit a set of fingerprints with his

application.

8. Petitioner’s understanding regarding the scope of

Question No. 5 was not reasonable in light of the following

definition of “moral turpitude , ” which appear ed i mmediately

bel ow the question o n the application form :

“Moral turpitude involves duties owed by

persons to society as well as acts contrary

to justice, honesty, principle or good

morals.” This includes, but is not limited

to theft, extortion, use of mail to obtain

prop erty under false pretenses, tax evasion,

and the sale of (or intent to sell)

controlled substances.

9. Petitioner did not cont act the Office prior to

submitting his application to get clarification regarding the

scope of Question No. 5 , nor did he discu ss the issue with legal

counsel.

10. Petitioner’s negative answer to Q uestion No. 5 was a

material misst atement of his criminal history .

11. On October 21, 1997 , Petitioner pled nolo contendere

and was adjudicated guilty of one count of lewd and lasciv ious

conduct for “ handling and fondling a child under the age of

sixteen years ” (a second degree felony), one count of false

imprisonment (a third degree felony), one count of aggravated

assault (a third degree felony) , and three counts of misdemeanor

batt ery.

12. On that same date, Petitioner was sentenced to two

years of community control followed by eight years of probation

for the lewd and lascivious conduct count, two years of

community control followed by three years of probation for the

false impris onment and aggravated battery counts, and one year

of community control for the battery counts. The sentences ran

concurrently.

13. Petitioner is still on probation for the lewd and

lascivious conduct count and , as a result of his conviction on

that coun t, he is a registered sex offender .

14. Petitioner’s probation for the lewd and lascivious

conduct count runs through October 2007.

15. The Office first learned of Petitioner’s criminal

history after it received the results of the background

screening co nducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement

based upon the fingerprints submitted by Petitioner with his

application. Thereafter, consistent with its standard practice,

the Office requested an explanation from Petitioner reg arding

his criminal hi story .

16. In May 2004, Petitioner provided a “ Statement of

Facts ” to the Office in which he described the circumstances of

his criminal offenses as follows:

In October on a Saturday night [I] went into

my stepdaughter bedroom and touch [sic] her

private areas. I still think about standing

at the door and knowing what I was about to

do was wrong but I did it anyway.

[My wife] and I were having problems and

that was the last straw. I had been

sleeping in our room and the tension was

very high. [My wife] confronted me about

what I had done and I of course denied it.

The argument escalated and I lost control of

my temper and threatened her if she did not

shut up. I went to the bedroom and she

followed me this is when I struck her the

first time and told her to leave me alone.

[My stepson] tried to defend his mother and

I spanked him and grab [sic] him by his arms

and carries [sic] him to his room. Likewise

with [my stepdaughter]. I grabbed the keys

to the car to leave and [my wife] told me if

I took the car she would call the police and

tell them that I had stolen it. I then

threw the keys at her and grabbed her and

threw her to the ground and told her that

she would not want to get the police

involved.

She picked up her keys and tried to get her

and the children out of the house and I

would not let them leave. She pleaded with

me to calm down and that I take care of the

problems that I had created. I brought up

the many things that she had done that had

led up to that night. She told the kids t o

go back to their room and prepare for school

the next day and that everything would be

okay.

I told her to go to our room and not say

another word and she complied with my

request. I eventually calmed down and we

went to bed. The next day she took m e to

work as was the normal routine. Later on

that day I was arrested and taken to jail.

17. Petitioner expressed remorse for these offenses , both

in the Statement of Facts and in his testimony at the final

hearing . His remorse appeared to be sincere .

18. Petitioner’s offenses were not acts of youthful

indiscretion. He was 33 years old at the time and, as reflected

in the Statement of Facts and as reaffirmed in his testimony at

the hearing , Petitioner fully understood at the time that what

he was do ing was wrong.

19. Petitioner’s offenses were extremely serious and are

morally and socially reprehensible . Petitioner's stepdaughter,

whose “private areas” he touched, was only 11 years old at th e

time, and his stepson, who he spanked and grabbed for tr ying to

defend his mother from Petitioner, was only nine years old at

the time .

20. As Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony at the

final hearing (Tr . 108, 119), the relationship between a

stepfather and stepdaughter involves a special amount of trust

and sexual contact between an adult and an 11 - year - old child --

which is the essence of his lewd and lascivious conduct offense

-- is contrary to good morals .

21. Petitioner’s original Order of Probation, entered on

October 2 1 , 1997, required him to parti cipate in and

successfully complete domestic violence counseling and sex

offender counseling. Petitioner testified that he successfully

completed those counseling programs.

22. Petitioner has not undertaken any volunteer work or

other community service s ince his offenses. He testified that

his status as a sex offender on probation makes it difficult for

him to do so.

23. Petitioner remained out of trouble with the law from

the time that he was placed on probation in October 1997 through

October 2005, wh en he was arrested for a n alleged probation

violation.

24. A circuit court proceeding involving the alleged

probation violation was still pending at the time of the final

hearing.

25. The alleged probation violation was based upon an

affidavit of Desiree Washington, who was Petitioner’s probation

officer in October 2005 . The affidavit s tated in pertinent

part :

[O]n 10 - 20 - 04, [Petitioner] was instructed

not to have any contact with any child under

the age of sixteen unless approved by this

officer or the sentencing court and

[Petitioner] did fail to carry out this

instruction by having contact with four of

Heather Fisher [sic] children, as told to

this officer on 10 - 4 - 05 by Sherri [sic]

Connel ly of DCF.

26. Petitioner testified that he was never given th e

instructions referenced in Ms. Washington’s affidavit, and it is

questionable whether those oral instructions, if given, are

consistent with the written conditions of Petitioner’s probation

imposed by the court . 1 Those issues are being litigated as part

of Petitioner’s probation violation proceeding.

27. The information that Ms. Washington was “told . . . by

Sherri [sic] Connelly of DCF” is summarized in a letter from Ms.

Connelly to Ms. Washington dated October 4, 2005, which states

in pertinent part :

In April 2005, I advised [Ms. Fisher] that

the children were not to be unsupervised

with [Petitioner]. At that time they did

admit that he did spend time with the

children but always supervised by the mother

who knows of his offense. On 9/27/05 I

rece i ve d a new report on the children. All

four [sic] the children stated that

[Petitioner] does watch them sometimes when

their mother goes to work. The boys all

reported that he is mean and had hit them

with his hand, belt, and paddle. [D.F.] and

[J.F.] also reported that he sla pped and

slammed [J.F.]’s head in to the ground.

[J.F.] reported that [Petitioner] is at

their house every night when they go to bed

but not in the morning.

28. Th o se allegations we re based upon Ms. Connelly’s

interviews with Ms. Fi sher’s children , who are ages 10, seven,

five, and four . Petitioner disputes the allegations in the

letter, except for the first and second sentences.

29. Petitioner’s testified that he has never had

unsupervised contact with Ms. Fisher’s children and th at he has

never disciplined or struck the children . That testimony was

corroborated by Ms. Fisher’ s testimony , and there is no credible

e vidence to the contrary in the record because the children did

not testify at the final hearing and Ms. Connelly’s tes timony

regarding their statements was uncorroborated hearsay. 2

30. The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter, which

resulted in Ms. Fisher’s children being removed from her

custody , are being litigated in circuit court as part of a

dependency proceeding in volving Ms. Fisher , her children , and

the Department of Children and Families .

31. The allegations in Ms. Connelly’s letter regarding the

alleged abuse of Ms. Fisher’s children by Petitioner are not

material to the pending probation violation proceeding because

Ms. Washington unequivocally testified (Tr. 180 - 81 , 190 ) that

Petitioner was “violated” solely for having contact with the

children, and not for the alleged abuse.

32. Petitioner had not been charged with child abuse or

any other crime based upon the allegations in Ms. Connelly’s

letter as of the date of the final hearing, and it is unknown

whethe r such charges are forthcoming from the local State

Attorney.

33. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s arrest

for the probation violation and /or the removal of Ms. Fisher’s

children were in any way connected with the Office’s review of

Petitioner’s license application. There was not, as Petitioner

implied in his testimony at the hearing , a conspiracy between

the Office, his probation officer, and/or the Department of

Children and Families against him and/or Ms. Fisher.

34. Petitioner has accepted full responsibility for his

criminal offense s , and he appears to be sincere in his efforts

to turn his life around. By all accounts, he has been

for thcoming with his friends and employers regarding his

criminal history , and he goes out of his way to comply with the

conditions of his probation. Petitioner's friends testified

that they would trust him with their money.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

35. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject

matter of this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 ,

120.57(1), and 120.60(3), Florida Statutes (2005). 3

36. Petitioner has the burden to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that he satisfies the crit eria for licensure as

a mortgage broker. See Dept. of Banking & Finance v. Osborne,

Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996); Dept. of

Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778, 787 (Fla.

1st DCA 1981).

37. The Office has broad discretion i n determining the

fitness of applicants for licensure. See Osborne, Stern & Co. ,

670 So. 2d 934; Astral Liquors, Inc. v. Dept. of Business

Regulation , 463 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 1985).

38. Section 494.0041(1)(f), Florida Statutes, authorizes

the Office to deny an application for licensure as a mortgage

broker if it finds that the applicant committed an act specified

in subsection (2) of that statute, including:

(a) Pleading nolo contendere to, or

having been convicted or found guilty of,

regardless o f whether adjudication was

withheld, a crime involving fraud, dishonest

dealing, or any act of moral turpitude.

* * *

(c) A material misstatement of fact on an

initial or renewal application.

§ 494.0041(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat.

39. Consistent with the definition contained on the

application form, the Office’s rules define “moral turpitude” as

follows:

" Moral turpitude involves duties owed by

persons to society as well as acts contrary

to justice, honesty, principle or good

morals. " This includes, b ut is not limited

to, theft, extortion, use of the mail to

obtain property under false pretenses, tax

evasion, and the sale of (or intent to sell)

controlled substances.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 69V - 40.001(11).

40. The Office’s rules do not contain a list of offenses

that involve moral turpitude, but that d oes not justify

Petitione r’s failure to affirmatively answer Question No. 5

because whateve r else “moral turpitude” might or might not

encompass, it certainly encompasses Petitioner’s lewd and

lascivious con duct offense , which was based upon Petitioner

touching his 11 - year - old stepdaughter’s “private areas .” See ,

e.g. , A p l in v. Fla. Real Estate Comm’n , Case No. 90 - 1844 , 1990

Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 6971, at *6 ( DOAH Oct. 2, 1990 )

(concluding that “the com mission of lewd and lascivious sexual

offenses against children clearly and unequivocally involves

moral turpitude”).

41. Moreover, Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony

that sexual contact between an adult and an 11 - year - old child is

contrary to good morals, which is a standard contained in the

definition of “moral tu rpitude” on the application form and in

the Office’s rules . Accord State ex rel. Tullidge v.

Hollingsworth , 146 So. 660, 661 (Fla. 1933) (“Moral turpitude

involves the idea of inherent b aseness or depravity in the

private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man

to society. It has also been defined as anything done contrary

to justice, honesty, principle or good morals, though it often

involves the question of intent as wh en unintentionally

committed through error of judgment when wrong was not

c ontemplated.” (citations omitted) ) .

42. Petitioner’s criminal history, which includes acts of

moral turpitude, provides the Office an adequate basis to de ny

his license application . § 494.0041(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

43. Petitioner mat erially misstated his criminal history

on his license application by answering “no” to Question No. 5.

His intent regarding the misstatement is immaterial for purposes

of Section 4 94.0041(2)(c), Florid a Statutes, because , as

explained in regard to a similar statute,

It is impossible for the Department to know

what each applicant knows or believes at the

time of application for licensure. The

inclusion of the phrase "material

misstatement" allows the De partment to avoid

having to make impossible determinations of

what was and was not known to the applicant.

If the applicant misstates his or her

criminal background, even unknowingly, he or

she is held liable for that misstatement.

Department of Insuranc e v. Koniz , Case No. 01 - 4271PL, 2002 Fla.

Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 684, at *8 (DOAH Apr. 23, 2002; DOI

May 17, 2002) (construing Section 626.611(2), Florida Statutes,

which is similar to Section 494.0 0 41(2)(c), Florida Statutes).

44. Thus, even though the ev idence establishes that

Petitioner’s failure to affirmatively answer Question No. 5 was

based upon his misunderstanding of the scope of the question,

rather than an intent to deceive the Office by concealing his

criminal history, Petitioner’s negative answ er to Question No. 5

provides the Office an additional basis to d eny his license

application . § 494.0041(2)(c), Fla. Stat .

45. The Department has discretion to approve a license

application even though there are statutory bases upon which it

may deny th e application. In determining whether to exercise

its discretion in that regard, the Office considers whether the

applicant has demonstrated that he or she is rehabilitated based

upon the passage of time, subsequent good conduct, and other

similar factors . See , e.g. , Zaremba v. Dept. of Banking &

Finance , Case No. 94 - 1229, 1994 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 5741 ,

**7 - 9 (DOAH Aug. 3, 1994; DBF Sept. 16, 1994) (approving

application for mortgage broker license based upon applicant’s

proof of rehabilitation); M atala v. Dept. of Banking & Finance ,

Case No. 93 - 5603, 1994 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 5448, at *6

( DOAH Jan. 27, 1994) (recommending denial of mortgage broker

license based upon applicant’s failure to demonstrate

rehabilitation) ; Tr. 227, 234, 237 (testim ony of William Sims,

who supervises the review of mortgage broker license

applications, regarding the factors that the Office considers in

evaluating whether an applicant has demonstrated

rehabilitation).

46. Petitioner failed to establish that he is

reh abilitated even though it has been almost nine years since

his criminal offenses . First an d foremost, Petitioner is still

on probation, and he will continue to be on probation u ntil

October 2 007 , even if the pending probation violation proceeding

is resol ved in his favor. Second , although Petitioner has

successfully completed the counseling programs required as

conditions of his probation and stayed out of trouble with the

law (except for the alleged probation violation that is pending)

since his 1997 cri minal offenses , there is no credible evidence

that he has done anything above and beyond what was required of

him , as is necessary to demonstrate rehabilitation.

47. In light of the foregoing conclusions, it is not

necessary to determine whether the Offi ce may also deny

Petitioner’s application based upon Section 494.0033(4), Florida

Statutes, which provides that:

it is a ground for denial of licensure if

the applicant . . . has pending against him

or her any criminal prosecution or

administrative enforce ment action . . .

which involves fraud, dishonest dealing, or

an y other act of moral turpitude.

48. That issue is addressed below, howe ver, in an

abundance of caution in the event that the Office (or an

appellate court) rejects the conclusions above.

49. The Office did not argue that the pending probation

violation proceeding is an “ad ministrative enforcement action, ”

and, in deed , that phrase is more likely than not intended to

encompass enforcement proceeding s in i tiated under the

Administrative Procedur e Act. See §§ 120.60(5), (6), 120.69,

Fla. Stat . ; Osborn v. Dept. of Banking & Finance , Case No. 93 -

6424, 1994 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 5522 (DOAH Aug. 5, 1994;

DBF Sept . 14, 1994) (applying Section 494.0033(4), Florida

Statutes, to an applicant against whom another state agency was

prosecuting an administrative complaint).

50. P etitioner’s pending probat ion violation proceeding is

not, as the Office argues in its PRO, a “criminal prosecution”

for purposes of Section 494.0033(4), Florida Statutes . See

generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)

("Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage

of a criminal prosecution . . . .") ; Morrissey v. Brewer , 408

U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (“ [T] he revocation of parole is not part of

a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a

defendant in such a pr oceeding does not apply to parole

revocations.”) . A criminal prosecution requires the filing of

an indictment or information, which is not required in the case

of an alleged prob ation violation. Compare Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.140(a) (methods of prosecution) and § 775.15(4), Fla. Stat.

(describing the procedure for prosecuting criminal offenses)

with Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.790(b) (revocation of probation or

community control) and § 948.06 , Fla. Stat. (describing the

procedure for commencing a probation violation proceeding).

51. Furthermore, Petitioner’s pending probation violation

does not involve an act of moral turpitude because, according to

Ms. Washington , the violation was based u pon Petitioner 's being

around Ms. Fisher’s children and not the incidents of child

abuse alleged in Ms. Connelly’s letter. Although child abuse

certainly involves “moral turpitude,” simply being around

children, which is the act for which Petitioner’s pro bation was

“violated,” does not.

52. Accordingly, Section 494.0033(4), Florida Statutes,

does not provide an independent basis for the Office to deny

Petitioner’s license application.

53. That said, the fact that a probation violation

proceeding is pen ding against Petitioner may be , and has been ,

considered in determining whether Petitioner demonstrated

rehabilitation. However, little weight was given to that fact

(as compared to the fact that Petitioner will still be on

probation until October 2007 , e ven if the pending p robation

violation proceeding is resolved in his favor ) because it is

questionable whether Ms. Washington’s oral instructions that

Petitioner purportedly v iolated are consistent with his written

conditions of probation, w hich calls into doubt the validity of

the oral instructions. See , e.g. , Pettus v. State , 836 So. 2d

1070, 1072 (Fla 5th DCA 2003)(probation may only be revoked for

violation of a condition imposed by the court, and a probation

officer is without authority to impose addi tional conditions

beyond the normal supervisory duties directly related to the

court - ordered conditions); Holterhaus v. State , 417 So. 2d 291

(Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (same).

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions

of law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation issue a

final order denying Petitioner’s application for a mortgage

broker’s license .

DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March , 2006, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed wi th the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 16th day of March , 2006 .

ENDNOTES

1/ Ms. Washington testified (Tr. 192) that the instructions

referenced in her affidavit were her interpretation of

Petitioner’s written conditions of probati on. However, t he

written conditions of probation d o not state that Petitioner can

have no contact whatsoever with any child under the age of 16 ,

but rather state:

You will have no unsupervised contact with

any child under the age of 18 without

another ad ult present , who is responsible

for the child’s welfare, who has been

advised of the crime and who has been

approved by the court, until you have

successfully completed a sex offender

treatment program , unless authorized by the

sentencing court.

Pet. Ex. B (emphasis supplied). And cf. Watkins v. State , 666

So. 2d 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (noting that a court - ordered

condition of probation that bars any contact with children under

the age of 16 "is too broad because it bars any contact with

children rather t han barring 'unsupervised' contact").

2/ T he children’s statements are not admissible under the

hearsay exception in Secti on 90.803(23), Florida Statutes,

because the Office made no effort to satisfy the procedural

requirements in that statute.

3/ Al l statutory references in this Recommended Order are to

the 2005 version of the Florida Statutes. See Lavernia v. Dept.

of Business and Professional Reg. , 616 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1993); Bruner v. Board of Real Estate , 399 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla.

5th DCA 1981).

COPIES FURNISHED :

Don B. Saxon, Commissioner

Office of Financial Regulation

Financial Services Commission

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0350

Robert Beitler, General Counsel

Department of Fin ancial Services

Flethcher Building, Suite 526

101 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0350

Robert Vandiver, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

Office of Financial Regulation

200 East Gaines Street

The Fletcher Building, Suite 526

Tallah assee, Florida 32399 - 0379

Mark Neumaier, Esquire

334 B West Bearss Avenue

Tampa, Florida 33613

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.