11-001115 Francisco Cosme vs. Lakeshore Club Of Polk County Homeowners Association Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, July 7, 2011.

Summary: Petitioner failed to show violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, where facts concerned untimely allegations; and no discriminatory intent.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FRANCISCO COSME, ) )

)

Petitioner, ) Case No. 11-1115

vs. )

)

LAKESHORE CLUB OF POLK COUNTY )

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

on May 24, 2011, by video teleconference in Tallahassee,

Florida, and Lakeland, Florida, before Thomas P. Crapps, a

designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Francisco Cosme, pro se

Post Office Box 8118

Fedhaven, Florida 33854

For Respondent: Scott Jackman, Esquire

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.

4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard

Suite 400

Tampa, Florida 33607-5712

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether Respondent, Lakeshore Club of Polk County

Homeowners Association (Lakeshore Club), violated the Florida

Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida

Statutes (2010). 1/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 24, 2010, Petitioner, Francisco Cosme

(Mr. Cosme), filed a complaint with the United States Department

of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) against Lakeshore Club,

Jim Purdy (Mr. Purdy), and Elizabeth Jewell-Sanford (Ms. Jewell-

Sanford) for discriminatory housing practices. Specifically,

Mr. Cosme alleged that Lakeshore Club, Ms. Jewell-Sanford and

Mr. Purdy had discriminated against him and other Hispanic

residents, by requiring that only English be spoken in the

homeowners association's office and had treated him

disrespectfully. Further, Mr. Cosme raised an issue concerning

the nominating process for residents seeking to become members

of Lakeshore Club's Board of Directors. HUD transferred the

complaint to the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(Commission) for an investigation and determination of whether

or not a discriminatory housing practice had occurred.

On January 28, 2011, the Commission entered a Notice of

Determination of No Cause .

On February 22, 2011, Mr. Cosme filed a Petition for Relief

against Lakeshore Club, alleging housing discriminatory

practices and violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,

as amended. The Petition for Relief did not identify

Ms. Jewell-Sanford or Mr. Purdy as Respondents. Moreover, the

Petition for Relief abandoned any claims concerning the

nominating process for Lakeshore Club's the board of directors

positions. In the Petition for Relief, Mr. Cosme alleged

"harassment to people that speak Spanish in the office,

especially those that file complaints against the manager.

Treated with disrespect." 2/

On March 1, 2011, the Commission transmitted the Petition

for Relief to DOAH. On March 2, 2011, Administrative Law Judge

James H. Peterson, III, issued an Initial Order. On March 21,

2011, the case was transferred to Administrative Law Judge

William F. Quattlebaum. Judge Quattlebaum set the case for

final hearing on May 24, 2011. On May 23, 2011, the case was

transferred to Administrative Law Judge Thomas P. Crapps for the

hearing.

At the onset of the hearing, Lakeshore Club requested a

clarification concerning the scope of the hearing. Lakeshore

Club argued that the Petition for Relief only named Lakeshore

Club as a Respondent; thus, no claims should be heard against

Ms. Jewell-Sanford and Mr. Purdy. Further, Lakeshore Club

raised the defense that Mr. Cosme's claims occurred in 2005 and

2006; thus, the claims were not timely. In response, Mr. Cosme

stated that he intended to bring forward evidence concerning

Ms. Jewell-Sanford and Mr. Purdy. Based on the Petition for

Relief, the undersigned ruled that the issue to be resolved

would be whether or not Lakeshore Club violated the Florida Fair

Housing Act. Further, the undersigned allowed Mr. Cosme to

bring forward evidence concerning Ms. Jewell-Sanford and

Mr. Purdy, as it was relevant to showing whether or not

Lakeshore Club had committed any discriminatory practice.

At the May 24, 2011, final hearing, Mr. Cosme presented the

testimony of the following seven witnesses: himself,

Virginia Pascual (Ms. Pascual), Ismael Ruiz (Mr. Ruiz),

Carol Horneck (Ms. Horneck), Jo-Ann Rucinski (Ms. Rucinski),

Sandra Salgado (Ms. Salgado), and Marta Torres (Ms. Torres).

Mr. Cosme introduced Exhibits 1, 8, and 9 into evidence.

Lakeshore Club did not present any witnesses, but did offer one

exhibit into evidence, Exhibit 1, during Mr. Cosme's case.

A transcript of the proceedings was not ordered or filed

with DOAH.

Mr. Cosme filed a Proposed Recommended Order on

June 1, 2011, and Lakeshore Club filed its Proposed Recommended

Order on June 3, 2011. Both parties' proposals have been

considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. 3/

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Since 2004, Mr. Cosme has been a resident and homeowner

in the Lakeshore Club of Polk County. He is of Hispanic descent

with a national origin of Puerto Rico.

2. Lakeshore Club is a homeowners' association located in

Lakeland, Florida. A majority of the residents are Hispanic and

of Puerto Rican origin.

3. Ms. Jewell-Sanford, at all times relevant to the

complaint, was the manager of Lakeshore Club.

4. The record shows instances in 2005 and 2006 when

Ms. Jewell-Sanford had directed that Spanish not be spoken in the

homeowners’ association office. The record shows that, in 2005

an "English only" sign was posted and removed. Further, it was

not disputed that, in 2006 Mr. Cosme had been asked by

Ms. Jewell-Sanford to leave the office because he had been

speaking Spanish to one of the office secretaries.

5. In March 2010, Mr. Cosme went to the Lakeshore Club’s

office to pick-up some papers. When Mr. Cosme entered the

office, he walked past the receptionist to go to the back of the

office. Ms. Jewell-Sanford told Mr. Cosme that he could not

walk to the back of the office, because the office had rules.

Mr. Cosme felt that action by Ms. Jewell-Sanford had been

disrespectful to him.

6. Ms. Horneck, the current president of the Lakeshore

Club Board of Directors, credibly testified that Ms. Jewell-

Sanford spoke little, if any, to Hispanic members of the

homeowners’ association.

7. On December 1, 2009, Lakeshore Club sent Mr. Cosme the

following letter:

Dear Mr. Cosme:

This comes in reply to your "packet" of

complaint that was given to the Board of

Directors against our Association Manager,

Elizabeth Jewell.

Our attorney and management consultant

both feel this is hearsay and opinion. The

past boards were in disagreement with you on

this issue as well as a majority of the

currently seated board.

We have been advised that should you

continue in your harassment of any member of

the association, its directors, agents or

employees, the Board of Directors will be

well advised to seek legal remedies up to and

including injunctive relief.

We regret that you have chosen to make

this step necessary after coming to the

agreement that the President of the

Association handle these issues and it is our

desire that we work things out peacefully

from this point forward.

8. Mr. Cosme felt this letter was threatening, because he

feared that the homeowners’ association would seek to eject him

from the community based on the terms "injunctive relief"

contained in the letter.

9. Ms. Horneck credibly testified that she had initialed

the letter and that it was her intent that the parties get

together and work out any problem.

10. Mr. Cosme did not offer into evidence the information

packet that he had provided the Board of Directors, which

prompted the December 1, 2009, letter. Further, Mr. Cosme did

not bring forward any evidence to show that Lakeshore Club had

taken any action to deprive him of his home or any part of the

community, or that it had taken any action against him.

11. Ms. Jewell-Sanford had left her job as manager in

April 2010.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

12. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, pursuant to

sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes.

13. As Petitioner, Mr. Cosme has the burden of

establishing facts to prove discrimination by a preponderance of

the evidence. See §§ 760.34(5) and 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

14. The Florida Fair Housing Act provides, in relevent

part, that:

(2) It is unlawful to discriminate against

any person in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

or in the provision of services or

facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial status, or religion.

§ 760.23(2), Fla. Stat.

15. Discrimination covered by the Florida Fair Housing Act

is the same discrimination as is prohibited under the federal

Fair Housing Act. Savanna Club Worship Serv. v. Savanna Club

Homeowners' Ass'n , 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see

Fla. Dep't. of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1991)(the Florida Fair Housing Act is patterned after the

federal Fair Housing Act, 45 U.S.C. sections 3601 through 3631;

thus, federal case law dealing with the federal Fair Housing Act

is applicable). Therefore, federal cases involving

discrimination in housing are instructive and persuasive in

interpreting section 760.23, Florida Statutes. See Dornbach v.

Holley , 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). 4/

18. In Savanna Club Worship Services , the federal court

addressed the issue of whether a homeowners’ association's rule

that prohibited all religious activities in the association's

common areas violated 42 U.S.C. section 3604(b).

Section 3604(b), provided in pertinent part, that it is unlawful

"'[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions,

or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the

provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,

because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or

national origin.'" 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-1226. The court

recognized that the majority of federal courts had interpreted

the federal Fair Housing Act as "not applicable to post-

acquisition discrimination in the provision of services, unless

the discrimination, somehow, deprives a person of their housing."

456 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. Consequently, the court noted that

"[t]his definition has resulted in the conclusion that if the

challenged discriminatory activity occurs after a buyer has

already purchased his or her home, and if such activity is not

one which results in either an actual or constructive deprivation

of that property, then such activity is not prohibited by the

FHA." Id. ; see also Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n ,

318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1142-1143 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The Savanna

Club Worship Service court, however, distinguished the line of

cases that appeared to require "a bright-line rule which holds

that the FHA does not reach any post-acquisition discrimination."

456 F. Supp. 2d at 1229. The Savanna Club Worship Service

court, recognized that in Florida many planned communities are

governed by the Florida Homeowner's Association Act, and that

most communities have "common areas which are maintained and

regulated by the community's homeowners’ association for use by

the homeowner members.” Id. at 1229-1230. Consequently, the

court held that, "in the context of planned communities, where

association members have rights to use designated common areas as

an incident of their ownership, discriminatory conduct which

deprives them of exercising those rights would be actionable

under the FHA." 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1230, citing Massaro v.

Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n , 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir.

1993). See also Geisel, et al. v. City of Marathon, City of

Marina , Case No. 11-0035 (March 11, 2011), remanded for factual

determination, FCHR Order No. 11-044 (June 7, 2011)(where

Administrative Law Judge Robert Meale's well-reasoned

Recommended Order recommended that the Commission clarify the

law as to whether or not to extend the Florida Fair Housing Act

to post-acquisition discrimination and, if the Commission

recognized post-acquistion housing, that the Commission limit

"post-acquisition discrimination to the extent that it is both

direct and it deprives the aggrieved person of substantial

enjoyment of his/her dwelling. As in cases of post-acquisition

housing discrimination by homeowner insurers, see , e.g. , Ojo v.

Farmers Group , 600 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2010); home

improvement or refinancing lenders, see , e.g. , Beard v.

Worldwide Mortgage Corp. , 354 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809 (W.D. Tenn.

2005).” 5/

19. "Discriminatory intent may be established through

direct or indirect circumstantial evidence." Johnson v.

Hamrick , 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001). Direct

evidence of discrimination is "evidence that, if believed,

proves the existence of a fact without inference or

presumption." Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1079,

1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“. . . if the [complainant] offers direct evidence and the trier

of fact accepts that evidence, then the [complainant] has proven

discrimination." Maynard v. Bd. of Regents , 342 F.3d 1281, 1289

(11th Cir. 2003). "[D]irect evidence is composed of 'only the

most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than

to discriminate' on the basis of some impermissible

factor . . . [i]f an alleged statement at best merely suggests a

discriminatory motive, then it is by definition only

circumstantial evidence." Schoenfeld v. Babbitt , 168 F.3d 1257,

1266 (11th Cir. 1999). Likewise, a statement "that is subject

to more than one interpretation . . . does not constitute direct

evidence." Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co. , 120 F.3d 1181, 1189

(11th Cir. 1997). Because direct evidence of intent is often

unavailable, those who claim to be victims of intentional

discrimination "are permitted to establish their cases through

inferential and circumstantial proof." Kline v. Tenn. Valley

Auth. , 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). 20. Where a complainant attempts to prove intentional

discrimination using circumstantial evidence, "the Supreme

Court's shifting-burden analysis adopted in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S.

Ct. 1817 (1973), . . . is applicable." Laroche v. Denny's Inc. ,

62 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1999); see also Head v.

Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. , 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis *99379,

19-20 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010). "Under this framework, the

[complainant] has the initial burden of establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination. If the [complainant] meets that

burden, then an inference arises that the challenged action was

motivated by a discriminatory intent. The burden then shifts to

the [respondent] to 'articulate' a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for its action. If the [respondent]

successfully articulates such a reason, then the burden shifts

back to the [complainant] to show that the proffered reason is

really pretext for unlawful discrimination." Schoenfeld ,

168 F.3d at 1267 (citations omitted). If, however, the

complainant fails to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, the matter ends. See , e.g. , Nat'l Indus., Inc.

v. Comm'n on Human Rel. , 527 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).

21. Mr. Cosme, in establishing his prima facie case of

discrimination under McDonnell Douglas , discrimination is

required to show: (1) that he is a member of a protected class;

(2) that he suffered an injury because of the alleged

discrimination; and (3) that, based on his claimed class of

national origin, he was denied the provision of services

protected by the Fair Housing Act, which were available to other

homeowners who were not Hispanic or of Puerto Rican national

origin.

22. Turning to the facts in the instant case, the record

shows that Mr. Cosme failed to bring forward evidence showing a

violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

23. At the onset, the record shows that much of

Mr. Cosme's evidence concerned events that occurred in 2005 and

2006. The underlying complaint in this case was not brought

forward until November 24, 2010. At the final hearing,

Lakeshore Club raised the statute of limitations defense.

Consequently, facts concerning events that occurred one year

before November 24, 2010, are untimely and not considered by the

undersigned. § 760.35, Fla. Stat.

24. Further, a review of the record, does not show any

direct evidence of discrimination. Moreover, the record shows

that Mr. Cosme failed to introduce evidence satisfying the

second or third prongs of the McDonnell Douglas case, that he

suffered an injury because of discrimination, because he was

Hispanic, or because of his national origin, or that he was

denied the provision of services protected by the Fair Housing

Act, which were available to other homeowners, who were not

Hispanic or of Puerto Rican national origin.

25. The timely factual allegations consisted of

Ms. Torres' and Mr. Cosme's testimony that they believed that

Ms. Jewell-Sanford treated Hispanics and Mr. Cosme

disrespectfully and that Ms. Jewell-Sanford informed Mr. Cosme in

one instance, he could not walk to the back of the homeowners’

association office. In addition, Mr. Cosme's complaint

concerning the December 1, 2009, letter sent to him is considered

timely. Applying the rule of law from Savanna Club Worship

Services , none of the testimony shows that Mr. Cosme had been

restricted from accessing a common area owned by the homeowners’

association based on his national origin, or that other

individuals who were not Hispanic or national origin of Puerto

Rico were treated differently than him. For example, there was

no evidence that other individuals, who were not Hispanic or of

Puerto Rican national origin, that were allowed unfettered access

to the homeowners’ association office. At best, Mr. Cosme

presented his subjective belief that he had been treated

disrespectfully. Therefore, Mr. Cosme failed to establish a

prima facie case of discriminatory intent. 6/

26. The last line of inquiry concerns whether the

December 1, 2009, letter from Lakeshore Club to Mr. Cosme

constituted a violation of section 760.37.

27. Section 760.37, provides that:

[i]t is unlawful to coerce, intimidate,

threaten, or interfere with any person in

the exercise of, or on account of her or his

having exercised, or on account of her or

his having aided or encouraged any other

person in the exercise of any right granted

under [Florida Fair Housing Act].

28. Section 760.37 is substantially identical to the

federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. section 3617. Loren v.

Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus,

federal case law is instructive in interpreting section 760.37.

29. Federal case law has recognized that, in 42 U.S.C.

section 3617, retaliation claims require a "plaintiff to

demonstrate that the defendant,"exercised their powers with a

discriminatory animus," in order to survive summary judgment.

Campbell v. Robb , 162 Fed. Appx. 460, 473, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis

*622 (6th Cir. 2006), citing Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv , 18

F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. City of

Birmingham , 727 F.2d 560, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1984) (modifying

injunction preventing any conduct interfering with plaintiffs'

exercise of rights under the Fair Housing Act to prohibition

only of conduct interfering "because of race or with

discriminatory motive on account of race"); East-Miller v. Lake

Cnty Hwy Dep't , 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We hold that

a showing of intentional discrimination is an essential element

of a § 3617 claim."); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty Hous. Auth. , 161 F.3d

1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998)(stating that section 42 U.S.C.

section 3617, like 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), requires a showing

of discriminatory intent"); Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty. , 931 F.2d

718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991)(requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate

"that race played some role" in defendants' actions alleged to

have violated 42 U.S.C. section 3617). But see Reg'l Econ.

Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown , 294 F.3d 35,

54 (2d Cir. 2002)(requiring only evidence that a defendant acted

with a retaliatory motive, rather than a discriminatory one to

make out a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. section 3617.); San

Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles , 159 F.3d 470, 477

(9th Cir. 1998).

30. Applying the law to the facts, Mr. Cosme failed to

establish that the December 1, 2009, letter constituted a

violation of section 760.37. Mr. Cosme did not introduce into

evidence the "packet" containing his complaints against

Ms. Jewell-Sanford that he provided to the Lakeshore Club Board

of Directors. Similarly, Mr. Cosme did not testify about the

contents of the "packet" of information that the Board of

Directors references in sending Mr. Cosme the letter.

Consequently, there is no record evidence that Mr. Cosme was

exercising any right under the Florida Fair Housing Act.

31. Even if one assumed that Mr. Cosme had brought forward

evidence showing that he was exercising a right under the

Florida Fair Housing Act when he initially wrote the Lakeshore

Club Board of Directors, the record does not show any

discriminatory animus on behalf of Lakeshore Club or that he

suffered any injury. There was no evidence that, the

December 1, 2009, letter that was sent to Mr. Cosme was based on

a discriminatory intent concerning his national origin or

Hispanic descent. Therefore, there is no tie between the letter

and the complaint of a discriminatory act. Furthermore, the

letter on its face does not contain language that is coercive,

intimidating, or threatening. Rather, the letter informs

Mr. Cosme that the Board may seek legal remedies, if he

continued to harass its members. The letter further states

that, Lakeshore Club wanted to "work things out peacefully from

this point forward." This interpretation was supported by the

testimony of Ms. Horneck, a member of the Lakeshore Club Board

of Directors, that she initialed the letter and that it was her

intent in the letter that the parties get together and work

things out. Consequently, Mr. Cosme failed to bring forward any

evidence showing a violation of section 760.37.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for

Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2011, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

THOMAS P. CRAPPS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

[phone]

Fax Filing [phone]

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 7th day of July, 2011.

ENDNOTES

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida

Statutes are to the 2010 version.

2/ The Petition for Relief here identified Lakeshore Club as the

only Respondent. Further, the Petition for Relief claimed both a

housing discriminatory practice and a violation of the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. The Petition for Relief

and Mr. Cosme's evidence at the final hearing focused on his

allegations concerning the English only sign, and actions that he

considered disrespectful by Ms. Jewell-Sanford. Because the

instant case does not involve an allegation of an unlawful

employment issue or discrimination concerning a public

accommodation, Mr. Cosme's checking the box on his Petition for

Relief that claims a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act

appears to be an error. Consequently, Mr. Cosme's allegation

that a discriminatory housing practice occurred will be reviewed

under the Florida Fair Housing Act.

3/ Mr. Cosme in his Proposed Recommended Order stated that he

regretted "not having the opportunity to question Mrs. Jewell,

Mr. Jim Purdy and Mr. Andy Andreu . . ." Further,

Mr. Cosme stated that tactics used by opposing counsel

"prevented me from bringing Mrs. Jewell and Mr. Purdy to

testify, even though they were in the outer room waiting."

Mr. Cosme did not present these witnesses for testimony.

Consequently, Mr. Cosme cannot be heard to complain that he did

not have an opportunity to present his case.

4/ The language in section 760.23(2) is identical to the language

in 42 U.S.C. section 3604(b), the federal Fair Housing Act.

5/ The federal court in applying rule of law to the facts in

Savanna Club Worship Service , determined that plaintiff had

failed to show that "it was denied access to use of facilities

or common areas available to other homeowners based upon

religion as contemplated by the FHA." 456 F. Supp 2d at 1232.

6/ If the undersigned applied the rule of law that restricts Fair

Housing Act claims to only those involving acquisition of

housing, not acts of post-acquisition discrimination, then

Mr. Cosme's claims would fail because they all occurred after he

had purchased his home.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Francisco Cosme

Post Office Box 8118

Fedhaven, Florida 33854

Scott H. Jackman, Esquire

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.

4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard

Suite 400

Tampa, Florida 33607-5712

Larry Kranert, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.