07-004765 Southern Insight, Inc. vs. Department Of Financial Services, Division Of Workers' Compensation Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, July 1, 2008.

Summary: Upon the facts presented, a penalty was owed by the non-exempt contractor, but the new calculation was in order.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL )

SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' )

COMPENSATION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 07-4765

)

SOUTHERN INSIGHT, INC., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Upon due notice, a disputed-fact hearing was held in this

case on April 3, 2008, in Bunnell, Florida, before Ella Jane P.

Davis, a duly-assigned Administrative Law Judge of the Division

of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Anthony B. Miller, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

Division of Workers' Compensation

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229

For Respondent: John Cauley, President

Southern Insight, Inc.

Post Office Box 2592

Bunnell, Florida 32110

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent Corporation, Southern Insight, Inc., failed to secure payment of workers' compensation coverage as

required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida

Insurance Code, and if so, whether the Department of Financial

Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Department) has

lawfully assessed the penalty against Respondent in the amount

of $27,805.11.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By an August 17, 2007, Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty

Assessment (Stop-Work Order), the Department alleged that

Respondent had failed to secure the payment of workers'

compensation as that term is defined in Section 440.107(2),

Florida Statutes. On August 22, 2007, the Department issued and

served an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of

$27,805.11.

Respondent timely requested a disputed-fact hearing, and

on October 17, 2007, the cause was referred to the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

The case was originally scheduled for December 12, 2007.

On December 7, 2007, a continuance was granted at the request of

the Department. On January 29, 2008, an Order was entered

denying the Department's Motion to Deem Matters Admitted and

Motion to Dismiss and re-scheduling final hearing for April 3,

2008.

At final hearing on April 3, 2008, the style of this cause

was amended to reflect the burden of proof, as set out above.

The Department presented the testimony of Department

Investigator Lynise Beckstrom and John Cauley, Respondent's

President, and had 14 exhibits admitted in evidence. Respondent

had two exhibits admitted in evidence.

A Transcript was filed with DOAH on April 8, 2008. The

parties were required to file proposed recommended orders by

April 28, 2008. The Department timely filed its Proposed

Recommended Order. Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order,

which was filed one day late, has also been considered.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Department is the state agency responsible for

enforcing Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, which requires that

employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage

for their employees and otherwise comply with the workers'

compensation coverage requirements under Chapter 440, Florida

Statutes.

2. Respondent has been a Florida corporation, actively

involved in the construction industry providing framing

services, during the period of February 16, 2006, through August

17, 2007 (assessed penalty period). At all times material,

Respondent has been an "employer," as defined by Chapter 440,

Florida Statutes. At all times material, John Cauley has been

Respondent's president and sole employee. At no time material

did Respondent obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage

for John Cauley.

3. On August 17, 2007, Department Investigator Lynise

Beckstrom conducted a random workers' compensation compliance

check of a new home construction site in Palm Coast, Florida.

At that time, Ms. Beckstrom observed four men, including John

Cauley, framing a new home.

4. Utilizing the Department's Compliance and Coverage

Automated System (CCAS) database, which contains all workers'

compensation insurance policy information from the carrier to an

insured and which further lists all the workers' compensation

exemptions in the State of Florida, Ms. Beckstrom determined

that for the assessed penalty period, Respondent did not have in

effect either a State of Florida workers' compensation insurance

policy or a valid, current exemption for its employee, John

Cauley.

5. During the assessed penalty period, Respondent paid

remuneration to its employee, John Cauley.

6. John Cauley admitted that during the assessed penalty

period he was not an independent contractor, as that term is

defined in Section 440.02(15)(d)(1), Florida Statutes.

7. Section 440.05, Florida Statutes, allows a corporate

officer to apply for a construction certificate of exemption

from workers' compensation benefits. Only the named individual

on the application is exempt from workers' compensation

insurance coverage. On or about April 15, 2006, John Cauley, as

Respondent's President, applied for such an exemption. That

application was denied. Mr. Cauley received neither an

exemption card nor a denial of exemption from the Department.

8. During the assessed penalty period, Respondent was a

subcontractor of the contractor, Mass Builders, Inc.

9. Sections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida

Statutes, authorize the Department to issue stop-work orders to

employers unable to provide proof of workers' compensation

coverage, including proof of a current, valid workers'

compensation exemption.

10. Based on the lack of workers' compensation coverage

and lack of a current, valid workers' compensation exemption for

Respondent corporation's employee, John Cauley, the Department

served on Respondent a stop-work order on August 17, 2007. The

stop-work order ordered Respondent to cease all business

operation for all worksites in the State of Florida.

11. Immediately upon notification by Investigator

Beckstrom of his lack of valid exemption, Mr. Cauley submitted a

new exemption application, which was granted, bringing

Respondent corporation into compliance. However, in order to

have the stop-work order lifted so that he can work as a

corporation again, Mr. Cauley must pay a percentage of the

penalty assessment and enter into a payment plan with the

Agency. In the meantime, Mr. Cauley cannot pay the percentage

required by the Department if he cannot find work as someone

else's employee, which he had been unable to do as of the date

of the hearing. Herein, it is not disputed that Respondent was

inadvertently out of compliance. Mr. Cauley seeks merely to

reduce the amount of the penalty assessment so that removal of

the stop-work order against Respondent corporation can be

negotiated.

12. On the day the stop-work order was issued,

Investigator Beckstrom also served Respondent with a "Request

for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment

Calculation," in order to determine a penalty under Section

440.107(7), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Florida

Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015, the Department may request

business records for the three years preceding the date of the

stop-work order. Logically, however, Ms. Beckstrom only

requested business records dating back to February 14, 2006,

Respondent's date of incorporation in Florida. The requested

records included payroll, bank records, check stubs, invoices,

and other related business records. Ms. Beckworth testified

that, "Business records requests usually consist of payroll,

bank records, taxes, check stubs, invoices, anything relating to

that business." This is a fair summation of a much more

detailed listing of records required to be kept pursuant to Rule

69L-6.015, Florida Administrative Code, which was in effect at

all times material.

13. In response to the Request for Production, Respondent

provided Southern Insight Inc.'s corporate bank statements for

the assessed penalty period, detailing corporate income and

expenses through deposits and bank/debit card purchases.

14. However, Investigator Beckworth did not deem the

corporate bank statements produced by Respondent to be an

adequate response, and she did not base her calculations for

penalty purposes thereon.

15. Mr. Cauley expected that the Department would, and has

argued herein that the Department should, have subtracted from

the total deposits to Respondent's corporate account (the

minuend) the total corporate business expenses (the subtrahend)

in order to determine the Respondent's payroll to Mr. Cauley

(the difference), upon which difference the Department should

have calculated his workers' compensation penalty.

16. In fact, the Department, through its investigator, did

not utilize the total amount deposited to Respondent's corporate

account, because some deposits "could" have come from a family

member of Mr.Cauley. That said, there are no individual names

on the account; the account is clearly in the name of the

Respondent corporation; and there is no proof herein that any

deposits to Respondent's corporate bank account were derived

from anyone other than Mr. Cauley, as Respondent's President.

17. Ms. Beckstrom testified that if the Agency had

accepted the total of the deposits to this corporate account for

the assessed penalty period as Respondent's payroll, the result

would have been more than the total amount actually determined

by her to constitute Mr. Cauley's payroll, but that statement

was not demonstrated with any specificity.

18. The Department also did not use any of the subtracted

amounts shown on the corporate bank statements, even though the

bank statements listed the same information as would normally be

found on a corporate check , including the transaction number,

recipient of the money, the date, and the amount for each

bank/debit card transaction. All that might be missing is the

self-serving declaration of the check writer on the check stub

as to what object or service was purchased from the recipient

named on the bank statement.

19. Ms. Beckstrom testified that if Mr. Cauley had

provided separate receipts for the transactions recorded on the

bank statements as bank/debit card entries, she could have

deducted those amounts for business expenses from the

corporation's income, to arrive at a lesser payroll for

Mr. Cauley. In other words, if Mr. Cauley had provided separate

receipts as back-up for the transactions memorialized on the

corporate bank statements, the Department might have utilized

the bank/debit card transactions itemized on Respondent's

corporate bank statements as the amount deducted for Respondent

corporation's business expenses, so as to obtain the payroll

(difference) paid to Mr. Cauley.

20. It is the amount paid to Mr. Cauley as payroll, upon

which the Department must calculate the workers' compensation

penalty.

21. The reason Ms. Beckworth gave for not using

Respondent's bank statements was that without more, the

transactions thereon might not be business expenses of the

corporation. However, she also suggested that if, instead of

submitting bank/debit card statements, Mr. Cauley had submitted

checks payable to third parties and if those corporate checks

showed an expenditure for a deductible business expense, like

motor vehicle fuel, she might have accepted the same

expenditures in check form (rather than the statements) in

calculating Respondent's payroll.

22. Ultimately, Ms. Beckworth's only reasons for not

accepting the bank statements showing recipients, such as fuel

companies like Amoco, was "agency policy," and her speculation

that Amoco gas could have been put into a non-company truck or

car. She also speculated that a prohibition against using bank

statements showing deductions might possibly be found in the

basic manual of the National Council on Compensation Insurance

(NCCI) or in a rule on payrolls (Rule 69L-6.035) which became

effective October 10, 2007, after the assessed penalty period.

However, the NCCI manual was not offered in evidence; a rule in

effect after all times material cannot be utilized here; and no

non-rule policy to this effect was proven-up.

23. In addition to not using Respondent's bank statements

to calculate a penalty, the Department also did not "impute" the

statewide average weekly wage to Respondent for Mr. Cauley.

Ms. Beckworth testified that to impute the statewide average

weekly wage would have resulted in a higher penalty to

Respondent. As to the amount of the statewide average weekly

wage, she could only say she thought the statewide average

weekly wage was "about $1,000.00".

24. Instead of using Respondent's corporate bank

statements or imputing the statewide average weekly wage,

Investigator Beckstrom determined that Mass Builders, Inc., was

the prime contractor on the jobsite being worked by Respondent,

and that Mass Builders, Inc., had not produced proof of securing

workers' compensation coverage for Respondent, its sub-

contractor. Therefore, she sought, and received, Mass Builders,

Inc.'s "payroll records" of amounts paid by the prime

contractor, Mass Builders, Inc., to Respondent Southern Insight,

Inc., via a separate site-specific stop-work order and business

records request directed to Mass Builders, Inc. The only

"payroll records" that Mass Builders, Inc., offered in evidence

were Mass Builders, Inc.'s check stubs, which Ms. Beckstrom

utilized to come up with an income/payroll amount for Respondent

Southern Insight, Inc.

25. Mr. Cauley did not know until the hearing that Mass

Builders, Inc.'s check stubs had been utilized in this fashion

by the Department. However, he ultimately did not dispute the

accuracy of the check stubs and did not object to their

admission in evidence.

26. In calculating Respondent's total payroll for the

assessed penalty period, Investigator Beckstrom considered only

the total of the check stubs from Mass Builders, Inc. It is

unclear whether or not she reviewed Mass Builders, Inc.'s actual

cancelled checks. No one from Mass Builders, Inc., appeared to

testify that the stubs represented actual cancelled checks to

Respondent or Mr. Cauley. The Department also did not deduct

from the total of Mass Builders, Inc.'s check stubs any of the

bankcard deductions made by John Cauley from Respondent's

corporate bank account, for the same reasons set out above.

27. Mr. Cauley testified, without refutation, that some of

the expenses noted on Respondent's bank statements, paid by

bank/debit card, most notably expenses for gasoline for his

truck, constituted legitimate business expenses of Respondent

corporation, which should have been deducted from either the

bank statement's total income figure or from the amounts paid by

Mass Builders, Inc., to Respondent corporation, before any

attempt was made by the Department to calculate the amount paid

by Respondent corporation to Mr. Cauley as payroll.

28. Utilizing the SCOPES Manual, which has been adopted by

Department rule, Ms. Beckstrom assigned the appropriate class

code, 5645, to the type of work (framing) performed by

Respondent.

29. In completing the penalty calculation, Ms. Beckstrom

multiplied the class code's assigned approved manual rate by the

payroll (as she determined it) per one hundred dollars, and then

multiplied all by 1.5, arriving at an Amended Order of Penalty

Assessment of $27,805.11, served on Respondent on August 22,

2007.

30. Subsequent to the filing of its request for a

disputed-fact hearing, in an effort to have the penalty reduced,

Respondent provided the Department with additional business

records in the form of portions of Southern Insight, Inc.'s 2006

and 2007 U.S. Income Tax Returns for an S Corporation (2006 and

2007 income tax returns). However, neither itemized deductions

nor original receipts for Respondent's business expenses were

provided to Ms. Beckworth at the same time, and she determined

that without itemized deductions, there was no way to calculate

Respondent's legitimate business deductions so that they could

be deducted from the total of Mass Builders, Inc.'s, check stubs

to determine a lesser payroll applicable to Mr. Cauley.

31. Investigator Beckstrom testified that the tax returns,

as she received them, did not justify reducing Respondent's

payroll used in calculating the penalty. The vague basis for

this refusal was to the effect that, "The Internal Revenue

Service permits different business deductions than does the

Department."

32. Itemization pages (schedules) of Respondent's income

tax returns were not provided until the de novo disputed-fact

hearing. Confronted with these items at hearing, Ms. Beckworth

testified that ordinary business income is not used by the

Department to determine payroll, but that automobile and truck

expense and legitimate business expenses could be deducted, and

that she would probably accept some of the deductions on

Respondent's 1020-S returns. Also, if Respondent's bank

statement corresponded to the amount on the tax form, she could

possibly deduct some items on the bank statements as business

expenses before reaching a payroll amount. However, she made no

such calculations at hearing.

33. Ms. Beckworth testified that if she had Respondent's

checks or "something more" she could possibly deduct the motor

fuel amounts. Although Respondent's 2006, and 2007, income tax

returns reflected Respondent corporation's income minus several

types of business deductions, Ms. Beckstrom testified that the

tax deductions were not conclusive of the workers' compensation

deductions, because the Internal Revenue Service allows certain

deductions not permissible for workers' compensation purposes,

but she did not further elaborate upon which tax deductions

were, or were not, allowable under any Department rule. She did

not "prove up" which deductions were not valid for workers'

compensation purposes.

34. Respondent's 2006, tax deductions for "automobile and

truck expense" were $2,898.00, and for 2007, were $4,010.00.

There was no further itemization by Respondent within these

categories for fuel. Other business deductions on the tax

returns were also listed in categories, but without any further

itemization. The only supporting documentation for the tax

returns admitted in evidence was Respondent's bank statements.

Respondent believed that the tax returns and possibly other

documentation had been submitted before hearing by his

accountant. It had not been submitted.

35. The Department never credibly explained why it

considered a third party's check stubs (not even the third

party's cancelled checks) more reliable than Respondent's bank

statements or federal tax returns. Even so, at hearing, the

Department declined to utilize the business deductions itemized

on Respondent's tax forms or any bank/debit card deductions on

its bank statements so as to diminish the amount arrived-at via

the Mass Builders, Inc.'s check stubs, and ultimately to arrive

at a difference which would show a lesser payroll to Mr. Cauley.

36. Although Mr. Cauley's questions to Ms. Beckstrom

suggested that he would like at least all of the fuel company

deductions on his bank statements to be considered as business

deductions of Respondent Southern Insight, Inc., and for those

fuel company expenditures to be subtracted from either the total

deposits to the corporate bank account or deducted from the

payroll total as calculated by Ms. Beckstrom from Mass Builders,

Inc.'s check stub total, he did not testify with clarity as to

which particular debits/charges on the bank statements fell in

this category. Nor did he relate, with any accuracy, the

debits/charges on the bank statements to the corporate tax

returns.

37. Upon review by the undersigned of Respondent's bank

statements admitted in evidence, it is found that the bulk of

Respondent's bank/debit card deductions during the assessed

penalty period were cash withdrawals or ATM debits which cannot

be identified as being paid to fuel companies or purveyors of

construction material. As Investigator Beckstrom legitimately

observed, "Big Al's Bait" is not a likely source of motor fuel.

"Publix" and "Outback Steak House" are likewise unlikely sources

of fuel or construction material, and cannot stand alone,

without some other receipt to support them, as a legitimate

corporate business entertainment expense. Other debits/charges

on the bank statements are similarly non-complying, ambiguous,

or defy categorization.

38. However, the undersigned has been able to isolate on

the corporate bank statements purchases from the known fuel

distributors "Amoco" and "Chevron" on the following dates:

7/09/07, 7/10/07, 6/04/07, 6/04/07, 6/11/07, 5/03/07/ 4/09/07,

4/10/07, 4/13/07, 4/16/07, 3/02/07, 3/05/07, 3/13/07, 3/15/07,

3/20/07, 1/29/07, 5/01/06, 6/02/06, 8/02/06, 11/03/06, totaling

$556.98.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

39. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause,

pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes

(2007).

40. As reflected by the amended style above, the

Department has the duty to go forward and the burden to prove,

by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated the

workers' compensation law during the relevant period and that

the penalty assessment is correct. Department of Banking and

Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection v.

Osborne Stern Inc. , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996); L and W

Plastering and Drywall Services, Inc., v. Department of

Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation , Case No.

06-3261 (DOAH, March 16, 2007).

41. There has never been any real dispute over the

Department's jurisdiction; that John Cauley was the sole, non-

exempt corporate officer/employee of Respondent during the

period from Respondent's incorporation up to the date of the

stop-work order; that the stop-work order was authorized by

statute; or that Respondent owes some amount of penalty for that

period. What is at issue herein is what formula should be

applied in order to calculate the penalty owed.

42. As to how the penalty is to be calculated, Section

440.107, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(7)(d)1. In addition to any penalty, stop-

work order, or injunction, the department

shall assess against any employer who has

failed to secure the payment of compensation

as required by this chapter a penalty equal

to 1.5 times the amount the employer would

have paid in premium when applying approved

manual rates to the employer's payroll

during periods for which it failed to secure

the payment of workers' compensation

required by this chapter within the

preceding 3-year period or $1,000, whichever

is greater.

* * *

(7)(e) When an employer fails to provide

business records sufficient to enable the

department to determine the employer's

payroll for the period requested for the

calculation of the penalty provided in

paragraph (d), for penalty calculation

purposes, the imputed weekly payroll for

each employee, corporate officer, sole

proprietor, or partner shall be the

statewide average weekly wage as defined in

s. 440.12(2) multiplied by 1.5.

43. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-

6.015, in effect at all times material, employers must at all

times maintain required records, including, but not limited to

"(4) Tax records. Every employer shall maintain all forms,

together with supporting records and schedules, filed with the

Internal Revenue Service." Employers also must produce those

records when requested by the Department. This Respondent did

not keep all the records required by the rule, but he produced,

or thought he had produced, what records he had.

44. The Department was tasked by Section 440.120 (7) (e),

with using the records that Respondent could produce to

calculate a penalty. If those records did not suffice, then the

Department was required to impute the statewide average weekly

wage.

45. Instead of complying with the statute, the Department

elected to get a third party's (Mass Builders, Inc.'s) records

and try to calculate Respondent's penalty that way.

46. The Department's heart may have been in the right

place, because there is at least speculation that if the

Department had used the deposits to Respondent's bank account

but not the deductions from that account for fuel, the penalty

assessed would have been higher than the off-statute method

used, and there also is minimal evidence that using the

statewide average weekly wage would have increased Respondent's

penalty above the off-statute method used, but the method of

using a third party prime contractor's check stubs was not

statutorily authorized.

47. A new computation of penalty is in order.

48. Liability herein has been accepted and proven by clear

and convincing evidence: the Department is entitled to its

penalty. Only damages (the penalty amount) is at issue. To

correctly assess that penalty, the Department must first attempt

to calculate a penalty according to law, using the bank

statements (all deposits and at least those fuel deductions

specifically culled out in Finding of Fact 38, as being clearly

payments for "motor fuel," the one business expense

Ms. Beckstrom was willing to recognize), and to the extent it

can use them, Respondent's tax returns, which as submitted at

hearing are now complete with schedules showing fuel costs and

other business deductions.

49. Given the sum of Ms. Beckstrom's testimony about the

Department being able to deduct at least Respondent's fuel costs

if the fuel costs are supported by cancelled checks, and the

failure of the Department to establish any distinction that

would render Respondent's bank/debit card transactions for fuel

less reliable than cancelled checks for fuel, it is concluded

that the Department should, at a minimum, have considered the

fuel costs described in Finding of Fact 38, and any other fuel

costs for which Respondent can produce some type of receipt.

50. Today, a bank/debit card transaction is the equivalent

of a check paid. Posting of a bank/debit card transaction to a

bank statement is the equivalent of a check clearing the bank,

and constitutes evidence that is, at a minimum, as credible as a

check stub and probably as credible as the cancelled check

itself. It also is axiomatic that today most people no longer

use checks to purchase motor vehicle fuel at the pump, and they

very rarely receive a separate receipt at the pump. There also

was no specific rule prohibiting the use of itemized bank

statements in effect at any time material. Moreover, if the

Department will accept a third party's check stubs without

supporting documentation and will accept Respondent's checks

without supporting receipts, it is inconsistent and unreasonable

to require Respondent to submit more than the detailed bank

statements submitted here.

51. Also, The Department has not drawn any distinction

that would render a third party's check stubs more reliable than

Respondent's deposits. Indeed, the Department has not

demonstrated that Mass Builders, Inc.'s check stubs, admitted

herein, constitute evidence of anything at all without some

predicate from the writer of the check stubs.

52. Beyond that, the income tax returns, now complete, may

or may not yield information for further deductions from

Respondent's total deposits.

53. Only if no calculation using these materials is

possible, may the Department impute the average weekly wage to

Respondent's Mr. Cauley.

54. In this case, the system sadly penalizes Mr. Cauley

for incorporating and for not working for someone else, which is

a proposition contrary to "The American Dream," but just as

incorporation is designed to insulate an individual from certain

types of liability, the complicated structure of Chapter 440, is

designed to protect those whom that individual might hire as

employees and those general contractors, like Mass Builders,

Inc., who might "sub-out" work to Southern Insight, Inc., in the

event Mr. Cauley, or one of his employees, suffers a

construction industry accident. Inadvertent though Mr. Cauley's

non-compliance was, the Department was obligated to protect him

and any potential employees he might hire.

55. Pursuant to Section 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes,

the Department may issue an order of conditional release from a

stop-work order upon a finding that the employer has complied

with the coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes,

and has agreed to remit periodic payments of the penalty

pursuant to a payment schedule agreement with the Department.

Considering the facts that no injuries addressed by workers'

compensation have befallen Mr. Cauley and that the Department

may be, in effect, "double-dipping" by pursuing another penalty

against Mass Builders, Inc., as well as against Respondent ( see

Finding of Fact 24) the instant case may be one that can be

settled. However, it is clear that at this stage, this case

should be returned to the Department for the calculations the

Department is best qualified to conduct.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department

of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, that

affirms the stop-work order and concludes that a penalty is

owed; that provides for a recalculation of penalty to be

completed, on the basis set out herein, within 30 days of the

final order; and that guarantees the Respondent Southern

Insight, Inc., a window of opportunity to request a Section

120.57 (1) disputed-fact hearing solely upon the recalculation.

DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2008, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

ELLA JANE P. DAVIS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1st day of July, 2008.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Anthony B. Miller, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

Division of Workers' Compensation

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229

John Cauley, President

Southern Insight, Inc.

Post Office Box 2592

Bunnell, Florida 32110

Honorable Alex Sink

Chief Financial Officer

Department of Financial Services

The Capitol, Plaza Level 11

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Daniel Sumner, General Counsel

Department of Financial Services

The Capitol, Plaza Level 11

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the final order in this case.