12-001220PL Department Of Business And Professional Regulation vs. Craig H. Butterfield
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Wednesday, December 12, 2012.


View Dockets  
Summary: Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not use reasonable diligence in the preparation of an appraisal.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND )

13PROFESSIONAL REGULATION , )

16)

17Petitioner , )

19)

20vs. ) Case No. 12 - 1220PL

27)

28CRAIG H. BUTTERFIELD , )

32)

33Respondent . )

36)

37RECOMMENDED ORDER

39Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

50on September 14, 2012 , by video teleconference in Tallahassee

59and Miami, Florida , before Thomas P. Crapps, a designated

68Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative

76Hearings (DOAH).

78APPEARANCES

79For Petitioner: Megan Demartini, Esquire

84Department of Business and

88Professional Regulation

90Suite 42

921940 N. Monroe Street

96Tallahas see, Florida 32399 - 2202

102Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Esquire

106Department of Business and

110Professional Regulation

112Office of General Counsel

1162295 Victoria Avenue, Suite 263

121Fort Myers, Florida 33901 - 3877

127For Respondent: Daniel Villazon, Esquire

132Law Office of Daniel Villazon, P.A.

138Suite 200

1401420 Celebration Blvd.

143Celebration, Flo rida 34747

147STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

151Whether Respondent violated section 475.624(15), Florida

157Statutes (2010), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and

166if so, the appropriate penalty. 1/

172PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

174On June 15, 2011, Petitioner, the Depart ment of Business

184and Professional Regulation (Department), filed a one - count

193Administrative Complaint before the Florida Real Estate

200Appraisal Board against Respondent , Craig H. Butterfield

207(Mr. Butterfield). The Administrative Complaint charges

213Mr. Butte rfield with violating section 475.624(15) , for failing

222to exercise reasonable diligence in developing and preparing an

231appraisal report.

233On July 15, 2011, Mr. Butterfield filed with the Department

243a petition seeking an administrative hearing. On April 6, 2012,

253the Department transmitted the case to DOAH, and the case was

264set for a final hearing to occur on May 30, 2012. At the

277beginning of the May 30, 2012 , hearing, the video teleconference

287sites experienced technical difficulties which resulted in an

295ina bility to conduct the hearing. As a result, the parties

306conferred and requested the undersigned to reschedule the

314hearing. Therefore, the undersigned granted a motion to

322continue the hearing on May 30, 2012. The final hearing was

333rescheduled for final h earing on September 14, 2012.

342At the September 14, 2012, hearing, the Department

350presented the testimony of Philip G. Spool (Mr. Spool) and

360James J. Courchaine (Mr. Courchaine) and introduced into

368evidence E xhibits numbered 1 through 4, 6 through 8, 10

379thr ough 14, and 16 through 18 and Petitioner's R ebuttal

390E xhibit numbered 1. Chapters 120, 455 , and 475, Florida

400Statutes ; Florida Administrative Code chapter 61J(1) ; and the

4082010 - 2011 edition of the Uniform Standards of Professional

418Appraisal Practice (USPAP ) were officially recognized.

425Mr. Butterfield testified on his own behalf.

432A two - volume Transcript was filed on October 11, 2012, and

444the parties submitted proposed recommended orders on

451November 12, 2012.

454FINDINGS OF FACT

4571. Department is the state age ncy charged with regulating

467the practice of real estate appraisal pursuant to

475section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes.

4842. Mr. Butterfield is licensed as a state - certified

494general real estate appraiser, holding state license number

502RD 1 063. Consequently, he is certified to give residential and

513commercial appraisals in Florida. Further, Mr. Butterfield has

521been a licensed appraiser in Florida since 1991. In addition to

532being licensed in Florida, Mr. Butterfield is licensed in 11

542other states, holding seven active and four inactive licenses.

551There is no evidence that Mr. Butterfield has any prior

561discipline.

5623. On April 26, 2010, Mr. Butterfield issued the Appraisal

572Report, which is at issue in this administrative hearing. He

582prepared the Appraisal Report for Charles Morgan, P.A., a law

592firm located in North Miami Beach, Florida. The Appraisal

601Report identified the law firm as the intended user and that the

613appraisal would be used in litigation. The stated purpose of

623the Appraisal Re port was to provide a market value for the

635subject property.

6374. The subject property of the appraisal is located at

6471500 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida. 2/ The subject property is

657a unique parcel located on Brickell Avenue, near the heart of

668Miami's Fina ncial District. The subject property's site is

677approximately 15,286 square feet with a 6,497 square foot

688building. The building is a French Chateau home constructed in

6981928 by John Murrell, a prominent Miami attorney that helped

708develop Miami and Coral G ables. The subject property was the

719home of Mr. Murrell and his wife Ethel Murrell. Ms. Murrell was

731a noted attorney, author, lecturer and known as one of Florida's

742leading feminists. Consequently, the subject property has

749significant historical value. The building, as described by the

758Appraisal Report, "contains two octagonal towers with tent roof,

767parpet roof and dormers, crenellated garage roof, and trefoil

776arch windows with leaded and stained glass." Clearly, this is a

787unique historical building si tuated on one of Miami's most

797prestigious streets, Brickell Avenue.

8015. The Appraisal Report does not identify whether it is a

812self - contained appraisal report, a summary appraisal report or a

823restricted use appraisal report , as required by Standards Rule

8322 - 2 of USPAP. Similarly, Mr. Butterfield's work file does not

844identify the type of appraisal he performed on the subject

854property. Rather, Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he

863contracted to provide a "Commercial Narrative Appraisal Report."

871Mr. Bu tterfield's uncontradicted testimony that the Appraisal

879Report is a summary appraisal report for the intended user, a

890law firm, is credible.

8946. The complaint against Mr. Butterfield was instigated by

903Scott Taylor (Mr. Taylor). Mr. Taylor, a licensed re sidential

913appraiser, initially contacted Mr. Butterfield requesting

919assistance in appraising the subject property. Because the

927subject property appeared to be a commercial property,

935Mr. Taylor was not qualified to give an appraisal.

944Consequently, Mr. Ta ylor requested Mr. Butterfield's assistance.

952Mr. Taylor assisted Mr. Butterfield in the preparation of the

962appraisal with the taking of photographs and gathering of

971information. However, Mr. Taylor became unhappy with

978Mr. Butterfield concerning the paym ent of Mr. Taylor's fee.

988According to Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Taylor threatened to file a

998complaint with the Department, if Mr. Butterfield did not pay

1008the fee. Mr. Butterfield refused to pay the disputed amount.

1018Consequently, Mr. Taylor filed a complaint against

1025Mr. Butterfield for perceived errors in the appraisal.

10337. The record contains no evidence that the intended user,

1043the law firm, had any complaint concerning the quality of the

1054work or that the law firm was misled by the Appraisal Report.

10668. Th e Department's expert witness, Mr. Spool, has 39

1076years of experience as an appraiser in the Miami - Dade, County

1088area. Further, he has taught appraisal practice at Miami - Dade

1099College, and published numerous articles concerning appraisal

1106practice.

11079. Mr. Sp ool identified USPAP as the standards used by

1118appraisers in conducting real estate appraisals. Further, he

1126credibly testified that USPAP standards related to an appraiser

1135using "reasonable diligence" in preparing an appraisal by

1143requiring that the apprais er correctly use recognized methods

1152and techniques to create a credible appraisal.

115910. The Appraisal Report contains Mr. Butterfield's

1166certification that the appraisal was conducted in compliance

1174with USPAP.

117611. The Department's case at the hearing pro ceeded to show

1187that Mr. Butterfield did not use reasonable diligence in the

1197preparation of the Appraisal Report along the following four

1206general lines:

1208a) The Highest and Best Use section of the

1217Appraisal Report did not contain any

1223supporting analyses o r discussion;

1228b) The Zoning section of the Appraisal

1235Report did not contain any supporting

1241analyses or discussion;

1244c) The comparables used by Mr. Butterfield

1251were inappropriate, and that he used an

1258incorrect methodology for determining the

1263subject prop erty's market value; and

1269d) The Appraisal Report contained numerous

1275errors that call into question its

1281credibility.

1282Each of these areas is discussed separately

1289in this Recommended Order.

1293Highest and Best Use

129712. The Appraisal Report here sets out t he Highest and

1308Best Use of the subject property as following:

1316The Highest and Best Use of the subject

1324property could accommodate office usages.

1329The structure represents a significant

1334portion of the total value of the whole

1342property. Therefore, due to the

1347contributory value of the improvements and

1353our estimate of the Highest and Best use of

1362the subject property is its present usage,

1369as would benefit an owner occupant, or as

1377present building may generate lease income.

138313. The Appraisal Report's discussi on of the subject

1392property's highest and best use contains what could be best

1402described as "boilerplate language , " setting out definitions and

1410the appropriate tests to be applied when reviewing the subject

1420property. 3/ Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisa l Report is not

1432that Mr. Butterfield reached an inappropriate conclusion, but

1440rather the lack of analysis. Mr. Butterfield credibly

1448testified, however, that this appraisal was a summary appraisal

1457report, and that further analysis was not required. The

1466un dersigned rejects Mr. Spool's testimony that a more detailed

1476analysis needed to be contained in the Appraisal Report because

1486the report is a summary. A review of the appraisal shows that

1498it summarized the highest and best use of subject property as

1509its ex isting use. Consequently, the undersigned finds that

1518Mr. Butterfield's determination of the subject property's

1525highest and best use complied with USPAP 2 - 2(b). Moreover, the

1537Comment to Standard 2 - 2(b)(vii) provides that "[b]ecause

1546intended users' relian ce on a appraisal may be affected by the

1558scope of work, the report must enable them to be properly

1569informed and not misled." In the instant case, the Department

1579did not bring forward any evidence showing that the intended

1589user, a law firm, had been misled by Mr. Butterfield's

1599determination of the subject property's highest and best use.

160814. The record shows that the Department did not prove by

1619clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use

1629reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's

1637determination of highest and best use.

1643Zoning

164415. Mr. Butterfield specifically identified the subject

1651property's zoning, at the time of the appraisal, as "R - 3 Multi -

1665Family with HC - Residential Office Heritage Conservation District

1674overlay." Mr. Spool's criticism of the Appraisal Report's

1682zoning section is that Mr. Butterfield's analysis is lacking. A

1692review Appraisal Report's section titled zoning again includes

1700mostly "boilerplate language" without analysis , as to the

1708meaning of the zoning and historical overlay. However,

1716considering that the Appraisal Report here is a summary

1725appraisal report prepared for a law firm, the Department did not

1736prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield did

1746not use reasonable diligence. There was no evidence that Mr.

1756Butterfield's identification of the zoning, without further

1763analysis, was a lack of reasonable diligence in the context of a

1775summary. Moreover, there was no evidence that the intended

1784user, the law firm, was misled by Mr. Butterfi eld's

1794identification of the proper zoning, without a further analysis.

1803Market Value Determination

180616 . The Department questioned Mr. Butterfield's choice of

1815his direct sales and rental comparisons, and his methodology in

1825determining the subject proper ty's market value. Mr. Spool

1834offered properties that, in his opinion, were more appropriate

1843comparisons with the subject property and questioned

1850Mr. Butterfield's methodology. The discussion of each test used

1859to determine the subject property's market v alue is discussed

1869separately.

1870A. Direct sales comparison

187417. The Appraisal Report here shows that Mr. Butterfield

1883identified the three approaches used by appraisers to determine

1892a property's market value: 1) the cost approach; 2) direct

1902sales comparis ons; and 3) an income approach. Further, the

1912Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield used a direct sales

1922comparison methodology and income approach to determine the

1930subject property's market value.

193418. In the direct sales comparison, the Appraisal Re port

1944shows that Mr. Butterfield used four comparable direct sales

1953within the location of the subject property for his analysis.

1963Of the four comparable sales identified by Mr. Butterfield, one

1973involved an office and three involved residential homes. The

1982r ecord shows that Mr. Butterfield chose to use both an office

1994and residential properties in the sales comparison because both

2003uses were permitted by the subject property's zoning. At the

2013time of the appraisal, the subject property could have been used

2024as e ither a residence or an office. Consequently, the direct

2035sales comparison which included both office and residential

2043sales was appropriate for valuing the subject property. Based

2052on Mr. Butterfield's testimony and the Appraisal Report, the key

2062considerat ion in choosing these comparable sales was the

2071proximity to the subject property's Brickell Avenue address.

2079Further, a review of Mr. Butterfield's work file shows that he

2090considered numerous properties for direct sales comparisons in

2098developing his market value opinion. The key factor for

2107Mr. Butterfield in preparing his sales comparisons was the

2116Brickell Avenue location. The undersigned finds Mr.

2123Butterfield's testimony concerning his use of the comparative

2131properties and methodology credible.

213519. M r. Spool's first criticism was that Mr. Butterfield

2145used an incorrect methodology in conducting the direct sales

2154comparison. Specifically, Mr. Spool testified that the highest

2162and best use of the property, as identified by Mr. Butterfield,

2173was an office. Consequently, Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect

2182methodology when he used direct sales from residences for

2191comparison. In essence, the correct methodology required that

2199any comparison be made with direct sales of office space or

2210rather compare "apples to apples and oranges to oranges."

2219Mr. Spool's criticism that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect

2228methodology is rejected because it is based on a wrong premise.

2239Mr. Butterfield did not identify the subject property's highest

2248and best use as only an office. The record shows that

2259Mr. Butterfield identified the subject property's highest and

2267best use as its permissible uses, which at the time was either a

2280residence or office. Mr. Butterfield used reasonable diligence

2288in comparing direct sales from nearby res idences and an office

2299in his analysis. Next, Mr. Spool identified other properties ,

2308which in his opinion , were more appropriate as sales

2317comparisons, such as a historic home near the Miami River that

2328had been converted into office space. However, the

2336ide ntification of other properties that could have been used by

2347Mr. Butterfield does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not use

2358reasonable diligence in preparing his report. It is noted that

2368the properties offered by Mr. Spool did not share the Brickell

2379Avenu e address , which is highly desirable. Consequently, the

2388undersigned finds that the Department did not prove by clear and

2399convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use

2407reasonable diligence in the preparation of his direct sales

2416comparison.

2417B. Inc ome approach

242120. Next, the Appraisal Report shows that Mr. Butterfield

2430used an income approach to determine the subject property's

2439market value. The record credibly shows that Mr. Butterfield

2448identified four rental comparables all located on Brickell

2456Av enue within close proximity to the subject property, and

2466verified the rental rate per square foot in the range of $24.00

2478to $37.00 per square foot.

248321. Mr. Spool offered alternative properties that in

2491his opinion were more appropriate for making a rental

2500comparison. The crux of the Department's testimony was that

2509Mr. Butterfield 's use of rental space from new high rises was

2521inappropriate for comparing with the subject property, which is

2530an older property. The undersigned, however, finds that

2538Mr. Butterfi eld's explanation that he chose comparable rental

2547properties based on the Brickell Avenue address credible.

2555Again, the fact that other properties may be used as comparable

2566properties does not show that Mr. Butterfield did not prepare

2576the Appraisal Report without reasonable diligence. Next,

2583Mr. Spool's explanation that Mr. Butterfield used an incorrect

2592methodology for determining an income approach by using

2600residential properties is rejected. As found earlier,

2607Mr. Butterfield determined that the subject p roperty's highest

2616and best use could be either as an office or residence.

2627Therefore, it was appropriate to determine the rental income

2636from residences and office space. Moreover, the record shows

2645that Mr. Butterfield gathered information to determine the per

2654square - foot income. Therefore, the Department did not prove by

2665clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Butterfield failed to use

2675reasonable diligence in the preparation of the appraisal's

2683income approach analysis.

2686C. Miscellaneous Errors

268922. The App raisal Report does contain several admitted

2698errors. Examples of the errors are that the Appraisal Report

2708wrongly indicates that ingress and egress to the subject

2717property was from Brickell Avenue; that Brickell Avenue was a

2727minor north - south thoroughfare; that the three residences used

2737for direct sales comparison were "historic , " as opposed to being

2747located in "historic South Miami "; that it failed to designate

2757the type of appraisal that was conduct ed ; and that it did not

2770state in the certification that Mr . Butterfield had not

2780personally viewed the subject property. The undersigned finds

2788that these errors do not rise to the level of showing a lack of

2802reasonable diligence or could mislead the intended user. For

2811example, the Appraisal Report attached photog raphs of the three

2821residences used in the direct sales comparison. The photographs

2830clearly show that the three residences were not historical

2839homes, but modern construction. Therefore, it is clear that

2848Mr. Butterfield took steps to insure that the intend ed user of

2860the report would know the type of residences which were being

2871used for comparison with the subject property. Moreover,

2879concerning the errors about Brickell Avenue, one could safely

2888assume that a law firm in Miami Beach would know that Brickell

2900Avenue is a major and desirable location in Miami. Therefore,

2910the undersigned finds that although the appraisal contains

2918errors, which were admitted by Mr. Butterfield, those errors are

2928not of such a nature as to show a lack of reasonable diligence.

2941CON CLUSIONS OF LAW

294523. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

2955proceeding and of the parties hereto , pursuant to c hapter 120,

2966Florida Statutes (2012) .

297024. As a certified general real estate appraiser,

2978Mr. Butterfield is qualified to issue ap praisal reports for any

2989type of real property. § 475.611(1)(h), Fla. Stat.

299725. The Department has been statutorily empowered to take

3006disciplinary action against certified real estate appraisers

3013based upon any of the grounds enumerated in section 475.624,

3023Florida Statutes. An evidentiary hearing must be held when

3032there are disputed issues of material fact. See Hollis v. Dep't

3043of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , 982 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA

30572008); §§ 120.569(1) and 120.57(1), Fl a . Stat .

306726. The Department has the burden of proving that

3076Mr. Butterfield engaged in the misconduct, and thereby committed

3085the violations, alleged in the charging instrument by clear and

3095convincing evidence. See Dep't of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec.

3106and Inv . Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co . , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla.

31221996); Fox v. Dep't of Health , 994 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA

31362008); and § 120.57(1)(j), Fla . Stat . ("Findings of fact shall

3149be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal

3160or licensure disciplinary proceedin gs . . . . ").

317027. The standard of proof for clear and convincing

3179evidence requires that the evidence be "credible; the facts to

3189which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the

3198testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be

3209lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence

3220must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier

3234of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to

3245the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In re

3256Dave y , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)(citing with approval,

3267Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983));

3279see also In re Adoption of Baby E. A. W. , 658 So. 2d 961, 967

3294(Fla. 1995)("The evidence [in order to be clear and convincing]

3305must be su fficient to convince the trier of fact without

3316hesitancy."). "Although this standard of proof may be met where

3327the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to preclude evidence

3340that is ambiguous." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Shuler Bros. ,

3349590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

335828. In determining whether the Department met its burden

3367of proof, it is necessary to evaluate its evidentiary

3376presentation , in light of the specific allegations of wrongdoing

3385made in the charging instrument. Due process prohibit s the

3395Department from taking disciplinary action against a licensee

3403based on conduct not specifically alleged in the charging

3412instrument, unless those matters have been tried by consent.

3421See Aldrete v. Dep't of Health, Bd. of Med. , 879 So. 2d 1244,

34341246 ( Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Shore Village Prop. Owners' Ass'n. v.

3446Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , 824 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

3459The charging instrument must contain specific factual

3466allegations describing any misconduct upon which disciplinary

3473action is based. See Trevisani v. Dep't of Health , 908 So. 2d

34851 108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

349229. Furthermore, in deciding whether "the statute or rule

3501claimed [in the charging instrument] to have been violated" was

3511in fact violated, as alleged by the Department, if ther e is any

3524reasonable doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the

3535licensee. See Djokic v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of

3547Real Estate , 875 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Elmariah

3559v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., Bd. of Med. , 574 So. 2 d 164, 165 (F la.

35751st DCA 1990).

357830. The Administrative Complaint in this case alleged that

3587Mr. Butterfield violated s ection 475.624(15) by not exercising

3596reasonable diligence in the developing or preparing an

3604appraisal. 4/ Specifically, the Department alleged that

3611Mr . Butterfield failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the

3621following manner:

3623a. By missta t ing the prior sales prices of

3633the Subject Property, specifically the

3638April 2007 sale.

3641b. By failing to follow up with obvious

3649discrepancies regarding the Subjec t

3654Property's sales history.

3657c. By failing to clearly indicate highest

3664and best use.

3667d. By failing to describe or summarize the

3675support and rationale for his opinion of

3682highest and best use.

3686e. By failing to reach a specific

3693conclusion of the highest and best use Ð as

3702if vacant. Ñ

3705f. By failing to analyze the Subject

3712Property's zoning.

3714g. By exercising an inappropriate selection

3720of comparable sales.

3723h. By failing to provide support for his

373110% positive adjustment for Sales 2, 3 , and

37394 for zoning.

3742i. By failing to discuss the fact that the

3751Subject Property permits office use based on

3758the County Land Use Code and three house

3766sales do not.

3769j. By failing to discuss that the Subject

3777Property is designated as a historic

3783property and all four sales are not.

3790k. By using an incorrect methodology to

3797arrive at his concluded value of $340.53 per

3805square foot.

3807l. By using an unsupported capitalization

3813rate, and incorrect methodology to arrive at

3820a capitalization rate.

3823m. By exercising a poor choice of

3830c omparable rentals for the Income Approach.

3837n. By failing to provide support for his

3845conclusion of the Subject Property's rental

3851rate of $31 .00 per square foot or for his

3861expenses.

3862o. By failing to provide any data

3869information from a recognized data sour ce

3876for any of the four sales and Rentals 2, 3 ,

3886and 4.

3888p. By failing to indicate whether the

3895Report is self - contained, summary , or

3902restricted use appraisal report.

3906q. By failing to indicate in the

3913certification if he made a personal

3919inspection of the Su bject Property.

3925r. By failing to identify all extraordinary

3932assumptions necessary in the assignment.

3937s. By misstating where ingress/egress to

3943the Subject Property came from.

3948t. By misstating that Brickell Avenue was a

3956minor north/south thoroughfare, when in

3961actuality access to the Subject Property is

3968from SW 15th Road, a side street.

3975u. By failing to include sufficient

3981information to enable intended users of the

3988Report to understand it properly.

3993v. By citing an incorrect source for the

4001Subject Pro perty's square footage.

4006w. By failing to be competent to appraise a

4015property of this type.

4019x. By failing to be competent to appraise a

4028property located so far away.

4033y. By failing to explain how he was

4041competent to appraise the Subject Property

4047when h e was located so far away from it.

405731. The Administrative Complaint did not charge

4064Mr. Butterfield with violating section 475.624(14), which

4071subjects an appraiser to discipline for violating "any standard

4080for the development or communication of a real e state appraisal

4091or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional

4100Appraisal Practice." 5/

410332. Section 475.624(15) authorizes the Department to take

4111disciplinary action against a Florida - certified real estate

4120appraiser who "[h]as failed or refused to exercise reasonable

4129diligence in developing an appraisal or preparing an appraisal

4138report." However, there is no statute, rule, or USPAP standard

4148that defines "reasonable diligence." Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l

4157Reg., Div. of Real Estate v. Toral , No. 09 - 4 043PL, 2010 Fla.

4171Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 1179 *83 (Fla. DOAH Jan. 28,

41812010)(citing Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v.

4193Guilfoyle , No. 07 - 0683PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 469

4205*13 (Fla. DOAH Aug . 22, 2007)). Therefore, the Department must

4216bring forward competent evidence from a person with sufficient

4225insight into what constitutes reasonable diligence on the part

4234of a certified general real estate appraiser when developing an

4244appraisal or in preparing an appraisal report under the

4253circu mstances that Mr. Butterfield faced in the instant case.

4263See Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v.

4275Harrison , No. 06 - 3387PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 315

4287*24 - 25 (Fla. DOAH May 30, 2007); Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg.,

4301Div. of Real Esta te v. Catchpole , No. 06 - 3389PL, 2007 Fla. Div.

4315Adm. Hear. LEXIS 316 *22 - 23 (Fla. DOAH May 30, 2007); and Dep't

4329of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real Estate v. Price , No. 06 -

43433720PL, 2007 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 249 *26 - 27 (Fla. DOAH

4356May 3, 2007); see also McDonald v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. , 582 So.

43692d 660, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)(Zehmer, J., specially

4378concurring)("[W]here the agency charges negligent violation of

4386general standards of professional conduct, i.e., the negligent

4394failure to exercise the degree of care reasonably expected of a

4405professional, the agency must present expert testimony that

4413proves the required professional conduct as well as the

4422deviation therefrom.").

442533. Here, there is no dispute that USPAP standards apply

4435in the preparation of the Appraisal Report. In fact,

4444Mr. Butterfield certified in the Appraisal Report that he

4453prepared the appraisal in compliance with USPAP. Consequently,

4461there is no dispute in this case that an appraiser acts with

"4473reasonable diligence" if the appraisal is i n compliance with

4483USPAP. Conversely, failure to comply with USPAP is evidence

4492that the appraiser did not act with "reasonable diligence."

4501Mr. Spool's testimony tied the USPAP standards to the

4510determination of reasonable diligence. Further,

4515Mr. Butterfi eld's Appraisal Report states that it complied with

4525USPAP. Thus, there is no dispute that USPAP is applicable and

4536that failure to follow the standards provides evidence of

4545whether or not an appraiser acted with reasonable diligence.

4554The dispute in this c ase turns on whether or not the facts show

4568a lack of reasonable diligence. The Department presented

4576evidence supporting its claim through the expert testimony of

4585Mr. Spool. However, Mr. Butterfield also testified regarding

4593facts showing his methods in co nducting the appraisal. The

4603undersigned credits Mr. Butterfield's testimony as showing

4610reasonable diligence that effectively rebutted Mr. Spool's

4617testimony.

461834. The Department failed to show by clear and convincing

4628evidence that Mr. Butterfield did not u se "reasonable diligence"

4638in the preparation of the Appraisal Report.

4645RECOMMENDATION

4646Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

4656Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Appraisal

4666Board enter a final order dismissing the Admini strative

4675Complaint against Mr. Butterfield .

4680DONE AND ENT ERED this 1 2 th day of December , 2012 , in

4693Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

4697S

4698THOMAS P. CRAPPS

4701Administrative Law Judge

4704Division of Administrative Hearings

4708The DeSo to Building

47121230 Apalachee Parkway

4715Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

4720(850) 488 - 9675

4724Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

4730www.doah.state.fl.us

4731Filed with the Clerk of the

4737Division of Administrative Hearings

4741this 1 2 th day of December , 2012 .

4750ENDNOTES

47511/ References t o Florida Statutes shall be the 2010 version ,

4762unless otherwise indicated.

47652/ The subject property's legal description is the following:

4774BRICKELLS FLAGER PB 5 - 44 LOTS 41 & 42 BLK 55

4786LOT SIZE 84.920 x 180 COC 25565 - 1139 04 2007

47975 JOHN M MURRELL & W ETHEL EVERETT V

4806SUGABAKER OR 12735 - 3254 1185 1 KACHKAR GRP

4815HOLDINGS INC COC 24509 - 1919 P5 2006 5 .

48253/ Boilerplate is defined as "standardized text, formulaic or

4834hackneyed language." Merriam - Webster, http://www.merriam -

4841webster.com.

48424/ Section 475.624(15) read s as follows:

4849Discipline. -- T he board may deny an

4857application for registration or

4861certification; may investigate the actions

4866of any appraiser registered, licensed, or

4872certified under this part; may reprimand or

4879impose an administrative fine not to exceed

4886$ 5,000 for each count or separate offense

4895against any such appraiser; and may revoke

4902or suspend, for a period not to exceed

491010 years, the registration, license, or

4916certification of any such appraiser, or

4922place any such appraiser on probation, if it

4930finds th at the registered trainee, licensee,

4937or certificate holder:

4940* * *

4943(15) Has failed or refused to exercise

4950reasonable diligence in developing an

4955appraisal or preparing an appraisal report.

49615/ At the beginning of the hearing, the Department sough t

4972official recognition of the Uniform Standards of Professional

4980Appraisal Practice (USPAP). Mr. Butterfield's counsel objected

4987based on the fact that the Board did not allege in its

4999Administrative Complaint that Mr. Butterfield had violated USPAP

5007standard s. Thus, USPAP standards were irrelevant to the instant

5017charges, and would violate Mr. Butterfield's due process. In

5026response, the Department 's counsel argued that it could not have

5037charged Mr. Butterfield with violating USPAP because at the time

5047the app raisal here occurred "the rule was not properly

5057incorporated in the Florida Statute." The undersigned notes

5065that section 475.624(14) subjected an appraiser to discipline

5073for preparing an appraisal that violated USPAP standards.

5081Therefore, it is not clear to the undersigned why the Department

5092could not charge Mr. Butterfield with the specific standards

5101that it believed he violated. Nevertheless, the undersigned

5109took official recognition of USPAP standards to the extent that

5119the Department was able to show that those standards established

5129the relevant standard of care for establishing the "reasonable

5138diligence" that Mr. Butterfield should have used in p reparing

5148the Appraisal Report.

5151COPIES FURNISHED :

5154Daniel Villazon, Esquire

5157Daniel Villazon, P.A.

5160Suite 2 00

51631420 Celebration Boulevard

5166Celebration, Florida 34747

5169Megan Demartini, Esquire

5172Department of Business and

5176Professional Regulation

5178Suite 42

51801940 North Monroe Street

5184Tallahassee, Florida 32399

5187Jennifer Leigh Blakeman, Esquire

5191Department of Business and

5195Professional Regulation

5197Office of the General Counsel

52022295 Victoria Avenue, Suite 263

5207Fort Myers, Florida 33901 - 3877

5213Evalyn Oreto, Chair

5216Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board

5221Department of Business and

5225Professional Regulation

5227400 West Robinson Str eet, Suite N801

5234Orlando, Florida 32801

5237J. Layne Smith, General Counsel

5242Department of Business and

5246Professional Regulation

5248Northwood Centre

52501940 North Monroe Street

5254Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0792

5259NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

5265All parties ha ve the right to submit written exceptions within

527615 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

5287to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

5298will issue the Final Order in this case.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 11/12/2019
Proceedings: Agency Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/04/2013
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 12/19/2012
Proceedings: Transmittal letter from Claudia Llado forwarding Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, which was not admitted into evidence, to the agency.
PDF:
Date: 12/12/2012
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 12/12/2012
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held September 14, 2012). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 12/12/2012
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 11/13/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/13/2012
Proceedings: (Respondent's) Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/15/2012
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time.
PDF:
Date: 10/12/2012
Proceedings: Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
Date: 10/11/2012
Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings Volume I-II (not available for viewing) filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/19/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Petitioner's Rebuttal Exhibit 1 filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/19/2012
Proceedings: Rebuttal Exhibit 1 (Offered and Admitted into Evidence During Final Hearing) filed.
Date: 09/14/2012
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 09/13/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Rebuttal Exhibit 3 filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/10/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Appearance of Additional Counsel (Jennifer Blakeman) filed.
Date: 09/07/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Supplemental Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
PDF:
Date: 09/07/2012
Proceedings: Index to Petitioner's Formal (Proposed) Hearing Exhibits filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/07/2012
Proceedings: Index to Petitioner's (Proposed) Formal Hearing Exhibits (with proposed exhibits enclosed) filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/06/2012
Proceedings: Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/01/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Megan Demartini) filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/07/2012
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for September 14, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
PDF:
Date: 06/06/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Unopposed Motion to Reschedule Final Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/05/2012
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 06/04/2012
Proceedings: Order Re-scheduling Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for September 7, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Miami, FL).
PDF:
Date: 06/01/2012
Proceedings: Unilateral Response to Motion for Continuance filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/31/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Unilateral Response to Order Granting Continuance filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/30/2012
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance (parties to advise status by June 1, 2012).
Date: 05/30/2012
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held; continued to date not certain.
PDF:
Date: 05/29/2012
Proceedings: Respondent's Exhibits (exhibits attached) filed.
Date: 05/29/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits (exhibits not available for viewing)
PDF:
Date: 05/24/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Serving of Petitioner's Response to Respondent's First Interrogatories filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/24/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Dismissal of Factual Allegations filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/23/2012
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Crapps from P. Rendleman regarding enclosed the supplement exhibit filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/23/2012
Proceedings: Petitioner's Notice of Filing Proposed Supplemental Exhibit filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/23/2012
Proceedings: Order Allowing Testimony by Telephone.
Date: 05/22/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits (exhibits not available for viewing)
PDF:
Date: 05/22/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/18/2012
Proceedings: Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/18/2012
Proceedings: Motion to Allow Respondent to Appear Telephonically filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/15/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Transfer.
PDF:
Date: 05/11/2012
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petition's Interrogatory 26 filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/11/2012
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to Petitioner's First Request for Production filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/08/2012
Proceedings: Response to Petitioner's Interlocking Discovery Request filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/30/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Serving Interrogatorries filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/30/2012
Proceedings: Respondent's First Interrogatories to Petitioner filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/17/2012
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 04/17/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for May 30, 2012; 9:00 a.m.; Orlando and Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 04/16/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Transfer.
PDF:
Date: 04/12/2012
Proceedings: Notice of Serving Petitioner's First Interlocking Discovery Request filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/10/2012
Proceedings: Joint Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/06/2012
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 04/06/2012
Proceedings: Petition for Formal Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/06/2012
Proceedings: Agency referral filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/06/2012
Proceedings: Election of Rights filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/06/2012
Proceedings: Administrative Complaint filed.

Case Information

Judge:
THOMAS P. CRAPPS
Date Filed:
04/06/2012
Date Assignment:
05/15/2012
Last Docket Entry:
11/12/2019
Location:
Micanopy, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
Other
Suffix:
PL
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (6):