09-003597GM Bonnie Conklin And Wendy Goodson vs. Putnam County, Florida Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, December 24, 2009.

Summary: Petitioners proved that the proposed amendment is not in compliance because it locates an industrial use in a rural residential neighborhood with inadequate road access.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

BONNIE CONKLIN AND WENDY )

GOODSON, )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 09-3597GM

)

PUTNAM COUNTY, FLORIDA, )

)

Respondent, )

and )

)

STOKES LANDING ENTERPRISES, )

LLC, )

)

Intervenor. )

)

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The final hearing in this case was held on August 31

through September 1, 2009, in Palatka, Florida, before Bram D.

E. Canter, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Michael W. Woodward, Esquire

Keyser & Woodward, P.A.

501 Atlantic Avenue

Interlachen, Florida 32148

Craig Z. Sherar, Esquire

2701 South Bayshore Drive, Suite 303

Miami, Florida 33133

For Respondent: Russell D. Castleberry, Esquire

Post Office Box 759

Palatka, Florida 32148

For Intervenor: T. R. Hainline, Esquire

Ellen Avery-Smith, Esquire

Rogers Towers, P.A.

7 Waldo Street

St. Augustine, Florida 32084

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether the amendment to the

Putnam County Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance 2009-23 is

"in compliance," as that term is defined in Section

163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). 1/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On June 9, 2009, Putnam County adopted Ordinance 2009-23,

which amended the Future Land Use Map (“FLUM”) of the Putnam

County Comprehensive Plan to change the future land use

designation for a 2.4-acre parcel from Agriculture II to

Industrial. The parcel is owned by Intervenor and located at

597 Stokes Landing Road, which is south of Palatka in Putnam

County (“the Property”).

Because the amendment is a “small scale development

amendment,” as defined in Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida

Statutes, no compliance review was conducted and no notice of

intent was issued by the Department of Community Affairs.

Petitioners filed a petition for an administrative hearing with

DOAH to challenge the amendment. They subsequently amended

their petition.

At the final hearing, Joint Exhibits 1 through 5 and 7

through 18 were admitted into evidence. Petitioners presented

the testimony of Bonnie Conklin, Wendy Goodson, William Wilson,

Cathy Jenkins, and expert planner Mack Cope. Petitioners’

Exhibits 2.1 through 2.4, 3.1 through 3.90, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13.1

through 13.3, 17A, and 17B were admitted into evidence. The

County and Intervenor presented the testimony of Kenneth Gstohl;

planning experts Brian Hammons, Laura Dedenbach, and Lanny

Harker; wetland expert Jonathan Napier,; and surveyor Earl

Wallace. The testimony of Lanny Harker was presented through

the transcript of his deposition. Respondent/Intervenor’s

Exhibits 2, 3.1 through 3.4, 4 (pages 14 through 26, 28, 31

through 33, and 35 through 41), 7, 8(f), 8(g), 10, 17, 19, and

21 through 26 were admitted into evidence.

The three-volume transcript of the final hearing was

prepared and filed with DOAH. The parties filed Proposed

Recommended Orders, which were carefully considered in the

preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Parties

1. Petitioner Bonnie Conklin resides and owns property at

600 Stokes Landing Road. She submitted oral comments to the

County at the adoption hearing on the amendment.

2. Petitioner Wendy Goodson owns property at 595 Stokes

Landing Road in Putnam County. She submitted oral comments to

the County at the adoption hearing on the amendment.

3. Putnam County is a political subdivision of the State

and has adopted a comprehensive plan which it amends from time

to time pursuant to Section 163.3167(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

4. Intervenor Stokes Landing Enterprises, LLC (“Stokes

Landing”), is a Florida limited liability company. It owns the

Property affected by the amendment and submitted oral comments

and evidence during the local hearings on the amendment.

The Amendment

5. The amendment changes the future land use designation

of the Property from Agriculture II to Industrial. Section One

of Ordinance 2009-23 provides that the re-designation of the

Property is subject to the terms and conditions of the

development agreement between the County and Stokes Landing,

which is attached as an exhibit to the ordinance.

6. The Property has approximately 220 feet of frontage on

the St. Johns River. The development agreement requires that

the Property be developed as a Planned Unit Development (PUD)

for a “ship building and repair facility.” Contemporaneous with

the adoption of the amendment, the County rezoned the Property

to PUD.

7. The development agreement includes the following

recitals:

D. Developer and the County wish to enter

into this Agreement to set forth the

conditions under which development of the

facility shall be used.

E. The County has entered into this

Agreement in consideration of the commitment

by Developer to construct certain

improvements as further described in Section

3 below (hereinafter the “Improvements”);

and to redevelop the site and utilize the

Property as a Planned Unit Development (PUD)

only, with the understanding that the

Developer shall apply for a PUD to operate a

ship building and repair facility.

* * *

G. The conditions specified within a

Planned Unit Development (PUD) zoning

district established by Developer pursuant

to this Agreement will aid redevelopment of

the Property, limit localized impacts of the

Property and advance the implementation of

the County’s Comprehensive Plan.

8. Section 3 of the development agreement requires that

the developer make the following improvements:

(a) Access Roadway Improvement: Developer

at its sole cost and expense shall design,

engineer, permit, construct and install in

accordance with all applicable laws, rules

and regulations and the County’s approval of

the design, the improvement(s) of the Access

Roadway from Stokes Landing Road to the

subject site via the established access

easements. County approvals shall not be

unreasonably withheld.

(b) Timing: Developer shall complete the

Access Roadway Improvements prior to

starting redevelopment of the site for the

proposed ship building and repair use.

(c) Planned Unit Development (PUD) Zoning:

Developer shall obtain approval of rezoning

the Property to PUD prior to starting

redevelopment of the site and shall maintain

the approved PUD zoning throughout the

duration of the Industrial future land use

on the site. This requirement does not

preclude any future request for a

Comprehensive Plan Amendment to another

future land use category and subsequent

associated rezoning requests to a compatible

zoning district.

The Property and Surrounding Land Uses

9. Most land uses contiguous to or adjacent to the

Property are residential uses on lands designated Agriculture

II. However, 100 feet south of the Property are lands along the

St. Johns River designated Conservation. There are other

Conservation lands across the river from the Property and north

of the Property.

10. The only other land uses in the area are a commercial

well-drilling business on land designated Agriculture II, and a

shipyard known as St. Johns Ship Building on lands designated

Industrial. The St. Johns Ship Building facility is located on

101 acres and is approximately 900 feet north of the Property.

11. The lands abutting the Property on the west, south,

and east are currently undeveloped. Across the St. Johns River

from the Property is Stokes Island, which is also undeveloped.

12. About 60 percent of the Property lies within the 100-

year flood zone. There are wetlands on the Property which are

generally of low quality due to invasive vegetation.

Historic Uses and Improvements on the Property

13. The staff report for the amendment states that the

purpose of the amendment is to “make the land use designation of

the property consistent with the existing use of the land,”

which “according to the applicant,” has been ship building since

the 1960’s. This statement incorrectly characterizes both the

existing use and the past use of the Property.

14. Aerial photography shows that much of the Property was

cleared in 1943. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the County

hauled shell rock from the Property for road building. The

Property was used intermittently to build fishing vessels

between the 1970's and 1998. The number of vessels that were

built on the Property was not established by the record

evidence. Some barge demolition activities also occurred on the

Property in 2006 and 2007. Intervenor started to build a barge

on the Property in 2008, but was almost immediately stopped by a

County code enforcement officer because such activities are not

allowed under the Property’s agricultural zoning.

15. The evidence shows that the barge building and barge

demolition activities, and probably the earlier boat building

activities, were conducted in violation of the agricultural

zoning of the Property.

16. Two steel mooring pilings and remnants of a dock or

platform are still located on the Property.

17. There was some dispute about whether there still exist

on the Property the rails or “ways” used in the past for hauling

vessels out of the water and for launching vessels. Although a

2008 survey of the Property (Joint Exhibit 12) shows the rails,

they do not appear in recent photographs of the Property

(Respondent/Intervenor’s Exhibits 3.1 through 3.4 and

Petitioners’ Exhibits 13.1 through 13.3).

18. The shoreline along the east boundary of the Property

is not bulkheaded and, except for the clearing that has occurred

on the Property, remains in a relatively natural condition.

Whether the Subject Property is a Port

19. The parties disputed whether the Property is an

existing water port, which is relevant to the Comprehensive Plan

policies regarding the location of industrial uses, as will be

discussed below. The term “port” is not defined in the

Comprehensive Plan. “Port facility” is defined in Florida

Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(92) as:

[H]arbor or shipping improvements used

predominantly for commercial purposes

including channels, turning basins, jetties,

breakwaters, landings, wharves, docks,

markets, structures, buildings, piers,

storage facilities, plazas, anchorages,

utilities, bridges, tunnels, roads,

causeways, and all other property or

facilities necessary or useful in connection

with commercial shipping.

This definition is not particularly helpful in resolving the

dispute in this case, because it is a list of facilities (e.g.,

buildings) that can be associated with a port, rather than an

identification of the elements that are essential to being a

port.

20. In the traffic circulation section of the Putnam

County Comprehensive Plan Data, Inventory, and Analysis, under

the heading “Port Facilities,” there is one water port

identified:

Putnam County is currently served by a small

barge port on the St Johns River, which is

located between downtown Palatka and Rice

Creek. . . . This barge facility is

incorporated into a larger industrial park

setting and provides an alternative method

of moving certain types of goods and

material into and out of the County.

21. The word “port” is defined in Webster’s Dictionary as

town or city where ships may take on or discharge cargo.”

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 889 (1979 ed.) The latter

definition indicates that the transport of cargo by water

between land sites (ports) is the core of the meaning.

22. When deep harbors, channels, and turning basins occur

naturally or are created and used by ships, there is little

cause to dispute that a port exists. Here, there are no such

natural or man-made features. The shoreline at the subject

Property was not shown to differ from much of the shoreline

along the St. Johns River. 2/

23. As indicated above, a port is a transportation

facility where waterborne goods are loaded and unloaded. A port

boats are built, repaired, and stored and often sold or rented.”

Merriam-Webster’s On-Line Dictionary (2009)

24. The remnant boat building facilities on the Property

do not make a port. It is found that the Property was used

intermittently in the past as a boatyard, but it was never a

water port.

Road Access to the Property

25. The Property’s connection to the nearest public, paved

road, is currently by easements over an unpaved drive. A 50-

foot-wide easement extends north from the Property approximately

240 feet over an unpaved drive, then makes a 90-degree turn to

the west along a 25-foot-wide, unpaved easement that runs about

325 feet to the beginning of a paved portion of the easement,

then continues 545 feet further west to the publicly owned and

paved Stokes Landing Road.

26. Petitioners Conklin and Goodson own property and

reside along the 25-foot easement. There are about a dozen

other residences along the easements. There are many other

residences along the public portion of Stokes Landing Road to

its connection with U.S. 19.

27. Petitioners attempted to show that Intervenor’s access

to the Property from the public portion of Stokes Landing Road

is legally insufficient because a small strip of land at the

intersection of the 50-foot easement and the 25-foot easement is

not included in the easements held by Intervenor. However,

because Intervenor showed colorable easement rights over the

entire private roadway, the Administrative Law Judge declined to

take evidence on or determine the merits of the adverse real

property claim.

28. Stokes Landing Road is classified as a “local road” by

Putnam County. It is not an arterial or collector road.

Although the properties along the unpaved road have a mailing

address of Stokes Landing Road, some of the official documents

that describe or depict Stokes Landing Road do not include the

private easement segments.

29. It was estimated that the proposed boatyard would

generate about 30 daily employee vehicle trips and one trip for

pickup or delivery.

30. Intervenor presented evidence that a truck with a

wheel base of 50 feet (typical of a truck and semi-trailer)

could make the 90-degree right turn from a 25-foot-wide roadway

onto a 50-foot-wide roadway. However, to do so, the truck would

have to use the left side of the 25-foot easement and the left

side of the 50-foot easement (from the driver’s perspective).

In other words, the truck would have to enter the lanes used by

oncoming traffic.

Internal Consistency

31. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with Policy A.1.9.3.A.6.d of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE)

of the Comprehensive Plan. That policy states:

Industrial Uses shall be located on sites

that “use existing utilities or resources;

utilize one or more transportation

facilities such as air ports, water ports,

collector roads, arterial roads, and

railroads; do not require significant non-

residential vehicular traffic to pass

through established neighborhoods; and are

sufficiently separated and/or buffered when

necessary from residential and other urban

uses to minimize adverse impacts of noise,

glare, dust, smoke, odor or fumes.

32. The Property is not located on a collector road or

arterial road. It is not a water port.

33. The amendment would require significant non-

residential vehicular traffic to pass through an established

neighborhood. The non-residential traffic is significant

because it more than doubles the existing traffic in the most

rural portion of Stokes Landing Road and would create an unsafe

condition for every trip to and from the Property by a large

truck. It is not sound planning to locate an industrial use on

property that is served only by a narrow residential driveway.

It is not sound planning to locate an industrial use on a road

where access by large trucks will require that the trucks travel

in the oncoming traffic lanes.

34. The Property is not sufficiently separated or buffered

from residential uses to minimize the adverse impacts of noise,

glare, dust, smoke, odor, and fumes. Currently, there are

vacant, wooded parcels adjacent to the Property, but the

Intervenor has no control over these parcels and they will not

always be vacant. The proposed industrial use is incompatible

with the dominant pattern of development surrounding the

Property, which is rural residential.

35. Intervenor argues that the Agriculture II land use

designation allows “intensive” agricultural land uses, such as

slaughter houses, suggesting that the residents are already

subject to the possibility of adverse impacts from noise, glare,

dust, smoke, odor, and fumes. However, there are no intensive

agricultural uses in the area and no evidence to suggest that

such development is likely to occur in the future. The dominant

land use is likely to remain rural residential.

36. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with Goal 1 of the FLUE, which is to maintain the quality of

life by “establishing a pattern of development that is

harmonious with the County’s natural environment and provides a

desired lifestyle for County residents.” The proposed boat

building and repair operation in this rural residential

neighborhood would significantly degrade the desired lifestyle

of the residents in the area.

37. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with FLUE Policy A.1.1.1.A.3., which prohibits land uses that

generate, store, or dispose of hazardous waste in “areas of

special flood hazard”. However, Policy A.1.1.1.A.2.b. expressly

allows water-dependent components of a development to be located

in areas of special flood hazard. When FLUE Objective A.1.1 and

its accompanying policies are read in pari materia , they

indicate that a water-dependent land use can be allowed in the

floodplain as long as any generation, storage, or disposal of

hazardous waste will occur outside of the floodplain.

Petitioners did not show that the proposed boatyard cannot be

operated in conformance with these policies.

38. For similar reasons, Petitioners’ contention that the

amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy A.1.1.E. is

unpersuasive. That policy encourages the clustering of

development away from flood-prone areas. However, in the case

of water-dependent land uses, the water-dependent components of

the land use must be located near the water.

39. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with FLUE Objective A.1.3 and FLUE Policy A.1.3.1, which

encourage the elimination or reduction of non-conforming uses.

Petitioners argue that past boat building and boat repair

operations at the Property were non-conforming uses under the

Agriculture II land use category and should be eliminated.

40. Petitioners’ arguments are not persuasive because, if

the amendment is approved, the boatyard uses would not be

inconsistent with the FLUM. Furthermore, Petitioners showed

that there is no existing, non-conforming use of the Property,

so there is no non-conforming use that needs to be reduced or

eliminated.

41. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with FLUE Policy A.1.3.2, which states:

Adequate buffering and separation between

land uses of different densities and

intensities shall be provided in accordance

with the Land Development Code to minimize

compatibility issues.

This policy directs that the Land Development Code (“Code”)

shall establish buffering requirements to minimize

incompatibility. Compatibility is also a comprehensive planning

issue that can cause an amendment to be “not in compliance,”

regardless of the buffering regulations contained in the Code,

but this particular policy is only directed to the Code.

Petitioners did not show that the Code does not contain

buffering requirements.

42. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with FLUE Policy A.1.4.9, which requires a vegetated upland

buffer for any waterfront development. The Petitioners’

evidence on this issue was insufficient to establish that the

required buffer could not be provided. Furthermore, the policy

directs the County to adopt regulations to establish the buffer

requirements. Petitioners did not show that such regulations

were not adopted by the County.

43. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with FLUE Policy A.1.6.1, which encourages infill within the

designated urban service areas of the County. Water-dependent

uses must be located where the water is located. Therefore,

infill policies cannot be applied to water-dependent uses in the

same manner as with other land uses. Although the availability

of necessary urban services is still a relevant inquiry,

Petitioners did not present evidence on this point.

Consistency with Rule 9J-5

44. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(23), which

encourages the reduction or elimination of inconsistent uses;

Rule 9J-5.006(3)(c)2., which requires that comprehensive plans

provide for “compatibility of adjacent land uses”; and Rules 9J-

5.006(5)(h)6. and 8., which require that amendments be reviewed

for compatibility and “functional relationship” with adjacent

land uses.

45. The term “compatibility” is defined in Florida

Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(23) as:

[A] condition in which land uses or

conditions can coexist in relative proximity

to each other in a stable fashion over time

such that no use or condition is unduly

negatively impacted directly or indirectly

by another use or condition.

A definition is not a regulation that requires compliance. A

definition simply shows the intended meaning for a term used in

a regulation. Therefore, a comprehensive plan amendment cannot

be inconsistent with a definition.

46. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(3)(b)3.

requires the future land use elements of comprehensive plans to

contain one or more objectives that encourages the elimination

or reduction of uses inconsistent with the community’s character

and future land uses. This rule addresses existing non-

conforming uses. The Property is no longer being used in a

manner that is inconsistent with the community’s character.

Therefore, there is no inconsistent use of the Property that

needs to be reduced or eliminated.

47. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(3)(c)2.

requires the future land use element of a comprehensive plan to

contain one or more policies that provide for compatibility of

adjacent land uses. It was found, above, that the rural

residential neighborhood adjacent to the Property would be

negatively impacted by boat building and boat repair uses of the

Property. The amendment is incompatible with the surrounding

rural residential neighborhood.

48. Florida Administrative Code Rules 9J-5.006(5)(h)6. and

8. relate specifically to the analysis of whether an amendment

fails to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Because

Petitioners did not raise urban sprawl as an issue, they cannot

claim inconsistency with these rules.

49. Petitioners contend that the amendment is inconsistent

with Section 163.3177(8), Florida Statutes, and Florida

Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2), which require that an

amendment be based on relevant and appropriate data and

analysis. Petitioners believe that there is no demonstrated

need for additional industrial uses in the County.

50. Petitioners’ argument and evidence on the issue of

need failed to take into account the water-dependent use that is

proposed. Petitioners’ computations to show that there are

substantial acres of unused industrial lands in the County fails

to address the question of whether there is a need for

additional water-dependent land uses.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

51. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of and parties to this

proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57, and

163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes.

52. In order to have standing to challenge a plan

amendment, a challenger must be an “affected person,” which is

defined in Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as a person

who resides, owns property, or owns or operates a business

within the local government whose comprehensive plan amendment

is challenged, and who submitted comments, recommendations, or

objections to the local government during the period of time

beginning with the transmittal hearing and ending with

amendment’s adoption.

53. Petitioners Conklin and Goodson and Intervenor Stokes

Landing are "affected persons" as that term is defined in

Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

54. Pursuant to Chapter 163.3184, the Department of

Community Affairs is charged with the duty to determine whether

comprehensive plan amendments are “in compliance.” However,

because this amendment involves a parcel of land that is smaller

than ten acres, it is a “small-scale development amendment” and

is not subject to a compliance review by the Department.

See § 163.3187(1)(c), Fla. Stat.

55. If the Administrative Law Judge recommends that a

small scale development amendment be found not in compliance,

the recommendation is submitted to the Administration Commission

for final action. If the Administrative Law Judge recommends

that a small scale development amendment be found in compliance,

the recommendation is submitted to the Department of Community

Affairs for final action. See § 163.3187(3)(b), Fla. Stat.

56. The term “in compliance” is defined in Section

163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes:

In compliance means consistent with the

requirements of ss. 163.3177, when a local

government adopts an educational facilities

element, 163.3178, 163.3180, 163.3191, and

163.3245, with the state comprehensive plan,

with the appropriate strategic regional

policy plan, and with chapter 9J-5, Florida

Administrative Code, where such rule is not

inconsistent with this part and with the

principles for guiding development in

designated areas of critical state concern

and with part III of chapter 369, where

applicable.

57. A local government’s determination that a small scale

amendment is “in compliance” is presumed to be correct and shall

be sustained when challenged unless it is shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amendment is not in

compliance. § 163.3187(3)(a), Fla. Stat.

58. The amendment is inconsistent with Section 163.3177,

Florida Statutes, because the amendment violates Subsection

163.3177(2), Florida Statutes, which requires the elements of a

comprehensive plan to be internally consistent. Petitioners

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that that the

amendment is internally inconsistent with FLUE Goal 1 and FLUE

Policy A.1.9.3.A.6.d.

59. The amendment is inconsistent with Florida

Administrative Code Chapter 9J-5, because Petitioners proved by

a preponderance of the evidence that the amendment fails to

comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(3)(c),

which requires compatibility with adjacent land uses.

60. Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the amendment was not supported by appropriate

data and analysis with regard to the issue of the need for

additional water-dependent, industrial land uses. Despite this

conclusion, the more persuasive evidence in the record shows

that the proposed industrial use should not be placed in this

location.

61. Because Intervenor showed colorable easement rights

over the entire private portion of Stokes Landing Road, the

Administrative Law Judge declined to take evidence or determine

the merits of Petitioners’ argument that Intervenor’s easement

rights were subject to an adverse claim. The circuit courts

have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve real property disputes.

See § 26.012, Fla. Stat.

62. In summary, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of

the evidence that the amendment is not “in compliance,” as the

term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a

Final Order determining that the amendment adopted by Putnam

County through Ordinance 2009-23 is not in compliance.

DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2009, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

BRAM D. E. CANTER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone]

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 24th day of December, 2009.

ENDNOTES

1 / All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2008

codification.

2/ In contrast, St Johns Ship Building constructed a dry dock,

turning basin, and artificial channel to connect its facilities

to the St Johns River.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Russell D. Castleberry, Esquire

Putnam County Attorney

518 St. Johns Avenue

Post Office Box 758

Palatka, Florida 32178-0758

Barbara Leighty, Clerk

Transportation and Economic

Development Policy Unit

The Capitol, Room 1801

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001

Robert Wheeler, General Counsel

Office of the Governor

The Capitol, Suite 209

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001

Shaw P. Stiller, General Counsel

Department of Community Affairs

2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

Michael W. Woodward, Esquire

Keyser & Woodward, P.A.

Post Office Box 92

Interlachen, Florida 32148-0092

Craig Z. Sherar, Esquire

2701 South Bayshore Drive, Suite 303

Tallahassee, Florida 33133

Theodore Ronald Hainline, Esquire

Rogers Towers, P.A.

1301 Riverplace Boulevard., Suite 1500

Jacksonville, Florida 32207

Ellen Avery-Smith, Esquire

Rogers Towers, P.A.

7 Waldo Street

St. Augustine, Florida 32084

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions

within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any

exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the

agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.