12-002816RX Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc., D/B/A Rcma Smith Brown Child Development Center vs. Department Of Children And Families Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, October 9, 2012.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove rules requiring revocation of Gold Seal designation were invalid and did not demonstrate standing to challenge agency fact sheet as an unadopted rule.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

REDLANDS CHRISTIAN MIGRANT )

ASSOCIATION, INC., d/b/a )

RCMA SMITH BROWN CHILD )

DEVELOPMENT CENTER , )

)

Petitioner, ) Case No. 1 2 - 2816RX

)

vs. )

)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN )

AND FAMILIES , )

)

Respondent s . )

)

FINAL ORDER

On September 19 , 201 2 , a duly - noticed hearing was held in

Tallahassee, Florida, b efore F. Scott Boyd, an Administrative

Law Judge assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEA RANCES

For Petitioner: Timothy P. Atkinson , Esquire

Angela K. Far ford , Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant

and Atkinson, P.A.

Post Office Box 1 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent : Gregory D. Venz , Esquire

Department of Children and Families

1 317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

STATEME NT OF THE ISSUE S

Whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 65C -

22.009(2)(b)1. and 3. , are invalid exercises of delegated

legislative authority and whether a statement in a Gold Seal

Quality Care P rogram Fact Sheet constitutes an unadopted rule in

violation o f section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On August 17, 201 2 , Redlands Christian Migrant Association,

Inc. , d/b/a RCMA Smith Brown Child Development Center (RCMA) ,

filed a Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Existing

Rule and Violation of Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, for

an Agency Statement Defined as a Rule , against the Florida

Department of Children and Families . Hearing was set for

September 19, 2012 .

A n Order granting an unopposed Motion to Amend Rule

Challenge Petition was entered on August 27, 2012. A pre -

hearing Stipulation was filed, which was accepted at hearing.

Official r ecognition was taken of the Recommended Order and the

Final Order in Depar tment of Children and Families v. Redlands

Christian Migrant Association, Inc. , Case No. 12 - 0750 (Fla. DOAH

Aug. 6, 2012; Fla. DC F Aug 27 , 2012). Joint Exhibits J - 1 , a

Notice of Gold Seal Revocation , and J - 2, a Gold Seal Quality

Care Program Fact Sheet , w ere admitted into evidence .

Petitioner RCMA offered an excerpt of the transcribed testimony

of Ms. Sherrie Quevedo in the aforementioned case, which was

admitted , as discussed in more detail below . Petitioner and

Respondent offered the testimony of Ms. D eborah Russo, Child

Care Regulation Director at DCF. Neither party ordered a copy

of the Transcript, and the deadline to submit Prop o sed Final

Orders was set for Monday, October 1, 2012. P roposed orders

were timely submitted by both parties and were cons idered.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or

Department ) is the agency of the State of Florida that regulates

child care facilities, large family child care homes, and family

day care homes within the state to protect the health and

welfare of the children in care.

2 . Petitioner RCMA is a child care facility licensed by

the Department and located in Arcadia, Florida.

3 . RCMA ' s current child care facility license #CI2DE0009,

is effective January 1, 2012, through December 3 1, 2012.

4 . Child care facilities, large family child care homes ,

and family day care homes in Florida that meet criteria

demonstrating that they exceed the minimum licensing

requirements and promote quality child care are eligible for

G old Seal Quality C are des ignation by DCF. Designation

indicates a facility providing a higher standard of care .

5. Gold Seal Quality Care d esignation has no bearing on

licensure as a child care facility, large family child care

home, or family day care home.

6 . A Gold Seal Quality Care designation is an

authorization required by law in order for a facility to receive

certain tax benefits and enhanced school readiness program

reimbursement from the Early Learning Coalition.

7 . Issuance of a Gold Seal Quality Care desi gnation is not

merely a ministerial act and it is not a license required

primarily for revenue purposes .

8. Gold Seal Quality Care designation is a license .

9 . DCF granted RCMA Gold Seal designation on March 31,

2008.

10 . On December 29, 2011, DCF issu ed an A dministrative

C omplaint alleging that RCMA committed a C lass I licensing

violation . The Administrative Complaint s ought to impos e

sanctions against RCMA ' s child care facility license and to

revok e RCMA ' s Gold Seal designation.

11 . On or before Apr il 27, 2012, RCMA ' s accrediting

association, the National Association for the Education of Young

Children (NAEYC), revoked RCMA ' s accreditation. There was no

evidence at hearing as to whether its action was based solely

upon DCF ' s allegations in the Admin istrative Complaint that RCMA

had committed a C lass I licensing violation. 1/

12 . On or about May 24, 2012, RCMA was notified of the

Department ' s intended action to revoke its Gold Seal designation

because NAEYC had revoked RCMA ' s accreditation. The

noti fication letter advised RCMA of its right to request a

hearing , but was not in the form of an Administrative Complaint .

13 . It was stipulated by the parties that Petitioner is

substantially affected by rule s 65C - 22.009(2)(b)1. and 3.

14 . On August 6, 2 012, Administrative Law Judge R. Bruce

McKibben issued a Recommended Order on the Administrative

Complaint in DOAH Case No. 12 - 750 , concluding that DCF had

failed to prove the C lass I licensing violation and recommending

that the Administrative Complaint a nd R evocation of Gold Seal

Quality Care D esignation be dismissed.

15 . On August 27, 2012, DCF entered a Final Order

rescinding the Administrative Complaint .

16 . Ms. Sherrie Quevedo was the Child Care licensing

Supervisor for the geographic area includi ng Arcadia, Florida ,

at the time of the formal hearing on the Administrative

Complaint against RCMA ' s ch ild care facility license.

Ms. Quevedo was a supervisor called by Respondent and her

statements as to policies of DCF were regarding matters within

the scope of her employment. Ms. Quevedo did not work in the

policy - making arm of DCF, and she could not speak

authoritatively as to the Department ' s interpretation of

statutes implemented by DCF.

17 . Ms. Deborah Russo is the Director of Child Care

Regul ation Office at DCF , where she is responsible, in

conjunction with Department leadership and the General Counsel ' s

O ffice, for establishing Department p olicies and implementing

statutes setting out legislative policies.

18 . T he Department terminate s the Gold Seal designation

for a facility when its accreditation expires or when it is

revoked by the accrediting organization.

1 9. Ms. Russo testified that it is DCF ' s interpretation of

section 402.281, Florida Statutes, that the Department does not

have dis cretion not to terminate a child care facility ' s Gold

Seal designation if that facility ' s accrediting association

revokes the provider ' s accreditation.

20 . The Gold Seal Quality Care Program Fact Sheet contains

the statement that " section 402.281(3), Florida Statutes,

requires that the Department deny or revoke a child care

provider ' s Gold Seal Quality Care designation " if the provider

has a Class I violation within a two - year period (the

St atement).

2 1 . The fact sheet was distributed to Gold Seal chi ld care

facilities throughout the State of Florida in 2009 and the

S tatement is of general applicability to all child care

facilities designated as Gold Seal Quality Care providers.

2 2 . The S tatement , or a substantially similar statement

reflecting the D epartment ' s interpretation o f the statute, ha s

not been adopted as a rule under chapter 120, Florida Statutes.

2 3 . RCMA has committed no licensing violations defined by

DCF rule as a C lass I violation during the two years preceding

the rule challenge peti tion in this case.

C ONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2 4 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in this

proceeding pursuant to sections 120.56, 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes (201 2 ) . 2 /

2 5 . On joint reques t, o fficial r ecognition has been taken

of the R ecommended Order and Final O rder in Department of

Children and Families v. Redlands Christian Migrant Ass ociation ,

Inc. , Ca se No. 12 - 0750 ( Fla. DOAH Aug. 6, 2012; Fla. DCF Aug.

27, 2012).

Ex i sting Rule Challen ge

2 6 . Section 402.281 , Florida Statutes, is the legislative

authorization for the Gold Seal Quality Care designation program

and is the enabling statute for Florida Administrative Code r ule

65C - 22.009.

2 7 . Section 402.281(1)(b) provides that a child car e

facility that is accredited by a nationally recognized

accrediting association approved by the D epartment , and that

meets all other requirements shall, upon application to the

D epartment, receive a separate " Gold Seal Quality Care "

designation.

2 8 . Alth ough section 402.281 thus provides that

accreditation is required to initially qualify for Gold Seal

designation, it contains no explicit provision regarding the

effect of loss of accreditation on maintaining that

designation.

29 . Section 402.281 state s t hat in order to " obtain and

maintain " Gold Seal designation, a provider must not have had

certain violations. For example, it states, " The child care

provider must not have had any C lass I violations, as defined by

rule, within the 2 years preceding its a pplication for

designation as a Gold Seal Quality Care provider. Commission of

a C lass I violation shall be grounds for termination of the

designation as a Gold Seal Quality Care provider until the

provider has no C lass I violations for a period of 2 year s. "

This language, paralleled by other provisions regarding C lass II

and C lass III violations, explicitly states that violations not

only prevent initial designation, but also " provide grounds for "

termination of Gold S eal designation.

3 0 . Section 40 2.281(5), Florida Statutes, requires

Respondent to adopt rules which provide both criteria and

procedures for " conferring and revoking " designations of Gold

Seal Quality Care providers.

3 1 . Respondent adopted Florida Administrative Code R ule

65C - 22.009 , entitled Gold Seal Quality Care Program.

3 2 . Rule 65C - 22.009(2)(b) provides in relevant part:

(b) Gold Seal Quality Care Enforcement.

1. Gold Seal Quality Care providers must

maintain accreditation by a Gold Seal

Quality Care Accrediting Associat ion in

order to retain their designation. A child

care facility ' s Gold Seal designation will

be terminated upon expiration of

accreditation. In order to obtain and

maintain Gold Seal Quality Care provider

designation, a child care facility must meet

the additional criteria outlined in Section

402.281(3), F.S.

* * *

3. If a provider ' s accreditation is revoked

by the accrediting association, termination

of the provider ' s Gold Seal Quality Care

designation by the department will be

effective on the date of revocation.

3 3 . Section 120.56(1)(a) provides that a ny person

substantially affected by a rule may seek an administrative

determination of its invalidity on the ground that the rule is

an invalid exercise of delegated legislativ e authority.

3 4 . It was stipulated that Petitioner is substantially

affected by rule 65C - 22.009(2)(b)1. a nd 3. Petitioner has

standing to challenge these rules as invalid exercises of

delegated legislative authority.

3 5 . Section 120.52(8), provides:

" I nvalid exercise of delegated legislative

authority " means action that goes beyond the

powers, functions, and duties delegated by

the Legislature. A proposed or existing

rule is an invalid exercise of delegated

legislative authority if any one of the

follo wing applies:

(a) The agency has materially failed to

follow the applicable rulemaking procedures

or requirements set forth in this chapter;

(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of

rulemaking authority, citation to which is

required by s. 120.54 (3)(a)1.;

(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or

contravenes the specific provisions of law

implemented, citation to which is required

by s. 120.54 (3)(a)1.;

(d ) The rule is vague, fails to establish

adequate standards for agency decisions, or

vests unbridled discretion in the agency;

(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious. A

rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by

logic or the necessary facts; a rule is

capricious if it is adopted without thought

or reason or is irrationa l; or

(f) The rule imposes regulatory costs on

the regulated person, county, or city which

could be reduced by the adoption of less

costly alternatives that substantially

accomplish the statutory objectives.

3 6 . Petitioner first alleges that r ule 65C - 2 2.009(2)(b)1.

and 3. enlarge, modify or contravene section 402.281 . These

rule provisions state that a facility must maintain

accreditation by an approved Accrediting Association and that

upon expiration or revocation of this accreditation the

Department will terminate Gold Seal designation. Th e rule

provisions do not enlarge, modify, or contravene section

402.281 (1)(b) , which speaks only to the requirements for a

facility to be initially granted Gold Seal designation and does

not address grounds for revo cation .

3 7 . Neither do the se rule provisions enlarge, modify, or

contravene section 402.281(4) , which provide s that certain

violations shall be " grounds for " termination of Gold Seal

designation . The statute nowhere states or s uggests that these

were i ntended to be t he exclusive grounds for termination.

Petitioner argues, under the well - known rule of statutory

construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius , that these

violations are therefore the only grounds upon which designation

may be revoked. Under Petitioner ' s interpretation of the

statute , a facility, once designated as a Gold Seal Quality Care

provider, could retain that status indefinitely even while

providing sub - standard care, so long as it received no

violations. Such a construction of the statute would defeat the

very purpose of the legislation and is rejected . Smalley

Transp. Co. v. Moed ' s Transfer Co. , 373 So. 2d 55 , 57 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1979) (quoting U.S. Supreme Court for proposition that

" expressio unius " gives way to contrary intent of the drafters);

American Ins. Assn. v. Dep ' t of Rev . Case No. 97 - 0323RP

(Fla. DOAH Aug. 29, 1997)(other guides to legislative intent may

prevail over " expressio unius " doctrine) , per curiam aff ' d ,

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dep ' t of Rev. , 746 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1999) . Section 402.281(4) itself refers to violations as

" additional " criteria in order to obtain and maintain

designation. The setting by rule of a criteri on for revocation

of Gold Seal designation other than violations is in no way

co ntrary to th e statute , but is necessary to fulfill its

purpose .

3 8 . In fact, the statute contains a direct mandate in

section 402.2 81 (5) that the Department adopt rules which provide

criteria for revoking Gold S eal designation . This language is

directly contrary to Petitioner ' s argument that it was the

unstated legislative intent that the violations established by

statute as grounds for revocation were to be the sole basis for

such revocation. Since the Legislature required the Department

to adopt a rule providing criteria for revocation of

design a tion, the D epartment had rulemaking authority to provide

t hat revocation of accreditation by the approved a ccrediting

a ssociation should be one such criterion. Hanger Prosthetics &

Orthotics , Inc., v. Bd. of Or thotists and Prosthetists , 948

So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2007). Rule 65C - 22.009(2)(b)1. and 3.

do not exceed the grant of rulemaking authority.

39 . Petitioner finally a lleges that the se rules , requiring

revocation of Gold Seal designation upon expiratio n or

revocation of accreditation, vest unbridled discretion in the

agency , in violation of section 120.52(8)(d) . In fact, however,

the rules leave no agency discretion on this point at all. They

provide that if the accreditation granted by the a ccreditin g

a ssociation expires or is revoked by the a ssociation, that the

Department will revoke Gold Seal designation . No discretion,

unbridled or otherwise, is left to the Department under such

circumstances.

4 0 . Petitioner failed to prove that either rule 65C -

22.009(2)(b) 1. or 3. is an invalid exercise of delegated

legislative authority.

Unadopted Rule Challenge

4 1 . Petitioner further asserts that a portion of the

Department ' s Gold Seal Quality Care Program Fact Sheet

constitutes an unadopted rule:

Gold Seal Quality Care d esignees are advised

that section 402.281(3), Florida Statutes,

requires that the Department deny or revoke

a child care provider ' s Gold Seal Quality

Care designation if the provider has

licensing standards violations as follows:

A C lass I violation within a two - year

period.

4 2 . Petitioner suggests, consistent with the Recommended

Order in DOAH Case. No. 12 - 750, that statutory language

providing simply that the violations " shall be grounds for "

revocation means that some discretion as t o whether to in fact

revoke is left with the Department. If the Department has a

different interpretation of the statute that is not readily

apparent from its literal reading, or has exercised its

discretion to conclude that it should revoke designation i n

every such case, Petitioner argues, this is a Department policy

which must be adopted by rule, and not simply set out in an

unadopted fact sheet. Respondent argues conversely, consistent

with its Final Order in the same case, that the statutory

language providing that the violations are " grounds for "

revocation means revocation is required when the violations

occur as a matter of statutory policy, and that the fact sheet

simply reiterates this.

4 3 . Under section 120.56(4), a Petitioner has the burden

to prove that the statement constitutes a rule and that the

agency has not adopted the statement by rulemaking procedures.

S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte Co. , 774 So. 2d 903,

908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Under section 120.56(4)(b), the burden

to prove that rulemaking is not feasible or not practicable then

falls upon the agency.

4 4 . On the issue of whether or not the statement in the

f act s heet constitutes an age ncy statement of policy or merely a

simple recitation of policy already set forth in the statute,

Petitioner offered an excerpt of transcribed testimony given by

Ms. Sherrie Quevedo , the Child Care L icensing Supervisor for the

area including DeSoto County, in Department of Children and

Families v. Redlands Christian Migrant Ass ociation , Inc. , Ca se

No. 12 - 0750 ( Fla. DOAH Aug. 6, 2012; Fla. DCF Aug. 27, 2012).

4 5 . While th is excerpt of Ms. Quevedo ' s prior testimony is

hearsay, it was given in a related case involving the same

parties when she was a supervisor working for Respondent at the

re gional staff level . She had been called as a witness by

Respondent , and her statements were regarding matters within the

scope of her employment. The excerpt of transcribed testimony

would be admissible at civil trial under section 90.803(18)(d),

Florida Statutes, as an admission. Lee v. Dep ' t of HRS , 698

So. 2d 1194, 1200 (Fla. 1997)(statements made by employee of HRS

during the scope of his employment was admissible). It is

sufficient to support a finding here . § 120.57(1)(c).

4 6 . Ms. Quevedo ' s tes timony that the source of the policy

requiring mandatory revocation of Gold Seal certification

following violations was " instructions from the child care

program office in Tallahassee " is given little weight, however.

Ms. Quevedo did not work in the polic y - making arm of the

Department, and she could not speak authoritatively as to the

Department ' s interpretation. Given her position as an employee

at the regional level, Ms. Queve do ' s " instructions " would come

from Tallahassee regardless of whether mandator y revocation was

a statutory policy, or alternatively was the Department ' s own

policy created in the course of implementing the statute.

4 7 . Section 120.56( 1 )( b ) provides:

The petition seeking an administrative

determination must state with particularit y

the provisions alleged to be invalid with

sufficient explanation of the facts or

grounds for the alleged invalidity and facts

sufficient to show that the person

challenging a rule is substantially affected

by it, or that the person challenging a

proposed rule would be substantially

affected by it.

4 8 . In order to demonstrate standing, Petitioner must show

that : 1) the agency statement of policy result s in a real or

immediate injury in fact; and 2) the alleged interest is within

the zone of interest to be protected or regulated. Jacoby v.

Fla. Bd. of Medicine , 917 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ;

Lanoue v. Fla. Dep ' t of Law Enf. , 751 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA

1999).

49 . In order to constitute a real and immediate injury in

f act, " the injury must not be based on pure speculation or

conjecture. " See Ward v. Bd. of Trs. of the Int. Impust

Fund , 651 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

5 0 . In Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v.

Jerry , 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court held that

Jerry, who had completed disciplinary confinement imposed under

a rule, no longer had standing to challenge that rule because

there was no immediate injury unless and until it was again

applied to him. The court was unwi lling to presume that Jerry

would commit another assault or engage in other misconduct while

in custody that would result in application of the rule once

again, even though he was at all times subject to the rule.

Later cases have followed the Jerry ratio nale. 3/ See, e.g. ,

Dep ' t of Corr. v. Van Poyck , 610 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)

rev . den ied , 620 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1993).

5 1 . The injury to Petitioner here is equally speculative,

is not immediate, and is governed by Jerry . The alleged

unadopted ru le mandating revocation of Gold Seal designation

after certain violations could create no injury to Petitioner

unless and until Petitioner had committed one or more of the

violations subjecting it to such revocation. While Respondent

issued an A dministrat ive C omplaint on December 29, 2011,

alleging that Petitioner had committed a C lass I violation and

seeking to revoke Petitioner ' s Gold Seal designation, Respondent

subsequently rescinded that complaint on August 27, 2012, after

formal hearing. It was stip ulated here that Petitioner has

committed no licensing violations defined by DCF rule as a C lass

I violation during the two years preceding the rule challenge

petition in this case. The mere possibility of injury at some

later date does not meet the " imme diate injury " prong of the

standing test. Further, no evidence was presented to show that

the charge in the Administrative Complaint that Petitioner had

committed a Class 1 violation was the reason that NAEYC revoked

accreditation. 4/

5 2 . Petitioner fai led to demonstrate standing to challenge

the statement regarding revocation following a Class I violation

contained in the Gold Seal Quality Care Program Fact Sheet .

5 3 . Redlands Christian Migrant Association, Inc., d/b/a

RCMA Smith Brown Child Developme nt Center , failed to prove that

Florida Administrative Code R ule 65C - 22.009(2)(b)1. or 3. was

an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and did

not demonstrate standing to challenge the Gold Seal Quality

Care Program Fact Sheet as an unadopted rule in violation of

section 120.54(1)(a).

FINAL ORDER

Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and

conclusions of law, it is

ORDERED :

The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Existing

Rule and Violation of Section 120.54(1) is DISMISS ED . The

final portion of Petitioner ' s Proposed Final Order is treated

as a Motion for Attorney ' s fees and is DENIED. Respondent ' s

Motion for Attorney ' s fees is DENIED.

DONE AND ORD ERED this 9 th day of October , 2012 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Flori da.

S

F. SCOTT BOYD

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Fi led with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 9 th day of October, 2012.

ENDNOT ES

1/ Revocation of accreditation by an Accrediting Association

solely on the basis of an Administrative Complaint later

determined at hearing to be unfo unded, in turn requiring the

Department to follow its rule and revo ke Gold Seal designation ,

would create a disturbing " Catch 22 " for a provider. A

restructured rule which established substantive criteria to

evaluate whether a facility ' s standard of care warranted

revocation of designation , coupled with license revocation

procedures allocating to DCF the burden to prove that

allegation , would avoid any suggestion of abdication of

rulemaking responsibilities or irrebuttable administrative

presumption , alleg ations not made here. § 120.60(5); §

402.281(5); Gaudet v. Bd. of Prof. Eng. , 900 So. 2d 574 , 580

(Fla. 4 th DCA 2004); Little v. Dep ' t of Labor & Emp . Sec . , 652

So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1995) ; Cf . Ayala v. Dep ' t. of Prof.

Reg. , 478 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) .

2 / All references to statutes are to the versions in effect in

201 2. References to r ule 65C - 22.009 are to the version adopted

on January 13, 2010, which is now in effect , and not to any

amendments noticed on July 20, 2012 .

3/ The Florida Supreme Court disapproved Jerry to the extent

that it conflicted with Florida Home Builders Association v.

Department of Labor and Employment Security , 412 So. 2d 351

(Fla. 1982)(association representing its members need not suffer

an immediate and direct injury to its own interests as an

association).

4/ In Jerry , the court note d tha t had it been confronted with a

situation in which a loss of gain time had been imposed for

Jerry ' s earlier violation of the rule, this would have

constituted an injury in fact and Jerry would have had standing .

The facts presented here do not raise the i ssue of w hether or

not the " Catch 22 " mentioned in note 1 above would constitute

sufficient ly " real and immediate " injury to confer standing.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Timothy P. Atkinson, Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant and Atkinson, P.A.

Post Office Box 111 0

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

[e-mail]

Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk

Department of Children and Families

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Liz Cloud, Program Administrator

Administrative Code

Department of State

R. A. Gray Bui lding, Suite 101

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is advers ely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to s ection 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing one copy of a Notice of Ad ministrative Appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a

second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with

the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the

District Court of Appeal in the appellate d istrict where the

party resides. The Notice of Administrative Appeal must be

filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.