09-001515 George Spivak vs. Office Of Financial Regulation Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, June 9, 2009.

Summary: Applicant for mortgage broker license who failed to disclose disqualifying civil judgment on application and had other disqualifying "violations" should not be granted licensure.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GEORGE SPIVAK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 09-1515

)

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, )

)

Respondent. )

_________________________________)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted in this case on

April 30, 2009, by telephone conference call at sites in West

Palm Beach and Tallahassee, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a

duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: George Spivak, pro se

118 Cassilly Way

Jupiter, Florida 33458

For Respondent: Robert H. Schott, Esquire

Assistant General Counsel

Office of Financial Regulation

P.O. Box 8050

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-8050

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a

mortgage broker should be denied on the grounds set forth in the

Office of Financial Regulation's October 31, 2008, Notice of

Denial of Application.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By issuance of a Notice of Denial of Application (Notice of

Denial) on October 31, 2008, the Office of Financial Regulation

(Office) advised Petitioner that it had preliminarily decided to

deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker

based on the following:

(a) On September 2, 1999, the National

Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD,"

now known as Financial Industry Regulatory

Authority or FINRA) found that you had

violated securities rules and regulations.

Specifically, NASD found that you had

churned six accounts[,] making unsuitable

bond purchases for three of those

accounts[,] and making material

misrepresentations of fact in selling one

bond issue to those clients. As a result,

NASD enjoined you from committing future

violations and barred you from association

with any broker or dealer. These actions by

NASD and your conduct state grounds for

license denial within the meaning of section

494.0041(2)(q) and (u)1., Florida Statutes.

(b) On September 26, 2001, the State of

Washington Department of Financial

Institutions Securities Division found that

you had acted as an unregistered salesperson

and made misrepresentations of material fact

in connection with the offer and sale of

commodities. As a result, Washington State

ordered you to cease and desist from acting

as an unregistered salesperson and from

violating the anti-fraud provisions of the

Commodities Act of Washington. These

actions by Washington State and your conduct

state grounds for license denial within the

meaning of section 494.0041(2)(q) and (u)1.,

Florida Statutes.

(c) On January 1, 2003, in the U.S. Court

for the Southern District of Florida, in a

civil action Commodit[y] Futures Trading

Commission v. World-Wide Currency Services

Corp., Genady Spivak a.k.a. George Spivak

and Ellison Kent Morrison , [the court]

entered Judgment against Defendants for

Permanent Injunction and other Ancillary

Relief. The court found that you were

director and acted as president of World-

Wide and oversaw its day to day operations.

The court further found that the defendants

engaged in solicitation fraud and fraud by

misappropriation of customer funds. You

caused $226,950 of customer funds to be

disbursed to yourself. The judgment

assessed civil monetary penalties in the

amount of $4,331,658.90 against World-[W]ide

and $1,361,700.00 against you. Your

actions, described in the judgment,

constitute misconduct within the meaning of

section 494.0041(2)(q), and the judgment is

for fraud, misrepresentation and deceit

within the meaning of section

494.0041(2)(t).

(d) In submitting your license application

on June 11, 2008, you answered "NO" to

question 10F that asks:

Has a final judgment been entered against

you in a civil action upon grounds of

fraud, embezzlement, or deceit?

Because of the January 1, 2003 judgment, you

should have answered "YES," and your "NO"

answer was a material misstatement on an

initial application within the meaning of

section 494.0041(2)(c), Florida Statutes.

(e) On June 18, 2008, the Office of

Financial Regulation, in processing your

current license application, wrote a letter

advising you of deficiencies in your

application. That letter instructed you

inter alia , to provide the Office of

[Financial Regulation] certified copies of

any administrative final orders entered

against you. That letter advised you of a

September 16, 2008 deadline. As of today,

you have not complied. This is a violation

of the requirements of Rule 60V-40.031(2),

Florida Administrative Code, and is a ground

for denial within the meaning of subsection

494.0041(2)(j).[ 1 ]

The facts stated immediately above are

grounds for denial of your application based

on section 494.0041(2)(c),(j),(q),(t) and

(u)1, Florida Statutes, and Rule 69V-

40.031(2), Florida Administrative Code,

quoted above. . . .

On November 17, 2008, Petitioner submitted to the Office a

written request for a hearing "to contest this action of [the

Office]." On December 2, 2008, the Office issued an Order

Dismissing Petition for Hearing with Leave to Amend. On

December 23, 2008, Petitioner filed an amended hearing request.

Upon reviewing the amended hearing request, the Office

determined that it did not raise any disputed issues of material

fact. Accordingly, it appointed an Informal Hearing Officer to

conduct proceedings in accordance with Section 120.57(2),

Florida Statutes.

The Office subsequently determined, during the discovery

process, that "a disputed issue of material fact probably

exist[ed]." It therefore, on March 20, 2009, referred the

matter to DOAH for a "formal hearing."

As noted above, the hearing was held on April 30, 2009.

Petitioner was the only witness who testified at the hearing.

In addition to Petitioner's testimony, nine exhibits

(Respondent's Exhibits A through I) were offered and received

into evidence.

At the close of the taking of evidence, the undersigned

announced on the record that if the parties desired to file

proposed recommended orders they had to so no later than 21 days

from the date of the filing of the hearing transcript with DOAH.

The hearing Transcript (consisting of one volume) was filed

with DOAH on May 13, 2009.

The Office filed its Proposed Recommended Order on June 3,

2009. To date, Petitioner has not filed any post-hearing

submittal.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as

a whole, the following findings of fact are made:

1. Petitioner held a Series 7 securities license before it

was revoked in 1999 by the National Association of Securities

Dealers (NASD). As alleged in the Notice of Denial (and as

Petitioner admitted during his testimony at the final hearing),

NASD took such action on September 2, 1999, based upon its

finding that Petitioner had violated securities rules and

regulations by "churning six accounts[,] making unsuitable bond

purchases for three of those accounts[,] and making material

misrepresentations of fact in selling one bond issue to those

clients." NASD "enjoined [Petitioner] from committing future

violations and barred [him] from association with any broker or

dealer."

2. As alleged in the Notice of Denial (and as Petitioner

admitted during his testimony at the final hearing), "[o]n

September 26, 2001, the State of Washington Department of

Financial Institutions Securities Division found that

[Petitioner] had acted as an unregistered salesperson and made

misrepresentations of material fact in connection with the offer

and sale of commodities" and, based upon this finding, "ordered

[Petitioner] to cease and desist from acting as an unregistered

salesperson and from violating the anti-fraud provisions of the

Commodities Act of Washington."

3. On or about January 13, 2003, the Commodity Futures

Trading Commission filed a two-count civil complaint in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida (Civil Action No. 03-80032) against Petitioner, World-

Wide Currency Services Corporation (of which he was a director

and president) and Ellison Kent Morrison. Count I of the

complaint alleged an "offer and sale of commodity future

contracts not conducted or subject to a Board or Trade which

ha[d] been designated as a contract market or a transaction

execution facility." Count II of the complaint alleged

"solicitation fraud and fraud by misappropriation of customer

funds." According to the complaint, these acts occurred from

December 21, 2000, up until the filing of the complaint.

4. As alleged in the Notice of Denial (and as Petitioner

admitted during his testimony at the final hearing), a Summary

Judgment against Defendants for Permanent Injunction and other

Ancillary Relief" (Judgment) was entered against Petitioner and

his co-defendants in Civil Action No. 03-80032). 2

4. The Judgment was entered on August 5, 2004, 3 and filed

with the clerk of the court four days later. It contained the

following "Conclusions of Law":

23. Defendants violated section 4(a) of the

Commodity Exchange Act ("the Act") 7 U.S.C.

§ 6a (2003), since the futures contracts

sold by the Defendants are not conducted on

or subject to the rules of a board of trade

which has been designated or registered by

the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission

as a contract market or derivatives

transaction facility for such contract.

24. Defendants violated Section 4b(a)(2)(i)

and (iii) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(i)

and (iii) (2003) and Commission Regulation

1.1, 17 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2003), by making

materially false representations concerning

the likelihood that customers will profit

from purchasing futures contracts from the

Defendants, and by making false

representations and material omissions

concerning the risk of loss.

25. Defendants violated Section 4b(a)(2)(i)

and (iii) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2)(i)

and (iii) (2003) and Commission Regulation

1.1, 17 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2003), by

misappropriating customer funds for personal

expenses.

26. Defendant Spiva[]k is additionally

liable as a controlling person under Section

13(b) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b), because

(1) World-Wide, the corporate entity[,]

violated the Act; (2) Spiva[]k "directly or

indirectly" controlled that corporate

entity; and (3) Spiva[]k "did not act in

good faith or knowingly induced, directly or

indirectly, the act or acts constituting the

violation." CFTC v. Baragosh , 278 F.3d 319,

330 (4th Cir. 2002).

5. Injunctive relief as well as the following monetary

relief were granted in the Judgment:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment for

restitution, disgorgement, and civil

monetary penalties shall be entered in favor

of the Commission and against Defendants

World-Wide, Spiva[]k, and Morris, for which

Defendants shall be jointly and severally

liable for the following:

A. Restitution for injured investors in the

amount of $1,092,880.60, which includes pre-

judgment interest, plus any post-judgment

interest which accrues following the entry

of this Order. The judgment amount for

restitution represents the monies received

by Defendants from customers less any

refunds or other payments received by

customers from Defendants or customer funds

that have been frozen pursuant to the asset

freeze.

C. [sic] Civil Penalties in an amount to be

determined following an evidentiary hearing

and upon due notice to the Defendants. The

judgment amount for civil monetary penalties

shall be payable only upon full

satisfaction[] of judgments for restitution.

6. An Order Assessing Civil Monetary Penalties was

subsequently issued in the case on January 4, 2005. It

provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The plaintiff's motion for assessment of

civil monetary penalties is GRANTED.

2. A civil monetary penalty in the amount

of $4,331,658.90 is here entered against

defendant World[-]Wide Currency Services

Corporation.

2. A civil monetary penalty in the amount

of $1,361,700.00 is here entered against

defendant Genady Spiva[]k a/k/a George

Spiva[]k.

* * *

7. Petitioner has not paid any of the court-ordered

restitution in Civil Action No. 03-80032, notwithstanding that

in 2005 and 2006, his annual income was approximately

$110,000.00 and $98,000.00, respectively. 4

8. Petitioner ended his association with World-Wide

Currency Services Corp. in February 2004.

9. From March 2004 through August 2008, Petitioner was

employed as a "loan originator" for Alliance Home Mortgage

(March 2004, through January 2007), United Home Mortgage

(February 2007, through April 2008), and United Capital Lenders

(April 2008, through August 2008). Petitioner is unaware of

there having been any client complaints lodged against him

during the time he worked as a "loan originator." 5

10. On June 11, 2008, Petitioner filed his original

Application for Licensure as a Mortgage Broker (Original

Application) with the Office. On his Original Application, he

falsely answered "No" to the each of the following questions:

10C. Have you had a license, or the

equivalent, to practice any profession or

occupation denied, revoked, suspended, or

otherwise acted against?

10F. Has a final judgment been entered

against you in a civil action upon grounds

of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresentation,

or deceit?

11. On June 26, 2008, after having been told during a

telephone conversation with Tonya Knight, a Financial

Examiner/Analyst II with the Office, "that there was a problem"

with his answer to Question 10C. on the Original Application, 6

Petitioner filed an amended Application for Licensure as a

Mortgage Broker (Amended Application) with the Office. On the

Amended Application, Petitioner correctly answered "Yes" to

Question 10C.; however, in answering Question 10F., he continued

to maintain that a "final judgment [had not ] been entered

against [him] in a civil action upon grounds of fraud,

embezzlement, misrepresentation, or deceit," even though he knew

that this was not true.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

12. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

proceeding and of the parties hereto pursuant to Chapter 120,

Florida Statutes.

13. Petitioner has applied to the Office to become

licensed in Florida as a mortgage broker.

14. Pursuant to Section 494.0033(2), Florida Statutes, any

"natural person" is qualified to be issued such a license if

that person:

(a) Is at least 18 years of age and has a

high school diploma or its equivalent.

(b) Has passed a written test adopted and

administered by the [O]ffice, or has passed

an electronic test adopted and administered

by the [O]ffice or a third party approved by

the [O]ffice, which is designed to determine

competency in primary and subordinate

mortgage financing transactions as well as

to test knowledge of ss. 494.001-494.0077

and the rules adopted pursuant

thereto. . . .

(c) Has submitted a completed application

and a nonrefundable application fee of $195.

(d) Has filed a complete set of

fingerprints for submission by the [O]ffice

to the Department of Law Enforcement or the

Federal Bureau of Investigation for

processing.

Additionally, the applicant "must have completed 24 hours of

classroom education on primary and subordinate financing

transactions and the laws and rules of ss. 494.001-494.0077 to

be eligible for licensure." § 494.0033(3), Fla. Stat.

15. An applicant who meets the foregoing qualifications

for licensure may nonetheless be denied licensure pursuant to

Section 494.0033(4), Florida Statutes, "if the applicant has

committed any violation specified in ss. 494.001-494.0077 or has

pending against her or him any criminal prosecution or

administrative enforcement action, in any jurisdiction, which

involves fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral

turpitude."

16. Furthermore, Section 494.0041, Florida Statutes,

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) Whenever the [O]ffice finds a person in

violation of an act specified in subsection

(2), it may enter an order imposing one or

more of the following penalties against the

person:

* * *

(f) Denial of a license or registration.

(2) Each of the following acts constitutes

a ground for which the disciplinary actions

specified in subsection (1) may be taken:

* * *

(c) A material misstatement of fact on an

initial or renewal application.

* * *

(q) Commission of fraud, misrepresentation,

concealment, dishonest dealing by trick,

scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or

breach of trust in any business transaction

in any state, nation, or territory; or

aiding, assisting, or conspiring with any

other person engaged in any such misconduct

and in furtherance thereof.

* * *

(t) Having a final judgment entered against

the applicant . . . in a civil action upon

grounds of fraud, embezzlement,

misrepresentation, or deceit.

(u)1. Having been the subject of any

decision, finding, injunction, suspension,

prohibition, revocation, denial, judgment,

or administrative order by any court of

competent jurisdiction, administrative law

judge, state or federal agency, national

securities exchange, national commodities

exchange, national option exchange, national

securities association, national commodities

association, or national option association

involving a violation of any federal or

state securities or commodities law or rule

or regulation adopted under such law or

involving a violation of any rule or

regulation of any national securities,

commodities, or options exchange or

association.

* * *

17. In the instant case, the Office preliminarily denied

Petitioner's application for licensure based on the action taken

against him by the NASD on September 2, 1999 (which the Office

alleged constituted grounds for denial pursuant to Section

494.0041(2)(q) and (u)1., Florida Statutes); the action taken

against him by the State of Washington Department of Financial

Institutions Securities Division on September 26, 2001 (which

the Office alleged constituted grounds for denial pursuant to

Section 494.0041(2)(q) and (u)1., Florida Statutes); the final

judgment entered in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.

World-Wide Currency Services Corp, Genady Spivak a/k/a George

Spivak and Ellison Kent Morrison , United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida Civil Action No. 03-80032

(which the Office alleged constituted grounds for denial

pursuant to Section 494.0041(2)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes);

and his making a "material misstatement" in his response to

Question 10F. on his application for licensure (which the Office

alleged constituted grounds for denial pursuant to Section

494.0041(2)(c), Florida Statutes).

18. Petitioner was granted a hearing before a DOAH

administrative law judge to challenge this preliminary

determination.

19. At the hearing, it was the Office's burden to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence the foregoing "violations"

alleged in its Notice of Denial. See M. H. v. Department of

Children and Family Services , 977 So. 2d 755, 762-63 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2008)("[I]f the licensing agency proposes to deny the

requested license based on specific acts of misconduct, then the

agency assumes the burden of proving the specific acts of

misconduct that it claims demonstrate the applicant's lack of

fitness to be licensed. . . . The only issue before the ALJ was

DCF's stated reason for denying the application for the renewal

of their foster care license, i.e., whether 'C. S., while in

[the Foster Parents'] care, suffered an injury that required

significant pulling force and [that] could not be considered

accidental.' . . . This issue involved a charge of specific

misconduct upon which DCF relied as its sole reason for the

denial of the Foster Parents' application for the renewal of

their foster care license. Accordingly, DCF had the burden of

proving this charge of specific misconduct by a preponderance of

the evidence.").

20. Through its evidentiary presentation at hearing, the

Office established by a preponderance of the evidence that

Petitioner's application for licensure is subject to denial

pursuant to Section 494.0041(2)(u)1., Florida Statutes, based on

the action taken against him by the NASD on September 2, 1999,

and the action taken against him by the State of Washington

Department of Financial Institutions Securities Division on

September 26, 2001, as alleged in the Notice of Denial; that it

is subject to denial pursuant to Section 494.0041(2)(t), Florida

Statutes, based on the final judgment entered in Commodity

Futures Trading Commission v. World-Wide Currency Services Corp,

Genady Spivak a/k/a George Spivak and Ellison Kent Morrison ,

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida Civil Action No. 03-80032, as alleged in the Notice of

Denial; and that it is subject to denial pursuant to Section

494.0041(2)(c), Florida Statutes, based on his having made a

material misstatement of fact in his response to Question 10F.

on his application for licensure. 7

21. The evidentiary record reveals no reason why the

Office should decline to exercise its authority to deny

Petitioner's application for licensure pursuant to Section

494.0041(2)(c), (t) and (u)1., Florida Statutes. While

Petitioner has asserted that "he has been rehabilitated[ 8 ] and is

entitled to the grant of his mortgage broker's license," the

record evidence simply does not support this claim. 9

22. In view of foregoing, Petitioner's application for

licensure should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation issue a

Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a

mortgage broker.

DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2009, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

STUART M. LERNER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone] SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 9th day of June, 2009.

ENDNOTES

1 In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Office announced that

it was abandoning this ground for denial.

2 Petitioner was represented by counsel in this civil

litigation.

3 The Notice of Denial erroneously alleged that the Judgment had

been entered on January 1, 2003.

4 Petitioner "lives in a single-family home in a gated . . . up-

scale neighborhood." He testified at hearing that the money he

made in 2005 and 2006 was "not a lot of money to [him]" and it

was just enough to enable him to keep "paying [his] bills."

5 No one other than Petitioner testified at the final hearing

concerning Petitioner's work record as a "loan originator."

6 Prior to speaking with Ms. Knight, Petitioner had received a

letter from her, dated June 18, 2008, which read, in pertinent

part, as follows:

The State of Florida, Office of Financial

Regulation ("Office") is in receipt of your

application for Mortgage Broker license on

June 11, 2008.

In order for the application to be deemed

complete, it will be necessary for you to

provide this office with the following:

* * *

- Please provide an explanation as to

why you answered "No" to Question . . .

10C . . . . According to the Financial

Industry Regulatory Authority's (FINRA)

CRD report . . . you were barred from

association with any broker or dealer.

If applicable, please amend your

application on the Real System. Please

provide copies of all documents

pertaining to each unrelated event

referred to in Question . . .

10C . . . . Such documentation includes,

but is not limited to, certified copies

of all documents supporting the charges

that were filed against you and the

disposition of each charge. If you

assert that you have been rehabilitated,

submit copies of all documents in support

of your rehabilitation. . . .

- Provide proof of fines or restitution

paid including amount and date paid.

* * *

The Office must receive a response resolving

all deficiencies by September 16, 2008.

Failure to provide all the requested

information by the deadline is deemed by the

Office as grounds for denial of the

application.

* * *

7 No "violation" of Section 494.0041(2)(q), Florida Statutes,

was proven, however. Cf. Williams v. Castor , 613 So. 2d 97, 99

(Fla. 1st DCA 1993)("The law is well established that a judgment

of conviction of a criminal offense . . . is not admissible in a

subsequent civil proceeding as proof of the facts on which it is

based. Thus, proof of the fact of Appellant's conviction by a

copy of the criminal judgment was not legally sufficient to

prove that Appellant was guilty of violating any of the statutes

or rules the EPC found him guilty of violating, other than

section 231.28(1)(e).")(citations omitted); Estate of Wallace v.

Fisher , 567 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)("Florida courts

have consistently held that a judgment of conviction in a

criminal prosecution is not admissible in a civil action as

evidence of the facts upon which it is based."); Nunez v.

Gonzalez , 456 So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)("It is well

settled that a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution

cannot be introduced into evidence in a civil action to

establish the truth of the facts upon which it was rendered.");

and Nell v. International Union of Operating Engineers,

Local # 675 , 427 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)

("[C]ollateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, requires

identity of parties in both actions. . . . [I]issues common to

civil and criminal proceedings, directly determined in the prior

criminal proceeding, would have to be tried anew in the civil

action.").

8 Petitioner bore the burden at hearing of proving his

rehabilitation. See Beshore v. Department of Financial

Services , 928 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)("As a general

rule, the burden of proof is on the party asserting the

affirmative of an issue."); and Espinoza v. Department of

Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Board of

Professional Engineers , 739 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA

1999)("The general rule is that, apart from statute, the burden

of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue

before an administrative tribunal.").

9 That Petitioner's most recent "violation" (his falsification

of his licensure application) occurred less than a year ago and

that he has not paid any of the court-ordered restitution in

Civil Action No. 03-80032 are among the factors weighing against

a finding of rehabilitation in the instant case. See Hester v.

Department of Financial Services, Office of Financial

Regulation , No. 05-2107, 2005 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 1311

*31 (Fla. DOAH September 12, 2005)(Recommended Order)("[I]t is

the repeated unwillingness of the Petitioner to be forthcoming

in the application process that demonstrates Petitioner's lack

of appreciation for truthfulness, honesty and integrity. The

continuation of such behavior also undermines any argument that

he has been rehabilitated from the events providing grounds for

denial in this case."); Comas v. Department of Financial

Services, Office of Financial Regulation , No. 03-1738, slip op .

at 9 (Fla. DOAH September 30, 2003)(Recommended Order)("One

element of rehabilitation is making restitution to one's

victims."); Fonseca v. Department of Juvenile Justice , No. 99-

3931 , 2000 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 5071 *9 (Fla. DOAH April

27, 2000)(Recommended Order)("By his dishonesty in applying for

employment with the Department, Fonseca has shown that he is not

rehabilitated and is not entitled to an exemption from

disqualification from employment."); and Goings v. Secretary of

State, Division of Licensing , No. 80-2062S, 1981 Fla. Div. Adm.

Hear. LEXIS 4353 *5 (Fla. DOAH January 7, 1981)(Recommended

Order)("The undersigned is not persuaded by Petitioner's

position at the hearing in this cause that his criminal record

constitutes mistakes made in his past and that he is entitled to

begin life anew. While it has been three years since the

Petitioner's last conviction, and while the passage of time may

well indicate a reformed intent to abide by and respect the laws

of the state, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

rehabilitation when he continues to rely upon dishonesty when he

deems it appropriate.").

COPIES FURNISHED :

George Spivak

118 Cassilly Way

Jupiter, Florida 33458

Robert H. Schott, Esquire

Assistant General Counsel

Office of Financial Regulation

P.O. Box 8050

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-8050

Alex Hager, Acting Commissioner

Office of Financial Regulation

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Robert Beitler, General Counsel

Office of Financial Regulation

200 East Gaines Street, Suite 526

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.