05-004463EC In Re: Jonathan A. Mantay vs. * Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, August 17, 2006.

Summary: Respondent`s travel on behalf of Bay County was provided by the county`s vendor. It was not a gift to Respondent.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

IN RE: JONATHAN A. MANTAY , )

) Case No. 05 - 4463 EC

Respondent . )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This cause came on for f inal hearing before Harry L.

Hooper, Ad ministrative Law Judge with the Division of

Administrative Hearings, on June 15 , 2006, in Panama City ,

Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Advocate : Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire

Advocate for the Florida

Commission on Ethics

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

For Respondent: Albert T. Gimbel, Esquire

Gary E. Early, Esquire

Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A.

Post Office Box 1876

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 1 876

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Jonathan A. Mantay , violated the

Florida Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Kenneth J. Kopczynski, of the Florida Police Benevolent

Association, authored a Complaint c oncerning Jonathan A. Mantay

(Mr. Mantay ), of Bay County, Florida, which was signed on

July 14, 2003, more than three years after the events alleged to

be the basis of the Complaint. It was submitted to the

Commission on Ethics (the Commission) and filed on the day it

was signed. The Complaint alleged a possible violation of

Section 112.313(2), (6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1999) . The

events alleged in the Complaint occurred in the year 2000.

The Commission, based on a Report of I nvestigation, and

upon consideration of the Commission's Advocate, entered an

Order Finding Probable Cause that was filed on September 8,

2004. This Order found probable cause to believe County Manager

Mantay violated Section 112.3148(4), Florida Statutes, by

accepting from Co rrections Corporation of America (CCA), a trip

to Nashville, Tennessee, valued in excess of $ 100. The

Commission dismissed all other allegations.

In a letter dated December 8, 2005, the Commission's

Complaint Coordinator notified the Division of Administ rative

Hearings that the Chairman of the Commission had requested a

public hearing into the matter. The Commission forwarded to the

Divis i on the cases of County Attorney Nevin Zimmerman and Chief

of Emergency Services Robert J. Majka, Jr., also of Bay Cou nty,

who had Probable Cause Orders entered for similar alleged

offenses. On December 27, 2005, Respondent Zimmerman's case,

Number 05 - 4462EC, and Respondent Majka 's case, Number 05 - 446 1 EC,

were consolidated with Mr. Mantay's case. T he parties

nevertheles s requested that individual Recommended Orders be

issued, which has been done.

At the hearing, the Advocate presented the testimony of two

witnesses and offered 16 exhibits into evidence. Respondent s

presented the testimony of four witnesses and offered five

exhibits into evidence.

A Transcript was filed on June 30, 2006 . After the

hearing, Mr. Mantay and the Advocate timely filed their Proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 31, 2006.

References to statutes are to Florida Statutes ( 1 999 ) unless

otherwise noted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Pursuant to Article II, Section 8, Florida

Constitution, and Section 112.320, the Commission is empowered

to serve as the guardian of the standards of conduct for the

officers and employees of the state. Pursuant to Sections

112.324 and 112.317, the Commission is empowered to conduct

investigations and to issue a Final Order and Public Report

recommending penalties for violations of the Code of Ethics for

Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics).

2 . Respondent Mantay is subject to the Code of Ethics.

Mr. Mantay , during times pertinent , was County Manager of Bay

County, Florida, and is a reporting individual, as that term is

used in the Code of Ethics, and is required to file annual

financial disclo sures with the Bay County Supervisor of

Elections, as provided by Section 112.3145(2)(c). In 2001,

Mr. Mantay left his position and moved to metropolitan Portland,

Oregon.

3 . On or about August 31, 1999, the Bay County Commission

was addressing the prob lem of inmate overcrowding in its county

correctional facilities, which were operated by CCA. On or

about that time, the county correctional facility exceeded

capacity by about 352 inmates.

4 . The Bay County Commissioners decided to address the

issue. The Bay County Commission directed Mr. Mantay and his

staff to study the problem and to recommend courses of action.

As a result of the study, two possible courses of action were

recommended.

5 . One possible course of action was the adoption of the

" Lifeline" program operated by CCA in Nashville, Tennessee,

which CCA claimed would reduce recidivism by teaching inmates

life skills and addressing drug abuse, among other things.

CCA's corporate headquarters is located in Nashville.

6 . The other possibl e course of action was to emulate the

program operated by Sheriff Joe Arpaio, of Maricopa County,

Arizona. Sheriff Arpaio's program consists of housing inmates

in tents that are sufficiently primitive that inmates, after

having had the tenting experience, avoid repeating it either by

not committing crimes in Maricopa County, or by committing them

elsewhere.

7 . In order to evaluate the two courses of action, the Bay

County Commission decided that three commissioners and certain

staff should travel to the two sites and evaluate the programs.

Mr. Mantay , Chief of Emergency Services Majka, Jr., and County

Attorney Zimmerman, were among those who were designated to

travel to Nashville and Phoenix.

8 . Mr. Mantay was not involved in planning the trip. He

re lied on the County Attorney's Office to coordinate the event .

9 . County Attorney Zimmerman called Mr. Wiggins on

February 6, 2000, and inquired if CCA would pay for the airline

tickets to Nashville. Mr. Zimmerman told Mr. Wiggins, when he

asked CCA to pay for the trip, that having CCA pay the airfare,

". . . was the County's preferred way of doing things, and, in

fact, that's when he recounted the story of the County taking

some trips to New York and maybe some other places."

1 0 . Mr. Wiggins was not au thorized by CCA to approve the

payment of travel expenses for customers or others. He

forwarded County Attorney Zimmerman's request to James Ball, his

supervisor. Subsequently, Mr. Wiggins happened upon the CEO of

CCA, a Dr. Crants, while walking about t he Nashville

headquarters of CCA. Dr. Crants directed Mr. Wiggins to fund

the trip.

11 . Ultimately, as a result of these conversations, CCA

paid Trade Winds Travel, Inc., of Panama City, Florida, for the

cost of the air travel for the entire Bay County c ontingent to

Nashville, and thence to Phoenix, and back to Panama City. The

evidence is not conclusive as to whether it was the intent of

CCA to fund the trip beyond Nashville, but they paid for the

cost of the airfare for the entire trip.

1 2 . The reques t for the payment and the request to visit

CCA in Nashville was driven by Bay County's needs, not by the

needs of CCA. Bay County was one of CCA's most valued

customers, however, and CCA was motivated to respond to their

request. This was especially true because one of CCA's first

contracts to provide correctional services was with Bay County.

1 3 . County Attorney Zimmerman's "marching orders" for many

years was that if there was an opportunity to require a third

party to pay an expense, then the third pa rty should pay rather

than Bay County. That policy is reflected in a variety of Bay

County ordinances including the requirement that developers pay

for the cost of permitting.

14 . The third party payor policy was also reflected in a

1997 trip where Wes tinghouse was required by the C ounty

C ommissioners to pay for the commissioners' and C ounty staff's

trip to Vancouver, B.C., and Long Island, New York, to evaluate

the transfer of the resource recovery facility to another

vendor. This was the trip that Co unty Attorney Zimmerman

discussed with Mr. Wiggins.

15 . This policy was set forth in a letter by County

Attorney Zimmerman dated October 30, 1997, which informed the

C ounty C ommissioners that all expenses in connection with their

travel, and with the trav el of staff, would be funded by

Westingho use. He further stated that, "[i t ] is our opinion that

the payment of these necessary expenses are not 'gifts,' as that

term is defined in State law."

16 . Prior to the trip to Nashville , Mr. Mantay had a

discussio n with County Attorney Zimmerman with regard to whether

the fact - finding trip would be "legal." One of the reasons he

asked that question was that C ounty C ommissioners would be

traveling together and he was concerned about "sunshine" issues.

County Attor ney Zimmerman said that the trip was legal.

Mr. Mantay also recognized that this trip, like the trip to New

York and British Columbia , was different from attending a

seminar alone.

1 7 . Mr. Mantay received his airline ticket when a courier

from Trade Win ds Travel brought it to him, along with an invoice

that he sent to Mr. Zimmerman. On Thursday, February 24, 2000,

Messrs. Zimmerman, Majka, and Mantay, traveled with Bay County

Commissioners Danny Sparks, Richard Stewart, and Carol Atkinson,

and a televis ion reporter, Carmen Coursey , by commercial air, to

Nashville, Tennessee. On Saturday, February 26, 2000, they

traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, and they returned to Panama City

on Tuesday, February 29, 2000.

18 . The trip was authorized by the Bay County Com mission

subsequent to several public discussions concerning the need for

an on - site visit to Nashville and Phoenix. There was a

legitimate public purpose for the trip.

19 . Channel 13 television news reporter, Carmen Coursey

accompanied the officials. It is clear that there was nothing

about the trip that was accomplished sub rosa .

2 0 . The airfare was paid by CCA directly to Trade Winds

Travel, Inc. CCA did not ask for or receive reimbursement from

either Bay County or the travelers. The cost of Mr. Mantay's

airfare for the entire trip was $1,257. Mr. Mantay did not

learn that CCA paid for the airfare until 2003 when he was

notified of the ethics investigation . Mr. Mantay at the time of

the trip had no reason to contemplate the cost. After learnin g

that CCA paid the tariff , he also learned that the cost of the

trip exceed ed $100.

2 1 . Upon arrival in Nashville, Mr. Mantay , and the other

travelers were greeted by Mr. Wiggins, who transported them to

the Downtown Courtyard Marriott Hotel in a van. The cost of the

transportation was paid by CCA , and CCA neither asked for nor

received reimbursement from Bay County or the travelers. The

value was not established. Mr. Mantay did not know who paid for

the ground transportation.

2 2 . The travelers ate t he evening meal , February 24, 2000,

as a group . Someone paid for Mr. Mantay's dinner , but the

record does not indicate that CCA paid for it.

2 3 . On Friday, February 25, 2000, Mr. Mantay and the other

travelers toured the Davidson County (Tennessee) Cor rectional

Facility from 9:00 a.m. until noon. They ate lunch at the CCA

corporate headquarters provided by CCA. That afternoon they met

with Mr. Wiggins and other representatives of CCA. They

discussed the possibility of CCA providing "Lifeline" and

"Ch ances" programs operated by CCA, to Bay County.

2 4 . That evening, at CCA's expense, Mr. Mantay and the

other travelers were transported to a dinner that was paid for

by CCA. The cost of the transportation and dinner was paid by

CCA , and CCA neither as ked for nor received reimbursement from

Bay County or the travelers. Mr. Mantay was not aware of either

the cost of the dinner or who paid for it.

2 5 . Mr. Mantay and the other travelers stayed two nights

at the Marriott at a cost of $224.24. The cost o f the hotel was

paid by CCA , and CCA neither asked for nor received

reimbursement from Bay County or the travelers. Mr. Mantay

learned after checking out from the Marriott, on February 26,

2000, when he attempted to pay a personal telephone bill , that

CCA had paid the hotel bill, but there is no evidence of record

that he knew the amount, or that it was an amount more than

$100. No evidence was adduced proving that Mr. Mantay

reasonably believed at that time that it was of a value of more

than $100. Mr. Mantay paid cash for his personal telephone call

during the check - out process.

2 6 . On Saturday, February 26, 2000, Mr. Mantay and the

other travelers departed for Phoenix by air and observed Sheriff

Arpaio's program the following Monday morning. They al so toured

the Phoenix Fire Department. The travelers, with the exception

of County Attorney Zimmerman, stayed at the San Carlos Hotel.

Mr. Mantay 's hotel bill in Phoenix was paid with a credit card

issued to him by Bay County. On Tuesday February 29, 2 000, they

all returned to Panama City.

2 7 . Bay County originally contracted with CCA to operate

their detention facilities on September 3, 1985. This contract

had a term of 20 years ; however, it was amended on September 16,

1996, to reflect an expirat ion date of September 24, 1999.

Other extensions followed. An amendment dated June 18, 2000,

provided that "CCA shall operate the 'Lifeline Program' through

September 1, 2001." On May 15, 2001, the contract was extended

to September 30, 2006.

2 8 . Mr. M antay did not derive any person financial benefit

as a result of CCA paying the lodging expenses in Nashville or

as a result of CCA paying for his airfare. At no time has he

attempted to reimburse CCA for the cost of the trip. Mr. Mantay

did not receive per diem or any amount in excess o f the actual

cost of the trip. The entity receiving a benefit from the trip

was Bay County.

29 . Mr. Mantay had a C ounty credit card in his possession

but by C ounty policy he was not allowed to charge meals on it.

He did , as noted, use it to pay the hotel bill in Phoenix. His

usual practice, when traveling on behalf of the C ounty, is to

obtain receipts and file an expense report at the conclusion of

the trip. He would thereafter be reimbursed for his travel

expenses. H e did not file an expense report subsequent to this

travel.

30 . It is found as a fact that the cost of the airfare to

Nashville and back to Panama City and the cost of the hotel in

Nashville totaled more than $100 and Mr. Mantay became aware

that the cost , when aggregated, was more than $100. Mr. Mantay

could not have learned this , however, until more than three

years after the trip because that is when he learned that CCA

had paid for the airfare.

31 . It was not uncommon for Mr. Wiggins and other CCA

of ficials to appear before the Bay County Commissioners on

behalf of CCA, or to otherwise interact with representatives of

CCA. Brad Wiggins was a lobbyist, as that term is defined in

Section 112.3148(1)(b)1 . , and others interacted with Bay County

on behalf of CCA and they were lobbyists also. During times

relevant , Bay County did not maintain a lobbyist registration

system.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this

p roceeding. §§ 120.57(1) and 112.324(3), Fla. Stat (2005) .

3 3 . The burden of proof, absent a statutory directive to

the contrary, is on the party asserting the affirmative of the

issue of the proceedings. Department of Transportation v.

J.W.C. Co., Inc . , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v.

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services , 348 So. 2d 349

(Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Therefore, the Advocate has the burden of

proof.

3 4 . Because of the penalties provided by Section 112.317,

the Advocate must prove its case by clear and convincing

evidence. Latham v. Florida Commission on Ethics , 694 So. 2d 83

(Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

35 . The issue in this case is narrowly drawn by the Order

Finding Probable Cause, which refers specifically to, " . . .

accep ting payment for expenses valued at over $100 relative to

his trip to Nashville." Thus events that occurred in Arizona

will not be considered in this Recommended Order.

36 . It is found as a fact that the cost of the travel to

Nashville and back to Pana ma City, and the cost of the hotel in

Nashville totaled more than $100 and Mr. Mantay eventually

learned that the cost, when aggregated, was more than $100.

Mr. Mantay could not have acquired this belief, however, until

more than three years after the tri p because that is when he

learned that CCA had paid for the airfare.

37 . The pertinent subsections of Section 112.3148, are set

forth below:

112.3148. Reporting and prohibited

receipt of gifts by individuals filing full

or limited public disclosure of f inancial

interests and by procurement employees

* * *

(2) As used in this section:

* * *

(b)1. "Lobbyist" means any natural person

who, for compensation, seeks, or sought

during the preceding 12 months, to influence

the governme ntal decisionmaking of a

reporting individual or procurement employee

or his or her agency or seeks, or sought

during the preceding 12 months, to encourage

the passage, defeat, or modification of any

proposal or recommendation by the reporting

individual o r procurement employee or his or

her agency.

* * *

(c) "Person" includes individuals,

firms, associations, joint ventures,

partnerships, estates, trusts, business

trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries,

corporations, and all other groups or

combinations.

(d) "Reporting individual" means any

individual, including a candidate upon

qualifying, who is required by law, pursuant

to s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution

or s. 112.3145 , to file full or limited

public disclosure of his or her financial

interest s.

* * *

(4) A reporting individual or procurement

employee or any other person on his or her

behalf is prohibited from knowingly

accepting, directly or indirectly, a gift

from a political committee or committee of

continuous existence, as defined in s

106. 0 11 or from a lobbyist who lobbies the

reporting individual's or procurement

employee's agency, or directly or indirectly

on behalf of the partner, firm, employer, or

principal of a lobbyist, if he or she knows

or reasonably believes that the gift has a

value in excess of $100; however, such a

gift may be accepted by such person on

behalf of a governmental entity or a

charitable organization. If the gift is

accepted on behalf of a governmental entity

or charitable organization, the person

receiving the gift shall not maintain

custody of the gift for any period of time

beyond that reasonably necessary to arrange

for the transfer of custody and ownership of

the gift.

38 . If Mr. Mantay is to be found to have violated Section

112.3148(4), the Advocate mus t prove that:

a. Mr. Ma ntay is a reporting individual;

b. who knowingly;

c. accepted a gift;

d. from a lobbyist who lobbies the

reporting individual's agency, or directly

or indirectly on behalf of the partner,

firm, employer, or principal of a lob byist ;

e. and he knew or reasonably believe d that

the gift ha d a value in excess of $100 .

39 . If the facts demonstrate that a gift was accepted by a

reporting individual on behalf of a governmental entity , it is a

complete defense to the offense allege d, if the person receiving

the gift did not maintain custody of the gift for any period of

time beyond that reasonably necessary to arrange for the

transfer of custody and ownership of the gift.

40 . It is undisputed that Mr. Mantay is a reporting

individu al, and that he was transported by commercial air from

Panama City to Nashville and ultimately back to Panama City on a

tariff that was paid by CCA, the principal of a lobbyist,

Mr. Wiggins.

4 1 . What remains to be decided, is whether Mr. Mantay

knowingl y accepted a gift, in the form of transportation and

accommodations in Nashville.

42 . The definition of a "gift" for purposes of

the Code of Ethics is provided in Section 112.312.

112.312. Definitions

As used in this part and for purposes of the

prov isions of s. 8, Art. II of the State

Constitution, unless the context otherwise

requires:

* * *

(12)(a) "Gift," for purposes of ethics in

government and financial disclosure required

by law, means that which is accepted by a

donee or by another on the d onee's behalf,

or that which is paid or given to another

for or on behalf of a donee, directly,

indirectly, or in trust for the donee's

benefit or by any other means, for which

equal or greater consideration is not given

within 90 days, including:

* * *

7. Transportation, other than that provided

to a public officer or employee by an agency

in relation to officially approved

governmental business, lodging, or parking.

* * *

( b ) "Gift" does not include:

1 . Salary, benefits, services, fees,

commissi ons, gifts or expenses associated

primarily with the donee's employment,

business, or service as an officer or

director of a corporation or organization.

4 3 . Construing this statute in the most simplistic way,

one could conclude that transportation is a utomatically a gift.

If one does that, however, then lodging, using the same logic,

can not be a gift since it is not enumerated in Section

112.312(12)(a)1 - 14. It is apparent, therefore, that the Florida

Legislature meant to include lodging under the gene ral

definition at Section 112.312(12), and intended to also provide

in definite terms that transportation was something that could ,

under certain circumstances, be a gift.

4 4 . The word "donee" is not specifically defined by

Section 112.312, or elsewhere i n the Code of Ethics. According

to Black's Law Dictionary , a "donee" is, ". . . one to whom a

gift is made." Black ' s Law Dictionary , 4th Ed. Rev. 1975. The

record is clear that it was the intent of CCA to give air

transportation, ground transportation, lodging, and subsistence

to Bay County.

4 5 . As noted in paragraph 10, above, CCA and Mr. Zimmerman

did not discuss giving anything to Mr. Mantay . Mr. Zimmerman

prevail ed upon Mr. Wiggins to fund travel on behalf of Bay

County. The donee contemplated b y CCA's lobbyist was Bay

County. Therefore, Mr. Mantay was not a donee, was not one to

whom a gift was made, and therefore could not have accepted a

gift as defined by Section 112.312(12)(a).

4 6 . The Code of Ethics recognizes that the situation faced

by Mr. Mantay did not involve a gift to him by noting in Section

112.312(12)(b)1, that "gift" does not include, ". . . expenses

associated primarily with the donee's employment . . . ." The

travel was part of his employment.

4 7 . The Code of Ethics also re cognizes that an employee

may receive a gift on behalf of a governmental agency as noted

in the last two sentences of Section 112.3148(8), which states,

". . . however, such a gift may be accepted by such person on

behalf of a governmental entity or a char itable organization.

If the gift is accepted on behalf of a governmental entity or

charitable organization, the person receiving the gift shall not

maintain custody of the gift for any period of time beyond that

reasonably necessary to arrange for the tra nsfer of custody and

ownership of the gift. "

4 8 . In this case, the "gift," if one concludes a gift was

given to Mr. Mantay on behalf of Bay County, was received and

simultaneously transferred back to the county in the case of the

hotel bill in Nashville. With regard to the air transportation,

since Mr. Mantay did not learn that CCA paid for it until more

than three years after the flights, if one follows this thread

to its logical conclusion, the gift was knowingly accepted on

behalf of Bay County someti me in 2003 and simultaneously turned

over to Bay County.

4 9 . Commission on Ethics Opinion 91 - 71 involved a

Charlotte County Commissioner who accepted free legal

representation in the successful defense of a recall petition.

The partner of the attorney p roviding the legal representation

occasionally lobbied the County Commission. If the attorney

providing the representation had not donated it to the county,

the county would be legally required to pay his retainer . The

Commission concluded that the donee was Charlotte County and

that therefore, the Charlotte County Commissioner had not run

afoul of Section 112.3148(4). The facts in the case at bar are

essentially congruent with the holding in Committee on Ethics

Opinion 91 - 71.

50 . Interestingly, Commit tee on Ethics Opinion 91 - 7 1

stated in part, "We are reluctant to get involved in matters

regarding the procedures to be used by a county commission in

conducting its business." It may be tempting to note in this

case that it may be bad business for a coun ty to prevail upon a

vendor, or an entity desiring to be a vendor, to provide travel

and lodging to a county commissioner or person on a county

staff. However, determining the wisdom of that policy is not

the province of the Administrative Law Judge, or t he Commission

on Ethics, as the Commission noted.

5 1 . A consideration of Committee on Ethics Opinion 91 - 21

is also helpful. In that case the Okaloosa County Supervisor of

Elections inquired if she might travel to California to inspect

voting machines an d accept travel expenses from the voting

machine manufacturer. The Commission held that it was

permissible under Section 112.3148(4) for the manufacturer to

reimburse Okaloosa County for the travel, but impermissible for

the manufacturer to provide the ex pense money directly to the

Supervisor. In this case the vendor paid a third party for

travel for the benefit of Bay County. There may be a

distinction between the that case and the case at bar, but there

is no difference because no one directly gave Mr. Mantay money

for travel.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it

is

RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue a Final

Order and Public Report finding that Jonathan A. Mantay did not

violate Section 112. 3148(4), F lorida Statutes, and dismissing

the complaint filed against him.

DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August , 2006, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

HARRY L. HOOPER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrati ve Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 17th day of August , 2006 .

COPIES FURNISHED :

Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire

Advocate for the Florida

Commission on Ethics

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

Albert T. Gimbel , Esquire

E. Gary Early, Esquire

Messer, Cap arello & Self, P.A.

Post Office Box 1876

Tallahassee, Florida 32302 - 1876

Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Ethics

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 5709

Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Ethi cs

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32319 - 5709

Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Ethics

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32319 - 5709

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to su bmit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.