06-000707PL Department Of Financial Services vs. Larry Lorenzo Jones Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, October 19, 2006.

Summary: Recommend a six months` suspension and a $5000 fine for Respondent`s failure to return collateral after expiration of the bail bond.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL )

SERVICES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 06 - 0707PL

)

LARRY LORENZO JONES, )

)

Respondent. )

______________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law Judge of the Division

of Administrative Hearings, conducted the final hearing in Fort

Lauderdale, Florida, on August 10, 2006.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Greg S. Marr

Department of Financial Services

Division of Legal Services

300 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0333

For Respondent: Michael A. Levin

Law Offices of Michael A. Levin

Global Commerce Center

1900 North Commerce Parkway

Weston, Florida 33326

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety

agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida

Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days

after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e),

Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or

trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section

648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or

dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the

license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by

willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any

proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating

any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance

Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue

is the penalty that should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By Administrative Compl aint dated January 30, 2006,

Petitioner alleged that Respondent was a licensed limited surety

agent, holding license number A134458. The Administrative

Complaint alleges that Petitioner has previously disciplined

Respondent, pursuant to a Settlement Stipu lation for Consent

Order dated October 25, 2002, and Consent Order dated

November 13, 2002, which placed Respondent on probation for one

year and imposed a $2500 fine. The allegations underlying the

Consent Order involved a failure to return collateral an d the

exaction of a charge in excess of the bond premium.

Count I of the Administrative Complaint alleges that, on

December 7, 2003, Respondent executed two bonds for principal

Mark Blackman, and, as collateral for these bonds, Respondent

received Mr. Bla ckman's 2002 Mercedes Benz automobile. Count I

alleges that, while in possession of Mr. Blackman's automobile,

Respondent used it for personal benefit or gain. Count I

alleges that Respondent did not return the automobile to

Mr. Blackman in the same cond ition as received. Count I alleges

that Section 648.442(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits bail bond

agents from using collateral for personal benefit or gain and

requires them to return collateral in the same condition as

received.

Count I alleges that Res pondent thus violated Section

648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness

or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section

648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or

dishonest practices in the conduct o f business under the

license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by

willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating, any

proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating

any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance

Code.

Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that, on

December 7, 2003, Respondent took possession of Mr. Blackman's

2002 Mercedes Benz automobile as collateral for the two bail

bonds described above. Count II alleges that these bail bonds

were discharged on January 23, 2004, but Respondent did not

return the automobile to Mr. Blackman until July or August 2004.

Count II alleges that Respondent thus violated Section

648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the

collateral wit hin 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond;

Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of

fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business;

Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in

fraudulent or dishones t practices in the conduct of business

under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes,

by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any

proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating

any provision of Chapter 648 , Florida Statutes, or the Insurance

Code.

By Motion to Amend Administrative Complaint filed May 1,

2006, Petitioner requested leave to amend Count II and add

Count III to the Administrative Complaint. The Administrative

Law Judge granted the motion by O rder entered May 3, 2006. The

motion amended Count II by adding a reference to Section

648.571(4), Florida Statutes, which requires the imposition of a

monetary penalty when a limited surety agent fails to return

collateral in a timely manner. The amendm ents to Count II also

state that Respondent returned the automobile in June or July

2004, not July or August 2004.

Count III of the Administrative Complaint alleges that,

while Respondent was in possession of Mr. Blackman's automobile

and used it for pers onal benefit or gain, the automobile was

uninsured and bore an expired registration and license tag.

Count III alleges that Respondent thus violated Section

648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness

or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business, and

Section 648.45(3)(e), Florida Statutes, by being found to be a

source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the

public interest or being found to be no longer carrying out the

bail bond business in good faith.

At t he hearing, Petitioner called three witnesses and

offered into evidence 20 exhibits: Petitioner Exhibits 1 - 20.

Respondent called three witnesses and offered into evidence two

exhibits: Respondent Exhibits 1 - 2. All exhibits were admitted

except that Pet itioner Exhibits 2 - 4 were admitted solely for the

purpose of determining the appropriate penalty and Petitioner

Exhibit 20 was not admitted for the truth of its contents.

The court reporter filed the transcript on August 30, 2006 .

The parties filed their P roposed R ecommended O rder s by

October 6, 2006 .

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed

surety agent, holding license number A134458 . Respondent is the

president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale.

2. Ma rk Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed

mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has

been convicted four times of driving under the influence over

the past 20 years . The arrest that resulted in the fourth

conviction took place on December 7, 2003.

3. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest,

Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent.

Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously

purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arres ted

for the possession of cocaine .

4. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's

office and arrange for Responde nt to post bond, which was

$23,5 00. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if

Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and deliv ered, as

security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity

agreement , title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle

itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these

conditions , and Respondent bailed him out of jail.

5. At this poi nt, the agreeme nt between Respondent and

Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would

store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon

receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it

could be stored safely an d without charge.

6. Three or four days later, while out on bail,

Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The

judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the

new offense. At this time , the vehicle no longer served as

se curity because the bail bond that it had secured no longer

existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the

return of the vehicle.

7. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any

misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the

second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be

able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged

offenses . Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February

2004 , after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman

began serving n ights in jail .

8. The day after his re - arrest, Mr. Blackman called

Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman

sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he

was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent i f

he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually,

Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car,

but Respondent declined , at least initially .

9. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the

day after his re - arrest , Respondent removed the car from the

body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer.

Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead

kept the car at his office or home. The record does not

establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason

prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second

arrest.

10. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with

Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as

collateral for a bail bond. Although released fro m jail during

days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned

about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he

explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackma n did not want

his brother to have access to the car . As Mr. Blac kman

testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of

Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may

have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000

from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car

due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want

the car parked in his crime - ridden neighborhood. Additionally,

Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004.

11. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after

his re - arrest for Responde nt to give up possession of

Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it

would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew

that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that

Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman.

12. At no time , though , did Respondent try to document the

change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to

holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically,

Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature o n a

collateral release, which would document that the car no longer

secured a now - nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he

could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail,

but i t is customary for limited surety agents to visit inma tes

in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a

collateral release . Also, in February 2004, Respondent could

have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the

day.

13. After showing the car the first time, two or three

days after M r. Blackman 's second arrest , Responden t began to use

the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as

occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January

2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear

whether the re gistration and license tag expired during this

period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent

produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different

persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused

these offers .

14. After be ing released on days, Mr. Blackman did not

visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman

was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his

release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one

night shortly after hi s release , Mr. Blackman violated one of

the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re - arrested

and returned to jail in March or April 2004.

15. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman

re - address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first

thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price

of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had

written on Tracy. The nex t thing, on April 13, 2004,

Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent

for th e sale of the vehicle , on the same date, to Respondent for

$35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal.

16. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman

sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of

attorney, but it did not app ly to the car, so Respondent would

not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on

Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's

distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks

later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's s ister returned with a

proper power of attorney, and Respondent release d the car to

her.

17. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's

sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably

higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it shou ld have.

Respondent had driven the vehicle 7 , 000 to 10,000 miles during

the six months t hat he had possessed the car, but entirely after

the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about

his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tick ets, as

well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in

the car when it was delivered to Respondent -- all of which

charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman . After repeated demands,

Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional

mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's

fair market value by as much as $3000.

18. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her

power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car

for $33,000 to a person other tha n Respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

19. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Fla. Stat. (2006).

20. Section 668.442(1) , (3), (4), and (7) , Florida

Statutes, provides:

(1) Collateral security or other indemnity

accepted by a bail bond agent, except a

promissory note or an indemnity agreement,

shall be returned upon final termination of

liability on the bond. Such collateral

security or other indemnity required by the

bail bond agent must be reaso nable in

relation to the amount of the bond.

Collateral security may not be used by the

bail bond agent for personal benefit or gain

and must be returned in the same condition

as received. A bail bond agent may accept

collateral security in excess of $50, 000

cash per bond, provided any amount over

$50,000 cash is payable to the insurer in

the form of a cashier's check, United States

postal money order, certificates of deposit,

or wire transfer and is remitted to and held

by the insurer. A copy of IRS Form 8300

must be retained as part of the defendant's

file if it is otherwise required. A

quitclaim deed for property may not be taken

as collateral. Other acceptable forms of

security or indemnity may consist of the

following:

(a) A promissory note;

(b) An indemnity agreement;

(c) A real property mortgage in the name

of the insurer;

(d) Any Uniform Commercial Code filing;

or

(e) Any other type of security approved

by the department. The department may

approve other security only if, after

considering the liquidity and other

characteristics of the security, it

determines that the security is of a type

which increases the probability that the

defendant will in fact appear in court or

increases the probability that the defendant

will be subsequently apprehended by the bail

bond agent.

* * *

(3) . . . If the bail bond agent or

managing general agent fails to return the

collateral to the indemnitor upon final

termination of liability on the bond, the

surety shall be liable for the collateral

and shall return the actual collateral to

the indemnitor or, in the event that the

surety cannot locate the collateral, the

surety shall pay the indemnitor pursuant to

the provisions of this section.

(4) When the obli gation of the surety on

the bond or bonds has been released in

writing by the court, the collateral shall

be returned to the rightful owner named in

the collateral receipt unless another

disposition is provided for by legal

assignment of the right to recei ve the

collateral to another person.

* * *

(7) No bail bond agent or insurer shall

solicit or accept a waiver of any of the

provisions of this section or enter into any

21. Section 648.45(2), Florida Statutes, provides:

(2) T he department shall deny, suspend,

revoke, or refuse to renew any license or

appointment issued under this chapter or the

insurance code, and it shall suspend or

revoke the eligibility of any person to hold

a license or appointment under this chapter

or th e insurance code, for any violation of

the laws of this state relating to bail or

any violation of the insurance code or if

the person:

* * *

(e) Has demonstrated lack of fitness or

trustworthiness to engage in the bail b ond

business.

* * *

(g) Has engaged in fraudulent or

dishonest practices in the conduct of

business under the license or appointment.

* * *

(j) Has willfully failed to comply with

or will fully violated any proper order or

rule of the department or willfully violated

any provision of this chapter or the

insurance code.

* * *

22. Section 648.45(3)(e), Florida Statutes, provides:

(3) The department may deny, suspend ,

revoke, or refuse to renew any license or

appointment issued under this chapter or the

insurance code, or it may suspend or revoke

the eligibility of any person to hold a

license or appointment under this chapter or

the insurance code, for any violation of the

laws of this state relating to bail or any

violation of the insurance code or for any

of the following causes:

* * *

(e) Being found to be a source of injury

or loss to the public or detrimental to the

public interest or being found by the

department to be no longer carrying on the

bail bond business in good faith.

* * *

23. Section 648.571 (1) , Florida Statutes, requires a

limited surety agent in possession of collateral to apply for a

writte n discharge of the bond, upon request of the indemnitor.

Within 21 days of receipt of an executed discharge of the bond,

according to Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, a limited

surety agent must return the collateral to the indemnitor.

Section 648.5 71(2), Florida Statutes, provides that the bond is

canceled, if the court fails to issue the written discharge

within seven days of the request for discharge, and the limited

surety agent must return the collateral to the indemnitor within

21 days of recei pt of the written request for discharge.

Section 648.571(4), Florida Statutes, states: " In addition to

the criminal penalties and any other penalties provided in this

chapter, the department shall impose against any person

violating this section an admin istrative fine of five times the

dollar amount of the collateral."

24. Petitioner must prove the material allegations by

clear and convincing evidence. Department of Banking and

Finance v. Osborne Stern and Company, Inc. , 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla.

1996) and Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

25. Count I alleges that, while in possession of

Mr. Blackman's car, Respondent used it for personal benefit or

gain and failed to return it in the same condition it was in

when it was delivered as collateral. Petit ioner proved these

factual allegations, but failed to prove that Respondent used

the car while it was collateral or that, upon the expiration of

the bond, the car was not in the same condition as it was when

delivered to Respondent. In fact, Respondent ne ver used the car

while it was collateral, except to drive it to storage.

26. The statutes on which Petitioner relies in Count I

impose obligations upon the limited surety agent in his

treatment of collateral. In particular, Section 668.442(1),

Florida Statu tes, prohibits the personal use of collateral

security. This statute does not attempt to impose this

prohibition on property that has lost its status as collateral.

While the car served as collateral, Respondent satisfied these

obligations. Petitioner ha s thus failed to prove any of the

violations alleged in Count I.

27. The real question in Count I is whether the

prohibition against personal use of collateral continues to

apply after the property has lost its status as collateral.

Common sense would dictate that, after the limited surety agent

has returned the collateral to the indemnitor, the agent could

acquire the right to use the property, upon the agreement of its

owner (the former indemnitor), and use it without subjecting

himself to discipline because his relationship to the property

no longer directly involves his role as a limited surety agent .

However, common sense also dictates that the statutory

protection accorded property used as collateral for a bail bond

should extend a reasonable time after the expiration of the

bond, or else the agent could put the property to personal use

immediately after the bond expired, but before he was required

t o return to collateral to the in demnitor.

28. In this case, Mr. Blackman clearly did not want his

car back upon the expiration of the bond, but instead wanted

Respondent, in w hatever capacity, to keep it. Thus, this case

does not present the issue , described in the preceding

paragraph, as to whether the law extend s protection to the

property for the short period a fter the bail bond has expired

that the agent reasonably needs to return the property to the

indemnitor.

29. Count II alleges that Respondent failed to timely

return the collateral. Petitioner has proved this factual

allegation, and Petitioner has proved th at this failure violates

the cited statutes. Section 668.442(1), Florida Statutes,

clearly requires the limited surety agent to return the

collateral upon the expiration of the bond. The applicability

of Section 648.571, Florida Statutes -- and thus the fi ve - times

penalty of Section 648.571(4), Florida Statutes -- is questionable

due to the absence in this case of a request for discharge of

bond or a written discharge of bond.

30. As in Count I, Mr. Blackman desired Respondent to keep

the car after the bond expir ed. However, for the violation

alleged in Count II, Mr. Blackman's desire is irrelevant.

Without regard to Mr. Blackman's desires, Respondent was

obligated to complete the paperwork and at least tender the

collateral back to Mr. Blackman. It is irreleva nt that

Mr. Blackman probably would have asked Respondent to continue to

hold the car. Section 648.442(1), Florida Statutes, states that

Respondent "shall" return the collateral upon the expiration of

the bond, and Section 648.442(7), Florida Statutes, pe rmits no

waiver of this provision. Nor is the specific time of the

accrual of this obligation important on the facts of this case.

Respondent knew that the bond had expired for many months, but

never formally attempted to return the vehicle to Mr. Blackm an

or even have him sign a collateral release.

31. As to Count II, Petitioner has thus proved a lack of

fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business,

in violation of Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes.

32. Petitioner failed to prove the all egations of Count

III in a couple of respects. First, the evidence failed to

establish whether the car's registration or tag expired while in

Respondent's possession, although it was not insured during at

least part of this time. Second, the cited statut es clearly do

not impose any obligation on Respondent for the use of property

after it has lost its status as collateral.

33. If Petitioner has rules governing the imposition of

discipline on limited surety agents, this Administrative Law

Judge could not find them. A reference at the hearing to

Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69B - 231 proved inapt due to

the provision in Rule 69B - 231.020(2) that these rules do not

apply to "bail bond agents." Florida Administrative Code

Chapter 69B - 231 governs limited sure ty agents, but contains no

penalty provisions. Petitioner's proposed recommended order

contains a tantalizing reference to "the penalty guidelines" and

their calling for a 15 - month suspension, but omits any

reference.

34. Section 648.49(1), Florida Statutes , limits the term

of any suspension to two years. Section 648.52(1), Florida

Statutes, authorizes an administrative fine: " the department

may, in its discretion, in lieu of or in addition to such

suspension, revocation, or refusal, and except on a second

offense, impose upon the licensee an administrative penalty in

an amount up to $5,000 or, if the department has found willful

misconduct or willful violation on the part of the licensee,

$20,000." Either the fine option is unavailable for a second

offens e or it is unavailable for a second offense in lieu of a

suspension. The latter interpretation makes more sense;

otherwise, a licensee could suffer a suspension (or revocation)

and fine for a first offense, but only a suspension (or

revocation) for a seco nd offense.

35. Absent guidance from penalty guidelines, the

appropriate penalty is a suspension of six months. The

violation is fairly technical, as the material omission by

Respondent is his failure to present Mr. Blackman with an

opportunity to reclaim pos session of a car for which he had no

use and limited ability to safeguard. The major aggravating

circumstance is prior discipline.

36. Respondent's use of th e vehicle exceeded

Mr. Blackman's expectations . T he mileage that Respondent ran up

on the car and h is irresponsible incurring of parking tickets

and use of Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder are reprehensible .

B ut these acts and omissions fell outside the ambit of

Petitioner's regulatory responsibilities. Given the likelihood

that Mr. Blackman would h ave declined the opportunity to regain

possession of his car in December or January, Respondent's

cavalier use of Mr. Blackman's vehicle (and his SunPass

transponder) is not sufficiently linked to Respondent's

omissions at the expiration of the bail bond t o permit the

inclusion of Respondent's irresponsible behavior and

Mr. Blackman's consequent economic losses as aggravating

factors.

RECOMMENDATION

It is

RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter

a final order dismissing Counts I and III , finding Respondent

guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in

Count II, and imposing a six - month suspension and a $5000

administrative fine .

DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

ROBERT E. MEALE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 68 47

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 19th day of October, 2006.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Greg S . Marr, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

Division of Legal Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0333

Michael A. Levin, Esquire

Law Offices of Michael A. Levin

Global Commerce Center

1900 North Commerce Parkway

Weston, Flor ida 33326

Larry Lorenzo Jones

1310 Sistrunk Boulevard

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331

Honorable Tom Gallagher

Chief Financial Officer

Department of Financial Services

The Capital, Plaza Level 11

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0300

Carlos G. Mu ñ iz, General Counsel

Department of Financial Services

The Capitol Plaza Level 11

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0307

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. A ny exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.