05-004136
Johnny Pena vs.
American Airlines, Inc.
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, May 15, 2006.
Recommended Order on Monday, May 15, 2006.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8JOHNNY PENA, )
11)
12Petitioner, )
14)
15vs. ) Case No. 05 - 4136
22)
23AMERICAN AIRLINES, )
26)
27Respondent. )
29__________________________________)
30)
31JOSE CASTELLANOS, )
34)
35Petitioner, )
37)
38vs. ) Case No. 05 - 4139
45)
46AMERICAN AIRLINES, )
49)
50Respondent. )
52__________________________________)
53RECOMMENDED ORDER
55Pursuant to notice , a hearing was conducted in the s e
66consolidated case s pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1),
75Florida Statutes, 1 before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly - designated
86administrative law j udge of the Division of Administrative
95Hearings, on February 24, 2006 , by video teleconference at sites
105in Miami and Tallahassee, Florida.
110APPEARANCES
111For Petitioner s : Lee Friedland , Esquire
118Friedland & Associates, P.A.
1224486 Southwest 64th Avenue
126Davie, Florida 33314
129For Respondent: Christopher P. Hammon , Esquire
135Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1405300 Wachovia Financia l Center
145200 South Biscayne Boulevard
149Miami, Florida 33131
152STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
156Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment
163practice s alleged in the employment discrimination charge s filed
173by Petitio ner s and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be
185granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
193PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
195On July 1, 2005 , Petitioner Jose Castellanos filed an
204employment discrimination charge with the Florida Commission on
212Human Relat ions (FCHR), alleging that American Airlines
220( American ) terminated his employment "based on [his] national
230origin (Hispanic)." On October 5 , 2 005 , following the
239completion of its investigation of Mr. Castellanos' charge, the
248FCHR issued a Notice of Determ ination: No Cause, advising that
259a determination had been made that "there [was] no reasonable
269cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice ha[d]
278occurred." Mr. Castellanos, on or about November 4, 2005 , filed
288a Petition for Relief with the FCHR . On November 14, 2005 , the
301FCHR referred the matter to the Division of Administrative
310Hearings ( DOAH) for the assignment of an administrative l aw
321j udge to conduct a hearing on the allegations of employment
332discrimination made by Mr. Castellanos against A merican . The
342DOAH Clerk docketed the case as DOAH Case No. 05 - 4139.
354On July 18, 2005, Petitioner Johnny Pena filed an
363employment discrimination charge with the FCHR , alleging that he
372was "terminated from [his] position as an Aircraft mechanic at
382American Airlines based on [his] national origin (Hispanic)."
390On October 5, 2005, following the completion of its
399investigation of Mr. Pena's charge, the FCHR issued a Notice of
410Determination: No Cause, advising that a determination had been
419made that "there [was ] no reasonable cause to believe that an
431unlawful employment practice ha[d] occurred." Mr. Pena, on or
440about November 4, 2005, filed a Petition for Relief with the
451FCHR. On November 14, 2005, the FCHR referred the matter to
462DOAH for the assignment of an administrative law judge to
472conduct a hearing on the allegations of employment
480discrimination made by Mr. Pena against American . The DOAH
490Clerk docketed t he case as DOAH Case No. 05 - 4136 .
503On January 9, 2006, American filed an unopposed motion
512requesting t hat D OAH Case Nos. 05 - 4136 and 05 - 413 9 be
528consolidated. By o rder issued that same day ( January 9, 2006 ) ,
541the motion was granted.
545On February 23, 2006, the parties filed a Corrected Joint
555Prehearing Stipulation , which contained, among other things, the
563fol lowing "[c]oncise [s]tatement of the [n]ature of the
572[c]ontroversy" and "[c]oncise [s]tatement of [a]dmitted
578[f]acts":
580I. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
588CONTROVERSY
589Petitioners were employed as mechanics
594(Aircraft Maintenance Technicians) at
598Amer ican's maintenance station at the Miami
605International Airport. They were discharged
610from employment after they w e re found to
619have spent the latter half (about 4 hours)
627of their overnight work shift on Friday
634night, July 30, 2004, at a nightclub and
642about town, while claiming pay as if they
650had worked this complete shift. Petitioners
656(both union members) grieved their discharge
662with American in accordance with the
668procedures established in their collective
673bargaining agreement, and the grievance was
679ultima tely heard by a neutral arbitrator.
686The arbitrator denied Petitioners'
690grievances after a full evidentiary hearing
696and ruled that American had terminated their
703employment for good and just cause.
709Petitioners each filed a charge of
715discrimination against American with the
720Florida Commission on Human Relations
725("FCHR") claiming that they were terminated
733because of their national origin, Hispanic.
739After investigation, the FCHR issued a no -
747cause determination and dismissed the
752Petition ers' charges. These pe titions , now
759consolidated, follow.
761V. CONCISE STATEMENT OF ADMITTED FACTS
7671. Both petitioners were aviation
772maintenance technicians for American and
777worked at Miami International Airport
782("MIA").
7852. On July 30, 2004, Pena's scheduled shift
793began at 9 :00 p.m., and ended at 5:30 a.m.
803the next morning.
8063. On July 30, 2004, Castellan os' scheduled
814shift began at 10: 30 p.m., and ended at 7:00
824a.m. the next morning.
8284. Both petitioners badged in at MIA at the
837start of their scheduled shifts.
8425. Both pe titioners left MIA at
849approximately 12:45 a.m. without badging out
855and without notifying their supervisor that
861they were leaving.
8646. Both petitioners entered a black Ford
871Explorer and drove several miles to Coconut
878Grove , Florida.
8807. At Coconut Grove, they parked their
887vehicle, changed out of their work uniforms
894and into "dress" clothes.
8988. Both petitioners entered the Quench
904nightclub in Coconut Grove at approximately
9101:20 a.m.
9129. Both petitioners consumed two
917intoxicating beverages each at Quench.
92210. At approximately 2:2 0 a.m., the
929petitioners left Qu ench, returned to their
936vehicle, and drove to a 24 - hour lunchwagon
945near MIA where they ate sandwiches.
95111. Following their meal, they drove back
958to MIA at approximately 4:40 a.m.
96412. Both petiti oners were paid as if they
973worked a full - shift, including those hours
981spent away from MIA and at Quench nightclub.
98913. Petitioners' discharge grievances were
994denied by a neutral arbitrator after a full
1002hearing, who found that American discharged
1008Petition ers for just cause because they had
1016engaged in timecard fraud.
102014. No similarly situated, non - Hispanic
1027aviation technician was treated more
1032favorably than petitioners after engaging in
1038similar conduct.
1040As noted above, the hearing in these consolidated c ase s was
1052held on February 24, 2006 . Four witnesses testified at the
1063hearing: Mr. Castellanos , Mr. Pena , George Rojas, and Anthony
1072DeGrazia. In addition, 39 exhibits (Petitioner s ' Exhibits 1
1082through 3, and Respondent's Exhibits A through JJ ) were offered
1093and received into evidence. At the close of the evidentiary
1103portion of the hearing on February 24, 2006 , the undersigned
1113established the deadline for filing proposed recommended orders
1121at 30 days from the date of the filing of the heari ng transcript
1135with the DOAH .
1139The Transcript of the final hearing (consisting of two
1148volume s ) was filed with the D OAH on March 31 , 2006 .
1162Accordingly, proposed recommended orders had to be filed no
1171later than Monday, May 1, 2006 .
1178On May 1, 2006 , American timely filed a Pro posed
1188Recommended Order, which has been carefully considered by the
1197undersigned. To date, Petitioners have not filed any post -
1207hearing submittal s .
1211FINDINGS OF FACT
1214Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as
1225a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement
1236and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the
1246parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing
1253Stipulation 2 :
12561 . Petitioners are both Hispanic.
12622. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the
1270work force in American's maintenance department at Miami
1278International Airport (MIA) .
12823. Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance
1290department are those who occupy supervisory positions.
12974. Americans Vice - President for Maintenance, Danny
1305Martinez, is Hispanic.
13085. As aviation maintenance technicians for American,
1315Petitioners ' job duties, as set forth in the written job
1326d escription for the position, were as follows:
1334In addition to the work specified for the
1342Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an
1347Avi ation Maintenance Technician 's
1352responsibility also includes the following:
1357troubleshooting, individually or with Crew
1362Chief, management or professional direction,
1367disassembly, checking and cleaning,
1371repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting,
1375assembling, in stalling, servicing,
1379fabricating, taxing or towing airpla nes
1385and/or run - up engines, de - i cing aircraft,
1395required to maintain the airworthiness of
1401aircraft and all their components whil e in
1409service or while undergoing overhaul and/or
1415modific ation. Certifies for quality of own
1422workmanship, including signing mechanical
1426flight releases for all work done on field
1434work. In those work positions where stock
1441chasers are not utilized and/or available at
1448the time may chase own parts. May have
1456other Mechanic personne l assigned to assist
1463him/her in completing an assignment. Works
1469according to FAA and Company regulation s and
1477procedures and instructions from Crew Chief
1483or supervisor. Completes forms connected
1488with work assignments according to
1493established procedures an d communicates with
1499other Company personnel as required in a
1506manner designated by the Company.
1511Perform s the following duties as assigned:
1518cleaning of aircraft windshields;
1522connection/removing ground power and ground
1527start units; pushing out/towing of air craft
1534and related guideman functions,
1538fueling/defueling, de - icing of aircraft.
15446. At all times material to the instant case s , Petitioners
1555were member s of a collective bargaining unit represented by the
1566Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a
1576collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU
1584(TWU Contract) , which contained the following provisions, among
1592others:
1593ARTICLE 28 - NO DISCRIMINATION, AND
1599RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE
1604(a) The Company and the Union agree to make
1613it a matter of record in this Agreement that
1622in accordance with the established policy of
1629the Company and the Union, the provisions of
1637this Agreement will apply equally to all
1644employees regardless of sex, color, race,
1650creed, age, religious preferences, st atus as
1657a veteran or military reservist, disability,
1663or national origin.
1666(b) The Union recognizes that the Company
1673will have sole jurisdiction of the
1679management and operation of its business,
1685the direction of its working force, the
1692right to maintain disc ipline and efficiency
1699in its hangars, stations, shops, or other
1706places of employment, and the right of the
1714Company to hire, discipline, and discharge
1720employees for just cause, subject to the
1727provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed
1734that the rights of ma nagement not enumerated
1742in this Article will not be deemed to
1750exclude other preexisting rights of
1755management not enumerated which do not
1761conflict with other provisions of the
1767Agreement.
1768* * *
1771(e) Copies of the Peak Performance Through
1778Commitment (PPC) Program will be available
1784to all employees upon request. Any changes
1791to the PPC Program will be provided and
1799explained to the TWU prior to
1805implementation.
1806ARTICLE 29 - REPRESENTATION
1810* * *
1813(f) The Uni on does not question the right
1822of the Company supervisors to manage and
1829supervise the work force and make reasonable
1836inquiries of employees, individually or
1841collectively, in the normal course of work.
1848In meetings for the purpose of investigation
1855of any ma tter which may eventuate in the
1864application of discipline or dismissal, or
1870when written statements may be required, or
1877of sufficient importance for the Company to
1884have witnesses present, or to necessitate
1890the presence of more than the Company
1897supervisor, o r during reasonable cause or
1904post accident drug/alcohol testing as
1909provided in Article 29(h), the Company will
1916inform the employee of his right to have
1924Union representation present. If the
1929employee refuses representation, the
1933supervisor's record will refl ect this
1939refusal.
1940(1) At the start of a meeting under the
1949provisions of Article 29(f), the Company
1955will, except in rare and unusual
1961circumstances, indicate the reason that
1966causes the meeting and then provide an
1973opportunity for the employee and his Union
1980representative to confer for a reasonable
1986period of time. Following that period, the
199329(f) meeting will be reconvened and
1999continue until concluded by the supervisor.
2005(2) Before written notification of
2010discipline or dismissal is given, an
2016employee will b e afforded the opportunity to
2024discuss the matter with his supervisor. If
2031he desires, he will have a Union
2038r epresentative in the discussion. . . .
2046* * *
2049ARTICLE 30 - DISMISSAL
2053(a) An employee who has passed his
2060probationary pe riod will not be dismissed
2067from the service of the Company without
2074written notification of that action. The
2080notification will include the reason or
2086reason s for his dismissal. Appeal from
2093dismissal will be made, in writing, by the
2101employee within seven (7 ) calendar days
2108after receiving the notification and will be
2115addressed to the Chief Operating Officer,
2121with a copy to the appropriate Human
2128Resources Office. The Chief Operating
2133Officer will fully investigate the matter
2139and render a written decision as so on as
2148possible, but not later than twelve (12)
2155calendar days following his receipt of the
2162appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise.
2167A copy of the written decision will be
2175provided to the Union.
2179* * *
2182(b) If the decision of t he Chief Operating
2191Officer is not satisfactory to the employee,
2198the dismissal and decision will be appealed
2205in accordance with Article 30(c), provided,
2211however, the appeal must be submitted within
2218twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the
2226decision render ed by the Chief Operating
2233Officer.
2234(c) An appeal from the decision of the
2242Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to
2249the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in
2256accordance with Article 32. . . .
2263* * *
2266ARTICLE 31 - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
2271(a) An employee who believes that he has
2279been unjustly dealt with, or that any
2286provision of this Agreement has not been
2293properly applied or interpreted, or against
2299whom the Company has issued written
2305disciplinary action, may submit his
2310grievan ce in person or through his
2317representatives within seven (7) calendar
2322days. The grievance will be presented to
2329his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate
2335the grievance or complaint and render a
2342written decision as soon as possible, but
2349not later than sev en (7) calendar days
2357following his receipt of the
2362grievance. . . .
2366(b) If the written decision of the
2373immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to
2379the employee whose grievance is being
2385considered, it may be appealed within ten
2392(10) calendar to the Chief Operating
2398Officer, with a copy to the appropriate
2405Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating
2411Officer will fully investigate the matter
2417and will render a written decision as soon
2425as possible, but not later than twelve (12)
2433calendar days , unless mutually agreed
2438otherwise, following his receipt of the
2444appeal. . . .
2448(c) If the decision of the Chief Operating
2456Officer is not satisfactory to the employee,
2463the grievance and the decision may be
2470appealed to the System Board of Adjustment,
2477as provided for in Arti cle 32.
2484* * *
2487ARTICLE 32 - BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
2493* * *
2496(c) Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline
2502and Dismissal Cases
2505* * *
2508(2) Each Area Board will be composed on one
2517member appointed by the Company, one member
2524appointed by the Union, and a neutral
2531referee acting as Chairman. . . .
2538* * *
2541(d) Procedures Generally Applicable to the
2547Boards
2548* * *
2551(6) Employees and the Comp any may be
2559represented at Board hearing by such person
2566or persons as they may choose and designate.
2574Evidence may be presented either orally or
2581in writing, or both. The advocates will
2588exchange all documents they may enter and
2595the names of witnesses they m ay call in
2604their direct case not later than ten (10)
2612calendar days prior to the date set for
2620hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will
2626require either advocate to present the
2632documents or the witnesses provided above
2638during the course of the hearing. The
2645ad vocates will not be restricted from
2652entering documents or calling witnesses that
2658become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten
2666calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of
2673forty - eight (48) hours notice is provided to
2682the other party and a copies are submitte d
2691to the other party prior to the presentation
2699of the direct case. The part y receiving the
2708late document or witness has the option to
2716postpone the hearing in light of the new
2724document or witness.
2727(7) Upon the request of either party to the
2736dispute, or o f two (2) Board members, the
2745neutral referee will summon witnesses to
2751testify at Board hearing. The Company will
2758cooperate to ensure that all witnesses
2764summoned by the board will appear in a
2772timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the
2778Union for employee w itnesses will be
2785honored. The requests for witnesses will
2791normally not be greater than the number,
2798which can be spared without interference
2804with the service of the Company. Disputes
2811arising from this provision will be
2817immediately referred to the Director of the
2824Air Transport Division and the Vice
2830President - Employee Relations, or their
2836respective designees, for resolution.
2840(8) A majority of all members of a Board
2849will be sufficient to make a finding or a
2858decision with respect to any dispute
2864properly befo re it, and such finding or
2872decision will be final and binding upon the
2880parties to such dispute. . . .
2887* * *
2890ARTICLE 36 - MEAL PERIODS
2895(a) Meal periods will be thirty minutes,
2902except when a longer period is agreed upon
2910between the parties.
2913(b) Meal periods will be scheduled to begin
2921not earlier than three (3) hours after
2928commencement of work that day and not later
2936than five hours after commencement of work
2943that day. The commencement of work is from
2951the start of t he employee' s regular shift.
2960If an employee is not schedule d for a meal
2970period within the foregoing time span, the
2977meal period will be provided immediately
2983before or after it. I n the even t that a
2994meal period has not been provided in
3001accordance with the foregoing, th e employee
3008is then free, if he so desires, to take his
3018meal period.
30207. At all times material to th e instant cases, American
3031had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (a s permitted by
3043Article 28(b) of the TWU Co ntract) were applicable to TWU -
3055represented bargaining unit members , including Petitioners .
3062These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part , as follows:
3072As an American Airlines employee, you can
3079expect a safe and productive workplace that
3086ensures your ability to succeed and grow
3093with your job. The rules listed below
3100represent the guidelines and principles that
3106all employees work by at American.
3112Attendance
3113* * *
31163. During you r tour of duty, remain in the
3126area necessary for the efficient performance
3132of your work.
31354. Remain at work until your tour of duty
3144ends unless you are authorized to leave
3151early.
3152* * *
315517. Work carefully. Observe posted or
3161published regulations.
3163* * *
3166Personal Conduct
3168* * *
317134. Dishonesty of any kind in relations
3178with the company, such as theft or pilferage
3186of company property, the property of other
3193employees or property of others entrusted to
3200the company, or misrepresentation in
3205obtaining employee benefits or privileges,
3210will be grounds for dismissal and where the
3218facts warr ant , prosecution to the fullest
3225extent of the law. Employees charged with a
3233criminal offense, on or off duty, may
3240immediately be withheld from service. Any
3246action constituting a criminal o ffense,
3252whether committed on duty or off duty, will
3260be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this
3267rule, April 10, 1984)
3271* * *
3274Violations of any of the Amer ican Airlines
3282Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could
3291be grounds for immediate termination
3296depending of the severity of the incident or
3304offense an d the employee's record. . . .
33138. At all times material to the instant cases, American
3323had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to
3333deal with employee perfo rmance and disciplinary problems. The
3342policy , which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU
3352Contract) was applicable to TWU - represented bargaining unit
3361members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as
3369follows:
3370Peak Performance Through Com mitment (PPC) is
3377a program that fosters ongoing communication
3383between managers and employees. It
3388encourages manage rs . . . to regularly
3396recognize outstanding performance and to
3401work together with employees to address and
3408correct performance issues fairly.
3412For the few employees whose performance does
3419not respond to regular coaching and
3425counseling, the following steps advise them
3431that continued performance problems have
3436serious consequences, ultimately leading to
3441termination:
3442- First Advisory for employees with problem
3449performance or conduct who do not respond to
3457coaching or counseling.
3460- Second Advisory for e mployees whose
3467performance fail s to respond to initial
3474corrective steps.
3476- Career Decision Advisory for employees
3482whose problem performance or conduct
3487warrants termination. They are given a paid
3494Career Decision Day away from work to
3501consider their future and continued
3506employment with American Airlines.
3510- Final Advisory for employees whose problem
3517performance or conduct requires termination,
3522or those who have failed to honor the Letter
3531of Commitment signed after their Career
3537Decision Day.
3539Please not e that steps can sometimes be
3547skipped, in instances where the nature of
3554the conduct is very serious.
3559It is your responsibility as an employee to
3567know the com pany's rules of conduct and
3575performance standards for your job, and to
3582consistently meet or exceed those standards.
3588In the even t that you r performance does not
3598measure up to the company's expectations,
3604your manager will work with you to identify
3612the probl em and outline steps to correct it.
3621* * *
3624SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES
3628Some violation s of our guiding principles
3635and rules of conduct will result in
3642immediate termination. For example,
3646insubordination, violating our alcohol a nd
3652drug policy, abusing travel privileges,
3657aircraft damage, violations of the work
3663environment policy, and job actions could be
3670grounds for immediate termination, depending
3675on the severity of the incident and the
3683employee's record. Hate - related conduct an d
3691dishonesty will always result in
3696termination. In cases when immediate
3701termination may be appropriate but
3706additional information is needed, the
3711employee may be withheld from service while
3718an investigation is conducted.
37229. At all times material to the i nstant case, Petitioners '
3734regular shifts were eight and a half hours , including an unpaid,
3745thirty minute "meal period " ( to which TWU - represented bargaining
3756unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU
3766Contract ).
376810. Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work
3779during their eight and a half hour shif ts, TWU - represented
3791bargaining unit members , including Petitioners, were , in
3798practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without
3810penalty.
381111. TWU - represented bargaining unit members " clocked in "
3820at the beginning of their shift and " clocked out " at the end of
3833their shift. Th ey were expected to remain "on the clock" during
3845their "meal periods" (which , as noted above, were to be no
3856longer than one hour).
386012. During his eight an d a half hour shift which began on
3873July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a
"3883routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an
3893assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [ aviation
3903maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully"
3909approximately four hours to complete.
391413. At the t ime he left MIA that evening t o go to the
3929Quench nightclub, Mr . Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes
3940into his shift.
394314. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on
3955July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS
3965checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have
3976taken a "well qualified [ aviation maintenance technician]
3984working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete.
399415. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the
4007Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into
4018his shift.
402016. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's
4027corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners
4033when they left MIA that evening a nd kept them under surveillance
4045until their return almost four hours later.
405217. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end
4062of their shift s on July 31, 2004 . In so doing , the y effectivel y
4078claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that , d uring
4088the shifts, they had been of f the worksite , engaged in non - work -
4103related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were
4115allowed for "meal periods."
411918. Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report
4127detailing what he had observed as to Peti ti oner s ' movements and
4141conduct during the time that they had been under his
4151surveillance.
415219. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department
4159station manager at MIA . He is " responsible for the entire
4170[ American ] maintenance operation in Miami. "
417720. Mr. Sm ith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia,
4186a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into,
4198and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in
4208response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report.
421721. Neither Mr. Sm ith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic.
422722. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr.
4238Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the
4247provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract .
425623. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had
4264reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report.
426824. Mr. Castellanos stated , among other things, the
4276following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in
4287question , he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as
4298possible because he wanted to have an alcoho lic beverage; that
4309evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours ,
4319which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in
4332similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions .
434225. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the followi ng in
4353his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he
4364was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was
4377not "okay " ; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the
4388past ; and American was a "gre at company " to work for.
439926. Bas ed on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the
4411information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia
4419concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in
4428violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that
4439they therefore, in acc ordance with American's policy that
"4448dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in
4457the PPC Policy), should be terminated.
446327. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with
4472Mr. Smith and " someone " from American's human r esources
4481d epartment, who both "concurred " with Mr. DeGrazia that
4490termination was the appropriate action to take against
4498Petitioners .
450028. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final
4509Advisories terminating Petitioner s ' employment.
451529. The Final Adv isory given to M r. Castellanos read, in
4527pertinent part, as follows:
4531On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled
4538tour of duty was 2230 - 0700. During your
4547scheduled shift you were assigned to
4553complete an A - check on a 757 aircraft.
4562At approximately 0045, Corporate Security
4567obs erved you leaving the premises and going
4575into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While
4582there, you were observed at the bar drinking
4590from a plastic cup. You were observed
4597leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving
4604towards the airport. By your own account,
4611you returned to the airport approximately
46170400.
4618During a company investigation, you admitted
4624to leaving the premises, during your
4630scheduled tour of duty and going to a
4638restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to
4643consuming alcoholic beverages.
4646Additionally, whe n asked how it was possible
4654for you to complete your assignment in such
4662a short amount of time you stated that you
4671were, "trying to complete the job as fast as
4680I can because I was getting the urge of
4689getting a drink."
4692Based on the above information I have
4699concluded that your actions fall far short
4706of that which may be reasonably expected of
4714our employees and are a direct violation of
4722American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules
47283, 4, 17, and 34 . . . .
4737In view of the above rule violations your
4745employment wi th American Airlines is hereby
4752terminated effective today, August 12, 2004.
4758* * *
476130. The Final Adv isory given to Mr. Pena read, in
4772pertinent part, as follows:
4776On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled
4783tour of duty was 2100 - 0530 . During your
4793scheduled shift you were assigned to
4799complete two PS - checks on 737 aircraft.
4807At approximately 0045, Corporate Security
4812observed you leaving the premises and going
4819into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While
4826there, you were observed at the bar drinking
4834from a plastic cup. You were observed
4841leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving
4848towards the airport. By your own account,
4855you returned to the airport approximately
48610400.
4862During a company investigation, you admitted
4868to leaving the premises, dur ing your
4875scheduled tour of duty and going to a
4883restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to
4888consuming alcoholic beverages.
4891Additionally, when y ou[] were asked if it is
4900acceptable to go to lunch for 3 - 4 hours you
4911stated, "no, according to Company Rules ,
4917it's not OK."
4920Based on the above information I have
4927concluded that your actions fall far short
4934of that which may be reasonably expected of
4942our employees and are a direct violation of
4950American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules
49563, 4, and 34 . . . .
4964In view of t he above rule violations your
4973employment with American Airlines is hereby
4979terminated effective today, August 12, 2004.
4985* * *
498831. That Petitioners were Hispanic play ed no role
4997whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate t hem .
5007Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because , and only because,
5015he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing
" 5025time clock fraud. "
502832. Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered a nother situation ,
5037in his capacity as a productio n manage r for A merican, where an
5051aviation maintenance techni ci an over whom he had disciplinary
5061authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which
5071he terminated Petitioners.
507433. No one has ever reported to him , nor has he ever
5086observed , any aviation mainten ance technician other than
5094Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour
5104while remaining "on the clock . "
511034. Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant
5117to Article 31 of the TWU Contract . Neither of them advance d any
5131allegation s of anti - Hispanic discrimination in his grievance .
514235. Petitioners ' grievances were ultimately denied on
5150September 9, 2004, b y William Cade , American's managing director
5160for maintenance .
516336. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to
5172the A merican and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida
5184(Board) , in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract,
5194which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes
5203arising under the contract.
520737. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was h eld before the
5217Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were
5227represented by counsel. Th rough counsel, they called and cross -
5238examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and
5244presented argument . Neither of them testified .
525238. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005 , denying
5263Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented . The
5272Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in
5281pertinent part, as follows:
5285There is no dispute that the rule violations
5293by grievants['] act ions on July 30, 2004
5301constituted time card fraud and violation of
5308rules relating to remaining at work. This
5315was not some minor taking of time, such as
5324overstaying lunch for a shortened period.
5330It was a well - planned event. They had with
5340them a change of clothes - in effect "party
5349clothes" apropos to a late night - early
5357morning South Florida nightclub. They had
5363even done this several times before.
5369Once at this nightclub they actually drank
5376very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks
5383and grievant Castellan os appeared to have
5390just one. In fact, when he was later tested
5399after his return to work almost five hours
5407later, the result was negative for drugs and
5415alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at
5422work for their tours of duty in violation of
5431Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not
5440by themselves call for immediate discharge
5446nor do any of the Company documents relating
5454to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as
5464serious violations that would incur
5469discharge.
5470The seriousness here concerns the grievants '
5477badging out after their eight - hour tour and
5486being paid for eight hours, almost five of
5494which they did not work. There is no
5502question that this is time card fraud and as
5511such it involves dishonesty that is covered
5518by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind."
5525Nu merous arbitrators for the parties have
5532found such conduct to be violative of Rule
554034 and have concluded that stealing time
5547from the Company is dishonesty that requires
5554immediate dismissal.
5556* * *
5559[T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct
5565on multiple occasion s that involved more
5572than half of their shift being spent at a
5581nightclub. An d they knew it was wrong as
5590they readily admitted when finally caught.
5596Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP
5602involvement is insufficient to overco me and
5609reduce in any fashion their core
5615responsibility to be honest employees and
5621abide by all Company rules and regulations.
5628The Company made this clear enough in its
5636current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as
5643seen, other Board s have found it reasonable,
5651a s does this Board.
5656To all of this the Union argues that there
5665are other mitigating factors - seniority,
5671disparate treatment, failure to consider
5676employment records and a common practice
5682permitting employees to extend lunch breaks.
5688As to the latter, there is no evidence that
5697any employee has been allowed to stay away
5705from work for almost five hours with the
5713knowledge or consent of management at any
5720level. There is some evidence of employees
5727overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of
5734employees going for food for the crew and
5742arr iving back late and even some t w o - hour
5754absences. None of this is comparable to the
5762grievants' conduct.
5764Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor
5770Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of
5777a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor.
5784She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but
5790that alone does not mean that she knew he
5799was off several hours at that point
5806socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on
5813July 3 0 or at other times. She may have
5823gone out with them while she was a mechanic,
5832but the evidence does not show that she went
5841for these long journeys to drink and
5848socialize at a night club. Most
5854importantly, the grievants never claimed a
5860practice existed but instead readily
5865admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct
5872was wrong and they vio lated Company rules.
5880As to the disparate treatment incidents,
5886although the dishonesty issue appears
5891similar, different treatment only becomes
5896disparate when the employees being compared
5902also have factual situations and records
5908that are similar. The compa rators her e did
5917not leave work on more than one occasion, or
5926on any occasion, for four hours or more to
5935drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus,
5942Mora's 45 - minute late punch - in resulted from
5952his retrieving his drivers' license; he then
5959immediately informe d management of what he
5966did. He did not have to be put under
5975security surveillance for this type of
5981conduct occurring in the past. Although his
598830 - minute extended lunch was part of the
5997practice referred to above, it hardly
6003qualifies as like conduct when compared to
6010the grievants' activities.
6013The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when
6022he used his Company travel privilege is the
6030type of violation referred to the Travel
6037Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing
6043employees by suspending their travel
6048privileges . The facts of that incident and
6056the reasoning of this committee are not
6063known to make any clear and relevant
6070comparison. Even if accepted as a valid
6077comparison, it is only one employee incident
6084that by itself is insufficient to show that
6092management disp arately treated these
6097grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule
610534 was involved in either of these
6112situations.
6113Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not
6120consider the grievants' prior record or
6126their seniority. He explained that the
6132seriousness of the ir conduct was sufficient
6139for his decision. The Board fully
6145recognizes that the grievants cooperated
6150during the investigation, had no prior
6156discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and
61631996. Each of these factors is significant
6170in assessing the suitabilit y of the
6177penalties. But it is well established by
6184the parties and even in arbitration cases
6191i nvolving outside parties, that in light of
6199the gravity of time card fraud, these
6206factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman
6213notes nonetheless, that seniority an d work
6220records cannot be entirely ignored. But
6226here, the grievants' propensity in the past
6233to engage in this same outlandish conduct,
6240and to do so undetected, significantly
6246minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of
6252their good record and seniority.
625739. Petitioners subsequently filed employment
6262discrimination charge s with the FCHR, alleging for the first
6272time that their terminations were product s of anti - Hispanic
6283discrimination.
628440. There has been no persuasive showing made , in support
6294in these allegati ons, that the decision to terminate them was
6305motivated by anything other than legitimate business
6312considerations.
6313CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
631641. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Act) is codified
6327in Sections 760.01 through 760.11, Florida Statutes, and Secti on
6337509.092, Florida Statutes. It "is patterned after Title VII of
6347the [federal] Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2" and
6361therefore "federal case law dealing with Title VII is
6370applicable." Florida Department of Community Affairs v. Bryant ,
6378586 So . 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
638842. Among other things, the Act makes certain acts
"6397unlawful emp loyment practices" and gives the FCHR the
6406authority, if it finds following an administrative hearing
6414conducted pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Fl orida
6423Statutes, that an "unlawful employment practice" has occurred,
6431to issue an order "prohibiting the practice and providing
6440affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including
6449back pay." §§ 760.10 and 760.11(6), Fla. Stat .
645843. To obtain su ch relief from the FCHR, a person who
6470claims to have been the victim of an "unlawful employment
6480practice" must, "within 365 days of the alleged violation," file
6490a complaint ("contain[ing] a short and plain statement of the
6501facts describing the violation an d the relief sought") with the
6513FCHR, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or "any unit
6522of government of the state which is a fair - employment - practice
6535agency under 29 C.F.R. ss. 1601.70 - 1601.80." § 760.11(1), Fl a .
6548Stat . This 365 - day period is a "l imitations period" that can be
" 6563be equitably tolled, but . . . only [based on the] acts or
6576circumstances . . . enumerated in section 95.051," Florida
6585Statutes. Greene v. Seminole Electric Co - op., Inc. , 701 So. 2d
6597646, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
660344. "[O]nly those claims that are fairly encompassed
6611within a [timely - filed complaint] can be the subject of [an
6623administrative hearing conducted pursuant to Sections 120.569
6630and 120.57, Florida Statutes]" and any subsequent FCHR award of
6640relief to the complainant. Chambers v. American Trans Air ,
6649Inc. , 17 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1994).
665745. The "unlawful employment practices" prohibited by the
6665Act include those described in Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida
6673Statutes, which provides as follows:
6678It is an unlawful employme nt practice for an
6687employer:[ 3 ]
6690(1)(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to
6699hire any individual, or otherwise to
6705discriminate against any individual with
6710respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
6715or privileges of employment, because of such
6722individual 's race, color, religion, sex,
6728national origin, age, handicap, or marital
6734status.
673546. In the instant consolidated case s , Petitioner s have
6745alleged that American committed such "unlawful employment
6752practice s " when it terminated their employment based on th eir
" 6763national origin (Hispanic)."
676647. Petitioner s had the burden of proving, at the
6776administrative hearing held in th ese case s , that they were the
6788victim s of such discriminatorily motivated action. See
6796Department of Banking and Finance Division of Secur ities and
6806Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern and Company , 670 So. 2d
6816932, 934 (Fla. 1996)("'The general rule is that a party
6827asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
6837presenting evidence as to that issue."'); Florida Department of
6847Health an d Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission ,
6856289 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)("[T]he burden of proof
6869is 'on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an
6881administrative tribunal.'"); Hong v. Children's Memorial
6888Hospital , 993 F .2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993) (" To ultimately
6900prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, the
6910plaintiff must prove that she was a victim of intentional
6920discrimination. "); and Mack v. County of Cook , 827 F. Supp.
69311381, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1993)("To prevail on a racially - based
6943discriminatory discharge claim under Title VII, Mack must prove
6952that she was a victim of intentional discrimination.").
696148. "Discriminatory intent may be established through
6968direct or indirect circumstantial evidence." Johnson v.
6975Hamrick , 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1377 ( N.D. Ga. 2001 ) ; see also
6989United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens , 460
6999U.S. 711, 714 ( 1983)("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff [in a
7012Title VII action] may prove his case by direct or circumstantial
7023e vidence. The trier of fact should consider all the evidence,
7034giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.").
704349. " Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would
7052prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to
7061inference or pre sumption." King v. La Playa - De Varadero
7072Restaurant , No. 02 - 2502 (Fla. DOAH February 19,
70812003)(Recommended Order). "If the [complainant] offers direct
7088evidence and the trier of fact accepts that evidence, then the
7099[complainant] has proven discrimination." Maynard v. Board of
7107Regents , 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) .
711650. "[D]irect evidence is composed of 'only the most
7125blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to
7135discriminate' on the basis of some impermissible factor. . . .
7146If an a lleged statement at best merely suggests a discriminatory
7157motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence."
7166Schoenfeld v. Babbitt , 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999).
7176Likewise, a statement "that is subject to more than one
7186interpretation . . . does not constitute direct evidence."
7195Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co. , 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.
72061997).
720751. "[D]irect evidence of intent is often unavailable."
7215Shealy v. City of Albany, Ga. , 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir.
72271996). For this reason, those who claim to be victims of
7238discrimination "are permitted to establish their cases through
7246inferential and circumstantial proof." Kline v. Tennessee
7253Valley Authority , 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).
726252. Where a complainant attempts to prove int entional
7271discrimination using circumstantial evidence, the "shifting
7277burden framework established by the [United States] Supreme
7285Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
7297Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community
7308Aff airs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d
7321207 (1981)" is applied. "Under this framework, the
7329[complainant] has the initial burden of establishing a prima
7338facie case of discrimination. If [the complainant] meets that
7347burden, then an infer ence arises that the challenged action was
7358motivated by a discriminatory intent. The burden then shifts to
7368the employer to 'articulate' a legitimate, non - discriminatory
7377reason for its action.[ 4 ] If the employer successfully
7387articulates such a reason, the n the burden shifts back to the
7399[complainant] to show that the proffered reason is really
7408pretext for unlawful discrimination." Schoenfeld , 168 F.3d at
74161267 (citations omitted ). "The analysis of pretext focuses only
7426on what the decisionmaker, and not any one else, sincerely
7436believed." Little v. Illinois Department of Revenue , 369 F.3d
74451007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004) ; see also Schaffner v. Glencoe Park
7456District , 256 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2001)( " [T]the Park
7466District stated that it did not promote Schaffner bec ause it
7477believed she was unable to work well with others. Schaffner
7487argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
7498whether she could work well with others. The district court
7508agreed with her, based on the affidavit of one of her co - worke rs
7523and the affidavits of several parents whose children had
7532participated in the Kids' Club. However, the issue is not
7542whether Schaffner worked well with others, but whether the Park
7552District honestly believed that she did not. In order to rebut
7563the Park District's articulated reason, Schaffner must present
7571evidence that it did not believe its own assessment. . . . The
7584affidavits of parents and of Schaffner's coworkers simply do not
7594contradict whether the Park District honestly believed Schaffner
7602worked w ell with others. . . . Because Schaffner did not
7614present any evidence to contradict the Park District's honest,
7623albeit possibly mistaken belief (as opposed to the underlying
7632truth of that belief), she may not overcome the Park District's
7643second articulate d reason for not promoting her. "); Komel v.
7654Jewel Cos. , 874 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1989)("[T]he fact that
7666the employee takes issue in general terms with the employer's
7676overall evaluation is not sufficient to create a triable issue
7686on pretext. As we have recently stated, the employee's 'own
7696self - interested assertions [even where accompanied by the
7705conclusory statements of a co - worker] concerning her abilities
7715are not in themselves sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
7726material fact.'") ; and Smith v. Flax , 618 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th
7738Cir. 1980)(" Smith, of course, testified that he had versatility,
7748and that his competence as an analyst was not confined to the
7760field of logistics. Smith's perception of himself, however, is
7769not relevant. It is the perception of the decision maker which
7780is relevant.").
778353. "Although the intermediate burdens of production shift
7791back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
7802fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
7810employee remains at all times with the plaintiff." EEOC v.
7820Joe's Stone Crabs, Inc. , 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002 ) ;
7832see also Brand v. Florida Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla.
78451st DCA 1994)("Whether or not the defendant satisfies its burden
7856of production showing legitimate , nondiscriminatory reasons for
7863the action taken is immaterial insofar as the ultimate burden of
7874persuasion is concerned, which remains with the plaintiff.").
788354. "In a case alleging discriminatory discharge or
7891termination, [establishing a prima facie cas e] may be
7900accomplished by showing the following: (1) [the discharged
7908employee] is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
7919qualified for the position from which she was terminated; (3)
7929she was terminated; and (4) she was replaced by someone who was
7941not a member of her protected class or a similarly situated
7952employee who was not a member of her protected class engaged in
7964comparable conduct and was not di scharged." Boex v. OFS Fitel,
7975LLC , 339 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1360 (D. Ga. 2004) ; see also Maynard ,
7988342 F.3 d at 1289 ("To prevail on a claim for discrimination
8001under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, Maynard must
8010show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was
8024qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse
8033employment action; an d (4) he was replaced by a person outside
8045his protected class or was treated less favorably than a
8055similarly - situated individual outside his protected class.").
806455. "To show that employees are similarly situated, the
8073[complainant] must establish that th e employees are 'similarly
8082situated in all relevant respects.' The comparator must be
8091[shown to be] 'nearly identical' to the [complainant] to prevent
8101courts from second - guessing a reaso nable decision by the
8112employer." Hammons v. George C. Wallace State Community
8120College , No. 05 - 14962, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6396 *10 (11th Cir.
8133March 16, 2006)(citation omitted). "This normally entails a
8141showing that the two employees [the complainant and the
8150comparator] dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the
8160s ame standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such
8171differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish
8178their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Radue v.
8188Kimberly - Clark Corp. , 219 F.3d 612, 617 - 618 (7th Cir. 2000) ; see
8202a lso Lopez v. Micro Center Sales Corp. , 109 Fed. Appx. 114, 117
8215(7th Cir. 2004)("In determining whether employees are similarly
8224situated, courts balance a number of factors including whether
8233employees were disciplined by a common decisionmaker. But as
8242the district court noted, Lopez was terminated by Myers and
8252Miller, not Stiles. . . . None of the other employees whom
8264Lopez asserts were similarly situated were terminated by Myers
8273and Miller.") (citations omitted) ; and Patterson v. Avery
8282Dennison Corp. , 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)("It is clear
8294that Meyer was not similarly situated to Patterson because they
8304reported to different supervisors and had different levels of
8313experience and job responsibilities.").
831856. Where the administrative law judge does no t halt the
8329proceedings "for lack of a prima facie case and the action has
8341been fully tried, it is no longer relevant whether the
8351[complainant] actually established a prima facie case. At that
8360point, the only relevant inquiry is the ultimate, factual issue
8370of intentional discrimination. . . . [W] hether or not [the
8381complainant] actually established a prima facie case is relevant
8390only in the sense that a prima facie case constitutes some
8401circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. " Green
8407v. Scho ol Board of Hillsborough County , 25 F.3d 974, 978 (11th
8419Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) ; see also Aikens , 460 U.S. at 713 -
8431715 ("Because this case w as fully tried on the merits, it is
8445surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still
8456addressing the question whether Aikens made out a prima facie
8466case. W e think that by framing the issue in these terms, they
8479have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of
8486discrimination vel non . . . . [W] hen the defendant fails to
8499persuade the district court to di smiss the action for lack of a
8512prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff's proof by
8522offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection
8531[as a candidate for promotion] , the factfinder must then decide
8541whether the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of
8550Title VII. At this stage, the McDonnell - Burdine presumption
8560'drops from the case,' and ' the factual inquiry proceeds to a
8573new level of specificity.' After Aikens presented his evidence
8582to the District Court in this case, the Postal Service's
8592witnesses testified that he was not promoted because he had
8602turned down several lateral transfers that would have broadened
8611his Postal Service experience. The District Court was then in a
8622position to decide the ultimate factual issue in the cas e. . . .
8636Where the defendant has done everything that would be required
8646of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie
8658case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.
8669The district court has before it all the evidence it need s to
8682decide whether 'the defendant intentionally discriminated
8688against the plaintiff.'" ) (citation omitted) ; Beaver v. Rayonier,
8697Inc. , 200 F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1999)(" As an initial matter,
8709Rayonier argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
8721be cause Beaver failed to establish a prima facie case. That
8732argument, however, comes too late. Because Rayonier failed to
8741persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of a
8753prima facie case and proceeded to put on evidence of a non -
8766discriminat ory reason -- i.e., an economically induced RIF -- for
8777terminating Beaver, Rayonier's attempt to persuade us to revisit
8786whether Beaver established a prima facie case is foreclosed by
8796binding precedent . ") ; and Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works ,
8806738 F.2d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1984) (" The plaintiff has framed
8818his attack on the trial court's findings largely in terms of
8829whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of
8839discrimination. We are mindful, however, of the Sup reme Court's
8849admonition that when a dispar ate treatment case is fully tried,
8860as this one was, both the trial and the appellate courts should
8872proc eed directly to the 'ultimate question' in the case:
8882' whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
8890plaintiff .' " ) .
889457. In the instant c ase, Petitioners produced no direct
8904evidence to support their claims that they had been the victims
8915of intentional national origin discrimination on the part of
8924American . They therefore had to rely on circumstantial evidence
8934to prove their claim s . A revi ew of the evidentiary record
8947reveals that Petitioners did not present sufficient
8954circumstantial evidence to even establish a prima facie case of
8964discrimination . The ir evidentiary presentation was devoid of
8973any persuasive evidence that either of them w as " replaced by
8984someone who was not a member of [their] protected class " or that
" 8996a similarly situated employee who was not a member of [their]
9007protected class engaged in comparable conduct and was not
9016discharged. " Both Petitioners testified that they felt th at
9025they were terminated because they were Hispanic. Under no
9034circumstances, however, is proof that, in essence, amounts to no
9044more than mere speculation and self - serving belief on the part
9056of the complainant concerning the motives of the employer
9065sufficie nt, standing alone, to establish a prima facie case of
9076intentional discrimination. See Little v. Republic Refining
9083Co., Ltd. , 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991)(" Little points to his
9096own subjective belief that age motivated Boyd. An age
9105discrimination plain tiff's own good faith belief that his age
9115motivated his employer's action is of little value."); Elliott
9125v. Group Medical & Surgical Service , 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir.
91371983 )("We are not prepared to hold that a subjective belief of
9150discrimination, however genuine, can be the basis of judicial
9159relief."); and Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation , 960 F. Supp.
91701022, 1031 (W.D. Va. 1997 )(" [A]ll too many leaps and
9181unjustifiable inferences must be made before one can reasonably
9190conclude that any causal connection exi sts between plaintiff's
9199termination and his disability. Nothing in the record, apart
9208from plaintiff's private speculation, provides any reason to
9216believe there is such a connection. But '[m]ere unsupported
9225speculation, such as this, is not enough to defe at a summary
9237judgment motion.'").
924058. American, for its part, not only advanced a
9249legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for terminating
9256Petitioners, to wit: Petitioners' having committed " time clock
9264fraud," 5 it affirmatively established that this reason was not
9274pretextual, but rather was the real reason that Mr. DeGrazia
9284decided to terminate their employment , and that Petitioners'
9292being Hispanic was not a factor in his decision .
930259. Under such circumstances, American cannot be found to
9311have committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the
9320employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners, and said
9328charge s should therefore be dismissed.
9334RECOMMENDATION
9335Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
9345Law, it is
9348RECOMMENDED that the F lorida Commission on Human Relations
9357issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the
9368unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioner s and
9376dismissing their employment discrimination charge s .
9383DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006 , in
9393Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
9397S
9398___________________________________
9399STUART M. LERNER
9402Administrative Law Judge
9405Division of Administrative Hearings
9409The DeSoto Building
94121230 Apalachee Parkway
9415Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
9420(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675
9428Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
9434www.doah.state.fl.us
9435Filed with the Clerk of the
9441Division of Administrative Hearings
9445this 15th day of May , 2006 .
9452ENDNOTES
94531 All references to Florida Statutes in this Recommended Order
9463are to Florida Statutes (2005).
94682 The undersigned has accepted these factual stipulations. See
9477Columbia Bank for Cooperatives v. Okeelanta Sugar Cooperative ,
948552 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1951) ( " When a case is tried upon
9499stipulated facts the stipulation is conclusive upon both the
9508trial and appellate courts in respect to matters which may
9518validly be made the subject of stipulation. Indeed, on appeal
9528neither party will be heard to suggest that the facts were other
9540than as stipulated or that any material facts w[ere] omitted . ");
9552Schrimsher v. School Board of P alm Beach County , 694 So. 2d 856,
9565863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ( " The hearing officer is bound by the
9578parties' stipulations. " ); and Palm Beach Community College v.
9587Department of Administration, Division of Retirement , 579 So. 2d
9596300, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)( " When the parties agree that a case
9609is to be tried upon stipulated facts, the stipulation is binding
9620not only upon the parties but also upon the trial and reviewing
9632courts. In addition, no other or different facts will be
9642presumed to exist.").
96463 An "employer ," as that term is used in the Act, is defined in
9660Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, as "any person employing 15
9669or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
9682calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and
9692any agent of such a person."
96984 " To 'articulate' does not mean 'to express in argument.'"
9708Rodriguez v. General Motors Corporation , 904 F.2d 531, 533 (9th
9718Cir. 1990). "It means to produce evidence." Id.
97265 Had Petitioners' made a prima facie showing of
9735discrimination, t he presumption of discrimination arising from
9743such a showing would have been overcome by American's advancing
9753this legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for their
9761terminations.
9762COPIES FURNISHED:
9764Lee Friedland, Esquire
9767Friedland & Assoc iates, P.A.
97724486 Southwest 64th Avenue
9776Davie, Florida 33314
9779Christopher P. Hammon, Esquire
9783Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
97885300 Wachovia Financial Center
9792200 South Biscayne Boulevard
9796Miami, Florida 33131
9799Terence G. Connor, Esquire
9803Hunton & Williams, LLP
9807M ellon Financial Center
98111111 Brickell Avenue, Suite 2500
9816Miami, Florida 33131
9819Cecil Howard, General Counsel
9823Florida Commission on Human Relations
98282009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
9833Tallahassee, Florida 32301
9836Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk
9840Florida Commissi on on Human Relations
98462009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
9851Tallahassee, Florida 32301
9854NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
9860All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
987015 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions
9881to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that
9892will issue the final order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 06/16/2006
- Proceedings: Final Order Dismissing Petitions for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/15/2006
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/01/2006
- Proceedings: Recommended Order Including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by the Petitioner.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/01/2006
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing of American`s Proposed Recommended Order Including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed.
- Date: 03/31/2006
- Proceedings: Transcript (Volumes I and II) filed.
- Date: 02/24/2006
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/23/2006
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Lerner from C. Hammon enclosing replacement exhibit II-1 thru II-5 filed (not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 02/23/2006
- Proceedings: Matter of Arbitration relating to Case Nos. 05-4136 and 05-4139 filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/23/2006
- Proceedings: Opinion and Award relating to Case Nos. 05-4136 and 05-4139 filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/22/2006
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Lerner from C. Hammon enclosing exhibit PP-1 filed (not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 02/21/2006
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Exhibits for Final Hearing filed (not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 02/21/2006
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Possible Rebuttal Exhibits for Final Hearing filed (not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 02/21/2006
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Notice of Submission of Unilateral Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/20/2006
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony by other Current or Former American Employees about other Alleged Acts of Discrimination Unrelated to Petitioners` Claims filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/20/2006
- Proceedings: Respondent`s Notice of Submission of Unilateral Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/17/2006
- Proceedings: Notice of Petitioner Jose Castellanos` Response to Respondent`s First Set of Interrogatories filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/17/2006
- Proceedings: Notice of Petitioner Johnny Pena`s Response to Respondent`s First Set of Interrogatories filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 01/11/2006
- Proceedings: Agency`s court reporter confirmation letter filed with the Judge.
- PDF:
- Date: 01/10/2006
- Proceedings: Notice of Service of American`s First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner Pena filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 01/09/2006
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference (video hearing set for February 24, 2006; 9:00 a.m.; Miami and Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 01/09/2006
- Proceedings: Order of Consolidation (consolidated cases are: 05-4136 and 05-4139).
- PDF:
- Date: 01/06/2006
- Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance (parties to advise status by January 6, 2006).
- PDF:
- Date: 01/06/2006
- Proceedings: Petitioner, Johnny Pena`s, Agreed Motion for 30-day Continuance filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 11/30/2005
- Proceedings: Agency`s court reporter confirmation letter filed with the Judge.
Case Information
- Judge:
- STUART M. LERNER
- Date Filed:
- 11/14/2005
- Date Assignment:
- 11/14/2005
- Last Docket Entry:
- 06/16/2006
- Location:
- Miami, Florida
- District:
- Southern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
Counsels
-
Terence G. Connor, Esquire
Address of Record -
Lee Friedland, Esquire
Address of Record -
Christopher P. Hammon, Esquire
Address of Record -
Matthew S. Sarelson, Esquire
Address of Record