10-010098 Arlene Matvey vs. Limited Edition Interiors, Inc. Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, October 18, 2011.

Summary: Reinstatement to employment is not an available remedy under the applicable county ordinance; accordingly, front pay, an alternative to reinstatement, is not awarded.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ARLENE MATVEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 10 - 10098

)

LIMITED EDITION INTERIORS, )

INC., )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing commenced by

video teleconference on May 10, 2011, between Tallahassee and

St. Petersburg, Florida, and concluded telephonically on June 7,

2011, before William F. Quattlebaum, Administrative Law Judge,

Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Sherri K. Adelkoff, Esquire,

Qualified Representative

1159 South Negley Avenue

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15217

For Respondent: Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esquire

Robert G. Walker, P.A.

1421 Court Street, Suite F

Clearwater, Florida 33756

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Limited Edition

Interiors, Inc. (Respondent), committed an act of unlawful

employment discrimination and an act of retaliation against an

employee, Arlene M atvey (Petitioner), in violation of Pinellas

County Code sections 70 - 53(a) and 70 - 54(1).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Om August 14, 2009, the Petitioner filed a discrimination

complaint with the Pinellas County Office of Human Rights

(PCOHR), asserting that the R espondent had committed unlawful

employment discrimination against the Petitioner. On May 26,

2010, the PCOHR issued a determination of "reasonable cause."

The PCOHR attempted to resolve the matter, but such attempts

were unsuccessful, and, on November 1 2, 2010, the PCOHR

submitted the case to DOAH for further proceedings.

The administrative hearing was initially scheduled to

commence on February 9, 2011, and was subsequently rescheduled

on several occasions upon the various requests of the parties.

At the hearing, the Petitioner testified on her own behalf,

presented the testimony of seven additional witnesses, and had

Exhibits numbered 1 through 5 admitted into evidence. The

Respondent presented the testimony of two witnesses. Prior to

the hearing, t he parties filed a document titled Joint

Stipulations of Fact that was marked and admitted as an

Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) Exhibit numbered 1.

The two - volume Transcript of the May 10, 2011, hearing was

filed on June 3, 2011, and the one - volume Trans cript of the

June 7, 2011, hearing was filed on July 6, 2011. Both parties

filed Proposed Recommended Orders that were considered in the

preparation of the Recommended Order that was issued on

September 22, 2011.

On September 29, 2011, the Petitioner file d e xceptions to

the Recommended Order specifically related to the proposed

remedy set forth in the Recommen ded Order. T he Respondent did

not file exceptions to the Recommended Order, but , on October 7,

2011, filed a r eply to the Petitioner's e xceptions . As

discussed herein , the Petitioner's exceptions are hereby

rejected. T he Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended

Order are adopted and are set forth below .

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was

an interior furnishings retailer located in Largo, Florida, and

owned by William S. Miller (Mr. Miller) and Judith L. Miller

(Mrs. Miller), a married couple. Mrs. Miller was the president

of the company. Mr. Miller was the secretary/treasurer of the

company. Both M r. and Mrs. Miller were generally present at the

business.

2. The Respondent was an "employer" pursuant to the

definition of the term set forth within the applicable Pinellas

County Code provision.

3. On October 31, 2005, the Respondent hired the

Petit ioner to work as the office manager and bookkeeper in a

full - time, salaried position.

4. The Petitioner's duties included tracking various

accounts, preparing sales invoices, preparing the payroll,

preparing certain tax records, and general office filing.

5. The Petitioner, a single mother, had been unemployed

for an extended period prior to being hired by the Respondent.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Miller knew that the Petitioner needed the

financial support provided by her job.

6. Mr. Miller was the Petitioner' s supervisor. Their work

areas were in relatively close proximity, with Mr. Miller

occupying an office space with a door and the Petitioner

occupying a workstation immediately outside Mr. Miller's office.

There was a second workstation also located outsi de Mr. Miller's

office, and, on occasion, a third employee was present in the

area.

7. A few months after the Petitioner began employment at

the Respondent, Mr. Miller began to make remarks about the

Petitioner's physical appearance, particularly her "der riere."

The remarks were frequent and were heard by other employees.

The Petitioner was offended by the remarks and routinely told

Mr. Miller to stop.

8. On more than one occasion, Mr. Miller asked the

Petitioner to sit on his lap. The Petitioner obj ected to

Mr. Miller's requests and told him so. On at least one

occasion, the exchange between Mr. Miller and the Petitioner was

overheard by another employee.

9. At various times, Mr. Miller called male employees and

the Petitioner into his office to vi ew sexually - suggestive

photographs on his computer, some of which were described as

pornographic. The Petitioner and other employees objected to

the display of photographs and told him that they objected to

his showing them the photos.

10. At other times , Mr. Miller called the Petitioner into

his office and showed her pornographic images on his computer

screen. She felt disturbed by his behavior and told him of her

objection.

11. At times during the Petitioner's employment by the

Respondent, Mr. Miller made purposeful and inappropriate

physical contact with the Petitioner's body. Such contact

included attempts to grab the Petitioner by her waist and to rub

his clothed genital area against the Petitioner's clothed

buttocks. The Petitioner consistently o bjected to Mr. Miller's

behavior and told him of her objections. Other employees

observed Mr. Miller's conduct and the Petitioner's objections to

his behavior.

12. On one occasion, Mr. Miller called the Petitioner into

his office and told her a joke that included his displaying the

outline of his penis through his pants, at which time the

Petitioner voiced her objection to Mr. Miller.

13. In September 2007, Mr. Miller appeared at the

Petitioner's home, and, while there, he exposed his penis to the

Petiti oner and attempted to entice the Petitioner into sexual

activity. He had not been invited to come to her home, and he

left the premises when she directed him to do so.

14. At various times during her employment, Mr. Miller

asked the Petitioner to expose her breasts to him, and she

objected and declined to do so. She eventually complied with

the request on one occasion, because she feared losing her job

if she refused. Subsequently, Mr. Miller told a male employee

that the Petitioner had acceded to his r equest to see her

breasts. The male employee relayed the conversation to the

Petitioner, who felt humiliated by the incident.

15. There was no evidence presented at the hearing to

suggest that the Petitioner invited or encouraged Mr. Miller's

inappropria te behavior. To the contrary, the evidence

establishes that the Petitioner routinely told Mr. Miller of her

objections to his conduct at the time it occurred. Because the

Petitioner had been unemplo yed prior to being hired by the

Respondent and was afr aid of losing her job, she did not

complain to Mrs. Miller about Mr. Miller's conduct.

16. At the beginning of 2008, the Petitioner advised

Mr. Miller that she felt he was "sexually harassing" her.

Mr. Miller thereafter began to engage in a pattern of ver bal

harassment directed towards the Petitioner's job performance.

17. He began to assign tasks to the Petitioner unrelated

to her prior bookkeeping or office manager duties. She was

assigned to monitor the store inventory, prepare sales tags and

attach t hem to floor samples, dust the store, and clean the

kitchen. Mr. Miller routinely criticized the Petitioner's work

skills, argued with her about the performance of her duties, and

called her "stupid."

18. Prior to January 2008, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Mille r had

expressed any significant dissatisfaction with the quality of

the Petitioner's work as office manager or bookkeeper. There

was no credible evidence presented at the hearing that the

Petitioner was unable or unwilling to perform the office manager

an d bookkeeper tasks for which she was hired.

19. Indicative of Mr. Miller's general attitude towards

the Petitioner, he used a parrot that was kept at the store to

intimidate the Petitioner, who was afraid (perhaps irrationally)

of the bird. Mr. Miller cl early knew that the Petitioner was

fearful of the bird, yet he would stand behind the Petitioner

while she was working and hold the bird near the Petitioner's

head, terrifying her.

20. In early 2009, Mr. Miller again called the Petitioner

into his office and showed her pornographic images on his

computer screen. She again advised him of her objection to his

conduct.

21. Prior to 2009, the Petitioner had not talked with

Mrs. Miller about her husband's conduct, because the Petitioner

remained concerned abo ut losing the job. However, in

February 2009, while the two women were both in the store's

lunchroom area, the Petitioner advised Mrs. Miller of

Mr. Miller's conduct and asked Mrs. Miller to intervene.

22. Mr. Miller had been out of the store for much of

February 2009. He returned to work on February 23, 2009, and

the Petitioner testified that he left her alone for a few days

after his return.

23. However, on March 2, 2009, the Respondent terminated

the Petitioner's employment as a salaried, full - time e mployee,

transferred her into an hourly wage position, and reduced her

employment hours. She was partially relieved of her bookkeeping

responsibilities and was assigned additional store tasks such as

moving old boxes and cataloging their contents.

24. Th e Respondent asserted that the March 2, 2009, action

was the result of deteriorating business conditions. The

Respondent asserted that the store revenues had declined and

that they were required to reduce payroll costs by reducing

personnel. The Responde nt failed to provide any credible

evidence supporting the assertion that deteriorating sales and

income were the rationale behind the alteration of the

Petitioner's work responsibilities.

25. After March 2, 2009, Mr. Miller routinely continued to

criticize the Petitioner's work performance. On July 23, 2009,

Mr. Miller and the Petitioner became engaged in a heated

discussion in the office area, during which he referred to her

as a "fucking c - nt."

26. Although Mr. Miller testified that he did not intend

for the Petitioner to hear his insult, he said it loudly enough

to be overheard by another employee who was also in the office

area.

27. Mr. Miller had previously used the same phrase to

refer to other women, including Mrs. Miller.

28. The Petitio ner immediately reacted, screaming at

Mr. Miller that he could not use the phrase and stating that she

would be filing "a complaint" against him.

29. The Petitioner left the office area and went into the

store area, loudly protesting Mr. Miller's insult a nd intending

to advise Mrs. Miller of th e incident. Because there were

customers in the store at the time, Mrs. Miller focused more on

calming the Petitioner and not disrupting the store.

30. After speaking briefly with Mrs. Miller, the

Petitioner retu rned to the office area to collect her

possessions. Mr. Miller approached the Petitioner and placed

his hands in the area of her neck, which caused the Petitioner

to feel physically threatened. The Petitioner took her

possessions and left the store.

31. The Petitioner next returned to work on July 27, 2009,

at which time she was told that she was no longer the office

manager and bookkeeper.

32. At the hearing, Mr. Miller testified that the

Petitioner was removed from the office because the situation had

become volatile. Mrs. Miller testified that, because the

Petitioner was argumentative, a decision had been made to remove

her from the office.

33. On July 27, 2009, when the Petitioner asked

Mrs. Miller why she was no longer the office manager,

Mrs. Mil ler said the Petitioner's job had been changed "because

of Bill," meaning Mr. Miller.

34. As of July 27, 2009, the Petitioner had no further

office management responsibilities and retained only janitorial

and store tasks. The Petitioner was also directed to call the

store before coming in to see if she was needed on that day. On

some days, the Petitioner was told there was no work for her.

35. On August 14, 2009, the Respondent terminated the

Petitioner's employment.

36. There was no credible evidence presented at the

hearing that the termination of the Petitioner's employment was

related to dissatisfaction with her performance as the

Respondent's office manager and bookkeeper, or to the

performance of the other tasks that were subsequently ass igned.

37. The Respondent asserted that economic conditions

caused them to terminate some employees, including the

Petitioner, but there was no credible evidence presented to

support the assertion. The evidence presented during the

hearing established th at employees who were terminated were

fired for non - performance of their job duties. There was no

credible evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner's

termination or the reduction in her work hours was related to

the Respondent's economic cond ition.

38. At the hearing, employees (both current and former)

described Mr. Miller's treatment of women as degrading and

humiliating. Employees who worked for the Respondent

concurrently with the Petitioner were aware that she was being

humiliated by Mr . Miller's behavior.

39. In addition to the Petitioner, Mr. Miller previously

assigned janitorial duties to an employee whom he disfavored

when he wanted the employee to quit.

40. After the Petitioner's employment was terminated by

the Respondent, the Petitioner attempted to obtain another job.

During the period of unemployment, the Petitioner received

$300.00 per week in unemployment compensation benefits.

41. As of November 9, 2006, the Petitioner earned a bi -

weekly salary of $1,600.00 from the Resp ondent. As of

February 1, 2006, the Respondent provided health insurance

coverage for the Petitioner as a benefit of her employment and

continued such coverage after her termination and through

December 31, 2009.

42. As of April 29, 2010, the Petitioner became employed

by Gentry Printing Company as a full - time bookkeeper earning

$15.00 per hour and working a 40 - hour week. On July 17, 2010,

the Petitioner received a raise from Gentry Printing Company to

$16.00 per hour for the 40 - hour week. Gentry Printi ng Company

withholds $22.50 from the Petitioner's weekly income as her

contribution to the medical insurance program.

43. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented testimony

related to damages. The evidence established that the

Petitioner was entitled to an award of $32,745.00 in back pay.

44. The Respondent presented no corresponding evidence or

testimony re lated to damages.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

45. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this

proceeding. §§ 120.65(7), Fla. Stat. (2010), & Pinellas Cnty.

Code §§ 70 - 77(e) - (h).

46. Pinellas County Code section 70 - 52 identifies the

purpose of the relevant county code sections as follows:

(a) The general purposes of this division

are to:

(1) Pr ovide for execution within the county

of the policies embodied in the Federal

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

(2) Secure for all individuals within the

county the freedom from discrimination

because of race, color, religion, national

origin, sex, s exual orientation, age,

marital status, or disability in connection

with employment, and thereby to promote the

interests, rights and privileges of

individuals within the county.

(b) This division shall be liberally

construed to preserve the public safet y,

health and general welfare, and to further

the general purposes stated herein.

(c) The enforcement of this division may be

delegated by interlocal agreement to other

units of local government or to nonprofit

corporations.

47. Pinellas County Code section 70 - 53 identifies unlawful

discriminatory employment practices and provides, in relevant

part, as follows:

(a) Unlawful discrimination in employment

practices.

(1) Employers. It is a discriminatory

practice for an employer to:

a. Fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or

otherwise discriminate against an individual

with respect to compensation or the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment

because of race, color, religion, national

origin, sex, sexual orientation, age,

marital status, o r disability; or

b. Limit, segregate, or classify an

employee in a way which would deprive or

tend to deprive an individual of employment

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect

the status of an employee because of race,

color, religion, national ori gin, sex,

sexual orientation, age, marital status, or

disability.

c. The above described prohibited

discrimination on the basis of sex includes

sexual harassment, including same - sex sexual

harassment, and pregnancy discrimination.

48. The Petitioner be ars the ultimate burden of proving

the unlawful discriminatory employment practice by a

preponderance of the evidence. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp. ,

907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). The shifting burden

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp . v. Green , 411

U.S. 792 (1973), is generally used in analyzing a complaint of

employment discrimination. The Petitioner must initially

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Once the

employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employment action taken; then, the employee bears

the ultimate burden of persuasion to establish that the

employer's proffered reason for the action taken is merely a

pretext for di scrimination.

49. Because the purpose of the cited Pinellas County Code

provisions is to implement the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,

federal civil rights law is instructive in reviewing disputes

arising through PCOHR enforcement of the county code. T itle VII

prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person based

on the person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,

or from retaliating against an employee for reporting

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2(a)(1) & 3(a). Sexual

hara ssment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title

VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 64,

(1986).

50. In order to support a hostile environment claim under

Title VII based on sexual harassment by a supervisor, an

employee mu st establish the following elements: (1) that he or

she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been

subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances,

requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual

nature; (3) tha t the harassment must have been based on the sex

of the employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and

create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a

basis for ho lding the employer liable. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,

195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). The Petitioner, as a female, is

clearly a member of a protected class.

51. As to the second element, the evidence establishes

that the Petitioner was subjected to unwelc ome sexual harassment

of a serious and continuing nature. The fact that, after

Mr. Miller's repeated requests, the Petitioner exposed her

breasts to him on one occasion does not indicate that

Mr. Miller's behavior was solicited or encouraged by the

Petiti oner, or that she was not offended by his conduct See

Henson v. City of Dundee , 682 F.2d 897, 903 - 05 (11th Cir. 1982).

52. As to the third element, Mr. Miller's conduct was

clearly based on her gender.

53. As to the fourth element, the Petitioner "must

establish not only that she subjectively perceived the

environment as hostile and abusive, but also that a reasonable

person would perceive the environment to be hostile and

abusive." Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents , 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th

Cir. 2000). In evaluating the objective severity of the

harassment, one must consider, among other factors: "(1) the

frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct;

(3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or

h umiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the

conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job

performance." Id. at (citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc. , 195 F.3d

1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999)). In this case, the offensive

conduct was fr equent, severe, humiliating, and interfered with

the Petitioner's performance of her responsibilities. A

reasonable person would perceive Mr. Miller's conduct towards

the Petitioner to be hostile and abusive.

54. As to the fifth element, the employer is liable,

because the sexual harassment was committed by an owner and

officer of the Respondent.

55. The Respondent offered no legitimate non -

discriminatory rationale to counter the evidence related to

Mr. Miller's conduct. He engaged in a pattern of sexua l

harassment against the Petitioner over an extended period. Such

harassment towards the Petitioner included derogatory remarks,

exposure of his genitals, and uninvited physical contact. Other

employees observed portions of Mr. Miller's conduct towards t he

Petitioner and testified at the hearing as to their

observations. The Respondent has violated Pinellas County Code

section 70 - 53(a).

56. Pinellas County Code section 70 - 54, prohibiting

retaliation against a person who has opposed a discriminatory

pr actice, states that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice

for a person to commit the following:

(1) Retaliate or discriminate against a

person because he or she has opposed a

discriminatory practice, or because he or

she has made a charge, filed a com plaint,

testified, assisted, or participated in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

this division;

(2) Aid, abet, incite, or coerce a person

to engage in an unlawful discriminatory

practice;

(3) Willfully interfere with the

performance of a duty or the exercise of a

power by the commission or one of its staff

members or representatives; or

(4) Willfully obstruct or prevent a person

from complying with the provisions of this

division or an order issued thereunder.

57. The Petitioner's ret aliation claim is also analyzed

according to the McDonnell Douglas burden - shifting framework.

An employee may establish a prima facie case of retaliation by

showing that (1) the employee engaged in statutorily - protected

expression; (2) the employee suffer ed an adverse employment

action; and (3) there is some causal relationship between the

two events. Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir.

1997).

58. When the Petitioner advised Mr. Miller on July 23,

2009, that she would be filing a complain t against him, the

Petitioner was engaged in a statutorily - protected expression.

59. Upon the Petitioner's return to work on July 27, 2009,

the Petitioner was informed that she was no longer employed as

the Respondent's office manager and bookkeeper and t hat she

would be working on an as - needed basis to perform janitorial and

inventory tasks. The Petitioner's working hours (and

correspondingly her income) were reduced. Approximately two

weeks later, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's

employment. A reasonable employee would have found the

employment change to be significant and materially adverse. See

Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53, 68

(2006).

60. As to the causal - relationship between the events,

courts have construed t he element broadly. A petitioner merely

has to demonstrate that the protected activity and the adverse

action are not completely unrelated. Higdon v. Jackson , 393

F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). The time that elapses between

the employee's protected a ctivity and the adverse action is

significant. A "close temporal proximity" between the

employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action

may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine

issue of material fact of a causal connec tion. Brungart v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. , 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000).

On the other hand, a substantial delay between the protected

activity and the adverse action may cause the complaint of

retaliation to fail. Higdon , 393 F.3d at 1220 - 21. Here, on the

day the Petitioner returned to work after advising that she

would be filing a complaint against Mr. Miller, the Petitioner's

work hours and income were reduced. About two weeks later, she

was fired. The evidence establishes that she was fire d because,

after years of being harassed by Mr. Miller, she threatened to

file the complaint against him.

61. A prima facie case of retaliation having been

established by the Petitioner, the burden shifts to the

Respondent to provide a legitimate, non - d iscriminatory reason

for the employment action. At the hearing, the Respondent

asserted that reduction of the Petitioner's working hours and

subsequent termination were unrelated to the events of July 23,

2009, and were nothing more than a response to a b usiness

climate that, according to the Millers, required them to reduce

their workforce and cut salary costs. There was no credible

evidence presented to establish that any other full - time

employees were terminated based on an economic downturn. The

Mill ers' testimony regarding the reasons for termination of the

Petitioner's employment was not supported by any documentation,

was self - serving, and lacked credibility. It has been rejected.

62. The evidence establishes that the Respondent

terminated the Pe titioner's employment as retaliation for the

Petitioner's threat to file a complaint against the Respondent,

thereby violating Pinellas County Code section 70 - 54(1). The

Petitioner advised Mr. Miller on July 23, 2009, that she would

be filing a complaint against his conduct. When she returned to

work on July 27, 2009, her employment as the Respondent's office

manager was over, and she was assigned a reduced work schedule

of janitorial and other basic tasks. On August 14, 2009, the

Respondent terminated t he Petitioner's employment.

63. Under Pinellas County Code section 70 - 78, an

Administrative Law Judge has the authority to award actual

damages caused by a violation of the applicable code provisions

as well as reasonable costs and attorney's fees incur red to

pursue a claim of discrimination. At the hearing, the

Petitioner presented evidence related to the subject of damages.

The Respondent presented no testimony in this regard.

64. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the

Petitioner is entitle d to $26,761.00 in "termination back pay"

and $5,984.00 in "reduced salary back pay" for a total back pay

award of $32,745.00.

65. The Petitioner was represented during a portion of

this proceeding by a qualified representative who is not

entitled to an a ward of attorney's fees.

66. As set forth in the Petitioner's e xceptions to the

Recommended Order, the Petitioner seeks to have her request for

"front pay" addressed in this Order. In situations where

reinstatement to employment is within the remedies available to

address unlawful employment discrimination or an act of

retaliation, front pay is an equitable remedy available when

reinstatement is inappropriate due to the circumstances of an

individual case. Front pay is simply money awarded for lost

compensation during the period between judgment and

reinstatement , or in lieu of the reinstatement. Pollard v. E.I.

du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). Here, the

relevant Pinellas County ordinance does not provide for

employment reinstatement as a remedy to discriminatory c onduct.

Accordingly, front pay is unavailable , and the Petitioner's

re quest for front pay is denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ORDERED that:

A. The Respondent violated Pinellas County Code

sections 70 - 53 and 70 - 54.

B. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of

$32,745.00 plus interest at the prevailing statutory rate.

DONE AND ORDERED this 1 8th day of October , 2011, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 18th day of October, 2011.

COPIES FURNISHED :

William C. Falkner, Esquire

Pinellas County Attorney's Office

315 Court Street, Sixth Floor

Clearwater, Florida 33756

Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esquire

Robert G. Walker, P.A.

1421 Court Street, Suite F

Clearwater, Florida 33756

Sherri K. Adelkoff, Esquire

1159 South Negley Avenue

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15217

Leon W . Russell, Director/EEO Officer

Pinellas County Office of Human Rights

400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor

Clearwater, Florida 33756

Peter J. Genova, Jr., EEO Coordinator

Pinellas County Office of Human Rights

400 South Fort Harrison Avenue, 5th Floor

Clearwater, Florida 33756

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing one copy of a Notice of Administrative Appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a

second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with

the Distric t Court of Appeal, First District, or with the

District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the

party resides. The Notice of Administrative Appeal must be

filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.