08-004917N Monica Cordero And Christian R. Morrill, Sr., On Behalf Of And As Parents And Natural Guardians Of Baby Boy Christian Ross Morrill, Jr., A/K/A Baby Cordero (Deceased) vs. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, June 2, 2009.

Summary: ALJ lacks jurisdiction to resolve willful and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity. Claim compensable and award made.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MONICA CORDERO AND CHRISTIAN R. )

MORRILL, SR., ON BEHALF OF AND )

AS PARENTS AND NATURAL )

GUARDIANS OF BABY BOY CHRISTIAN )

ROSS MORRILL, JR., a/k/a BABY )

CORDERO (DECEASED), )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 08-4917N

)

FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED )

NEUROLOGICAL INJURY )

COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, )

)

Respondent, )

)

and )

)

HELEN ELLIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, )

)

Intervenor. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative

Hearings, by Administrative Law Judge William J. Kendrick, held

a hearing on April 21, 2009, by video teleconference, with sites

in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Harold L. Sebring, III, Esquire

Sebring Law, P.A.

1315 South Howard Avenue, Suite 101

Tampa, Florida 33606

For Respondent: Robert J. Grace, Jr., Esquire

Stiles, Taylor & Grace, P.A.

Post Office Box 460

Tampa, Florida 33601

For Intervenor: Thomas L. Schieffelin, Esquire

Hill, Reis, Adams, Hall

& Schieffelin, P.A.

Post Office Box 1090

Winter Park, Florida 32790

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether Christian Ross Morrill, Jr., a deceased minor,

qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related

Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).

2. If so, the amount and manner of payment of an award to

the parents, the reasonable expenses incurred in connection with

the filing of the claim, including reasonable attorney's fees,

and the amount owing for expenses previously incurred.

3. Whether the administrative law judge has jurisdiction

to determine the applicability of the willful and wanton

exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth in Section 766.303(2),

Florida Statutes (2007). 1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 2, 2008, Monica Cordero and Christian R.

Morrill, Sr., on behalf of and as parents and natural guardians

of Christian Ross Morrill, Jr. (Christian), a deceased minor,

filed a "petition for determination of jurisdiction of NICA

Plan, and in the alternative for benefits pursuant to Florida

Statute Section 766.301 et seq. " The petition included the

following statements:

10. The Petitioners take the position that

they are not bound by the provisions of

Florida Statute Section 766.301 et seq. (the

NICA Plan) due to the fact the conduct of

the medical providers in this case,

specifically the nursing staff, amounted to

willful and wanton conduct demonstrating a

reckless disregard for the safety and

welfare of this infant and also amounted to

bad faith in the care and treatment of this

child. In the alternative, Petitioner

request the following relief for themselves

and their minor child:

a. Expenses for items or services that are

medically necessary and reasonable for the

child's medical and hospital care.

b. Lump sum of an award to the parents of

the minor in an amount not to exceed

$100,000.00.

c. All expenses requested hereunder are to

be awarded pursuant to the provisions of

Sections 766.301-766.316, Florida Statutes,

and subject to exclusions contained in said

sections.

d. Reasonable expenses incurred in

connection with the filing of this claim.

It is Petitioner's position that the

Administrative Law Judge in this matter does

not have jurisdiction to determine the

allegations set forth, to wit: the conduct

of the nursing staff at Helen Ellis Memorial

Hospital amounted to willful and wanton

conduct demonstrating a reckless disregard

for the safety and welfare of this infant

and also amounted to bad faith in the care

and treatment of this child. Petitioner

relies on the authority of Rinella v.

Abifaraj , 908 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA

2005), Review denied, Abifaraj v. Rinella ,

921 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2006).

DOAH served the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury

Compensation Association (NICA) with a copy of the petition on

October 3, 2008, and on November 20, 2008, NICA responded to the

petition and gave notice that it was of the view the claim was

compensable. However, given the issues raised by Petitioners,

NICA requested a hearing be held to address compensability.

Thereafter, by motion filed December 9, 2008, Helen Ellis

Memorial Hospital requested leave to intervene. That motion

included the following allegations:

1. Petitioner previously filed a petition

to determine NICA compensability and

Intervenor was granted its motion to

intervene in the original action.

2. Petitioner subsequently withdrew the

petition to pursue claimed damages in civil

court.

3. Intervenor, Helen Ellis Memorial

Hospital, then filed a declaratory judgment

action addressing the issues of exclusivity

of NICA remedies for the claimed wrongdoing

and damages.

4. In response, Petitioner filed a

counterclaim for medical malpractice against

Intervenor, Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital.

5. By order of the Circuit Court, John A.

Schaefer, Sixth Judicial Circuit, said

action has been [abated] pending the

determination regarding compensability under

the provision of the Birth-Related

Neurological Injury Compensation Act. (See

Exhibit A)[ 2 ]

6. Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital is

entitled to intervene for the reason that

the underlying issues in the pending

litigation in Circuit Court are of such

direct and immediate character that

Intervenor, Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital,

will either gain or lose by direct legal

operation and effect of any ruling under the

provision of the Birth-Related Neurological

Injury Compensation Program . . . .

7. Specifically, Intervenor has an interest

in the outcome of Petitioner's claim that

the care rendered by its nursing staff rises

to the level of "willful and wanton

disregard" as set forth as exception to the

exclusivity of NICA compensation as a remedy

and the subordinate issue raised by

Petitioner of which forum has jurisdiction

to decide applicability of this exception.

Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital's motion to intervene was granted

by Order of December 10, 2008.

By Notice of Hearing dated January 14, 2009, a hearing was

scheduled for April 21, 2009, to resolve whether the claim was

compensable and, if so, the amount and manner of payment of an

award to the parents, the reasonable expenses incurred in

connection with the filing of the claim, including reasonable

attorney's fees, and the amount owing for expenses previously

incurred. Subsequently, it was agreed the administrative law

judge would also address whether he had jurisdiction to resolve

the willful and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth

in Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes.

The parties' Pre-Hearing Stipulation was filed April 15,

2009, and at hearing Joint Exhibits 1-3 were received into

evidence. No witnesses were called, and no other exhibits were

offered.

The parties were accorded 10 days from the date of the

hearing to file written argument or proposed orders. Respondent

elected to file a proposed order and it has been duly-

considered.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Stipulated facts

1. Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., are the

natural parents of Christian R. Morrill, Jr. (Christian), a

deceased minor. Christian was born a live infant on June 21,

2007, at Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital, a licensed Florida

hospital, located in Tarpon Springs, Florida, and his birth

weight exceeded 2,500 grams. Christian died June 27, 2007.

2. Obstetrical services were delivered at Christian's

birth by Brooke Slaton, M.D., who, at all times material hereto,

was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related

Neurological Injury Compensation Plan as defined by Section

766.302(7), Florida Statutes.

3. The participating physician (Dr. Slaton) and the

hospital (Helen Ellis Memorial Hospital) complied with the

notice provisions of the Plan.

4. Petitioners and NICA have further stipulated, which

stipulation Intervenor "does not oppose . . . and intends to

offer no evidence to rebut," that Christian suffered a "birth-

related neurological injury," as defined by Section 766.302(2),

Florida Statutes, in that he suffered an injury to the brain or

spinal cord caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury

occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in

the immediate postdelivery period in the hospital, which

rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and

physically impaired.

Coverage under the Plan

5. Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the

Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological

injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . of a live

infant weighing at least 2,500 grams for a single gestation

. . . at birth caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in

the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate

postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant

permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired."

§ 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla.

Stat.

6. Here, the parties' agreement that Christian suffered a

"birth-related neurological injury" is consistent with the

objective proof which demonstrates that Christian suffered an

injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation occurring in

the course of labor, delivery, and the immediate postdelivery

period that, following withdrawal of life-support at day 6 after

birth, resulted in death. Consequently, since obstetrical

services were provided by a "participating physician" at birth,

the claim is compensable. §§ 766.309(1) and 766.31(1), Fla.

Stat.

The award

7. Where, as here, it has been resolved that a claim is

compensable, the administrative law judge is required to make a

determination of how much compensation should be awarded.

§ 766.31(1), Fla. Stat. Pertinent to this case, Section

766.31(1), Florida Statutes, provides for an award of the

following items:

(a) Actual expenses for medically necessary

and reasonable medical and hospital,

habilitative and training, family

residential or custodial care, professional

residential, and custodial care and service,

for medically necessary drugs, special

equipment, and facilities, and for related

travel. However, such expenses shall not

include:

1. Expenses for items or services that

the infant has received, or is entitled to

receive, under the laws of any state or the

Federal Government, except to the extent

such exclusion may be prohibited by federal

law.

2. Expenses for items or services that

the infant has received, or is contractually

entitled to receive, from any prepaid health

plan, health maintenance organization, or

other private insuring entity.

3. Expenses for which the infant has

received reimbursement, or for which the

infant is entitled to receive reimbursement,

under the laws of any state or the Federal

Government, except to the extent such

exclusion may be prohibited by federal law.

4. Expenses for which the infant has

received reimbursement, or for which the

infant is contractually entitled to receive

reimbursement, pursuant to the provisions of

any health or sickness insurance policy or

other private insurance program.

* * *

(b)1. Periodic payments of an award to

the parents or legal guardians of the infant

found to have sustained a birth-related

neurological injury, which award shall not

exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion

of the administrative law judge, such award

may be made in a lump sum.

2. Death benefit for the infant in an

amount of $10,000.

(c) Reasonable expenses incurred in

connection with the filing of a claim under

ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable

attorney's fees, which shall be subject to

the approval and award of the administrative

law judge. In determining an award for

attorney's fees, the administrative law

judge shall consider the following factors:

1. The time and labor required, the novelty

and difficulty of the questions involved,

and the skill requisite to perform the legal

services properly.

2. The fee customarily charged in the

locality for similar legal services.

3. The time limitations imposed by the

claimant or the circumstances.

4. The nature and length of the

professional relationship with the claimant.

5. The experience, reputation, and ability

of the lawyer or lawyers performing

services.

8. In this case, Petitioners and NICA have agreed that,

should Petitioners elect to accept benefits under the Plan,

Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., as the parents of

Christian, be awarded One hundred thousand dollars

($100,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b.)1., Florida

Statutes, and a death benefit of Ten thousand dollars

($10,000.00), pursuant to Section 766.31(1)(b)2., Florida

Statutes, all to be paid in lump sum. The parties have further

agreed to an award of Two thousand six hundred twenty-five

dollars ($2,625.00) for attorney's fees and other expenses

incurred in connection with the filing of the claim. Moreover,

the parties have agreed no monies are owing for past expenses.

Such agreement is reasonable, and it is approved.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction

9. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of,

these proceedings. § 766.301, et seq. , Fla. Stat.

Compensability and award

10. In resolving whether a claim is covered by the Plan,

the administrative law judge must make the following

determination based upon the available evidence:

(a) Whether the injury claimed is a

birth-related neurological injury. If the

claimant has demonstrated, to the

satisfaction of the administrative law

judge, that the infant has sustained a brain

or spinal cord injury caused by oxygen

deprivation or mechanical injury and that

the infant was thereby rendered permanently

and substantially mentally and physically

impaired, a rebuttable presumption shall

arise that the injury is a birth-related

neurological injury as defined in s.

766.303(2).

(b) Whether obstetrical services were

delivered by a participating physician in

the course of labor, delivery, or

resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery

period in a hospital; or by a certified

nurse midwife in a teaching hospital

supervised by a participating physician in

the course of labor, delivery, or

resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery

period in a hospital.

§ 766.309(1), Fla. Stat. An award may be sustained only if the

administrative law judge concludes that the "infant has

sustained a birth-related neurological injury and that

obstetrical services were delivered by a participating physician

at the birth." § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat.

11. "Birth-related neurological injury" is defined by

Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes, to mean:

. . . injury to the brain or spinal cord of

a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams

for a single gestation or, in the case of a

multiple gestation, a live infant weighing

at least 2,000 grams at birth caused by

oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury

occurring in the course of labor, delivery,

or resuscitation in the immediate

postdelivery period in a hospital, which

renders the infant permanently and

substantially mentally and physically

impaired. This definition shall apply to

live births only and shall not include

disability or death caused by genetic or

congenital abnormality.

12. In this case, it has been established that the

physician who provided obstetrical services at Christian's birth

was a "participating physician," and that Christian suffered a

"birth-related neurological injury." Consequently, Christian

qualifies for coverage under the Plan, and Petitioners are

entitled to an award of compensation. §§ 766.309 and 766.31,

Fla. Stat. Here, the parties have stipulated to such award, as

set forth in paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact.

Whether the administrative law judge has jurisdiction

to determine the applicability of the willful and wanton

exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth in Section 766.303(2),

Florida Statutes

13. Here, Intervenor is apparently of the view that the

administrative law judge must resolve whether there is "clear

and convincing evidence of bad faith or malicious purpose or

willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or

property" before claimants, such as Petitioners, may elect

(under the provisions of Section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes)

to pursue a civil action in lieu of accepting an award under the

Plan. Petitioners and NICA are of a contrary view.

14. Pertinent to the issue raised, the Plan provides:

766.301 Legislative findings and intent.-

(1) The Legislative makes the following

findings:

* * *

(d) The costs of birth-related neurological

injury claims are particularly high and

warrant the establishment of a limited

system of compensation irrespective of

fault. The issue of whether such claims are

covered by this act must be determined

exclusivity in an administrative proceeding.

766.303 Florida Birth-Related Neurological

Injury Compensation Plan; exclusiveness of

remedy.-

(1) There is established the Florida Birth-

Related Neurological Injury Compensation

Plan for the purpose of providing

compensation, irrespective of fault, for

birth-related neurological injury

claims . . . .

(2) The rights and remedies granted by this

plan on account of a birth-related

neurological injury shall exclude all other

rights and remedies of such infant, her or

his personal representative, parents,

dependents, and next of kin, at common law

or otherwise, against any person or entity

directly involved with the labor, delivery,

or immediate postdelivery resuscitation

during which such injury occurs, arising out

of or related to a medical negligence claim

with respect to such injury; except that a

civil action shall not be foreclosed where

there is clear and convincing evidence of

bad faith or malicious purpose or willful

and wanton disregard of human rights,

safety, or property, provided that such suit

is filed prior to and in lieu of payment of

an award under ss. 766.301-766.316. Such

suit shall be filed before the award of the

division becomes conclusive and binding as

provided for in s. 766.311 . (Emphasis

added).

766.304 Administrative law judge to

determine claims.- The administrative law

judge shall hear and determine all claims

filed pursuant to ss. 766.301-766.316 and

shall exercise the full power and authority

granted to her or him in chapter 120, as

necessary, to carry out the purposes of such

sections. The administrative law judge has

exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether

a claim filed under this act is compensable.

No civil action may be brought until the

determinations under s. 766.309 have been

made by the administrative law judge. If

the administrative law judge determines that

the claimant is entitled to compensation

from the association, or if the claimant

accepts an award issued under s. 766.31, no

civil action may be brought or continued in

violation of the exclusiveness of remedy

provisions of s. 766.303 . . . .

766.309 Determination of claims;

presumption; findings of administrative law

judge binding on participants.-

(1) The administrative law judge shall make

the following determinations based upon all

available evidence;

(a) Whether the injury claimed is a birth-

related neurologically injury. If the

claimant has demonstrated, to the

satisfaction of the administrative law

judge, that the infant has sustained a brain

or spinal cord injury caused by oxygen

deprivation or mechanical injury and that

the infant was thereby rendered permanently

and substantially mentally and physically

impaired, a rebuttable presumption shall

arise that the injury is a birth-related

neurological injury as defined in s.

766.302(2).

(b) Whether obstetrical services were

delivered by a participating physician in

the course of labor, delivery, or

resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery

period in a hospital; or by a certified

nurse midwife in a teaching hospital

supervised by a participating physician in

the course of labor, delivery, or

resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery

period in a hospital.

(c) How much compensation, if any, is

awardable pursuant to s. 766.31.

(d) Whether, if raised by the claimant or

other party, the factual determinations

regarding the notice requirements in s.

766.316 are satisfied. The administrative

law judge has the exclusive jurisdiction to

make these factual determinations.

766.311 Conclusiveness of determination or

award; appeal-

(1) A determination of the administrative

law judge as to qualification of the claim

for purposes of compensability under s.

766.309 or an award by the administrative

law judge pursuant to s. 766.31 shall be

conclusive and binding as to all questions

of fact. Review of an order of an

administrative law judge shall be by appeal

to the District Court of Appeal. Appeals

shall be filed in accordance with rules of

procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court

for review of such orders.

15. As enacted, Section 766.304, Florida Statutes, grants

the administrative law judge exclusive jurisdiction to determine

whether a claim is compensable, and refers to Section 766.309,

as the determinations an administrative law judge must make in

resolving a claim. Those determinations are: (a) "[w]hether

the injury claimed is a birth-related neurological injury," (b)

"[w]hether obstetrical services were delivered by a

participating physician in the course of labor, delivery, or

resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a

hospital," (c) "[h]ow much compensation, if any, is awardable,"

and (d) "[w]hether, if raised by the claimant or other party,

the factual determinations regarding the notice requirements in

s. 766.316 are satisfied."

16. Notably, there is nothing in the language of the Plan,

that grants the administrative law judge jurisdiction to resolve

the willful and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity.

Consequently, it must be resolved that the administrative law

judge lacks jurisdiction to resolve the issue. Rinella v.

Abifaraj , 908 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("[U]nder the

plain meaning of the statute as written, the ALJ properly

determined that he did not have jurisdiction to decide the

willful and wanton issue."). See also City of Cape Coral v. GAC

Utilities, Inc., of Florida , 281 So. 2d 493, 495-96 (Fla.

1973)("All administrative bodies created by the Legislature are

not constitutional bodies, but, rather, simply mere creatures of

statute. This, of course, includes the Public Service

Commission . . . . As such, the Commission's powers, duties and

authority are those and only those that are conferred expressly

or impliedly by statute of the State . . . . Any reasonable

doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular power that is

being exercised by the Commission must be resolved against the

exercise thereof, . . . and the further exercise of the power

should be arrested.") and Department of Environmental Regulation

v. Falls Chase Special Taxing District , 424 So. 2d 787, 793

(Fla. 1st DCA 1982)("An agency has only such power as expressly

or by necessary implication is granted by legislative enactment.

An agency may not increase its own jurisdiction and, as a

creature of statute, has no common law jurisdiction or inherent

power such as might reside in . . . a court of general

jurisdiction.").

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

ORDERED that the claim filed by Monica Cordero and

Christian R. Morrill, Sr., on behalf of and as parents and

natural guardians of Christian R. Morrill, Jr., a deceased

minor, is approved, as compensable.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the following benefits are

awarded:

1. Monica Cordero and Christian R. Morrill, Sr., as the

parents of Christian R. Morrill, Jr., a deceased minor, are

awarded One hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), pursuant to

Section 766.31(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes, and a death benefit of

Ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), pursuant to Section

766.31(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes, all to be paid in lump sum.

2. Petitioners' counsel is awarded Two thousand six

hundred twenty-five dollars ($2,625.00) for attorney's fees and

other expenses incurred in connection with the filing of the

claim.

3. No award is made for past expenses, as none are owing,

and no provision is made for the payment of future expenses, as

Christian is deceased.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the administrative law judge

lacks jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the willful

and wanton exception to Plan exclusivity, set forth in Section

766.303(2), Florida Statutes.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Section 766.312,

Florida Statutes, jurisdiction is reserved to resolve any

disputes, should they arise, regarding the parties' compliance

with the terms of this Final Order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 2009, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

WILLIAM J. KENDRICK

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone]

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of June, 2009.

ENDNOTES

1/ Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the

2007 version of the Florida Statutes.

2/ The order of Judge Schaefer included the following

conclusion:

1. The motion to abate of

Plaintiff/Counter-Claim Defendant, Helen

Ellis Memorial Hospital Foundation, Inc., is

GRANTED. The Court finds that the

determination of NICA compensability by the

appropriate Administrative Law Judge to

determine all claims of NICA compensability

within the jurisdiction of the

Administrative Law Judge is prerequisite to

the Corderos' instituting their potential

civil action. The Court makes no

determination at this time whether the

"willful and wanton" exception to the

exclusivity provisions of NICA is within the

jurisdiction of the Administrative Law Judge

or this Court to decide.

COPIES FURNISHED :

(Via Certified Mail)

Harold L. Sebring, III, Esquire

Sebring Law, P.A.

1315 South Howard Avenue, Suite 101

Tampa, Florida 33606

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9210)

Kenney Shipley, Executive Director

Florida Birth Related Neurological

Injury Compensation Association

2360 Christopher Place, Suite 1

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9227)

Robert J. Grace, Jr., Esquire

Stiles, Taylor & Grace, P.A.

Post Office Box 460

Tampa, Florida 33601

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9234)

Thomas L. Schieffelin, Esquire

Hill, Reis, Adams, Hall

& Schieffelin, P.A.

Post Office Box 1090

Winter Park, Florida 32790

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9241)

Brooke Leigh Slaton, M.D.

8110 Royal Palm Boulevard, Suite 108

Coral Springs, Florida 33065

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9258)

Charlene Willoughby, Director

Consumer Services Unit - Enforcement

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-75

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3275

(Certified Mail No. 7008 3230 0001 6307 9265)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled

to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311,

Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk

of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy,

accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the

appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311,

Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury

Compensation Association v. Carreras , 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of

rendition of the order to be reviewed.