09-001337 Tracey Francis vs. Wal-Mart Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, January 4, 2010.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that respondent discriminated against her based on her race, or that Respondent failed to accomodate a purported disability.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

TRACEY FRANCIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 09-1337

)

WAL-MART, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to proper notice this matter came on for formal

hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly-designated Administrative

Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The

hearing was conducted in Tallahassee, Florida, on October 12,

2009. The appearances were as follows:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Tracy Francis, pro se

284 Water Oak Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32305

For Respondent: Cornelius D. Boone, Esquire

Littler Mendelson, P.C.

3344 Peachtree Road Northeast, Suite 1500

Atlanta, Georgia 30326

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern

whether the Petitioner was subjected to employment

discrimination because of her race (African-American) based upon

being subjected to harassment, different terms and conditions of

employment and alleged denial of a reasonable accommodation with

regard to an alleged disability.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This cause arose upon the filing of a complaint of

discrimination on August 6, 2008, by the above-named Petitioner.

The Petitioner alleged that she had been harassed, subjected to

different terms and conditions of employment and denied a

reasonable accommodation with regard to her race and her alleged

disability. In due course, an investigation was conducted by

the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) which

resulted in a determination of No Cause, entered on February 5,

2009. The Petitioner contested that determination and filed a

Petition for Relief on March 12, 2009, which was transmitted to

the Division of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.

The matter was assigned to the undersigned Administrative

Law Judge. After an Initial Order and a Pre-Hearing Order was

issued, the discovery process commenced. After allowing a

reasonable time for discovery to be accomplished, the matter was

scheduled for hearing on July 10, 2009. Thereafter, by a Joint

Motion for Continuance, the parties agreed that they needed

additional preparation time and the matter was continued.

Ultimately, after efforts to accommodate the parties' schedules,

the matter was set for hearing for October 12, 2009.

The cause came on for hearing as noticed. The Petitioner

presented 14 witnesses. The Respondent presented no direct

witnesses, but relied in its presentation upon its cross-

examination of the Petitioner's witnesses, many of whom were

Company management personnel. The Petitioner offered no

exhibits into evidence; the Respondent had its Exhibits 1

through 29 admitted into evidence. Upon conclusion of the

proceeding, the parties were given an opportunity to submit

proposed recommended orders. Although the Respondent had

initially indicated intent to order a transcript, ultimately no

transcript was filed. The Proposed Recommended Order from the

Respondent was timely filed on November 24, 2009, and has been

considered in the rendition of this recommended order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Petitioner, Tracy Francis, began employment with

the Respondent at Wal-Mart store #1077 on or about March 3,

2003. She was employed as a Customer Service Representative at

that Wal-Mart store during times pertinent to this claim.

During her tenure at Wal-Mart, the Petitioner never held a

position that carried managerial responsibilities.

2. The Respondent owns and operates the Wal-Mart store

#1077 in Tallahassee, Florida, involved in the facts of this

case. A Personnel Manager at that store is not a salaried

member of management. As such, personnel managers cannot

discipline hourly associate employees regarding suspected

violations of Company policy. An essential function of the

Personnel Manager is to read and understand Company policies and

procedures and to have a working knowledge of any changes or

updates in those policies and procedures. Wal-Mart maintains an

Open Door Communications Policy. It contains reporting and

investigation procedures that encourage Associates (employees)

to report any and all incidents of perceived discrimination.

The store also maintains a Dress Code Policy that provides

employees with guidance and direction as to workplace appearance

expectations.

3. Wal-Mart maintains an Anti-Harassment and

Discrimination Policy. It does not tolerate harassment or

discrimination against employees. Wal-Mart also has an

Accommodation Policy that provides that it will provide

employees who have a disability, a reasonable accommodation to

enable them to perform the essential functions of their job or

to seek new jobs with the Company. The Accommodation Policy

provides that an employee can request an accommodation whenever

he or she chooses by informing any salaried member of the

management staff.

4. Wal-Mart also maintains a "Coaching for Improvement

Policy." That policy is designed to inform employees whether

they are meeting requirements and expectations of their

position. Pursuant to policy guidelines, there are four levels

of disciplinary action: (1) Verbal coaching; (2) Written

coaching; (3) Decision-Making Day; and (4) Termination.

5. Formal disciplinary coachings do not result in loss of

pay, benefits, or corporate rank or title. They do not have any

ultimate tangible effect on an Associate’s employment with the

Company. Due to privacy concerns, members of the management

team or staff are prohibited from discussing any coaching or

disciplinary actions taken against an employee with another

employee.

6. On July 10, 2008, while providing the Petitioner with

her payroll check, Personnel Manager Lisa Sanderson, who is

Caucasian, questioned whether the Petitioner's hair color was in

compliance with the Company's Dress Code Policy because the

Petitioner's hair color did not appear to be a natural color.

7. In response to that comment about her hair color, the

Petitioner requested that Ms. Sanderson review the Company's

Dress Code Policy.

8. Ms. Sanderson had initially believed that the policy

stated that hair color must be a natural color and the

Petitioner's appeared to be an unnatural-appearing platinum

blonde color. However, after Ms. Sanderson reviewed the Dress

Code Policy she discovered that it required that the Associate’s

hair must only be "conservative" in style. After reviewing that

policy, Ms. Sanderson wrote an e-mail to the Human Resources

Manager, John Williams, who is African-American, detailing the

encounter with the Petitioner. Ms. Sanderson acknowledged in

the e-mail that she had made a mistake in advising the

Petitioner that she was not in compliance with the Dress Code.

Ms. Sanderson thereafter met with the Petitioner and apologized

to her for making the incorrect statement regarding the

Petitioner's hair color.

9. After the e-mail was sent to Mr. Williams by

Ms. Sanderson, the Petitioner contacted Mr. Williams and

complained about the comment. Mr. Williams thereupon conducted

an investigation. He determined that the comment was improper.

Therefore, he, along with Store Manager, Demetrius Jones, who is

African-American, and Co-Manager Richard Coleman, who is

Caucasian, met with Ms. Sanderson and informed her that, as

Personnel Manager, she should bring any policy violation she

identified to the attention of a member of the management staff.

She was informed that it was not proper for her, as an hourly

associate employee, to personally address the violation directly

with another associate who she felt was in violation of Company

policy. Specifically, Ms. Sanderson was informed that she did

not have the authority to enforce Company policy, but rather,

only authority to interpret that policy.

10. Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones determined that

Ms. Sanderson should be verbally counseled concerning the

comment made to the Petitioner about hair color. She was

verbally counseled for that comment. The Petitioner was not

required to change her hair color as a result of the comment or

the investigation. The Petitioner also admits that she has no

evidence to indicate that the comment made by Ms. Sanderson

regarding her hair color was racially motivated.

Alleged Disability and Accomodation Request

11. The Petitioner claimed to have a medical condition

stemming from a "slip and fall" accident she suffered in the

fall of 2001. This was before she commenced employment with the

Respondent. She suffered from that same medical condition

throughout her entire employment with Wal-Mart. In the summer

of 2007, she was involved in a car accident that aggravated her

previous back and neck injury.

12. The Petitioner failed to provide any evidence to

detail any physical or mental limitations resulting from her

initial slip and fall injury or her subsequent car accident-

related injury. She did not show any evidence to indicate that

either injury or condition caused any significant or substantial

impairment in a major life activity such as walking, sleeping,

working, or other major life activities.

13. The Petitioner was aware, during her tenure with Wal-

Mart, that in order to request a reasonable accommodation for a

purported disability that she was required to complete a Request

for Accommodation "packet."

14. In June 2007, more than a year before the Petitioner

filed the subject complaint of discrimination with the

Commission, she submitted a request for a reasonable

accommodation to Wal-Mart. That request was granted by the

Respondent. Thus, the Petitioner did not request an

accommodation within the one-year statute of limitation prior to

filing the subject complaint.

15. During her tenure with the Respondent, the Petitioner

satisfactorily performed the essential functions of her job.

She admitted that throughout her employment, her performance had

been correctly evaluated, and that every performance evaluation

she received had rated her performance as satisfactory.

16. Sometime in August 2007, the Petitioner informed

Mr. Williams that she was involved in a car accident which was

not related to her employment at Wal-Mart. After returning to

work following the car accident she met with Mr. Williams to

discuss her disciplinary coaching record.

17. During that meeting with Mr. Williams, she complained

that she was held accountable and disciplined for absences that

were due to her car accident and subsequent surgery.

Mr. Williams investigated her complaint regarding the discipline

and discovered that the Petitioner was coached for unexcused

absences she incurred while away from the store recovering from

surgery. As a result of his investigation, Mr. Williams

requested that the Petitioner complete a Leave of Absence

"packet" to cover the past and future absences related to her

surgery. He subsequently approved her request for the leave of

absence.

18. Despite the fact that Mr. Williams had approved the

Petitioner's leave of absence related to surgery, the co-

manager, Reginald Brooks, who is African-American, did not file

the required documents with the Personnel office. This resulted

in the Petitioner still being held accountable and coached for

continued absences. The Petitioner brought this to the

attention of Mr. Williams and he conducted a follow-up

investigation and learned that the leave of absence

documentation had never been properly filed. He, therefore,

completed an additional leave of absence packet and provided the

Petitioner with an intermittent leave of absence for an entire

year. An “intermittent leave of absence” was given to the

Petitioner to provide her with the flexibility to schedule her

work shifts to accommodate her recovery from surgery and any

related medical treatment. After providing the Petitioner with

an intermittent leave of absence, Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones

removed every disciplinary coaching record or notation contained

in the Petitioner's personnel file.

19. The Respondent maintains a Dress Code Policy and a

Dress Code Chart that provides employees with guidance regarding

expectations for their attire while on work duty. The Dress

Code Chart is posted in the Associate's Lounge.

20. Under the policy, employees are required to wear

workpants that range in color from beige to dark brown. On one

occasion, Assistant Manager Paula Barfield, who is Caucasian,

spoke with the Petitioner regarding the color of her workpants.

Ms. Barfield believed that the workpants, which were of a rust

color, violated the Dress Code Policy. There is no evidence to

show that Ms. Barfield's conversation with the Petitioner

regarding the color of the Petitioner's workpants had any

relationship to the Petitioner's race.

21. The Petitioner reported Ms. Barfield's comments to

Mr. Coleman. Mr. Coleman reviewed the Petitioner's work place

attire and informed her that her workpants were appropriate. He

therefore allowed the Petitioner to remain at work and she was

not coached or disciplined in any way about the matter.

22. On another occasion, on April 10, 2009, Ms. Sanderson

believed that the Petitioner's workpants violated the Dress Code

Policy. She therefore asked Assistant Manager Marie Williams,

who is African-American, and Customer Service Manager Corlin

Hudson, who is also African-American, to speak to the Petitioner

regarding the color of her workpants. These two staff members

reviewed the Petitioner's attire and determined that the pants

violated the Company's Dress Code Policy and so informed the

Petitioner.

23. The Petitioner thereupon reported Ms. Williams and

Ms. Hudson's comments to Mr. Coleman. Mr. Coleman reviewed the

Petitioner's workplace attire and informed her that her

workpants were appropriate. He allowed her to remain at the

store and she was not coached or disciplined in any way.

24. The Petitioner admits that each time she complained

about an incident regarding her compliance with the Company's

Dress Code Policy, that Mr. Coleman remedied the problem. The

Petitioner was never required to change her work attire due to

non-compliance with the Dress Code Policy. She was never

required to change her hair color or style. She never received

a disciplinary coaching, nor was she ever sent home as a result

of her workplace attire or her hair color or styling. In

summary, during the entire course of her period of employment

with Wal-Mart, as relevant to this case, she never suffered an

adverse employment action.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

25. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this

proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).

26. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009), provides that

"it is unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to

discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital status."

27. The Petitioner maintains that she was discriminated

against, in essence, through imposition of harassment and a

hostile work environment because she is African-American. She

also claims she was discriminated against when the Respondent

failed to accommodate her purported disability. Because of the

substantial similarities between the relevant provisions of

Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), federal decisions interpreting and

applying the ADA have been held to be instructive in cases

arising under Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009). Chanda

v. Englehard/ICC , 234 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000). The

Petitioner's disability discrimination claim is based on events

occurring prior to January 1, 2009. Therefore, the Amendments

Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008),

effective January 1, 2009, does not apply to the instant case.

Fikes v. WalMart Inc. , 322 Fed. Appx. 882, 883 (11th Cir. 2009).

28. The Petitioner established no direct evidence of

discrimination. Therefore, in order to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination, she must establish an inference of

discrimination under the burden-shifting provisions set forth in

McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

29. The Petitioner must establish that: (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse

employment action; (3) similarly-situated employees outside of

her protected category or class were treated more favorably by

the Respondent; and (4) she was qualified for the job.

Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997).

30. If the Petitioner established a prima facie case, then

the Respondent would be required to provide a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the relevant, adverse employment

action. Smith v. Horner , 839 F.2d 1530, 1536-37 (11th Cir.

1988). If a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

employment action at issue is shown by the Respondent employer,

then the Petitioner must come forward with evidence to show that

such a reason is really a pretext for what amounts to

intentional discrimination.

31. The Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of

race or disability discrimination because she failed to show

that she was subjected to an adverse employment action. "An

adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision,

such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that

'alters the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment

opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an

employee.'" Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents , 212 F.3d 571,

587 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh , 120

F.3d 1286, 1300 (3rd. Cir. 1997)); Davis v. Town of Lake Park ,

245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the

employee's subjective view of the significance of the employer's

action is not controlling; rather, the employment action must be

materially adverse to a reasonable person under the

circumstances."). In the instant situation, the Petitioner must

show that she suffered a significant change in employment

status. She failed to adduce any evidence which persuasively

shows that.

32. The Petitioner failed to establish that she suffered

an adverse employment action during the one year statute of

limitations period prior to filing her complaint with the

Commission. Indeed, she admitted that from the time she was

hired until she filed the subject complaint, that she never

suffered a tangible loss of any kind. To the contrary, all of

her performance appraisals were positive, and she received a pay

increase each year of her employment with the Respondent. More

particularly, with regard to the above-found facts, as to each

potential situation involving any suggestion that the Petitioner

had violated Company policy, no disciplinary action was imposed

and her personnel record was even cleansed of any reference to

it, in the manner found above.

33. The Petitioner has failed to establish that she

suffered an adverse employment action, which is fatal to both

her race and disability discrimination claims. See Davis ,

supra. at 1238. Because the Petitioner failed to provide direct

evidence of any discriminatory intent and because she has not

established her prima facie discrimination claim, as to

disability or race, through presumption, her claims must fail as

a matter of law.

Racial Discrimination Based Upon Harassment

34. Moreover, in order to establish a claim based upon

racially-related harassment, the Petitioner is required to show

that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based

upon a protected classification (her race); (4) the harassment

was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and

conditions of her employment and create a hostile working

environment; and (5) there is a basis for holding the Respondent

liable. Alexander v. Opelika City Schools , 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS

24686 (11th Cir. 2009).

35. In order to determine whether alleged "harassing"

conduct is sufficiently "severe or pervasive," courts will

evaluate: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of

the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening

or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether

the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job

performance. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. , 277 F.3d 1269,

1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The Petitioner failed to establish

several essential elements of the racial harassment claim and it

is without merit.

36. Her claim is based upon the following allegations:

(1) that Ms. Sanderson "harassed" the Petitioner when she

questioned whether her hair color was in compliance with the

Company's Dress Code Policy; and (2) that she was "harassed"

when various members of management, including African-American

managers, questioned whether her clothing was in compliance with

the Company Dress Code Policy. The preponderant, persuasive

evidence demonstrates that Ms. Sanderson's comment and or the

comments made by the store's management personnel regarding the

Petitioner's workplace attire and appearance were not based upon

her race. The comments were not frequent or severe enough to

create any semblance of an abusive work environment. Moreover,

the Petitioner readily admitted in hearing in her testimony,

that Ms. Sanderson's comment regarding her hair color was not

racially-motivated.

37. The Petitioner's complaint of discrimination is really

premised on comments that are nothing more than the "ordinary

trials and tribulations of the workplace," which, as a matter of

law, will not support a harassment claim. See Burlington

Northern and Sante Fe Railway Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53 (2006).

The conduct of which the Petitioner complains is not racially-

related and is not severe or pervasive enough as to alter the

terms and conditions of the Petitioner's job. Therefore, the

harassment claim has not been established.

38. Even if the Petitioner had established such a prima

facie harassment claim, the Respondent may still avoid liability

by showing: (1) that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent

and correct any harassing behavior;" and (2) that Petitioner

"unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or

corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid

harm otherwise." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775,

807 (1998).

39. Based upon its establishment of an Anti-Harassment

Policy and its Open Door Policy requiring Associates to report

any perceived act of harassment, as well as the fact that the

Petitioner was aware of these policies, it cannot be disputed

that the Respondent exercised reasonable care to prevent and

correct any harassing behavior.

40. Indeed, as Petitioner admits, every time she made a

complaint regarding imagined harassment, the Respondent promptly

responded and corrected any behavior which might possibly be

deemed to be harassing.

The Disability Claim

41. In order to establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination the Petitioner must demonstrate: (1) that she

has a qualified disability; (2) that she is qualified for the

job at issue; and (3) that she was subjected to unlawful

discrimination because of her disability. See D'Angelo v.

Conagra Foods , 422 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005).

42. "It is insufficient for individuals attempting to

prove disability status . . . to merely submit evidence of a

medical diagnosis of impairment. Instead, the ADA requires

those claiming the Act's protection . . . to prove a disability

by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused

by their impairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is

substantial." Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg , 527 U.S. 555,

567 (1999). An impairment must be of a considerable nature or

to a large degree, and its impact must also be permanent or long

term. Toyota Motor Manuf., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S.

184, 196-98 (2002) (The terms "major life activities" and

"substantial limitation" must be "interpreted strictly to create

a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. . . "). In

order to determine if a petitioner's ailments substantially

limit his or her activities, courts look to federal regulations

which define the term "substantially limits" to mean:

"[u]nable to perform a major life activity

that the average person in the general

population can perform" or "[s]ignificantly

restricted as to the condition, manner or

duration under which an individual can

perform a major life activity as compared to

the condition, manner or duration under

which the average person in the general

population can perform the same major life

activity."

Hilburn v. Maruta Elecs. N. Am. Inc. , 181 F.3d 1220, 1227

evaluating the existence of a disability, the Eleventh Circuit

has further directed courts to look at "(1) the nature and the

severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected

duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long term

impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or

resulting from the impairment." Id . at n.13 (citing 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(j)(2). The Petitioner in this case simply did not

adduce any persuasive evidence under the above standards, to

establish that she has any impairment, that it is a significant

impairment and that it significantly limits or impairs any major

life activity such as working, ambulating, etc.

43. The Petitioner, in fact, offered little more than a

vague, general description of her purported disability. She

failed to provide any evidence or explanation as to how this

purported condition limits any major life activities. Moreover,

on May 13, 2008, the Petitioner provided the Respondent with

medical documentation that showed that she was released to go

back to work at the Respondent's store location at issue, in the

position of Customer Service Representative, with no medically-

related restrictions.

44. The Petitioner therefore failed to establish that she

was disabled as a matter of law, thus failing to establish the

prima facie case for disability and disability discrimination.

Thus, to the extent she has made a claim for alleged failure to

accommodate her disability, the claim becomes untenable. See

Albright v. Columbia County Board of Educ. , 135 Fed. Appx. 344,

346 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, to establish an actionable

failure to accommodate claim, it must be demonstrated that the

employee is disabled within the meaning of the ADA).

45. The above facts show that as a result of her car

accident, in June 2007, more than one year before the Petitioner

filed the complaint of discrimination with the Commission, the

Petitioner submitted a request for a reasonable accommodation.

That request was granted by the Respondent. The Petitioner

never thereafter requested an additional accommodation for any

disability. This is also fatal to her claim concerning failure

to accommodate. An employee must request an accommodation and

be denied such prior to bringing a reasonable accommodation

claim under Title I of the ADA. Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens

and Home, Inc. , 167 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1999).

46. Moreover, in order to establish that the Petitioner

was subjected to unlawful discrimination by failure to

accommodate her purported disability, she is required to show

that she suffered some adverse employment action. See Doe v.

DeKalb County School District , 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir.

1998). The Petitioner here never suffered an adverse employment

action during the relevant time period, as delineated in the

above Findings of Fact. Therefore, the failure to accommodate

claim is without merit because the only request to accommodate

was honored by the Respondent and because no adverse employment

action ever occurred.

47. In summary, the above Findings of Fact show that the

Petitioner has not established with preponderant, persuasive

evidence either her claim based upon racial discrimination or

based upon disability discrimination. She has not established a

prima facie case under either theory of discrimination because

she is not established that any of the comments or other acts

she described in her evidence were racially motivated nor did

she prove the required elements of establishing a disability.

Moreover, she did not establish that the disability was not

reasonably accommodated, if it had existed, because the only

accommodation request was granted. Finally, and most pointedly,

she did not establish that any adverse employment action ever

occurred. Consequently, the Petitioner's claim must fail.

RECOMMENDATION

Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and

demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of

the parties, it is, therefore,

RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida

Commission on Human Relations denying the petition in its

entirety.

DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of January, 2010, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

P. MICHAEL RUFF

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone]

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 4th day of January, 2010.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Cornelius D. Boone, Esquire

Littler Mendelson, P.C.

3344 Peachtree Road Northeast, Suite 1500

Atlanta, Georgia 30326

Tracy Francis

284 Water Oak Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32305

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Larry Kranert, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.