11-005422 Eulinda M. Russ vs. Keys Property Management Enterprise, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, February 16, 2012.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent committed a violation of the Fair Housing Act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of her race.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

EULINDA M. RUSS , )

)

Petitioner , )

)

vs. ) Case No. 11 - 5422

)

KEYS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT )

ENTERPRISE, INC. , )

)

Respondent . )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case was heard on January 30, 2012, in Starke,

Florida, before E. Gary Early, a designated Administrative Law

Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Eulinda Russ, pro se

Post Office Box 902

Starke, Florida 32091

For Respondent: Sean Murrell, Esquire

Murrell Law, LLC

4651 Salisbury Road, Suite 503

Jacksonville, Florida 32256

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful

discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or

provision of services in connection with the rental of a

dwelling from Respondent, base d on her race, in violation of

s ection 804(b) or 804(f) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the

Florida Fair Housing Act, c hapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes

(2011).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 18, 201 1, Petitioner filed a complaint with the

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the

Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), alleging that she

was discriminated against based on her race by Respondent . The

basis for the claim of d iscrimination is that Respondent failed

to perform adequate maintenance and repairs to her leased house

in the Country Club Woods residential community, or imposed

discriminatory terms and conditions on her with regard to her

leasehold interest in violatio n of the Fair Housing Act.

An investigation of the complaint was made by FCH R. On

September 19, 2011, the FCHR issued its Notice of Determination

of No Cause, which incorporated a HUD Determination, dated

September 8, 2011, and conclud ed that there was no reasonable

cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had

occurred.

Petitioner disagreed with FCHRÓs determination and filed a

Petition for Relief. The petition was forwarded to the Division

of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing o n the matter.

The final hearing was scheduled for December 6, 2011.

Petitioner requested a continuance of the hearing, which was

unopposed. The hearing was reset for January 30, 2012, and was

held as scheduled.

At the hearing, Petitioner testified on he r own behalf and

offered the testimony of Kelsy Roulhac, her son; and Wanda Gary,

a Florida Correction and Probation Officer. Petitioner o ffered

PetitionerÓs Exhibits P1 - P21, whi ch were received in evidence.

Respondent presented the testimony of Rebekkah Baker, Property

Manager for Country Club Woods; Samuel Baker, who performed

maintenance at Country Club Woods; Karen Headrick, the CEO for

Respondent; Sheila Palmer, a resident of Country Club Woods; and

Tynesha Epps, a resident of Country Club Woods. Re spondent

o ffered RespondentÓs Exhibits R1 - R5, which were received in

evidence.

The FCHR did not have the final hearing recorded either by

electronic means or by court reporter. Neither party elected to

have a court reporter present. Therefore, there is no official

record of the final hearing.

After the hearing, Petitioner and Respondent timely filed

Proposed Recommended Orders , which have been considered in the

preparation of this Recommended Order. References to statutes

are to Florida Statutes (2011) unless otherwise noted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent owns and manages the Country Club Woods

residential community in Starke, Florida. Country Club Woods is

a racially - mixed community. The current residential mix

includes 29 African - American families and 6 white families.

County Club Woods receives low - income housing subsidies in the

form of tax credits through the Florida Housing Finance

Corporation. Some residents qualify for federal Section 8

housing subsidies.

2. Petitioner is African - American. On February 4, 2011,

Petitioner signed a lease agreement for a home in Country Club

Woods. Rent was $698.00 per month. The home was vacant, and

power and water had been turned off. Respondent asked

Petitioner to activate power and water so that repair s and unit

preparation could be performed , and she did so . PetitionerÓs

rent for February was partially prorated to account for the

period during which she did not occupy the unit.

3. The lease agreement required that all occupants of the

house be list ed, and provided that Ð[n]o other occupants are

permitted.Ñ Guests were limited to stays of no more than 14

consecutive days. Due to the status of Country Club Woods as an

affordable housing community, it is subject to restrictions on

the income and crim inal history of its residents. Therefore,

all permanent occupants are required to undergo income and

background screening to ensure that the low income housing tax

credit rules are being met. The failure to do so could

jeopardize the tax credits.

4. Wh en she signed the lease, Pet itioner knew what the

lease required regarding the occupancy of the house. Petitioner

listed Aulettia Russ and Aarian Russ, her daughter and son, as

occupants with her in the home.

5. After the lease contract was signed, Respo ndent

performed a few repairs and updates to prepare the unit for

Petitioner. Mr. Sam Baker, who performed maintenance services

for County Club Woods, fumigated the house and painted some of

the interior walls. He performed a minor repair to the roof,

wh ich consisted of applying tar around the cracked rubber boot

of the roof drain vent. Mr. Baker moved a stove into the house

from another unit because there was no stove when the lease was

signed. He also replaced the toilet with a new one.

6. Petition er moved into the unit on February 16, 2010.

She was joined by her fiancé , Kevin Sampson, and her older son,

Kelsy Roulhac, neither of whom were listed as occupants.

Mr. Sampson was on probation for several felony offenses. Both

Mr. Sampson and Mr. Roul hac were residents for the entirety of

PetitionerÓs tenancy. At no time during the tenancy did

Petitioner seek to add Mr. Sampson or Mr. Roulhac to the lease.

7. Petitioner testified that Rebekkah Baker, the property

manager, knew that Mr. Sampson was a permanent occupant, but had

no objection. Ms. Baker denied that she consented to his

occupancy, given that it would have been a violation of Country

Club Woods policy against leasing to persons with a criminal

history in the past seven years. Given the c onsequences of

failing to meet the occupancy and background screening

requirements, Ms. BakerÓs testimony is credited.

8. When Petitioner moved in, there were still problems

with the unit. Problems noted by Petitioner included a broken

dishwasher, mildew on a number of surfaces, dead insects --

likely from the fumigation -- in the cabinets, a hole in the

foyer wall caused by the adjacent doorÓs doorknob, a ceiling

stain from the roof leak, a missing shower head, a broken light

fixture, and a missing smoke alarm. In addition, the carpet was

stained and in generally very poor condition.

9. Petitioner resolved the mildew problem by cleaning the

affected surfaces with Tilex. PetitionerÓs son, Mr. Roulhac,

got rid of the dead insects and cleaned the cab inets.

Petitioner replaced the showerhead on her own.

10. Shortly after she moved in, Petitioner notified

Respondent that her roof was leaking. Mr. Baker went to the

house, advised PetitionerÓs daughter that he was there to fix

the roof, and went onto t he roof. He determined that the leak

was occurring at the location of his previous repair. He

completed the repair by re - tarring the roof drain vent boot.

11. Petitioner testified that the roof continued to leak

after heavy rains. She indicated that sh e made a subsequent

complaint via a message left on Ms. BakerÓs telephone answering

machine. Ms. Baker testified that she received no subsequent

complaints, and there is no other evidence to suggest that

Respondent received any subsequent complaints regar ding the

roof. Mr. Baker performed no further repairs.

12. Petitioner complained that the dishwasher was holding

water. She testified that Respondent never came to fix the

dishwasher. Both Mr. Baker a nd Ms. Baker testified that

Mr. Baker was tasked to repair the dishwasher, but upon arriving

at the house was denied entry, with the explanation that the

dishwasher had been fixed by a friend, and the problem resolved

by removing a plastic fork that had clogged the drain.

13. From the time Petitioner moved in, until the time she

vacated the home, Mr. Baker fixed the hole in the foyer wall and

the broken light fixture. In addition, Mr. Baker came to the

house to fix the refrigerator, which was a problem that was not

on the original list.

14. From the beg inning of her tenancy, Petitioner

complained of the carpet. The carpet was badly stained and

worn. In addition, the carpet contained a dye or some other

substance that aggravated Aarian RussÓs asthma. It was

PetitionerÓs desire to have the carpet replac ed before the time

of her daughterÓs graduation.

15. Respondent agreed to replace the carpet, and had

employees of a flooring company go to PetitionerÓs house to

measure for new carpet. The flooring company employees were

allowed entry to the house by Pe titionerÓs daughter. They

measured the rooms, except for PetitionerÓs bedroom, which was

locked. Respondent advised Petitioner that the measurements of

the bedroom of an identical unit could be provided to the carpet

company. It is not known if that was done. Due to difficulties

on the part of the flooring company, the new carpet was not

installed before Petitioner vacated the unit. There was no

evidence offered to suggest any relationship between the failure

to install new carpet and PetitionerÓs race .

16. Petitioner complained that she had not been given

notice that the flooring company employees were coming, and

complained that Respondent had not performed a background check

on the workers. She argued that she was entitled to have a

background chec k done on anyone providing services before she

would have to allow them into her home. T here is no

relationship between PetitionerÓs complaints regarding the lack

of a background check on the workers and Pe titionerÓs race.

17. The lease agreement provide s that Ð[m]anagement will

make repairs . . . after receipt of written notice.Ñ Respondent

occasionally prepared work orders describing the nature of the

problem at a unit, and the work done to resolve the problem .

However, t he evidence demonstrates that written work orders were

likely the exception rather than the rule. It appears that most

problems were reported by verba l requests, and resolved by

Mr. BakerÓs maintenance and repairs.

18 . Most of PetitionerÓs requests for repairs and

maintenance were ma de verbally. At some point, due to the

number of items, Petitioner provided Respondent with a list of

items for repair. There is no evidence that any repairs at

PetitionerÓs home were documented with a work order. In any

event , there was no evidence tha t the failure to document the

work, which was common, was the result of PetitionerÓs race.

19 . Petitioner did submit seven work orders in evidence.

Six of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to

the homes of African - American families upon verbal requests.

One of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to

the home of a white family upon a verbal request. Petitioner

questioned why none of her repairs were memorial ized in work

orders. T he work orders do not substantiate that P etitioner was

discriminated against on account of her race, and in fact serve

to indicate that Respondent provided maintenance services

equally, without any consideration to the race of the person

requesting such services.

20 . Petitioner complained that M r. Baker did not have

Ðcredentials,Ñ and questioned him regarding any education or

licenses that qualified him to perform maintenance, including

electrical work. Whether qualified to do so or not, Mr. Baker

performed maintenance for all of the residents o f Country Club

Woods, regardless of their race. There is no relationship

between PetitionerÓs complaints regarding Mr. BakerÓs

credentials and PetitionerÓs race.

21 . Beginning in April, 2011, Petitioner began to fall

behind on her rent. Petitioner was paid bi - weekly, though how

that affected her ability to plan for monthly rental payments

was not clearly explained. On April 21, 2011, Ms. Baker posted

a notice on PetitionerÓs door demanding that the $279.60 balance

of the April rent payment be made. Pe titioner denied having

seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in

evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that Ð[p]romised

to pay balance w/ May 2011Ós rent.Ñ

22 . On May 9, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on

PetitionerÓs door demanding that the rent payment be made. The

amount in arrears was calculated to be $1,077.60 , which included

a late fee . Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However,

the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation

from Ms. Baker that Ðpd. $69 8 on 5/11/11.Ñ

23 . On June 1, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on

PetitionerÓs door demanding that the rent payment be made. The

amount in arrears remained at $1,077.60. Petitioner denied

having seen the notice.

24 . On July 27, 2011, Respondent provide d a notice to

Petitioner indicating that due to unauthorized occupants and

$1,975 in unpaid rent, Petitioner had until August 1, 2011 , to

vacate the premises, or Respondent would commence eviction

proceedings. Petitioner admitted to having received that

notice.

25 . RespondentÓs resident history report indicates that by

the time Petitioner vacated the home on August 31, 2011, her

re nt was $2,075.60 in arrears. Some of that was due to assessed

late charges, but the majority reflected unpaid rent. When

Petitioner vacated the unit, PetitionerÓs security deposit was

applied, the remaining arrearage was assigned to a collection

company, and RespondentÓs books were cleared.

26 . Ms. Sheila Palmer and Ms. Tynesha Epps testified at

the hearing. They have been residents of Country Club Woods for

16 years and for 1 year and 3 months , respectively. Both are

African - American. Both testified that they had never been

refused maintenance at their homes, and that Respondent was

responsive to their requests for maintenance which were

generally verbal. Neit her Ms. Palmer nor Ms. Epps was aware of

any instance in which management of Country Club Wo ods had

discriminated against any tenant due to their race, though

neither personally knew Petitioner.

27. Ms. Headrick, Ms. Baker, and Mr. Baker each testified

that they never denied or limited repair and maintenance

services to any resident of Country C lub Woods account of their

race. They each testified convincingly that race played no

factor in their duties to their tenants.

Ultimate Findings of Fact

28 . There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced

at the hearing that Respondent failed or refused to provide

services to Petitioner under the same terms and conditions that

were applicable to all persons residing in the Country Club

Woods community. There was not a scintilla of evidence that , in

providing services to Petitioner, Respondent dev iated from its

standard practice of providing maintenance services to all

residents of Country Club Woods regardless of their race,

income, or any other reason.

29 . The evidence does support a finding that Petitioner

materially breached the terms of the lease agreement, both by

allowing undisclosed persons to reside at the house, and by

failing to timely pay rent.

30 . PetitionerÓs race had nothing to do with the timing or

manner in which maintenance and repair services were provided to

her by Respondent , and it is expressly so found. T he evidence

did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against

Petitioner on the basis of her race. Therefore, the Petition

for Relief should be dismissed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

31 . The Division of Administrative Hea rings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

proceeding . § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat .

32 . FloridaÓs Fair Housing Act, s ections 760.20 through

760.37, Florida Statutes , makes it unlawful to discriminate in

the provision of services provided to the tenants of re ntal

housing. In that regard, s ection 760.23(2), provides that:

(2) It is unlawful to discriminate against

any person in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

or in the provision of services o r

facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial status, or religion.

33 . In cases involving a claim of rental housing

discrimination, the burden of proof is on t he complainant.

§ 760.34(5), Fl a . Sta t .

34 . The Florida Fair Housing Act is patterned after Title

VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair

Housing Act of 1988, and discrimination covered under the

Florida Fair Housing Act is the same discrimination prohibited

under the Fe deral Fair Housing Act. Savanna Club Worship Serv.

v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n , 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224

(S.D. Fla. 2005); see also Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1300

(11 th Cir. 2002). When Ða Florida statute is modeled after a

federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take

on the same constructions as placed on its federal prototype.Ñ

Brand v. Florida Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA

1994); see also Millsa p v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. ,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8031 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Dornbach v. Holley ,

854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff.

v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

35 . A plaintiff may proceed under the Fair Housing Act

under theories of either disparate impact or disparate

treatment, or both. Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. , 2010

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99379 (S.D. Fla. 2010). To establish a prima

facie case of disparate impact, Petitioner would have to prove a

significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on a protected

class of persons as a result of RespondentÓs facially neutral

acts or practices. Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. ,

supra , citing E.E.O.C. v. JoeÓs Stone Crab, Inc. , 220 F.3d 126 3,

1278 (11 th Cir. 2000). To prevail on a disparate treatment in

housing claim, Petitioner would have to come forward with

evidence that she was treated differ ently than similarly -

situated tenants. Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. , supra ,

citing Sch warz v. City of Treasure Island , 544 F.3d 1201, 1216

(11 th Cir. 2008) and Hallmark Dev., Inc. v. Fulton County , 466

F.3d 1276, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2006).

36 . The evidence indicates that Petitioner was attempting

to prove that she was discriminated against due to Respondent Ó s

disparate treatment of her as opposed to other residents, both

African - American and white, that lived in the Country Club Woods

community.

37 . In establishing that she was the subject of

discrimination based upon her race, Petitioner could either

produce direct evidence of discrimination that motivated

disparate treatment in the provision of services to her, or

prove circumstantial evidence sufficient to allow the trier of

fact to infer that discrimination was the cause of the dispara te

treatment. See King v. Auto, Truck, Indus. Parts & Supply , 21

F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1381 (N.D. Fla. 1998).

38 . Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to

inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d

1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555,

1561 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts have held that ÐÒonly the most

blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate. . .Ó will constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.Ñ Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. ,

196 F.3d 1354, 1358 - 59 (11th Cir. 1999)(citations omitted).

39 . Petitioner presented no direct evidence of

discrimination by Respondent in its provision of maintenance and

r epair services to any resident of Country Club Woods, including

Petitioner.

40 . When there is no direct evidence of discrimination,

fair housing cases are subject to the three - part test set forth

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) an d

Texas DepÓt of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

Boykin v. Bank of America Corp. , 162 Fed. Appx. 837, 838; 2005

U.S. App. LEXIS 28415 (11 th Cir. 2005); see also Massaro v.

Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic AssÓn, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6

(11 th Cir. 1993); Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban

Development, on Behalf of Herron v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870

(11th Cir. 1990); Savannah Club Worship Serv. v. Savannah Club

HomeownersÓ AssÓn , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 - 1232.

41 . Under the three - part test, Petitioner has the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , at 802; Texas

DepÓt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , at 252 - 253; Burke - Fowler v.

Orange Cnty., Fla. , 447 F.3d 1319 , 1323 (11th Cir. 2006);

Valenzuela v GlobeGround North America, LLC. , 18 So. 3d at 22.

ÐT he elements of a prima facie case are flexible and should be

tailored, on a case - by - case basis, to differing factual

circumstances . " Boykin v. Bank of America Corp. 162 Fed. Appx.

at 838 - 839, citing Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112,

1123 (11th Cir. 1993)

42 . If Petitioner is able to prove a prima facie case by a

preponderance of the evidence, t he burden shifts to Respondent

to articulate a legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for its

actions. Texas DepÓt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 255;

DepÓt of Corr. v. Chandler , 582 So. 2d 1183 (F la. 1st DCA 1991).

Respondent has the burden of production, not persuasion, to

de monstrate to the finder of fact that its action as a landlord,

upon which the complaint was made, was non - discriminatory.

DepÓt of Corr. v. Chandler , supra . This burden of production is

"exceedingly light." Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1564

(11th C ir. 1997); Turnes v. Amsouth Bank, N.A. , 36 F.3d 1057,

1061 (11th Cir. 1994).

43. If Respondent produces evidence that the basis for its

action was non - disc riminatory, then Petitioner must establish

that the proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a

pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks ,

509 U.S. 502, 516 - 518 (1993). In order to satisfy this final

step of the process, Petitioner must Ðshow[] directl y that a

discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the

decision, or indirectly by showing that the proffered reason for

the employment decision is not worthy of belief.Ñ DepÓt of

Corr. v. Chandler , 582 So. 2d at 1186, citing Tex. Dep't of

Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 252 - 256 . Pretext can be

shown by inconsistencies and/or contradictions in testimony.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 143

(2000); Blackwell , supra ; Woodward v. Fanboy, L.L.C. , 298 F.3d

1261 (11th Cir. 2002). The demonstration of pretext Ðmerges

with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of showing that the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.Ñ

(citations omitted) Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d at 1565.

44 . Petitioner has the burden of proving a prima facie

case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Fla.

Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1981). Failure to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination ends the inquiry. See Ratliff v. State , 666 So.

2d 1008, 1013 n.7 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), affÓd, 679 So. 2d, 1183

(Fla. 1996)(citing Arnold v. Burger Queen Systems , 509 So. 2d

958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)).

4 5 . As applied to this case, the standard established in

McDonnell - Douglas requires Petit ioner to establish in her prima

facie case: (1) that she is a memb er of a protected class;

(2) that she requested that necessary maintenance services be

performed to her dwelling by Respondent on terms comparable to

others living in Country Club Woods; and (3) that, based on her

race, she was denied provision of services protected by the Fair

Housing Act which were available to other tenants of Country

Club Woods. See , e.g. , Savannah Club Worship Serv. v. Savannah

Club HomeownersÓ AssÓn , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.

46 . Petitioner did not meet her burden to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination. Petitioner failed to prove

that any actions on the part of Respondent were discriminatory

in nature. The evidence in this case demonstrates that

Petitioner received services from Respondent in response to

requests that were generally comparable to the manner in which

most maintenance services were requested and provided to persons

of all races in Country Club Woods. Petitioner did not prove by

a preponderanc e of the evidence that Respondent treated her

differently than other residents of Country Club Woods based on

her race.

47 . It should be noted that PetitionerÓs dissatisfaction

with the condition of her unit was not entirely misplaced. It

appears that the carpet was indeed in poor condition, and that

some repairs could have been made faster. Nonetheless,

Petitioner failed to present even a scintilla of evidence that

she was discriminated against on the basis of her race. Even if

the lack of written work orders was not the norm, such a mild

departure from normal procedures would not, given the facts of

this case, be sufficient to support PetitionerÓs claim. Boykin

v. Bank of America Corp. , 162 Fed. Appx. at 839; Randle v. City

of Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir. 1995).

48 . The evidence demonstrated that the residents of

Country Club Woods, including Petitioner, were treate d fairly,

without consideration of race, and that Respondent, Keys

Property Management Enterprise, Inc., did not commit a

discriminatory housing practice as to Petitioner, Eulinda M.

Russ. Therefore the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDAT ION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief

filed in FCHR No. 2012H0004.

DONE AND ENT ERED this 16th day of Febr uary, 2012 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

E. GARY EARLY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 16th day of February, 2012 .

COPIES FURNISHED :

Eulinda M. Russ

Post Office Box 902

Starke, Florida 32091

Sean Michael Murrell, Esquire

Murrell Law, LLC

4651 Salisbury Road South, Suite 503

Jacksonville, Florida 32256

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Larry Kranert, General Counsel

Flori da Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.