06-002233 Clear Channel Outdoor-Atlantic Coast Division vs. Department Of Transportation
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 3, 2007.


View Dockets  
Summary: Fourteen applications for signs comply with the requirements of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code. The signs are to be written industrial or commercial. Zoning is not enacted primarily to permit signs. Recommend that the permits be granted.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR - ATLANTIC )

14COAST DIVISION , )

17)

18Petitioner , )

20)

21vs. ) Case No. 06 - 2233

28) 03 - 143

32DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION , )

36)

37Respondent . )

40)

41RECOMMENDED ORDER

43Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted in this case

53before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge of the

62Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) , on October 4, 2006,

71in Tallahassee, Florida.

74APPEARANCES

75For Pe titioner: Paul Sexton, Esquire

81Williams Wilson & Sexton, P.A.

86215 South Monroe Street, Suite 600 - A

94Tallahassee, Florida 32302

97For Respondent: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire

103Department of Transportation

106Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58

112605 Suwannee Street

115Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

120STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

124Whether the 14 applications (application numbers 54481

131through 54494) for the eight sign structures (six double - sided

142and two single - sided) adjacent to Interstate Route 95 and the

154Florida Turnpike within the City of Port St. Lucie should be

165granted or denied by Respondent.

170PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

172On August 21, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal

182Administrative Hearing with Respondent relating to the denial of

19114 applications for sign structures. On December 2, 2003,

200Respondent issued amended notices of denied application on each

209of the 14 applications. Following a delay in referral,

218requested by Petitioner, this matter was referred to the DOAH on

229June 22, 2006. Following discovery and a continuance granted at

239the request of Respondent, the parties submitted their Joint

248Pre - hearing Stipul ation on September 27, 2006.

257At the hearing, Petitioner called one witness, Edward

265Williams, who testified as an expert witness, and Respondent

274called one witness, John Garner, m anager of Production and

284Program Operations for Respondent. One Joint Exhibit , with

29212 tabs, w as offered by the parties and accepted into evidence.

304The Joint Exhibit is comprised of Clear Channel’s applications

313( Tab 1a - 1h) ; the Department’s Notices of Denied Application

324( Tab 2a - 2h) ; an excerpt from the City of Port St. Lucie’s

338C omprehensive Plan ( Tab 3) ; an excerpt from the City’s Land

350Development Regulations ( Tab 5) ; a comparison of the sign sites

361with parcels shown in the City’s Zoning Book ( Tab 5a - 5h) ; photos

375and other materials from site visits by Garner ( Tab 6a - 6h) ;

388Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14 - 10 ( Tab 7) ; Chapter 479,

400Florida Statutes ( Tab 8) ; an excerpt from FHWA regulations,

41023 C.F.R., Subpart G ( Tab 9) ; a copy of Florida Administrative

422Code Rule 9J - 5.003 (Tab 10); selected definitions from the

433American Heritage Dictionary ( Tab 11) ; and Mr. Williams’

442Curriculum Vitae ( Tab 12).

447The Transcript of the hearing was filed on October 18,

4572006. Following the granting of a request for extension of time

468for the filing of post - hearing submittals, each party timely

479filed th eir Proposed R ecommended O rders on November 17, 2006.

491Both proposals have been given careful consideration in the

500preparation of this Recommended Order.

505FINDINGS OF FACT

508Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as

519a whole, the following fi ndings of fact are made:

529Petitioner’s Applications

5311. Petitioner’s applications are for sign structures at

539eight different locations within the City of Port St. Lucie (the

550City). Six of the structures are two - sided sign structures and

562two are single - side d sign structures.

5702. Petitioner’s 14 applications were received by

577Respondent on July 1, 2003. The applications were completed in

587accordance with Respondent's Rules.

5913. Respondent’s original Notices of Denied Application

598were dated and mailed out July 29, 2003, and were received by

610Petitioner on August 1, 2003. Petitioner filed its Petition for

620Formal Administrative Hearing on August 21, 2003. On

628December 2, 2003, Respondent issued amended notices of denied

637application on each of the 14 applications. Referral of the

647Petitions to the D OAH w as delayed at the request of Petitioner.

660All Sign Sites are Located in a Commercial or Industrial Zone.

6714. The sites upon which the proposed sign structures will

681be erected are located on parcels that have been zo ned

692commercial or industrial. The parcels where the proposed sign

701structures will be erected have been designated “Utility” by the

711City’s Future Land Use Map and have been designated “Utility”

721under its Land Development Regulations. The City’s

728Comprehens ive Plan includes the “Utility” land use as a category

739of Industrial land use. The City’s Land Development Regulations

748include the “Utility” land use category under Article IX,

757Industrial Districts.

7595. The sign sites are designed to correspond to the

769par cels of land designated in the City’s Zoning Book, as

780follows:

781· Application No. 54487 is located at site

7897 - 1, on Parcel 7.

795· Application Nos. 404708 & 404710 are

802located at site 35 - 2, on Parcel 35.

811· Application Nos. 404701 & 404702 are

818located at site 35 - 5, on Parcel 35.

827· Application Nos. 404697 & 404699 are

834located at site 35 - 6, on Parcel 35.

843· Application Nos. 404705 & 404706 are

850located at site 35 - 7, on Parcel 35.

859· Application No. 404698 is located at site

86741 - 2 on Parcel No. 41.

874· Application Nos. 404704 & 404704 are

881located at site 46 - 1, on Parcel 46.

890· Application Nos. 404707 & 404709 are

897located at site 48 - 1, on Parcel 48.

9066. The certified statements of the City’s zoning official

915establish that the sign sites are each located in a commercial

926or industrial zone. All applications submitted by Petitioner

934were submitted on Respondent's forms, which have been

942incorporated into Respondent’s rules by reference.

9487. Page 2 of 2 of each application submitted by Petitioner

959included a section to be completed by a City zoni ng official,

971and each provided as follows:

976To be completed by appropriate zoning

982official:

983Designation of parcel on the Future Land Use

991Map: UTILITY, WHICH IS AN INDUSTRIAL LAND

998USE CATEGORY.

1000The primary land uses under this designation

1007are: DEVELOPMEN T ACCOMMODATING MAJOR PUBLIC

1013AND PRIVATE UTILITIES, INCLUDING BUT NOT

1019LIMITED TO PUBLIC AN D PRIVATE STORM WATER

1027SYSTEMS, WATER AND WASTEWATER PLANTS,

1032ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND TRANSMISSION AND

1037STORM W ATER RIGHTS - OF - WAY, TELEPHONE

1046SWITCHING STATIONS.

1048Curren t Zoning of parcel (from Land

1055Development Regulations): UTILITY, WHICH IS

1060AN INDUSTRIAL LAND USE CATEGORY.

1065The primary land uses under this designation

1072are: UTILITIES FACILITIES, STORM WATER

1077SYSTEMS, WATER AND WASTEWATER PLANTS,

1082ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AN D TRANSMISSION

1087FACILITIES, TELEPHONE, CABLE TELEVISION AND

1092SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

1095Sign located within city limits ?

1100_ X _ Y es ___ N o

1108Please provide the name and telephone number

1115of the person the Department may contact if

1123additional information is

1126required :__________________________________

1128I certify that the above information

1134reflects the designation of the parcel as it

1142is shown on the current comprehensive plan

1149adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida

1155Statutes, and with all local governmental

1161requirements, and that I am authorized to

1168sign this form on behalf of the

1175county/municipality named above:

1178Cheryl S . Friend ________

1183Signature of Local Government Official

1188Cheryl S. Friend, Asst. Director of P&Z

1195Printed Name and Title

11995/22/03

1200Date

12018 . The testimony of Petitioner’s expert witness

1209established that the proposed sign sites are each located in a

1220commercial or industrial zone. Edward Williams was accepted in

1229this case as an expert in planning and zoning , and he has over

124228 years ' experien ce in applying planning and zoning principles.

1253He has been a [0] ccepted as an expert in planning and zoning in

1267Florida c ourts in over 30 counties. Williams [0] testified that

1278he reviewed the issue of whether the parcels where signs are to

1290be located are within commercial or industrial zones and

1299concluded that they were [0] . [0] Williams reviewed the Future

1310Land Use Element of the City’s Comprehensive Plan, which plainly

1320defines "Utility" as an industrial land use. [0] The City’s

1330zoning code also shows Utility zoning a s an industrial use.

1341[0] The City decided it was appropriate, considering all factors,

1351to adopt a utility zoning category as a part of the industrial

1363use classification because of the nature of the community.

1372Williams concluded that, based on the actual use s identified

1382under the various land use categories designated by the City,

1392the City correctly placed the "Utility" category under the

1401industrial land use category.

1405[0] 9. The Utility category under the City's Future Land

1415Use

1416Element and Land Development Reg ulations is intended for

1425facilities that are larger than those that serve residential

1434areas. They are more significant than just service lines.

144310. Long - established land use classification systems

1451utilized by planners to classify land use, and which ar e based

1463on the activities performed and their impact on other properties

1473and other uses, show that the proposed sign sites are located in

1485commercial or industrial zones. These long - established land use

1495classification systems have been used by local govern ments in

1505Florida [0] to prepare comprehensive plans, land development

1513regulations , and zoning maps. An evaluation of all of these

1523classification systems shows that utilities are listed in the

1532heavy commercial and in the industrial type categories. By

1541their nature, by their use , and by their compatibility issues,

1551they are commercial and industrial uses. [0] [0]

1559[0] 11. The utility uses described under the City’s Future

1569Land Use Element and its Land Development Regulations do meet

1579the definition of industrial uses in Florida Administrative Code

1588Rule 9J - 5.003(58). The public considers those utility uses to

1599be industrial uses.

160212. The unchallenged statements of the City’s “zoning

1610official” and Williams’ expert testimony establish that each

1618sign site is located on a p arcel of land designated for

1630commercial or industrial use under both the Future Land Use Map

1641of the City’s Comprehensive Plan and the City’s Land Development

1651Regulations adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes

1659(200 3 ) . 1

166413. John Garner’s contenti on that the uses authorized

1673under the “Utility” designation are not commercial or industrial

1682uses is not consistent with the land use planning principles or

1693land use classification systems used as the basis for

1702comprehensive planning in Florida. Garner ha s misapprehended

1710the nature and patterns of industrial development in Florida.

1719His description of industrial development is incorrect, to the

1728extent that Florida's industrial uses are of a less heavy and

1739dirty type typical of heavy industrial states and a re more

1750easily integrated with commercial and residential areas.

1757Security is an issue for industrial uses in some areas of the

1769state, and they are fenced in, but this is not common in the

1782current development of industrial parks, where security is

1790provided at the building, not the roads or perimeter. Though

1800providing a general description of the nature of industrial uses

1810in Florida that emphasized controlled access, heavy traffic , and

1819the like, Garner acknowledged that industrial uses can be stand

1829alone lo cations on a single lot.

183614. Comprehensive planning in Florida is accomplished

1843under Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. The general purpose of the

1853future land use element of a comprehensive plan is to reflect

1864the local government’s long - range vision of how a community

1875should develop and where certain uses are going to develop.

1885From a planning standpoint, it is inappropriate to direct

1894Respondent to review comprehensive plans and land development

1902regulations to identify permitted uses on a parcel, but ignore

1912technical planning and zoning principles in favor of lay

1921definitions. Respondent works closely with the Department of

1929Community Affairs and should be consistent in how it applies

1939planning principles.

1941Respondent’s Uniform Interpretation of S ubs ection 479.0 1(3),

1950Florida Statutes

195215. According to Garner, Respondent interprets the terms

1960“commercial or industrial use” found in S ubs ection 479.01(3),

1970Florida Statutes, as those words are “commonly understood,”

1979rather than as applied in land development regulation s. Garner

1989uses the layman’s everyday interpretation of the term

"1997industrial" when applying the term. Respondent has a uniform

2006interpretation of S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, under

2015which it utilizes an everyday lay definition of commercial or

2025in dustrial zone, rather than a technical planning and zoning

2035approach. Garner’s opinion that the sign sites were not

2044designated as industrial uses was based on this uniform

2053interpretation. That interpretation is not reflected in Florida

2061Administrative Code Chapter 14 - 10.

2067Commercial or Industrial Zoning Not Enacted Primarily to Permit

2076Signs

207716. The testimony of Petitioner’s expert witness is

2085persuasive that the commercial or industrial zoning of the

2094proposed sign sites was not enacted primarily to permit si gns.

2105According to Garner, Fl orid a Admin istrative Code Rule 14 -

211710.0052(2)(a) is not triggered if commercial or industrial uses

2126are the primary permitted uses. There is no problem under that

2137portion of the rule if the allowed uses for a parcel are

2149commerci al or industrial in nature. Similarly, Fl orida

2158Admin istrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2)(b) is not triggered if

2169commercial or industrial uses are the primary permitted uses.

217817. T he industrial uses authorized under the City’s Future

2188Land Use Map and its Lan d Development Regulations are primary

2199permitted uses and not incidental to other primary uses or

2209permitted only by variance or special exception. S uch uses are

2220expressly permitted under the City’s Comprehensive Plan and Land

2229Development Regulations.

223118. As applied by Respondent, in order for zoning of a

2242parcel to run afoul of Fl orid a Admin istrative Code Rule 14 -

225610.0052(2)(c) , both factors in that portion of the rule must

2266exist; that is, both the physical dimensions or other attributes

2276of the affected parc el would not reasonably accommodate

2285traditional commercial or industrial uses and the area

2293surrounding the affected parcel is not predominantly commercial

2301or industrial.

23031 9 . Williams e [0] valuated whether the dimensions or other

2315attributes of the parcels wou ld accommodate traditional

2323industrial uses and [0] concluded that traditional commercial and

2332industrial uses could be accommodated on the parcels. His

2341conclusions are persuasive. There are many possible commercial

2349or industrial uses that can be accommodated on all of the

2360parcels at issue in this case, including warehousing, equipment

2369storage yards, material storage yards , and small manufacturing

2377facilities. The utility uses designated for these parcels are

2386one of the types of industrial uses that could be a ccommodated

2398on these parcels. However, regardless of that fact, a full

2408range of industrial uses, including warehousing, manufacturing

2415facilities , and storage facilities, can be accommodated on these

2424parcels.

242520 . The sizes or configurations of these parce ls do not

2437preclude their development for commercial and industrial uses in

2446the traditional sense. Lots in the 50 to 60 - foot range can

2459accommodate traditional commercial and industrial uses,

2465including regular warehouses, fabrication yards, contractor

2471yards , equipment yards , and material yards. A review of the

2481City's L and D evelopment R egulations shows that there are no

2493restrictions that would prevent industrial uses on these

2501parcels.

250221 . It is not unusual to see industrial development on

2513parcels the size a nd shape of those on which the signs are

2526proposed to be located. Many of these parcels are actually

2536quite large in size. They are oddly configured as a result of

2548platting and construction of roads, but not so oddly configured

2558that they couldn't be develo ped for commercial or industrial

2568uses.

256922 . Garner offered the opinion that none of the parcels

2580upon which the sign sites were located would accommodate

2589traditional industrial uses. However, Garner has had no direct

2598experience in the ownership, proposal, permitting, development

2605or operation of any commercial or industrial development in

2614Florida.

261523 . Garner was of the opinion that three of the parcels

2627had size or shape problems, but admitted that the other parcels

2638were large enough to physically accommodat e industrial

2646development. Garner admitted that essentially all of the

2654parcels could be fenced for security and access control.

266324 . Ultimately, the princip al basis for Garner’s position

2673that the parcels would not accommodate traditional industrial

2681devel opment was that it is not “appropriate” for industrial uses

2692to obtain their access through residential streets. He

2700testified that all but one parcel (containing Site No. 48 - 1)

2712currently obtains access exclusively through residential

2718streets. However, Gar ner did not know how much industrial

2728development in Florida actually uses access through residential

2736streets and was not personally familiar with actions of local

2746zoning officials on requests by industrial developers to have

2755access through residential stre ets.

276025 . In order to determine whether these parcels can

2770accommodate traditional commercial or industrial uses, it is

2778necessary to consider the development history of Port St. Lucie,

2788and platting by General Development Corporation, in the 1960's,

2797that res t ricted the size and location of lots within the City.

2810There are differences in typical commercial and industrial

2818development in a rural versus urban/city setting. In a city,

28282,000 square - f oo t lots are developable and are highly desirable.

2842Commercial an d industrial development can be found on lots as

2853small as 30 feet wide, due to past platting, but commercial or

2865industrial development on 50 - foot lots is fairly standard.

287526 . A review of the City’s Future Land Use Map shows that

2888many existing commercial a nd industrial areas in the City have

2899their access through residential areas. Preexisting plats

2906prohibit access in any other way. [0] The reason that the City

2918does not restrict access for industrial uses through residential

2927areas is that the prior plats by G eneral Development limited how

2939the community could grow.

294327 . Garner was not aware of any restriction under City

2954codes that would restrict industrial development from using

2962residential streets for access. He was not aware of any

2972restriction that would pre vent access for an industrial use from

2983using residential streets, or whether the City has any problem

2993with a developer bringing industrial traffic through a

3001residential area.

300328 . In fact, there are no restrictions under the City’s

3014Land Development Regulat ions against industrial uses having

3022their access through residential areas. The reason that there

3031are no such restrictions is revealed through the City’s Future

3041Land Use Element. The City’s Future Land Use Element shows that

3052the City is trying to increas e its commercial/industrial

3061acreage, provide jobs and employment opportunities and deal with

3070the plats and roads its been given. The General Development

3080plat and the extension of the interstate and turnpike system

3090have seriously constrained how the commun ity can develop. The

3100City’s Future Land Use Element recognizes that there is

3109insufficient commercial and industrial development in the City

3117and attempts to increase that through the planning process.

312629 . The commercial or industrial zoning of the parce ls was

3138not enacted primarily to permit signs.

3144CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3147Standing, Jurisdiction , and Parties

315130 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

3159jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties hereto,

3169pursuant to the provisions of S ection 120. 569 and S ubsection

3181120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2006 ) .

318731. P etitioner’s applications are governed by the

3195provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Florida

3203Administrative Code Chapter 14 - 10. The issues in this case are

3215whether Petitioner’s applica tions comply with the requirements

3223of Section 479.111, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative

3231Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2).

323632. With the exception of compliance with Section 479.111,

3245Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14 -

325410.0052(2), which are the contested issues in this case, the

3264applications submitted by Petitioner comply with the

3271requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Florida

3279Administrative Code Chapter 14 - 10.

3285Sign Sites Within Commercial or Industrial Zone

329233. Section 479.111, Florida Statutes, provides that signs

3300in commercial - zoned and industrial - zoned areas or commercial -

3312unzoned and industrial - unzoned areas may be permitted within

3322certain areas along the interstate and federal - aid primary

3332highway system .

333534. Sectio n 479.111, Florida Statutes, entitled “Specified

3343signs allowed within controlled portions of the interstate and

3352federal - aid primary highway system,” provides:

3360Only the following signs shall be allowed

3367within controlled portions of the interstate

3373highway sy stem and the federal - aid primary

3382highway system as set forth in s. 479.11(1)

3390and (2):

3392(1) Directional or other official signs

3398and notices which conform to 23 C.F.R. ss.

3406750.151 - 750.155.

3409(2) Signs in commercial - zoned and

3416industrial - zoned areas or co mmercial - unzoned

3425and industrial - unzoned areas and within 660

3433feet of the nearest edge of the right - of -

3444way, subject to the requirements set forth

3451in the agreement between the state and the

3459United States Department of Transportation.

3464(3) Signs for which permits are not

3471required under s. 479.16.

34753 5 . As the proposed signs are neither directional or other

3487official signs, and the record does not show them to be exempt,

3499the relevant language of the above statute is found in

3509subsection (2).

35113 6 . S ubs ection 479 .01(3), Florida Statutes, defines

"3522commercial or industrial zone" as a parcel of land designated

3532for commercial or industrial use under both the future land use

3543map of the comprehensive plan and the land use development

3553regulations adopted pursuant to chap ter 163.

35603 7 . S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, provides:

3570“Commercial or industrial zone" means a

3576parcel of land designated for commercial or

3583industrial use under both the future land

3590use map of the comprehensive plan and the

3598land use development reg ulations adopted

3604pursuant to chapter 163. If a parcel is

3612located in an area designated for multiple

3619uses on the future land use map of a

3628comprehensive plan and the land development

3634regulations do not clearly designate that

3640parcel for a specific use, the a rea will be

3650considered an unzoned commercial or

3655industrial area if it meets the criteria of

3663subsection (23).

36653 8 . Based on the facts established above, it is determined

3677that the sites upon which the proposed sign structures will be

3688erected are all located in commercial or industrial zoned areas

3698within the meaning of S ubs ection 479.01(3) and Section 479.111,

3709Florida Statutes. The unchallenged and uncontroverted

3715statements of the City’s “zoning official” and Williams’ expert

3724testimony establish that each sig n site is located on a parcel

3736of land designated for commercial or industrial use under both

3746the Future Land Use Map of the City’s Comprehensive Plan and the

3758City’s Land Use Development Regulations adopted pursuant to

3766Chapter 163, Florida Statutes.

3770The Dep artment’s Unadopted Rule

37753 9 . The facts establish that Respondent’s decision in this

3786case relies on an interpretation of the terms found in

3796S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, as those words are

3806“commonly understood,” rather than as they are understood under

3816the planning and zoning concepts used for comprehensive planning

3825in Florida. Respondent has a uniform interpretation of

3833S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, under which it utilizes

3843an everyday lay definition of commercial or industrial zone,

3852rat her than a technical planning and zoning approach. That

3862interpretation is not reflected in Florida Administrative Code

3870Chapter 14 - 10. This uniform interpretation of S ubs ection

3881479.01(3), Florida Statutes, meets the definition of a “rule”

3890within the mean ing of S ubs ection 120.52(15), Florida Statutes,

3901in that it is a statement of general applicability that

3911interprets law.

391340 . S ubs ection 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, defines the

3923term “rule” as meaning:

3927[E] ach agency statement of general

3933applicability that implements, interprets,

3937or prescribes law or policy or describes the

3945procedure or practice requirements of a n

3952agency and includes any form which imposes

3959any requirement or solicits any information

3965not specifically required by statutes or by

3972an existing rul e. The term also includes

3980the amendment or repeal of a rule.

39874 1 . Because this interpretation is not reflected in the

3998provisions of any rule of Respondent, it is an “unadopted rule”

4009within the meaning of S ubs ection 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes.

40194 2 . S u bs ection 120.57(1)(e), Florida Statutes, states:

4030(e)1. Any agency action that determines

4036the substantial interests of a party and

4043that is based on an unadopted rule is

4051subject to de novo review by an

4058administrative law judge.

40612. The agency action shall not be

4068presumed valid or invalid. The agency must

4075demonstrate that the unadopted rule:

4080a. Is within the powers, functions, and

4087duties delegated by the Legislature or, if

4094the agency is operating pursuant to

4100authority derived from the State

4105Cons titution, is within that authority;

4111b. Does not enlarge, modify, or

4117contravene the specific provisions of law

4123implemented;

4124c. Is not vague, establishes adequate

4130standards for agency decisions, or does not

4137vest unbridled discretion in the agency ;

4143d. Is not arbitrary or capricious. A

4150rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by

4159logic or the necessary facts; a rule is

4167capricious if it is adopted without thought

4174or reason or is irrational;

4179e. Is not being applied to the

4186substantially aff ected party without due

4192notice; and

4194f. Does not impose excessive regulatory

4200costs on the regulated person, county, or

4207city.

42083. The recommended and final orders in

4215any proceeding shall be governed by the

4222provisions of paragraphs (k) and (l), exc ept

4230that the administrative law judge's

4235determination regarding the unadopted rule

4240shall not be rejected by the agency unless

4248the agency first determines from a review of

4256the complete record, and states with

4262particularity in the order, that such

4268determinat ion is clearly erroneous or does

4275not comply with essential requirements of

4281law. In any proceeding for review under s.

4289120.68, if the court finds that the agency's

4297rejection of the determination regarding the

4303unadopted rule does not comport with the

4310provis ions of this subparagraph, the agency

4317action shall be set aside and the court

4325shall award to the prevailing party the

4332reasonable costs and a reasonable attorney's

4338fee for the initial proceeding and the

4345proceeding for review.

43484 3 . The burden rests on Respo ndent to demonstrate, among

4360other things, that the unadopted rule does not enlarge, modify,

4370or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented ; is not

4380vague ; establishes adequate standards for agency decisions ; or

4388does not vest unbridled discretion i n the agency. Respondent

4398has not met its burden.

44034 4 . Respondent’s interpretation of S ubs ection 479.01(3),

4413Florida Statutes, which applies an everyday layman’s or “common”

4422understanding to the statutory language “designated for

4429commercial or industrial us e,” is inconsistent both with the

4440express language of the statute, with the definition of

4449“commercial or industrial zones” in 23 C.F.R. Section

4457750.703(a), and with the Federal acceptance of State zoning,

4466reflected in 23 C.F.R. Section 750.708.

44724 5 . In S ub s ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, the Florida

4485L egislature has directed Respondent to look directly to land use

4496designations under the local government comprehensive plans and

4504land use development regulations adopted pursuant to

4511Chapter 163, Florida Sta tutes. The highly technical and

4520specialized process of designating land uses under comprehensive

4528plans and land use development regulations relies on long -

4538accepted planning and zoning principles, not lay

4545interpretations.

45464 6 . Chapter 163, Florida Statutes , has been described as

4557“set[ting] forth a comprehensive and complex process for the

4566adoption and amendment of comprehensive plans.” Seminole County

4574v. City of Winter Springs , 935 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA

45872006). Some aspects of the analysis are so c omplex that the

4599Department of Community Affairs can’t even adopt rules

4607addressing them. See Florida East Coast Industries Inc. v.

4616State, Dept. of Community Affairs , 677 So. 2d 35 7 , 361 (Fla. 1st

4629DCA 1996). See also Home Builders & Contractors Assoc. v.

4639D epartment of Community Affairs , 585 So. 2d 965, 969 (Fla. 1st

4651DCA 1991).

46534 7 . Florida Administrative Code Chapter 9J - 5 illustrates

4664the highly technical and complex nature of comprehensive

4672planning in Florida. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J - 5.003

4682sets forth 142 definitions, some very technical in nature,

4691reflecting the complex and highly specialized process of

4699comprehensive planning in Florida. Florida Administrative Code

4706Rule 9J - 5.005 alone sets forth numerous technical requirements

4716for the formulati on of a comprehensive plan.

472448 . It makes no sense for the Legislature, having directed

4735Respondent to look to the land use designations resulting from

4745this complex technical process, to also intend that Respondent

4754use a layman’s approach to those land uses , and ignore the

4765planning and zoning principles that underlay those very

4773designations. To the contrary, it would be inconsistent with

4782the legislative charge under S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida

4791Statutes, to do so.

47954 9 . Similarly, 23 C.F.R. Section 750.703( a) defines

4805“commercial and industrial zones” as " districts established by

4813the zoning authorities as being most appropriate for commerce,

4822industry or trade, no matter how labeled . ” 23 C.F.R. Section

4834750.708(a) recites Congress’ acceptance of state zoning b y

4843reciting, “ '[ t ] he States shall have full authority under their

4856own zoning laws to zones areas for commercial or industrial

4866purposes, and the actions of the States in this regard will be

4878accepted for the purposes of this Act. ' ” Twenty - three C.F.R.

4891Sectio n 750.708(b) requires that zoning action be taken pursuant

4901to and in accordance with the State’s enabling statute. The use

4912of a layman’s understanding of commercial or industrial uses, in

4922lieu of the planning and zoning principles used to designate

4932such u ses, defies this mandate of the Federal r egulations.

494350 . Respondent has failed to establish that its

4952interpretation of S ubs ection 479.01(3), Florida Statutes, does

4961not contravene that statute. The most appropriate and logical

4970interpretation of that statu te looks to accepted planning and

4980zoning concepts when evaluating whether a parcel of land has

4990been designated for commercial or industrial use under both the

5000future land use map of the comprehensive plan and the land use

5012development regulations adopted pu rsuant to Chapter 163, Florida

5021Statutes. Similarly, Respondent has not established that its

5029“common understanding” or " layman’s understanding” does not

5036result in a vague interpretation of the statute, as one man’s

5047view of commercial or industrial use is n ot necessarily

5057another’s, and the record does not show that there is a

5068unanimity of agreement among the general population as to what

5078those terms mean. At best, the record provides one man’s belief

5089as to what that agreement is, but without evidence t o sho w that

5103belief to be justified in fact.

5109Commercial or Industrial Zoning Not Enacted Primarily to Permit

5118Signs

51195 1 . S ubs ection 479.07(10), Florida Statutes, provides as

5130follows:

5131(10) Commercial or industrial zoning

5136which is not comprehensively enacted or

5142which is enacted primarily to permit signs

5149shall not be recognized as commercial or

5156industrial zoning for purposes of this

5162provision, and permits shall not be issued

5169for signs in such areas. The department

5176shall adopt rules within 180 days after this

5184act takes effect which shall provide

5190criteria to determine whether such zoning is

5197comprehensively enacted or enacted primarily

5202to permit signs.

52055 2 . Respondent adopted Florida Administrative Code

5213Rule 14 - 10.0052, pursuant to the foregoing statutory provisions .

5224That rule, entitled “ Zoning Enacted Primarily to Permit Outdoor

5234Advertising Signs ,” provides:

5238(1) “Comprehensively Enacted Zoning”

5242means ordinances or other laws adopted by

5249the county or municipal government

5254pertaining to and designating the currentl y

5261allowable uses of property within its

5267jurisdiction, pursuant to and consistent

5272with a comprehensive plan enacted in

5278accordance with Chapter 163, Florida

5283Statutes.

5284(2) Even if comprehensively enacted, the

5290following criteria, including public records

5295re lated thereto, shall be considered in

5302determining whether such zoning is enacted

5308primarily to permit signs:

5312(a) The land use or zoning designation

5319provides for limited commercial or

5324industrial activity only as an incident to

5331other primary land uses.

5335( b) The commercial and industrial

5341activities, separately or together, are

5346permitted only by variance or special

5352exceptions.

5353(c) The physical dimensions or other

5359attributes of the affected parcel would not

5366reasonably accommodate traditional

5369commercial or industrial uses and the area

5376surrounding the affected parcel is not

5382predominantly commercial or industrial.

53865 3 . As a rule adopted pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida

5398Statutes, to implement S ubs ection 479.07(10), Florida Statutes,

5407F lorida Administrative C ode Rule 14 - 10.0052 is binding on

5419Respondent. Parrot Heads v. Dep’t. of Bus. Reg . , 741 So. 2d

54311231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999 ) ; Marrero v. Dep’t. of Professional

5442Reg . , 622 So. 2d 1109, 1 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

54545 4 . The parties have stipulated that the zoning of the

5466parcels upon which the proposed sign structures will be erected

5476was comprehensively enacted zoning within the meaning of Florida

5485Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(1). The zoning of those

5495parcels will therefore be recognized as commercial or industri al

5505zoning for purposes of S ubs ections 479.01(3) and 479.111(2),

5515Florida Statutes, and permits may be issued for signs in such

5526areas, unless the zoning was enacted primarily to permit signs.

55365 5 . The facts establish that the zoning of the parcels

5548upon whi ch the proposed sign structures will be erected was not

5560enacted primarily to permit signs. The criteria of F lorida

5570Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2)(a) and (2)(b) are not

5580triggered, because the commercial or industrial activity

5587authorized on these p arcels are permitted uses under the City’s

5598Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Regulations.

5604Accordingly, the land use and zoning of the parcels does not

5615provide for limited commercial or industrial activity only as an

5625incident to other primary land us es and are not permitted only

5637by variance or special exceptions.

56425 6 . As stipulated by the parties and as testified to by

5655Garner, when applying F lorida Administrative Code Rule 14 -

566510.0052(2)(c), zoning is enacted primarily to permit signs only

5674when both of the stated conditions exist ; that is, both the

5685physical dimensions or other attributes of the affected parcel

5694would not reasonably accommodate traditional commercial or

5701industrial uses and the area surrounding the affected parcel is

5711not predominantly comm ercial or industrial.

57175 7 . The facts establish that one of the two conditions of

5730F lorida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2)(c) does not

5740exist, in that the physical dimensions or other attributes of

5750the affected parcels would reasonably accommodate trad itional

5758commercial or industrial uses. Therefore, the criteria of

5766F lorida Administrative Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2)(c) are not

5776triggered and that portion of the rule will not support a

5787determination that the zoning of the parcels upon which the

5797proposed sign structures will be erected was enacted primarily

5806to permit signs.

58095 8 . None of the criteria of F lorida Administrative Code

5821Rule 14 - 10.0052 having been triggered, the zoning of the parcels

5833where the signs are to be erected was not enacted primarily to

5845perm it signs and, thus, is recognized as commercial or

5855industrial zoning for purposes of S ubs ections 479.07(10) and

5865479.111(2), Florida Statutes, and permits may be i ssued for

5875signs in such areas.

58795 9 . Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that

5890Petitioner’s applications comply with the requirements of

5897Section 479.111, Florida Statutes, and F lorida Administrative

5905Code Rule 14 - 10.0052(2) and should be granted.

5914RECOMMENDATION

5915Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

5924of Law, it is hereby

5929RECOMMEN DED that Respondent enter a final order granting

5938the 14 applications (application numbers 54481 through 54494)

5946for outdoor advertising sign permits submitted by Petitioner.

5954DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January , 2007 , in

5964Tallahassee, Leon County, Florid a.

5969S

5970DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

5973Administrative Law Judge

5976Division of Administrative Hearings

5980The DeSoto Building

59831230 Apalachee Parkway

5986Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

5991(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

5999Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

6005www.doah.state.fl.us

6006Filed with the Clerk of the

6012Division of Administrative Hearings

6016this 3rd day of January , 2007 .

6023ENDNOTE

60241/ All references to Florida Statutes are to Florida

6033Statutes (2003), unless otherwise indicated.

6038COPIES FURNISHED :

6041Robert M . Burdick, Esquire

6046Department of Transportation

6049Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58

6055605 Suwannee Street

6058Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0458

6063Paul Sexton, Esquire

6066Williams Wilson & Sexton, P.A.

6071215 South Monroe Street, Suite 600 - A

6079Tallahassee, Florida 3230 2

6083James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings

6090Department of Transportation

6093Haydon Burns Building

6096605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58

6102Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450

6107Pamela Leslie, General Counsel

6111Department of Transportation

6114Haydon Burns Building

6117605 S uwannee Street, Mail Station 58

6124Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450

6129Denver Stutler, Secretary

6132Department of Transportation

6135Haydon Burns Building

6138605 Suwannee Street

6141Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0450

6146NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

6152All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15

6163days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to

6174this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will

6185issu e the final order in this case.

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
PDF
Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2007
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 02/14/2007
Proceedings: Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/03/2007
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 01/03/2007
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held October 4, 2006). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 01/03/2007
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 11/20/2006
Proceedings: Clear Channel`s Motion for Leave to File Proposed Recommended Order Out of Time filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/17/2006
Proceedings: Proposed Recommended Order of Respondent, Department of Transportation filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/17/2006
Proceedings: Clear Channel`s Proposed Recommended Order.
PDF:
Date: 11/17/2006
Proceedings: Notice of Filing of Clear Channel`s Proposed Recommended Order.
Date: 10/18/2006
Proceedings: Final Hearing Transcript filed.
Date: 10/04/2006
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 09/27/2006
Proceedings: Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/11/2006
Proceedings: Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/18/2006
Proceedings: Certificate of Service filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/17/2006
Proceedings: Clear Channel`s Response to the Department`s First Request for Admissions filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/26/2006
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for October 4, 2006; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 07/19/2006
Proceedings: Motion for Continuance filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/13/2006
Proceedings: Request for Admissions filed.
PDF:
Date: 07/07/2006
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 07/07/2006
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for August 29, 2006; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 06/30/2006
Proceedings: Joint Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/22/2006
Proceedings: Amended Notice of Denied Application (7) filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/22/2006
Proceedings: Notice of Denied Application filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/22/2006
Proceedings: Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/22/2006
Proceedings: Agency referral filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/22/2006
Proceedings: Initial Order.

Case Information

Judge:
DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
Date Filed:
06/22/2006
Date Assignment:
06/22/2006
Last Docket Entry:
02/14/2007
Location:
Tampa, Florida
District:
Middle
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (9):