10-001968 Chrysler Group, Llc vs. Jerry Ulm Dodge, Inc., D/B/A Jerry Ulm Dodge Chrysler Jeep And Ferman On 54, Inc., D/B/A Ferman Chrysler Dodge At Cypress Creek Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, October 11, 2010.

Summary: Reopening of dealership within 12 months after termination of franchise agreement, but more than 12 months after dealer license lapsed, is exempt under Subsection 320.642(5) from protest requirements because bankruptcy tolled the 12-month period.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC , )

)

Petitioner , )

)

vs. ) Case Nos. 10 - 1968

) 10 - 1969

JERRY ULM DODGE, INC., d/b/a ) 10 - 1970

JERRY ULM DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP , )

AND FERMAN ON 54, INC., d/b/a )

FERMAN CHRYSLER DODGE AT )

CYPRESS CREEK , )

)

Respondents . )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Daniel Manry conducted the

final hearing of th ese case s for the Division of Administrative

Hearings (DOAH) on August 4, 2010, in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire

Nelson M ullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202

Tallahassee, Florida 32312

Robert D. Cultice

Qualified Representative

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale

and Door

60 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

For Respondents: Robert Craig Spickard, Esquire

Kurkin Forehand Brande s, LLP

800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North

Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa) , as a success or

motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line - makes

(vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and

protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes

(2009), 1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 19, 2010, Jerry Ulm Dodge, Inc. , d/b/a Jerry Ulm

Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Ulm) , and Ferman on 54, Inc. , d/b/a Ferman

Chrysler Dodge at Cypress Creek (Ferman) (collectively

Respondents) , filed a Petition for Determination t hat Chrysler

Group LLC Has Established an Additional Motor Vehicle Dealership

in Violation of Section 320.642 , Florida Statutes (the Petition)

with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (the

Department). The Petition styled Ulm and Ferman as the

petitioners. On April 13, 2010, the Department forwarded the

Petition to DOAH, where the matter was assigned three case

numbers for the separate Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles

involved. By Order of Consolidation dated May 5, 2010, the

cases were consolidated. DOAH subseq uently reversed the

parties in the style of the case s to designate Chrysler Group ,

LLC, as Petitioner and Ulm and Ferman as Respondents.

At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of

three witnesses and submitted 21 exhibits. Respondents cal led

no witnesses and submitted 30 exhibits. The identity of the

witnesses and exhibits and the rulings regarding each are

reported in the Transcript of the hearing filed with DOAH on

August 20, 2010. The parties timely filed their respective

P roposed R ec ommended O rders on August 30, 2010.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and

Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers.

Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with

Petitioner for Chrysler , Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells

Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry

Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607.

2. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service

Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge

vehicles. Ferman sell s Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at

24314 Stat e Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559.

3. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers

in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years.

Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more

dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as

a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson),

Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler

dealers in the Tampa m etro m arket.

4. In April 2008, Petition er had four dealers in the Tampa

metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and

Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy

C hrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson.

5. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition

in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of

Florida (the Bankruptcy Court) . At or about the same time,

Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing

Chry sler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles.

6. The filing of WilsonÓs bankruptcy petition precip itated

an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The

automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating WilsonÓs

franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for

WilsonÓs bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilso n a

notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased

dealership operations.

7. WilsonÓs cessation of business adversely impacted

Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked

a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to C hrysler, Jeep

and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner

desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson

location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the

economic loss.

8. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally

precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to

Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the

Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and , therefore, was still a

dealer.

9. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its

existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and

Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a

successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer,

would have undermined WilsonÓs efforts to sell the dealerships

and ma ximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A

sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and

WilsonÓs largest creditor, Chrysler Financial.

10. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a

sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale

negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to

sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to

do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the

evidence does not support a finding that Petiti oner did anything

to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or ma nipulate the

timing of a sale.

11. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the

Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also

sought the termination of WilsonÓs deale r agreements.

12. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in

an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also

wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly

as possible in the event th at a sale was not consummated .

13. The B ankruptcy C ourt did not initially grant

Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale

of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009,

Wilson continued to negotiate with potent ial buyers for the

dealership.

14. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer

license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale

of Wils onÓs assets would be unlikely.

15. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant

Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the

Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion

to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate WilsonÓs

dealer agreeme nts.

16. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of

the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of

intent to terminate WilsonÓs dealer agreements. Wilson received

the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the

termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance

of evidence does not support a finding that P etitioner attempted

to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of WilsonÓs

dealer agreements.

17. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement

dealership as soon as WilsonÓs dealer agreements were

terminated. Establishing a replacemen t dealership is a lengthy

process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer

candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making

sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to star t and

maintain the dealership.

18. Petitioner talk ed to several potential candidates to

replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the

principal of one of the complaining dealers in th e s e case s . By

letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he

opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else

but wanted the successor dealership for himself should

Petitioner decide to proceed.

19. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be

able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson

facility. Petitioner consi dered several potential alternative

locations for the successor dealership, includi ng property

offered by Ferman.

20. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa,

Florida, which F erman leased from a third party unrelated to

this proceeding. Ferm an offered to sublease the property to

Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated

July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that

Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysl er,

Jeep and Dodge dealership.

21. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership

at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa , Florida . It is

undisputed that this location is less than two miles f rom the

former Wilson location.

22. Before establishing the successor dealership, howeve r,

Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010

(the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm

that the establishment of the successor dealership would be

exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1 . from the notice and

protest requirem ents in Subsection 320.642(3).

23. The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy

and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented

Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor

dealership. The letter also provid ed the relevant dates of the

bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of

Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of

Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within

two miles of WilsonÓs former location.

24. The le tter asked the Department to confirm that the

establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it

was established within one year of March 10, 2009 , when

Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate

e - mails dated February 9 an d 12, 2010, the Department twice

confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that

the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the

manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner

relied on this confirmation by the Dep artment before proceeding

with the appointm ent of a successor dealership.

25. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter

to the Department , stating Petitioner's intention to appoint

North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson

(the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again

asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa

was exempt from the relevant statutory requir ements for notice

and protest.

26. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the

Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for

North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license

to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at

10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa , Florida .

27. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business.

North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and

employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

28. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter and

parties in th e s e case s . §§ 12 0.569 and 120.57(1) , Fla. Stat.

(2010) . DOAH provided the parties with adequate notice of the

final hearing.

29. Petitioner is a Ðmanufacturer,Ñ Ðdistributor,Ñ and

ÐlicenseeÑ defined in S ubs ection s 320.60(5), (8) , and (9).

Ulm and Ferman are Ðmotor vehic le dealersÑ defined in

S ubs ection 320.60(11)(a). Ulm and FermanÓs Dealer Sales and

Service Agreements with Petitioner constitute Ðfranchise

agreementsÑ defined in S ubs ection 320.60(1). The Department is

the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating motor

vehicle dealers, manufacturers, and distributors. § 320.011.

30. Section 320.642 generally requires a licensee that

proposes to establish an Ðadditional motor vehicle dealershipÑ

to give notice of its intention to the Department. The

De partment publishes the notice in the Florida Administrative

Weekly and mails the notice to the same line - make dealers in the

same and contiguous counties. § 320.642(1). A same line - make

dealer with standing may protest the proposed establishment of

an ad ditional motor vehicle dealership. § 320.642(3).

31. Section 320.642 provides an exemption from the general

requirements for notice and protest. Upon the satisfaction of

certain conditions, the opening or reopening of a dealership is

not considered an Ð additional motor vehicle dealerÑ and is not

subject to notice and protest. S ubs ection 320.642(5)(a)

provides , in relevant part:

The opening or reopening of the same or a

successor motor vehicle dealer within

12 months is not considered an additional

motor vehicle dealer subject to protest

within the meaning of this section, if:

1. The opening or reopening is within the

same or an adjacent county and is within

2 miles of the former motor vehicle dealer

location;

2. There is no dealer within 25 miles of

the proposed location or the proposed

location is further from each existing

dealer of the same line - make than the prior

location is from each dealer of the same

line - make within 25 miles of the new

location;

3. The opening or reopening is within

6 miles of the prior location and, if any

existing motor vehicle dealer of the same

line - make is located within 15 miles of the

former location, the proposed location is no

closer to any existing dealer of the same

line - make within 15 miles of the proposed

locati on; or

4. The opening or reopening is within

6 miles of the prior location and, if all

existing motor vehicle dealers of the same

line - make are beyond 15 miles of the former

location, the proposed location is further

than 15 miles from any existing motor

vehicl e dealer of the same line - make.

32. If the opening or reopening of the same or a

successor dealer meets one of the geographic requirements in

S ubs ection 320.642(5)(a), which is undisputed in th e s e case s ,

then the opening or reopening does not const itute an additional

motor vehicle dealer if the opening or reopening occurs Ðwithin

12 months.Ñ The statute does not define the event that starts

the 12 - month period. For example, the statute does not state

whether the "12 months" starts from: ( i) the t ermination of the

former dealershipÓs license; ( ii) the termination of the former

dealershipÓs franchise agreement; or ( iii) the cessation of

business by the former dealership. The statute also does not

define what constitutes an Ðopening or reopening,Ñ s uch as, for

example: ( i) applying for a license; ( ii) the issuance of a

license; ( iii) obtaining a franchise agreement with a licensee;

or ( iv) opening for business with the public.

33. Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C - 7.004(4)(a) 2

specifies at least one event that begins the 12 - month exemption

period and the reopening of the successor dealer:

If the license of an existing franchised

motor vehicle dealer is revoked for any

reason, or surrendered, an application for a

license to perm it the reopening of the same

dealer or a successor dealer within twelve

months of the license revocation or

surrender shall not be considered the

establishment of an additional dealership

if one of the conditions set forth in

Section 320.642(5) is met by t he proposed

dealer.

34. WilsonÓs motor vehicle dealer license expired on

January 8, 2009, after Wilson failed to renew its license. It

is undisputed that January 8, 2009, is the date Wilson

ÐsurrenderedÑ its license within the me aning of Rule 15C -

7.004(4 )(a).

35. North Tampa submitted its license application to open

at the successor location on February 24, 2010, more than

12 months after January 8, 2009. For reasons stated

hereinafter, however, the doctrine of equitable tolling operates

to extend the 1 2 - month period in S ubs ection 320.642(5)(a). See

Machules v. Department of Administration , 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134

(Fla. 1988) (for the general judicial rule applying equitable

tolling in administrative proceedings).

36. The judicial doctrine of equitable t olling applies to

state agencies and administrative proceedings when warranted by

the facts. Most judicial decisions requiring administrative

agencies to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling involve the

late filing of a petition. Brown v. Department o f Financial

Services , 899 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (Because

late filing of a petition was not jurisdictional, appellate

court remanded to agency for hearing on facts relevant to

equitable tolling.) ; Avante, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care

Admin istration , 722 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (Ð [I] f

[petitioner on remand] demonstrates facts that demand the

application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, the Agency

must accept the Petition for Formal Hearing as timely filed.Ñ);

Hay n es v. Publi c Employees Relations Commission , 694 So. 2d 821,

822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (ÐPERC should have held a hearing to

determine whether [petitionerÓs] claims justify application of

the doctri ne of equitable tolling.Ñ).

37. In Conley Subaru, Inc. v. Performance M otors , 16

F . A . L . R . 341, 1993 WL 943671, Case No. 92 - 6942 (DOAH November 3,

1993) (DHSMV Final Order ; December 22, 1993), the Department

ruled, on facts indistinguishable from th e s e case s , that

equitable tolling extends the 12 - month period in

S ubs ection 320.642(5)(a) when the predecessor dealer files

bankruptcy. The predecessor Subaru dealer held a Subaru

franchise agreement and motor vehicle dealer license agreement

when it filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. The

automatic stay operated to preve nt any action by Subaru to

terminate the dealer agreements. While the bankruptcy was

pending, the Department terminated the dealerÓs license on a

date that was more than 12 months prior to the date that a

license application was submitted to the Departmen t for a

successor dealer. During the bankruptcy, the predecessor dealer

attempted, unsuccessfully, to assign and sell i ts Subaru

franchise agreement.

38. After the sale did not occur, and some nine months

after the filing of the petition, Subaru filed a motion with the

bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay to terminate

the predecessor dealerÓs franchise agreement. One week after

the bankruptcy court granted the motion, Subaru sent a notice of

termination to the predecessor dealer. After te rminating the

predecessor dealerÓs agreement, Subaru appointed a successor

dealer at a location within two miles of the location of the

predecessor dealer. The successor dealerÓs complete license

application was not submitted until almost 16 months after the

Department terminated the predecessor dealerÓs license.

39. In Conley , the Department acknowledged that under a

literal construction and application of Rule 15C - 7.004(4)(a) the

successor dealerÓs complete license application must have been

submitted w ithin 12 months of the termination of the predecessor

dealerÓs license in order for the reopening to be exempt from

notice and protest. However, the Department determined that

equitable tolling was applicable to extend the 12 - month period:

Such a [literal ] construction does not take

into account the impediment of the

bankruptcy proceeding wherein Subaru is

prevented from asserting its right to

terminate the dealership agreement with [the

dealer] and proceed to timely select and

negotiate with a successor d ealer until some

nine months after the 12 - month time limit

had begun to run. The results of such a

construction and application of the rule are

rather harsh considering that Subaru,

through no fault of its own, was prevented

by the bankruptcy proceeding f rom timely

moving forward to meet the time limit set

out in the rule.

This is clearly a case where the doctrine of

equitable tolling is applicable. . . .

In applying the doctrine of equitable

tolling in this case, the 12 - month period

would begin to run on . . . the effective

date of the termination of [the predecessor

dealerÓs] dealership agreement by Subaru,

the first date on which Subaru could begin

the process of selecting and negotiating

with a successor dealer.

Conley at paragraphs 32 - 34.

40. There is no substantive difference between the facts

in Conley and th e s e case s . The refusal to apply equitable

tolling in th e s e case s would violate the principle of

administrative stare decisis . Villa Capri Association, Ltd. v.

Florida Housing Finan ce Corp. , 23 So. 3d 795, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA

2009), citing Brookwood - Walton County Convalescent Ctr. v. AHCA ,

845 So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (ÐAn agencyÓs failure to

follow its own precedent which contains similar facts is

contrary to established ad ministrative principles and sound

public policy.Ñ) (internal quotes omitted). See also Velez v.

City of Coral Gables , 819 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002)

(ÐAn administrative agency has the burden of providing a

reasonable explanation for inconsistent results based upon

similar facts.Ñ); Gessler v. Department of Business and

Professional Regulation , 627 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)

(Ð [I] nconsistent orders based upon similar facts, without a

reasonable explanation, may violate [S ubs ection 120.68(7 )(e)3 . ]

as well as the equal protection guarantees of both the Florida

and United States Constitutions.Ñ).

41. Administrative stare decisis is particularly

applicable in th e s e case s where Petitioner brought the Conley

decision to the DepartmentÓs attentio n to confirm that equitable

tolling would be applicable as a result of the Wilson

bankruptcy. The Department considered the application of

equitable tolling under its prior Conely decision, notified

Petitioner that it agreed that the equitable tolling doc trine

applied, and proceeded to issue a license to the successor

dealer. Petitioner relied on the agencyÓs determination and

would not have proceeded to appoint North Tampa in the absence

of the DepartmentÓs assurances. A licensee, including

Petitioner, is entitled to rely on an agencyÓs precedents,

particularly when the precedent is brought to the agencyÓs

attention and the agency confirms that reliance is warranted.

Plante v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation ,

716 So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). See also Gessler , 627

So. 2d at 503 (ÐPersons have a right to examine agency precedent

and the right to know the factual basis and policy reasons for

agency action.Ñ) .

42. The validity of Rule 15C - 7.004(4)(a) was affirmatively

determined in 1991 after certain motor vehicle manufacturers,

manufacturer associations, dealers, and dealer associations

challenged the then proposed rule. General Motors Corp. v. Fla.

Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles , Case No. 91 - 2591R

( DOAH July 8, 1991) (the Rule Challenge). The then - proposed

rule (now adopted rule) provided that the 12 - month exemption

period began on the date that the dealer license is terminated.

The petitioning dealer associations asserted that it would be

more fair and consistent with due process if the 12 - month

exemption period began on the date that the dealership abandoned

the dealership under S ection 320.641. Id. at 19. GM asserted

that fairness and due pr ocess would be better served if

the 12 - month exemption period began on the date that the

predecessor dealerÓs franchise agreement was terminated.

Id. at 19.

43. Regardless of the Department's position in the Rule

challenge case and its adopted rule, the D epartment has

consistently interpreted its rule in a manner that permits

bankruptcy proceedings to toll the 12 - month exemption period.

The Department took specific action to that effect in this

proceeding before Petitioner acted in reliance on the

Departm ent's interpretation of its rule.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a f inal o rder finding

that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor

vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest

requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to

Subsection 320.642(5)(a).

DONE AND ENTERED this 11 th day of October , 2010 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DANIEL MANRY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 11 th day of October , 2010 .

ENDNOTES

1/ References to subsections, sections, and chapters are to

Florida Statutes (2009) , unless otherwise stated.

2/ References to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida

Administrative Code for 2009.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Jennifer Clark

Department of Highway Safety

and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building, Room A - 308

2900 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0500

J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202

Tal lahassee, Florida 32312

Robert Craig Spickard , Esquire

Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP

800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Robert D. Cultice, Esquire

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale

and Door

60 State Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

Carl A. Ford, Director

Division of Motor Vehicles

Department of Highway Safety

and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building, Room B - 439

2900 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0500

Robin Lotane, General Counsel

Department of Highway Safety

and Motor Vehicles

Neil Kirkman Building

2900 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0500

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.