12-001220PL
Department Of Business And Professional Regulation vs.
Craig H. Butterfield
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, December 12, 2012.
Recommended Order on Wednesday, December 12, 2012.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )
13PROFESSIONAL REGULATION , )
16)
17Petitioner , )
19)
20vs. ) Case No. 12 - 1220PL
27)
28CRAIG H. BUTTERFIELD , )
32)
33Respondent . )
36)
37RECOMMENDED ORDER
39Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case
50on September 14, 2012 , by video teleconference in Tallahassee
59and Miami, Florida , before Thomas P. Crapps, a designated
68Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative
76Hearings (DOAH).
78APPEARANCES
79For Petitioner: Megan Demartini, Esquire
84Department of Business and
88Professional Regulation
90Suite 42
921940 N. Monroe Street
96Tallahas see, Florida 32399 - 2202
102Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Esquire
106Department of Business and
110Professional Regulation
112Office of General Counsel
1162295 Victoria Avenue, Suite 263
121Fort Myers, Florida 33901 - 3877
127For Respondent: Daniel Villazon, Esquire
132Law Office of Daniel Villazon, P.A.
138Suite 200
1401420 Celebration Blvd.
143Celebration, Flo rida 34747
147STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
151Whether Respondent violated section 475.624(15), Florida
157Statutes (2010), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and
166if so, the appropriate penalty. 1/
172PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
174On June 15, 2011, Petitioner, the Depart ment of Business
184and Professional Regulation (Department), filed a one - count
193Administrative Complaint before the Florida Real Estate
200Appraisal Board against Respondent , Craig H. Butterfield
207(Mr. Butterfield). The Administrative Complaint charges
213Mr. Butte rfield with violating section 475.624(15) , for failing
222to exercise reasonable diligence in developing and preparing an
231appraisal report.
233On July 15, 2011, Mr. Butterfield filed with the Department
243a petition seeking an administrative hearing. On April 6, 2012,
253the Department transmitted the case to DOAH, and the case was
264set for a final hearing to occur on May 30, 2012. At the
277beginning of the May 30, 2012 , hearing, the video teleconference
287sites experienced technical difficulties which resulted in an
295ina bility to conduct the hearing. As a result, the parties
306conferred and requested the undersigned to reschedule the
314hearing. Therefore, the undersigned granted a motion to
322continue the hearing on May 30, 2012. The final hearing was
333rescheduled for final h earing on September 14, 2012.
342At the September 14, 2012, hearing, the Department
350presented the testimony of Philip G. Spool (Mr. Spool) and
360James J. Courchaine (Mr. Courchaine) and introduced into
368evidence E xhibits numbered 1 through 4, 6 through 8, 10
379thr ough 14, and 16 through 18 and Petitioner's R ebuttal
390E xhibit numbered 1. Chapters 120, 455 , and 475, Florida
400Statutes ; Florida Administrative Code chapter 61J(1) ; and the
4082010 - 2011 edition of the Uniform Standards of Professional
418Appraisal Practice (USPAP ) were officially recognized.
425Mr. Butterfield testified on his own behalf.
432A two - volume Transcript was filed on October 11, 2012, and
444the parties submitted proposed recommended orders on
451November 12, 2012.
454FINDINGS OF FACT
4571. Department is the state age ncy charged with regulating
467the practice of real estate appraisal pursuant to
475section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes.
4842. Mr. Butterfield is licensed as a state - certified
494general real estate appraiser, holding state license number
502RD 1 063. Consequently, he is certified to give residential and
513commercial appraisals in Florida. Further, Mr. Butterfield has
521been a licensed appraiser in Florida since 1991. In addition to
532being licensed in Florida, Mr. Butterfield is licensed in 11
542other states, holding seven active and four inactive licenses.
551There is no evidence that Mr. Butterfield has any prior
561discipline.
5623. On April 26, 2010, Mr. Butterfield issued the Appraisal
572Report, which is at issue in this administrative hearing. He
582prepared the Appraisal Report for Charles Morgan, P.A., a law
592firm located in North Miami Beach, Florida. The Appraisal
601Report identified the law firm as the intended user and that the
613appraisal would be used in litigation. The stated purpose of
623the Appraisal Re port was to provide a market value for the
635subject property.
6374. The subject property of the appraisal is located at
6471500 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida. 2/ The subject property is
657a unique parcel located on Brickell Avenue, near the heart of
668Miami's Fina ncial District. The subject property's site is
677approximately 15,286 square feet with a 6,497 square foot
688building. The building is a French Chateau home constructed in
6981928 by John Murrell, a prominent Miami attorney that helped
708develop Miami and Coral G ables. The subject property was the
719home of Mr. Murrell and his wife Ethel Murrell. Ms. Murrell was
731a noted attorney, author, lecturer and known as one of Florida's
742leading feminists. Consequently, the subject property has
749significant historical value. The building, as described by the
758Appraisal Report, "contains two octagonal towers with tent roof,
767parpet roof and dormers, crenellated garage roof, and trefoil
776arch windows with leaded and stained glass." Clearly, this is a
787unique historical building si tuated on one of Miami's most
797prestigious streets, Brickell Avenue.
8015. The Appraisal Report does not identify whether it is a
812self - contained appraisal report, a summary appraisal report or a
823restricted use appraisal report , as required by Standards Rule
8322 - 2 of USPAP. Similarly, Mr. Butterfield's work file does not
844identify the type of appraisal he performed on the subject
854property. Rather, Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he
863contracted to provide a "Commercial Narrative Appraisal Report."
871Mr. Bu tterfield's uncontradicted testimony that the Appraisal
879Report is a summary appraisal report for the intended user, a
890law firm, is credible.
8946. The complaint against Mr. Butterfield was instigated by
903Scott Taylor (Mr. Taylor). Mr. Taylor, a licensed re sidential
913appraiser, initially contacted Mr. Butterfield requesting
919assistance in appraising the subject property. Because the
927subject property appeared to be a commercial property,
935Mr. Taylor was not qualified to give an appraisal.
944Consequently, Mr. Ta ylor requested Mr. Butterfield's assistance.
952Mr. Taylor assisted Mr. Butterfield in the preparation of the
962appraisal with the taking of photographs and gathering of
971information. However, Mr. Taylor became unhappy with
978Mr. Butterfield concerning the paym ent of Mr. Taylor's fee.
988According to Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Taylor threatened to file a
998complaint with the Department, if Mr. Butterfield did not pay
1008the fee. Mr. Butterfield refused to pay the disputed amount.
1018Consequently, Mr. Taylor filed a complaint against
1025Mr. Butterfield for perceived errors in the appraisal.
10337. The record contains no evidence that the intended user,
1043the law firm, had any complaint concerning the quality of the
1054work or that the law firm was misled by the Appraisal Report.
10668. Th e Department's expert witness, Mr. Spool, has 39
1076years of experience as an appraiser in the Miami - Dade, County
1088area. Further, he has taught appraisal practice at Miami - Dade
1099College, and published numerous articles concerning appraisal
1106practice.
11079. Mr. Sp ool identified USPAP as the standards used by
1118appraisers in conducting real estate appraisals. Further, he
1126credibly testified that USPAP standards related to an appraiser
1135using "reasonable diligence" in preparing an appraisal by
1143requiring that the apprais er correctly use recognized methods
1152and techniques to create a credible appraisal.
115910. The Appraisal Report contains Mr. Butterfield's
1166certification that the appraisal was conducted in compliance
1174with USPAP.
117611. The Department's case at the hearing pro ceeded to show
1187that Mr. Butterfield did not use reasonable diligence in the
1197preparation of the Appraisal Report along the following four
1206general lines:
1208a) The Highest and Best Use section of the
1217Appraisal Report did not contain any
1223supporting analyses o r discussion;
1228b) The Zoning section of the Appraisal
1235Report did not contain any supporting
1241analyses or discussion;
1244c) The comparables used by Mr. Butterfield
1251were inappropriate, and that he used an
1258incorrect methodology for determining the
1263subject prop erty's market value; and
1269d) The Appraisal Report contained numerous
1275errors that call into question its
1281credibility.
1282Each of these areas is discussed separately
1289in this Recommended Order.
1293Highest and Best Use
129712. The Appraisal Report here sets out t he Highest and
1308Best Use of the subject property as following:
1316The Highest and Best Use of the subject
1324property could accommodate office usages.
1329The structure represents a significant
1334portion of the total value of the whole
1342property. Therefore, due to the
1347contributory value of the improvements and
1353our estimate of the Highest and Best use of
1362the subject property is its present usage,
1369as would benefit an owner occupant, or as
1377present building may generate lease income.
138313. The Appraisal Report's discussi on of the subject
1392property's highest and best use contains what could be best
1402described as "boilerplate language , " setting out definitions and
1410the appropriate tests to be applied when reviewing the subject
1420property. 3/ Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisa l Report is not
1432that Mr. Butterfield reached an inappropriate conclusion, but
1440rather the lack of analysis. Mr. Butterfield credibly
1448testified, however, that this appraisal was a summary appraisal
1457report, and that further analysis was not required. The
1466un dersigned rejects Mr. Spool's testimony that a more detailed
1476analysis needed to be contained in the Appraisal Report because
1486the report is a summary. A review of the appraisal shows that
1498it summarized the highest and best use of subject property as
1509its ex isting use. Consequently, the undersigned finds that
1518Mr. Butterfield's determination of the subject property's
1525highest and best use complied with USPAP 2 - 2(b). Moreover, the
1537Comment to Standard 2 - 2(b)(vii) provides that "[b]ecause
1546intended users' relian ce on a appraisal may be affected by the
1558scope of work, the report must enable them to be properly
1569informed and not misled." In the instant case, the Department
1579did not bring forward any evidence showing that the intended
1589user, a law firm, had been misled by Mr. Butterfield's
1599determination of the subject property's highest and best use.
160814. The record shows that the Department did not prove by
1619clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use
1629reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's
1637determination of highest and best use.
1643Zoning
164415. Mr. Butterfield specifically identified the subject
1651property's zoning, at the time of the appraisal, as "R - 3 Multi -
1665Family with HC - Residential Office Heritage Conservation District
1674overlay." Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisal Report's
1682zoning section is that Mr. Butterfield's analysis is lacking. A
1692review Appraisal Report's section titled zoning again includes
1700mostly "boilerplate language" without analysis , as to the
1708meaning of the zoning and historical overlay. However,
1716considering that the Appraisal Report here is a summary
1725appraisal report prepared for a law firm, the Department did not
1736prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield did
1746not use reasonable diligence. There was no evidence that Mr.
1756Butterfield's identification of the zoning, without further
1763analysis, was a lack of reasonable diligence in the context of a
1775summary. Moreover, there was no evidence that the intended
1784user, the law firm, was misled by Mr. Butterfi eld's
1794identification of the proper zoning, without a further analysis.
1803Market Value Determination
180616 . The Department questioned Mr. Butterfield's choice of
1815his direct sales and rental comparisons, and his methodology in
1825determining the subject proper ty's market value. Mr. Spool
1834offered properties that, in his opinion, were more appropriate
1843comparisons with the subject property and questioned
1850Mr. Butterfield's methodology. The discussion of each test used
1859to determine the subject property's market v alue is discussed
1869separately.
1870A. Direct sales comparison
187417. The Appraisal Report here shows that Mr. Butterfield
1883identified the three approaches used by appraisers to determine
1892a property's market value: 1) the cost approach; 2) direct
1902sales comparis ons; and 3) an income approach. Further, the
1912Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield used a direct sales
1922comparison methodology and income approach to determine the
1930subject property's market value.
193418. In the direct sales comparison, the Appraisal Re port
1944shows that Mr. Butterfield used four comparable direct sales
1953within the location of the subject property for his analysis.
1963Of the four comparable sales identified by Mr. Butterfield, one
1973involved an office and three involved residential homes. The
1982r ecord shows that Mr. Butterfield chose to use both an office
1994and residential properties in the sales comparison because both
2003uses were permitted by the subject property's zoning. At the
2013time of the appraisal, the subject property could have been used
2024as e ither a residence or an office. Consequently, the direct
2035sales comparison which included both office and residential
2043sales was appropriate for valuing the subject property. Based
2052on Mr. Butterfield's testimony and the Appraisal Report, the key
2062considerat ion in choosing these comparable sales was the
2071proximity to the subject property's Brickell Avenue address.
2079Further, a review of Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he
2090considered numerous properties for direct sales comparisons in
2098developing his market value opinion. The key factor for
2107Mr. Butterfield in preparing his sales comparisons was the
2116Brickell Avenue location. The undersigned finds Mr.
2123Butterfield's testimony concerning his use of the comparative
2131properties and methodology credible.
213519. M r. Spool's first criticism was that Mr. Butterfield
2145used an incorrect methodology in conducting the direct sales
2154comparison. Specifically, Mr. Spool testified that the highest
2162and best use of the property, as identified by Mr. Butterfield,
2173was an office. Consequently, Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect
2182methodology when he used direct sales from residences for
2191comparison. In essence, the correct methodology required that
2199any comparison be made with direct sales of office space or
2210rather compare "apples to apples and oranges to oranges."
2219Mr. Spool's criticism that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect
2228methodology is rejected because it is based on a wrong premise.
2239Mr. Butterfield did not identify the subject property's highest
2248and best use as only an office. The record shows that
2259Mr. Butterfield identified the subject property's highest and
2267best use as its permissible uses, which at the time was either a
2280residence or office. Mr. Butterfield used reasonable diligence
2288in comparing direct sales from nearby res idences and an office
2299in his analysis. Next, Mr. Spool identified other properties ,
2308which in his opinion , were more appropriate as sales
2317comparisons, such as a historic home near the Miami River that
2328had been converted into office space. However, the
2336ide ntification of other properties that could have been used by
2347Mr. Butterfield does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not use
2358reasonable diligence in preparing his report. It is noted that
2368the properties offered by Mr. Spool did not share the Brickell
2379Avenu e address , which is highly desirable. Consequently, the
2388undersigned finds that the Department did not prove by clear and
2399convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use
2407reasonable diligence in the preparation of his direct sales
2416comparison.
2417B. Inc ome approach
242120. Next, the Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield
2430used an income approach to determine the subject property's
2439market value. The record credibly shows that Mr. Butterfield
2448identified four rental comparables all located on Brickell
2456Av enue within close proximity to the subject property, and
2466verified the rental rate per square foot in the range of $24.00
2478to $37.00 per square foot.
248321. Mr. Spool offered alternative properties that in
2491his opinion were more appropriate for making a rental
2500comparison. The crux of the Department's testimony was that
2509Mr. Butterfield 's use of rental space from new high rises was
2521inappropriate for comparing with the subject property, which is
2530an older property. The undersigned, however, finds that
2538Mr. Butterfi eld's explanation that he chose comparable rental
2547properties based on the Brickell Avenue address credible.
2555Again, the fact that other properties may be used as comparable
2566properties does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not prepare
2576the Appraisal Report without reasonable diligence. Next,
2583Mr. Spool's explanation that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect
2592methodology for determining an income approach by using
2600residential properties is rejected. As found earlier,
2607Mr. Butterfield determined that the subject p roperty's highest
2616and best use could be either as an office or residence.
2627Therefore, it was appropriate to determine the rental income
2636from residences and office space. Moreover, the record shows
2645that Mr. Butterfield gathered information to determine the per
2654square - foot income. Therefore, the Department did not prove by
2665clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use
2675reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's
2683income approach analysis.
2686C. Miscellaneous Errors
268922. The App raisal Report does contain several admitted
2698errors. Examples of the errors are that the Appraisal Report
2708wrongly indicates that ingress and egress to the subject
2717property was from Brickell Avenue; that Brickell Avenue was a
2727minor north - south thoroughfare; that the three residences used
2737for direct sales comparison were "historic , " as opposed to being
2747located in "historic South Miami "; that it failed to designate
2757the type of appraisal that was conduct ed ; and that it did not
2770state in the certification that Mr . Butterfield had not
2780personally viewed the subject property. The undersigned finds
2788that these errors do not rise to the level of showing a lack of
2802reasonable diligence or could mislead the intended user. For
2811example, the Appraisal Report attached photog raphs of the three
2821residences used in the direct sales comparison. The photographs
2830clearly show that the three residences were not historical
2839homes, but modern construction. Therefore, it is clear that
2848Mr. Butterfield took steps to insure that the intend ed user of
2860the report would know the type of residences which were being
2871used for comparison with the subject property. Moreover,
2879concerning the errors about Brickell Avenue, one could safely
2888assume that a law firm in Miami Beach would know that Brickell
2900Avenue is a major and desirable location in Miami. Therefore,
2910the undersigned finds that although the appraisal contains
2918errors, which were admitted by Mr. Butterfield, those errors are
2928not of such a nature as to show a lack of reasonable diligence.
2941CON CLUSIONS OF LAW
294523. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
2955proceeding and of the parties hereto , pursuant to c hapter 120,
2966Florida Statutes (2012) .
297024. As a certified general real estate appraiser,
2978Mr. Butterfield is qualified to issue ap praisal reports for any
2989type of real property. § 475.611(1)(h), Fla. Stat.
299725. The Department has been statutorily empowered to take
3006disciplinary action against certified real estate appraisers
3013based upon any of the grounds enumerated in section 475.624,
3023Florida Statutes. An evidentiary hearing must be held when
3032there are disputed issues of material fact. See Hollis v. Dep't
3043of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , 982 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA
30572008); §§ 120.569(1) and 120.57(1), Fl a . Stat .
306726. The Department has the burden of proving that
3076Mr. Butterfield engaged in the misconduct, and thereby committed
3085the violations, alleged in the charging instrument by clear and
3095convincing evidence. See Dep't of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec.
3106and Inv . Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co . , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla.
31221996); Fox v. Dep't of Health , 994 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA
31362008); and § 120.57(1)(j), Fla . Stat . ("Findings of fact shall
3149be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal
3160or licensure disciplinary proceedin gs . . . . ").
317027. The standard of proof for clear and convincing
3179evidence requires that the evidence be "credible; the facts to
3189which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the
3198testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be
3209lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence
3220must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier
3234of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to
3245the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In re
3256Dave y , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)(citing with approval,
3267Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983));
3279see also In re Adoption of Baby E. A. W. , 658 So. 2d 961, 967
3294(Fla. 1995)("The evidence [in order to be clear and convincing]
3305must be su fficient to convince the trier of fact without
3316hesitancy."). "Although this standard of proof may be met where
3327the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to preclude evidence
3340that is ambiguous." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Shuler Bros. ,
3349590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
335828. In determining whether the Department met its burden
3367of proof, it is necessary to evaluate its evidentiary
3376presentation , in light of the specific allegations of wrongdoing
3385made in the charging instrument. Due process prohibit s the
3395Department from taking disciplinary action against a licensee
3403based on conduct not specifically alleged in the charging
3412instrument, unless those matters have been tried by consent.
3421See Aldrete v. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med. , 879 So. 2d 1244,
34341246 ( Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Shore Village Prop. Owners' Ass'n. v.
3446Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , 824 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
3459The charging instrument must contain specific factual
3466allegations describing any misconduct upon which disciplinary
3473action is based. See Trevisani v. Dep't of Health , 908 So. 2d
34851 108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
349229. Furthermore, in deciding whether "the statute or rule
3501claimed [in the charging instrument] to have been violated" was
3511in fact violated, as alleged by the Department, if ther e is any
3524reasonable doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the
3535licensee. See Djokic v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of
3547Real Estate , 875 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Elmariah
3559v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., Bd. of Med. , 574 So. 2 d 164, 165 (F la.
35751st DCA 1990).
357830. The Administrative Complaint in this case alleged that
3587Mr. Butterfield violated s ection 475.624(15) by not exercising
3596reasonable diligence in the developing or preparing an
3604appraisal. 4/ Specifically, the Department alleged that
3611Mr . Butterfield failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the
3621following manner:
3623a. By missta t ing the prior sales prices of
3633the Subject Property, specifically the
3638April 2007 sale.
3641b. By failing to follow up with obvious
3649discrepancies regarding the Subjec t
3654Property's sales history.
3657c. By failing to clearly indicate highest
3664and best use.
3667d. By failing to describe or summarize the
3675support and rationale for his opinion of
3682highest and best use.
3686e. By failing to reach a specific
3693conclusion of the highest and best use Ð as
3702if vacant. Ñ
3705f. By failing to analyze the Subject
3712Property's zoning.
3714g. By exercising an inappropriate selection
3720of comparable sales.
3723h. By failing to provide support for his
373110% positive adjustment for Sales 2, 3 , and
37394 for zoning.
3742i. By failing to discuss the fact that the
3751Subject Property permits office use based on
3758the County Land Use Code and three house
3766sales do not.
3769j. By failing to discuss that the Subject
3777Property is designated as a historic
3783property and all four sales are not.
3790k. By using an incorrect methodology to
3797arrive at his concluded value of $340.53 per
3805square foot.
3807l. By using an unsupported capitalization
3813rate, and incorrect methodology to arrive at
3820a capitalization rate.
3823m. By exercising a poor choice of
3830c omparable rentals for the Income Approach.
3837n. By failing to provide support for his
3845conclusion of the Subject Property's rental
3851rate of $31 .00 per square foot or for his
3861expenses.
3862o. By failing to provide any data
3869information from a recognized data sour ce
3876for any of the four sales and Rentals 2, 3 ,
3886and 4.
3888p. By failing to indicate whether the
3895Report is self - contained, summary , or
3902restricted use appraisal report.
3906q. By failing to indicate in the
3913certification if he made a personal
3919inspection of the Su bject Property.
3925r. By failing to identify all extraordinary
3932assumptions necessary in the assignment.
3937s. By misstating where ingress/egress to
3943the Subject Property came from.
3948t. By misstating that Brickell Avenue was a
3956minor north/south thoroughfare, when in
3961actuality access to the Subject Property is
3968from SW 15th Road, a side street.
3975u. By failing to include sufficient
3981information to enable intended users of the
3988Report to understand it properly.
3993v. By citing an incorrect source for the
4001Subject Pro perty's square footage.
4006w. By failing to be competent to appraise a
4015property of this type.
4019x. By failing to be competent to appraise a
4028property located so far away.
4033y. By failing to explain how he was
4041competent to appraise the Subject Property
4047when h e was located so far away from it.
405731. The Administrative Complaint did not charge
4064Mr. Butterfield with violating section 475.624(14), which
4071subjects an appraiser to discipline for violating "any standard
4080for the development or communication of a real e state appraisal
4091or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional
4100Appraisal Practice." 5/
410332. Section 475.624(15) authorizes the Department to take
4111disciplinary action against a Florida - certified real estate
4120appraiser who "[h]as failed or refused to exercise reasonable
4129diligence in developing an appraisal or preparing an appraisal
4138report." However, there is no statute, rule, or USPAP standard
4148that defines "reasonable diligence." Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l
4157Reg., Div. of Real Estate v. Toral , No. 09 - 4 043PL, 2010 Fla.
4171Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 1179 *83 (Fla. DOAH Jan. 28,
41812010)(citing Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v.
4193Guilfoyle , No. 07 - 0683PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 469
4205*13 (Fla. DOAH Aug . 22, 2007)). Therefore, the Department must
4216bring forward competent evidence from a person with sufficient
4225insight into what constitutes reasonable diligence on the part
4234of a certified general real estate appraiser when developing an
4244appraisal or in preparing an appraisal report under the
4253circu mstances that Mr. Butterfield faced in the instant case.
4263See Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v.
4275Harrison , No. 06 - 3387PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 315
4287*24 - 25 (Fla. DOAH May 30, 2007); Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg.,
4301Div. of Real Esta te v. Catchpole , No. 06 - 3389PL, 2007 Fla. Div.
4315Adm. Hear. LEXIS 316 *22 - 23 (Fla. DOAH May 30, 2007); and Dep't
4329of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v. Price , No. 06 -
43433720PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 249 *26 - 27 (Fla. DOAH
4356May 3, 2007); see also McDonald v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. , 582 So.
43692d 660, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)(Zehmer, J., specially
4378concurring)("[W]here the agency charges negligent violation of
4386general standards of professional conduct, i.e., the negligent
4394failure to exercise the degree of care reasonably expected of a
4405professional, the agency must present expert testimony that
4413proves the required professional conduct as well as the
4422deviation therefrom.").
442533. Here, there is no dispute that USPAP standards apply
4435in the preparation of the Appraisal Report. In fact,
4444Mr. Butterfield certified in the Appraisal Report that he
4453prepared the appraisal in compliance with USPAP. Consequently,
4461there is no dispute in this case that an appraiser acts with
"4473reasonable diligence" if the appraisal is i n compliance with
4483USPAP. Conversely, failure to comply with USPAP is evidence
4492that the appraiser did not act with "reasonable diligence."
4501Mr. Spool's testimony tied the USPAP standards to the
4510determination of reasonable diligence. Further,
4515Mr. Butterfi eld's Appraisal Report states that it complied with
4525USPAP. Thus, there is no dispute that USPAP is applicable and
4536that failure to follow the standards provides evidence of
4545whether or not an appraiser acted with reasonable diligence.
4554The dispute in this c ase turns on whether or not the facts show
4568a lack of reasonable diligence. The Department presented
4576evidence supporting its claim through the expert testimony of
4585Mr. Spool. However, Mr. Butterfield also testified regarding
4593facts showing his methods in co nducting the appraisal. The
4603undersigned credits Mr. Butterfield's testimony as showing
4610reasonable diligence that effectively rebutted Mr. Spool's
4617testimony.
461834. The Department failed to show by clear and convincing
4628evidence that Mr. Butterfield did not u se "reasonable diligence"
4638in the preparation of the Appraisal Report.
4645RECOMMENDATION
4646Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
4656Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Appraisal
4666Board enter a final order dismissing the Admini strative
4675Complaint against Mr. Butterfield .
4680DONE AND ENT ERED this 1 2 th day of December , 2012 , in
4693Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
4697S
4698THOMAS P. CRAPPS
4701Administrative Law Judge
4704Division of Administrative Hearings
4708The DeSo to Building
47121230 Apalachee Parkway
4715Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
4720(850) 488 - 9675
4724Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
4730www.doah.state.fl.us
4731Filed with the Clerk of the
4737Division of Administrative Hearings
4741this 1 2 th day of December , 2012 .
4750ENDNOTES
47511/ References t o Florida Statutes shall be the 2010 version ,
4762unless otherwise indicated.
47652/ The subject property's legal description is the following:
4774BRICKELLS FLAGER PB 5 - 44 LOTS 41 & 42 BLK 55
4786LOT SIZE 84.920 x 180 COC 25565 - 1139 04 2007
47975 JOHN M MURRELL & W ETHEL EVERETT V
4806SUGABAKER OR 12735 - 3254 1185 1 KACHKAR GRP
4815HOLDINGS INC COC 24509 - 1919 P5 2006 5 .
48253/ Boilerplate is defined as "standardized text, formulaic or
4834hackneyed language." Merriam - Webster, http://www.merriam -
4841webster.com.
48424/ Section 475.624(15) read s as follows:
4849Discipline. -- T he board may deny an
4857application for registration or
4861certification; may investigate the actions
4866of any appraiser registered, licensed, or
4872certified under this part; may reprimand or
4879impose an administrative fine not to exceed
4886$ 5,000 for each count or separate offense
4895against any such appraiser; and may revoke
4902or suspend, for a period not to exceed
491010 years, the registration, license, or
4916certification of any such appraiser, or
4922place any such appraiser on probation, if it
4930finds th at the registered trainee, licensee,
4937or certificate holder:
4940* * *
4943(15) Has failed or refused to exercise
4950reasonable diligence in developing an
4955appraisal or preparing an appraisal report.
49615/ At the beginning of the hearing, the Department sough t
4972official recognition of the Uniform Standards of Professional
4980Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Mr. Butterfield's counsel objected
4987based on the fact that the Board did not allege in its
4999Administrative Complaint that Mr. Butterfield had violated USPAP
5007standard s. Thus, USPAP standards were irrelevant to the instant
5017charges, and would violate Mr. Butterfield's due process. In
5026response, the Department 's counsel argued that it could not have
5037charged Mr. Butterfield with violating USPAP because at the time
5047the app raisal here occurred "the rule was not properly
5057incorporated in the Florida Statute." The undersigned notes
5065that section 475.624(14) subjected an appraiser to discipline
5073for preparing an appraisal that violated USPAP standards.
5081Therefore, it is not clear to the undersigned why the Department
5092could not charge Mr. Butterfield with the specific standards
5101that it believed he violated. Nevertheless, the undersigned
5109took official recognition of USPAP standards to the extent that
5119the Department was able to show that those standards established
5129the relevant standard of care for establishing the "reasonable
5138diligence" that Mr. Butterfield should have used in p reparing
5148the Appraisal Report.
5151COPIES FURNISHED :
5154Daniel Villazon, Esquire
5157Daniel Villazon, P.A.
5160Suite 2 00
51631420 Celebration Boulevard
5166Celebration, Florida 34747
5169Megan Demartini, Esquire
5172Department of Business and
5176Professional Regulation
5178Suite 42
51801940 North Monroe Street
5184Tallahassee, Florida 32399
5187Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Esquire
5191Department of Business and
5195Professional Regulation
5197Office of the General Counsel
52022295 Victoria Avenue, Suite 263
5207Fort Myers, Florida 33901 - 3877
5213Evalyn Oreto, Chair
5216Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board
5221Department of Business and
5225Professional Regulation
5227400 West Robinson Str eet, Suite N801
5234Orlando, Florida 32801
5237J. Layne Smith, General Counsel
5242Department of Business and
5246Professional Regulation
5248Northwood Centre
52501940 North Monroe Street
5254Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0792
5259NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
5265All parties ha ve the right to submit written exceptions within
527615 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
5287to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that
5298will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 12/19/2012
- Proceedings: Transmittal letter from Claudia Llado forwarding Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, which was not admitted into evidence, to the agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/12/2012
- Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held September 14, 2012). CASE CLOSED.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/12/2012
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/12/2012
- Proceedings: Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
- Date: 10/11/2012
- Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings Volume I-II (not available for viewing) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 09/19/2012
- Proceedings: Rebuttal Exhibit 1 (Offered and Admitted into Evidence During Final Hearing) filed.
- Date: 09/14/2012
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 09/10/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Appearance of Additional Counsel (Jennifer Blakeman) filed.
- Date: 09/07/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Supplemental Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 09/07/2012
- Proceedings: Index to Petitioner's (Proposed) Formal Hearing Exhibits (with proposed exhibits enclosed) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/01/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Megan Demartini) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 06/07/2012
- Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for September 14, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 06/04/2012
- Proceedings: Order Re-scheduling Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for September 7, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 05/31/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Unilateral Response to Order Granting Continuance filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/30/2012
- Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance (parties to advise status by June 1, 2012).
- Date: 05/30/2012
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
- Date: 05/29/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits (exhibits not available for viewing)
- PDF:
- Date: 05/24/2012
- Proceedings: Notice of Serving of Petitioner's Response to Respondent's First Interrogatories filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/23/2012
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Crapps from P. Rendleman regarding enclosed the supplement exhibit filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/23/2012
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Filing Proposed Supplemental Exhibit filed.
- Date: 05/22/2012
- Proceedings: Notice of Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits (exhibits not available for viewing)
- PDF:
- Date: 05/11/2012
- Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Request for Production filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 04/17/2012
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for May 30, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Orlando and Tallahassee, FL).
Case Information
- Judge:
- THOMAS P. CRAPPS
- Date Filed:
- 04/06/2012
- Date Assignment:
- 05/15/2012
- Last Docket Entry:
- 11/12/2019
- Location:
- Micanopy, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- Other
- Suffix:
- PL
Counsels
-
Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Assistant General Counsel
Address of Record -
Megan Demartini, Esquire
Address of Record -
Daniel Villazon, Esquire
Address of Record