08-001438EC In Re: Jim Vandergrifft vs. * Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, November 17, 2008.

Summary: Petitioner did not prove that Respondent secured "special gain or loss" because proof showed that proposed ordinance applied to 522 properties in same area and he owned at most 2 parcels. It is not sufficient under case law to equate such private benefit.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

IN RE: JIM VANDERGRIFFT, ) Case No. 08-1438EC

)

Respondent. )

_______________________________ )

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice this matter came before P. Michael Ruff,

duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal proceeding and

hearing. The formal hearing was conducted in Daytona Beach,

Florida on July 29, 2008. The appearances were as follows:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Jennifer M. Erlinger, Esquire

James H. Peterson, III, Esquire

Advocate for the Commission on Ethics

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

For Respondent: Mark Herron, Esquire

Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A.

2618 Centennial Place

Post Office Box 15579

Tallahassee, Florida 32317

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE :

The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Jim Vandergrifft, the Respondent, as mayor of the City of New Smyrna Beach, voted on a matter which inured to his special private gain in violation of Section 112.3143(3),

Florida Statutes, by voting to postpone a vote on Proposed City

Ordinance 43-05. If enacted, the ordinance would have

established an "historic architecture overlay district" by

amendment to local land use regulations.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This proceeding arose when a complaint was filed with the

Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) alleging that Jim

Vandergrifft had violated the Code of Ethics for public officers

and employees. The Complaint was filed March 26, 2006. A

"Report of Investigation" was issued on January 25, 2007, with

the recommendation that no probable cause was present to believe

that Jim Vandergrifft had violated Section 112.3143(3)(a),

Florida Statutes.

The Commission rejected the recommendation of the Advocate

and found probable cause that Jim Vandergrifft, serving as Mayor

of the City of New Smyrna Beach at the times pertinent to this

Complaint, had violated the above statute by voting to postpone

a vote on a proposed city ordinance, Ordinance No. 43-05. A

public hearing was ordered to be held by the Commission in

accordance with Section 112.324(3), Florida Statutes. The case

was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and

ultimately the undersigned Administrative Law Judge for conduct

of a formal proceeding and hearing.

The cause came on for hearing, as noticed, on July 29,

2008. The parties entered into a Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation

which admitted certain facts which are depicted in that Pre-

Hearing Stiuplation and are included in this Recommended Order,

to the extent relevant. The Commission presented eight exhibits

which were admitted into evidence at the hearing. It also

presented the testimony of four witnesses: James L.

Vandergrifft, Frank B. Gummey, III, Chad Thomas Lingenfelter,

and Floyd Fulford. The Respondent presented three exhibits

which were admitted into evidence. The parties also stipulated

to the admission of an additional exhibit which was submitted

subsequent to the hearing.

Section 50-12 of the New Smyrna Beach City Code Ordinances

relating to historic building demolition was submitted as a

Joint Exhibit.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, a transcript of the

proceedings was ordered and the parties agreed to submit

proposed recommended orders, which were timely submitted on or

before September 19, 2008. The Proposed Recommended Orders have

been considered in the rendition of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Jim Vandergrifft was the Mayor of New Smyrna Beach at

times pertinent to this case. He had been mayor from 1995

through 2007, and prior to that time served as a city

commissioner from 1988 to 1995. He is subject to the

requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the

Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees.

2. A proposed city ordinance came before the New Smyrna

Beach City Commission for a vote, as proposed ordinance number

43-05. The vote was to be taken on February 14, 2006. The

Respondent voted to postpone enactment of the ordinance which

was designed to amend local land development regulations by

establishing an historic architectural overlay district. It

applied to a certain described territory within the City of New

Smyrna Beach. The purpose of the ordinance was to ensure that

new construction and renovations of current structures within

that historic overlay district would adhere to strict building

guidelines intended to maintain the historic character of the

area, by following historic design standards of the City of New

Smyrna Beach.

3. The guidelines concerning building and remodeling

structures in the historic district of New Smyrna Beach were

voluntary prior to the proposal of ordinance 43-05. The

ordinance was never enacted, however, so the guidelines for

building and remodeling in the subject territory in the City of

New Smyrna Beach remained voluntary.

4. At the time of the vote on February 14, 2006, the

Respondent had a pending contract for the purchase of property

located at 115 Washington Street, New Smyrna Beach, Florida.

The property was located in the area to be affected by the

above-referenced proposed ordinance. At the time of the vote on

February 14, 2006, the property was under contract and was not

actually in the title ownership of the Respondent. He closed

his purchase of the property and completed it on February 15,

2006. At the time of the purchase a dilapidated 15-room hotel

was located on the property. The hotel was in very bad

condition. The roof was in the process of collapse and it was

dangerous to walk on the second floor for risk of falling

through. The wiring was antiquated and in poor condition, and

the building had no central heating system.

5. At the time of the vote on February 14, 2006, the

Respondent owned his personal residence, also located in the

area affected by the ordinance. Because his residence was new

it would not have affected by the subject architectural

standards ordinance. Mr. Vandergrifft disclosed that he lived

in his residence and owned other property in the district,

encompassed by ordinance 43-05, at the city commission meeting

of February 14, 2006. The Respondent did not abstain from

voting on that date, but publicly disclosed that he lived

downtown and owned other properties in the affected area.

6. The Respondent had sought advice from the city attorney

prior to the vote on February 14, 2006, concerning whether he

would have a voting conflict if he voted on the ordinance. He

told the city attorney that he lived in and had other property

in the district to which the ordinance would apply if enacted.

He did not actually inform the city attorney of his impending

purchase of the property located at 115 Washington Street (the

hotel site). The city attorney advised him that as an elected

official he had an obligation to vote on the ordinance.

7. According to the city attorney's testimony the

Respondent indicated that he lived downtown and had other

property in the area of the ordinance's applicability and

inquired whether he could vote on the ordinance. Based on his

understanding of the district covered by the ordinance, the city

attorney advised Mr. Vandergrifft that he could vote on the

matter. The city attorney reasoned that under existing law,

Mr. Vandergrifft's ownership interest was less than one percent

of the properties being affected by the vote, therefore

Mr. Vandergrifft could vote on the ordinance. According to the

city attorney's testimony: ". . . practically every land use

vote that a member of the governing body makes could affect that

person's property one way or the other. But, they're . . .

required to live in the city to qualify for office . . . so

obviously their votes affect their property. The question is

whether it is a special private gain."

8. The proposed ordinance 43-05 would have affected 522

parcels of property within its territorial area. If the

Respondent had an ownership interest in two properties, his

residence and the property at 115 Washington Street (the hotel)

his interest would only constitute .37 percent of the total

parcels affected by the ordinance, obviously less than one

percent of the total parcels affected. In fact, as of the date

the postponement vote on the ordinance was taken, he did not

actually own the hotel property. It was under contract to be

sold to the Respondent but the closing and final performance of

the contract did not occur until the day after the city

commission meeting at which the postponement was voted. In any

event, Mr. Vandergrifft's ownership in the territorial area of

the proposed ordinance amounted to less than one percent, at

most, of the total affected parcels. Therefore, in the opinion

of the city attorney a voting conflict did not exist.

9. Although the Respondent did not inform the city

attorney of the impending purchase of that specific piece of

property, he did inform him that he owned his residence and

"other property" in the area affected by the proposed ordinance.

The city attorney would not have changed his legal advice as to

whether the Respondent could vote on the ordinance if he had

known of the specific impending purchase of the property at

115 Washington Street.

10. The Respondent purchased the property at 115

Washington Street with the intention of renovating it. After

having architects examine it, however, including a renovation

architect, and having it inspected by members of the city staff,

it was determined by all concerned, including the city building

inspector, that the property should be demolished. It was

deemed beyond repair and a liability. The renovation architect

believed that there was no feasible way to renovate the building

and so the Respondent requested approval to demolish the

structure.

11. Ultimately approval was granted by the city and the

old hotel structure has now been demolished, as of October 2007,

approximately one and one-half years after the property was

purchased by the Respondent. The demolition of the hotel

building was accomplished in accordance with the "Historic

Building Demolition Ordinance." Pursuant to that ordinance the

hotel was a "contributing structure" in the National Register

Historic District. If the subject proposed ordinance had been

enacted, demolition of the hotel building would have still have

been possible. There were no differences in the actual approval

process of the Historic Preservation Commission with respect to

the proposed demolition either with or without enactment of the

proposed ordinance at issue.

12. Several conditions were attached to approval of the

demolition of the hotel building, as allowed for by the

"Historic Building Demolition Ordinance." The Respondent agreed

to these conditions, one of which was that a site plan for

reconstruction be completed and approved, based upon historic

overlays. The procedures voluntarily followed by the Respondent

in demolition of the hotel, and obtaining the site plan approval

by the Historic Preservation Board and the City Building

Department, although pursuant to non-mandatory guidelines, were

essentially the same as they would have been if the mandatory

standards of the proposed ordinance had been enacted.

13. A Real Estate Broker, Mr. Floyd Fulford, established

that, based on Multiple Listing Service Reports, four properties

in the district covered by the proposed ordinance, were sold

during February of 2006. However, property sold by owners

without the use of a realtor are typically not shown in the

multiple listing service, a service to which realtors have

access. According to the Volusia County Property Appraiser's

data base, as described by Mr. Fulford, 166 properties were sold

in the entire 32168 zip code area, which is the mainland side of

the City of New Smyrna Beach. There may have been other sales

in February 2006 occurring in the beachside area of New Smyrna

Beach. Mr. Fulford was not aware of whether or not these

properties were located in the Historic Overlay District at

issue.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this

proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).

15. The Commission is authorized to conduct investigations

and to make public reports on complaints concerning violations

of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, which is the Code of

Ethics for public officers and employees. This activity is

authorized by Section 112.322, Florida Statutes, as well as

Florida Administrative Code Rule 34-5.0015.

16. The Ethics Commission is asserting through its

advocate the affirmative of the issue involving the Respondent's

purported violation of Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes.

The party having the affirmative of the issue in a proceeding

bears the burden of proof, according to the opinions in

Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co. Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778

(Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Balino v. Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services , 348 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

The Commission must establish by clear and convincing evidence

the elements of the violation it alleges. See § 120.57(1)(j),

Fla. Stat., and Latham v. Commission on Ethics , 694 So. 2d 83

(Fla. 1st DCA 1997), in which the First District Court of Appeal

cited Department of Banking and Finance Division of Securities

and Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern and Co. , 670 So. 2d 932

(Fla. 1996), and Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla.

1997).

17. The Florida Supreme Court has described the standard

of clear convincing evidence in the following fashion:

[C]lear and convincing evidence requires

that the evidence must be found to be

credible; the facts to which the witnesses

testify must be distinctly remembered; the

testimony must be precise and explicit and

the witnesses must be lacking in confusion

as to the facts in issue. The evidence must

of such weight that it produces in the mind

of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction, without hesitancy, as to the

truth of the allegation sought to be

established.

In Re: Davey , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994), quoting

Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

See also Evans Packing Company v. Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services , 550 So. 2d 112, 115 n.5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

18. It is alleged that the Respondent violated Section

112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, by voting to postpone an

official vote by the city commission of New Smyrna Beach

regarding the question of enactment of proposed city ordinance

43-05. Section 112.3143(3)(a), provides in pertinent part as

follows:

No county, municipal, or other public

officer shall vote in an official capacity

upon any measure which would inure to his or

her special private gain or loss; which he

or she knows would inure to the special

private gain or loss of any principal by

whom he or she is retained or to the parent

organization or subsidiary of a corporate

principal by which he or she is retained,

other than an agency as defined in s.

112.312(2); or which he or she knows would

inure to the special private or gain or loss

of a relative or business associate of the

public officer. Such public Officer shall,

prior to the vote being taken, publicly

state to the assembly the nature of the

officer's interest in the matter from which

he or she is abstaining from voting and,

within 15 days after the vote occurs,

disclose the nature of his or her interest

as a public record in a memorandum filed

with the person responsible for recording

the minutes of the meeting, who shall

incorporate the memorandum in the minutes.

19. In order to establish a violation of Section

112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes, the following elements must be

established by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) Respondent must have been a county,

municipal, or other local public officer.

(2) The Respondent must have:

(a) Voted on a measure that inured to

his special private gain or loss; or

(b) Knowingly voted on a measure that

inured to the special private gain or loss

of any principal by whom he was retained, or

to the parent organization or subsidiary of

a corporate principal by whom he is

retained, other than an agency defined in

Section 112.312(2), Florida Statutes; or

(c) Knowingly voted on a measure that

inured to the special private gain of a

relative or business associate . . .

20. There is no question that the Respondent was a public

officer and the first element described above has thus been

proven, regarding the allegations concerning Section

112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes. The Commission must therefore

prove that the Respondent's vote to postpone proposed ordinance

43-05 inured to his special private gain or loss. The

Commission has not established by clear and convincing evidence

that the Respondent's vote actually inured to his special

private gain or loss.

21. "A 'special private gain' described by the voting

conflicts statute usually involves a financial interest of the

public official that is directly enhanced by the vote in

question." George v. City of Cocoa, Florida , 78 F.3d 494, 496

(11th Cir. 1996). No clear evidence establishes that the

Respondent's financial interests would have gained or suffered a

loss because of the vote to postpone the vote on the ordinance.

22. The Commission, in its Final Order in the matter

styled In Re: Ervin Ellsworth, Complaint No. 02-108 (COE Final

Order No. 06-024 (April 26, 2006)) noted that it had used a

"size of the class" test in determining whether a gain is

"special." Ibid. pp. 8-9. The "size of the class test"

involves:

An analysis in which the determination as to

whether a particular vote would inure to the

'special private gain' of a public officer

is made by examining the 'size of the class'

of persons who stand to benefit to gain or

lose from the measure to be voted upon.

Where the class of persons is large, we have

concluded that 'special gain' will result

only if there are circumstances unique to

the officer under which he stands to gain

more than other members of the class. Where

the class of persons benefiting from the

measure is extremely small, we have

concluded that the possibility of 'special

gain' is much more likely. In other words,

when a measure affects a class of sufficient

size, the gain is of a 'general nature' and

thus is not the 'special' gain addressed by

the voting conflict law. CEO 00-13 .

23. No "special private gain" exists when the official's

interest or that of his principal constitutes less than one

percent of the size of the class affected. For example, the

Commission has advised that a town commissioner was not

prohibited from voting on issues relating to a project that

would benefit his neighborhood and that would be assessed

against property owners in the neighborhood, when the

commissioner owned 1.2 percent of the lots that would be

affected. See CEO 90-71 .

24. In the instant situation the Respondent owned one

parcel of property and was under a contract or agreement to

purchase the other parcel at 115 Washington Street, both within

the historic overlay district. This is the district that would

have been affected if the ordinance in question had been

enacted. A total of 522 parcels of property were in that

historic overlay district. Even if the Respondent was deemed to

own both parcels, his interest would still be only .37 percent

of the total parcels to be affected by the ordinance.

Consequently, if there was a gain or loss to Mr. Vandergrifft as

a result of the vote to postpone the vote on the ordinance, it

was not a "special gain" under the "size of the class test."

25. The Advocate appears to contend that the "size of the

class" should be re-defined to constitute "properties under

contract at the time of the vote" or the "number of properties

sold" at some point temporally connected to the vote on

February 14, 2006. Neither of those proposed standards for

determining the class to place the Respondent in is consistent

with the test explicated by the Commission on multiple

occasions, which focuses on the number of persons affected by

the measure under consideration.

26. There was no evidence presented which would establish

how many properties within the historic overlay district, were

actually under contract at the time of the vote on February 14,

2006. It would not be likely that anyone, including the

Respondent, could know how many properties were actually under

contract at any given time in a certain geographical area.

Further, there was no evidence or testimony to show that the

public, including the Respondent, would have had access to

information regarding the number of properties sold during any

designated time period in the Historic Overlay District of New

Smyrna Beach. The MLS service does not contain all properties

for sale or sold.

27. The Advocate presented testimony which indicated that

at least four properties were sold in the District at issue

during the month of February 2006. For purposes of determining

the Respondent's interest under these facts, however, the class

size cannot be made up of properties sold in the month of

February 2006. The MLS, used by the Advocate's witness to

determine the number of properties sold, is not accessible to

the general public, including the Respondent, and is not

reliable in that other properties could have sold during that

time period which are not listed in the Multiple Listing Service

System. Moreover, it can also be said that at the time of the

vote the Respondent was not in a class of persons who had

purchased property anyway. The Respondent was merely under

contract to purchase the subject property. Moreover,

technically speaking the contract was not even a contract since

the sellers had never executed it. It was at most a memorandum

of agreement or executory contract because the sellers had never

signed the contract document.

28. A determination that the appropriate class would be

made up of properties sold within a certain time period would be

speculative and would provide no meaningful standard for

determining whether, at the time of the vote, a public officer

was faced with a voting conflict. Some or all of the contracts

which closed in February 2006, could have been entered into

subsequent to the vote on February 14, 2006. Similarly,

property can be contracted for and sold simultaneously,

alleviating any time period during which the property is merely

effectively under contract, but not yet sold.

29. Even if information regarding pending contracts for

sale was available to the public and to the Respondent at the

time the vote on the ordinance was scheduled, it is more than

likely that such contracts were scheduled to close at different

times and even in different months. The contracts could have

closed in February but almost certainly there were contracts in

place at the time of the vote on the ordinance which did not

close in February. It is also likely that there were contracts

pending at the time of the vote which never closed at all

because the agreements "fell through."

30. The Respondent was not able to determine the class

size as made up of properties under contract to be sold in the

history overlay district at the time of the vote. Similarly, at

the time he voted on the ordinance the Respondent could not

determine that the class size would be made up of property sold

within the Historic Overlay District in February 2006. A

determination allowing such subjective classes would lead to

confusion in interpretation of the relevant law and create an

undue burden and uncertainty for public officials in approaching

many of the votes they have to make.

31. In view of the past decisions and opinions of the

Commission, and the guidelines thus established, although

concededly there is no rule establishing any one percent

standard, or establishing with precision how to determine the

scope of the measuring class, the clear and persuasive evidence

shows that the class size is appropriately made up of all

properties that could be affected by the proposed ordinance.

This seems patently logical because the ordinance, by its terms,

was designed to apply to properties not to persons. It would

have applied to all properties within the historic overlay

district regardless of whether they were held in long-term

ownership by an owner, were on the market to be sold, were under

contract for sale, or had recently been sold. The point is that

the logical class scope should be made up of all properties in

the District affected by the ordinance. Any other determination

would be contrary to the guidelines the Commission has proceeded

under previously for determining the scope or size of a class.

32. In the present case the Respondent owned two of the

522 parcels affected by the proposed ordinance. His personal

interest in the measure upon which he voted was thus less than

one percent of the interest of the class of persons affected by

the measure. This is true whether he is deemed to have owned

both properties or only one property and was under contract for

the other one, etc. If he owned both he still would only own

.37 percent of the properties in the District. He did not thus

vote on a measure which inured to his special private gain.

33. In asserting its version of the proper definition of

the class to which Mr. Vandergrifft purportedly belonged the

Commission argues that he stood to gain more than other members

of the class of 522 affected properties. However, no evidence,

and certainly no clear and convincing evidence of any unique

circumstances or characteristics resulting in a financial gain

unique to the Respondent was adduced at hearing. "To constitute

a prohibited voting conflict . . . the possibility of gain must

be direct and immediate, not remote and speculative." 78 F.3d

at 498.

34. Moreover, the Respondent merely voted to postpone the

vote on the ordinance based upon outcry by other members of the

public who had expressed opposition to the ordinance. There is

no evidence to refute that such was his intent in voting to

postpone the ordinance. This is borne out by the fact that the

contract, memorandum of agreement or executory contract, if one

wishes to so call it, was entered into on June 13, 2005. The

first closing date apparently agreed to by the parties to the

contract, according to Mr. Vandergrifft's testimony and the

dates depicted on the face of the contractual document, was

June 15, 2005. Thereafter, several more dates were arrived at

on which the property sale was supposed to have closed, but had

to be postponed. There was no evidence that they were postponed

due to any set of facts concerning the proposed ordinance.

Rather, Mr. Vandergrifft's testimony is unrefuted in showing

that the postponements of the closing date of the sale were due

to the fact that the sellers were dilatory in getting all their

property moved from those premises so that Mr. Vandergrifft

could close the sale and take possession of the property.

35. The last date agreed to upon which the sale could be

closed happened to be the date immediately after the day the

vote to postpone the ordinance was taken. There is no evidence

to refute Mr. Vandergrifft's testimony that, in essence, the

date was coincidental in terms of its relationship to the date

the postponement vote was taken. There was no showing,

moreover, that at the time the last date to close the sale of

the property was agreed upon that the agenda for the city

commission meeting for February 14, 2006, at which the vote on

the ordinance was taken, had already been prepared. Thus it was

not proven that, in setting that date, the Respondent would have

known that the ordinance was coming up for a vote before his

sale closure date. There is simply no evidence that the facts

occurred that way.

36. The fact that the sale closure date was set a number

of times and had to be postponed during the seven or so months

prior to the postponement vote on the subject ordinance, renders

it unlikely that the sale closure was intentionally scheduled by

Mr. Vandergrifft and the sellers to occur immediately after the

postponement vote. It was not established that Mr. Vandergrifft

had any certainty that the vote on the ordinance would result in

a postponement. There is simply no clear and convincing

evidence to show that Mr. Vandergrifft intended to vote to

postpone enactment of the ordinance for any special private

gain, financial or otherwise.

37. The evidence shows no direct financial benefit or

indirect benefit that actually inured to the Respondent as a

result of the vote. In fact the evidence shows that, although

the ordinance was never enacted, that Mr. Vandergrifft proceeded

with the demolition and site plans for reconstruction under the

same terms and conditions as if the ordinance had been in place.

38. In summary, the evidence shows that there was no

"special private gain or loss" which inured to the benefit of

Jim Vandergrifft. The ownership interest of Mr. Vandergrifft

comprised at most no more than .37 percent of the property

impacted by the ordinance in the subject Historic Overlay

District. Consequently, it is concluded that there was no

"special gain or loss" which inured to Mr. Vandergrifft as a

result of his vote to postpone the enactment or consideration of

city ordinance 43-05 of the City of New Smyrna Beach.

RECOMMENDATION

Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and

demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and the arguments

of the parties, it is, therefore,

RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida

Commission on Ethics finding that the Respondent, Jim

Vandergrifft, did not violate Section 112.3143(3)(a), Florida

Statutes.

DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2008, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

P. MICHAEL RUFF

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 17th day of November, 2008.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Kay Starling, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Ethics

3600 Macclay Boulevard, South

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709

Phillip C. Claypool, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Ethics

3600 Macclay Boulevard, South

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709

Jennifer M. Erlinger, Esquire

James H. Peterson, III, Esquire

Advocate for the Commission on Ethics

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Mark Herron, Esquire

Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A.

2618 Centennial Place

Post Office Box 15579

Tallahassee, Florida 32317

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.