12-003268 Anayo Jerry Udenwoke vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, April 2, 2013.

Summary: Petitioner, a black male originally from Africa, failed to demonstrate that his dismissal from employment was caused by anything other than his submission of a false time sheet.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ANAYO JERRY UDENWOKE , )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No . 1 2 - 3268

)

PEPSICO, INC. , )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal hearing was condu cted in this case on January 15,

2013 , in Jacksonville , Florida, before Lawrence P. Stevenson, a

duly - designated Administrative Law Judge with the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Anayo Jerry Udenwoke , pro se

6 728 Powers Avenue

Jacksonville , Florida 3 2217

For Respondent: Dena H. Sokolow , Esquire

A llen, Norton & Blue, P.A.

906 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee , Florida 3 2303

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Respondent , Pepsico, Inc. (" Pepsi ")

committed unlawful employment practice s contrary to s ection

760. 10, Florida Statutes (20 12 ) , 1 / by discriminating against

Petitioner b ased on h is race , color, or national origin by

discharging Petitioner from h is employment.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On or about April 19, 2012 , Petitioner Anayo Jerry Udenwoke

("Petitioner ") filed with the Florida Commission on Human

Relations ("FCHR") a n Employment Complaint of Discrimination

against Pepsi . Petitioner alleged that he had been

discriminated against pursuant to c hapter 760, Florida Statutes ,

and Title VII of the Federal Civ il Rights Act as follows:

I began employment with Pepsi Cola Bottling

on June 16, 2004 , and was terminated on

February 21, 2012. I worked as a route

driver, delivering Pepsi products to

different locations. I was paid on a

commission basis. I believe th at based on

the color of my skin (black), and the fact

that I am African and was not born in the

United States, that I was treated less

favorably by my employer. Specifically, I

was given less delivery routes, which means

that I could never make as much m oney as the

other drivers since I was paid on

commission. I was made fun of for my

accent. I was terminated on February 21,

2012, for allegedly forging time on my time

sheet, however this was false. I gave my

time sheet to my supervisor, Christopher

Qui ndoza, who changed the time on the time

sheet. He initialed the time sheet where he

made changes, however I was terminated on

February 21, 2012 , by Andrew (I don't know

his last name), who was aware of the changes

that Christopher made. I believe this wa s a

pretext and that they wanted to fire me

based on my skin color, race and ethnicity.

There are other employees who faced similar

discrepancies in their time sheets who were

not terminated. I always did a good job for

Pepsi and there was no reason for my

termination.

The FCHR investigated Petitioner's Complaint. In a letter

dated September 27, 2012 , the FCHR issued its determination that

there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful

employment practice occurred .

On October 4, 2012 , Petitio ner timely filed a Petition for

Relief with the FCHR . On the same date , the FCHR referred the

case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (" DOAH " ) . The

case was originally scheduled for hearing on December 13, 2012 .

One continuance w as granted. The hearing was ultimately held on

January 15, 2013 .

At the outset of the hearing, Petitioner stated that he had

witnesses to testify on his behalf but that he did not bring

them to the hearing because Pepsi had "stopped" him from doing

so. Discussion of the matter revealed that counsel for Pepsi

had informed Petitioner that she intended to object to his

witnesses because Petitioner had failed to disclose their names

prior to the hearing. The undersigned explained the discovery

rules to Petitioner. Because of Petitioner's misunderstanding

of the import of Pepsi's objection, and in an effort to provide

Petitioner with every opportunity to present his case fully, the

undersigned offered to continue or bifurcate the hearing in

order to give Petitioner an opport unity to produce his

witnesses, the only condition being that Petitioner would have

to disclose their names to counsel for Pepsi. Petitioner

continued to refuse to disclose the names of his witnesses. The

undersigned therefore decided that the hearing wo uld go forward

as scheduled and that Petitioner would be granted no further

opportunity to produce unnamed witnesses.

At the hea ring, Petitioner testified on his own behalf.

Petitioner ' s Exhibits 1 through 3 were admitted into evidence.

Respondent presen ted the testimony of Christopher Quindoza, a

Pepsi delivery supervisor who was one of Petitioner's direct

supervisors, and of Kyle Lowens, the sales operations manager

for Pepsi. Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 11 were admitted

into evidence.

There was no court reporter present at the hearing, and no

transcript of the hearing has been prepared. 2 / The undersigned

made a digital recording of the hearing that was used in

preparing this Recommended Order. The undersigned offered a

copy of the recording to th e parties, but neither party filed a

request for a copy.

At the close of the hearing, the undersigned informed the

parties that they would have ten days in which to submit

proposed recommended orders. On J anuary 25, 2013 , Respondent

timely filed a P ropose d R ecommended O rder. Petitioner did not

file a proposed recommended order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Pepsi is an employer as that term is defined in

s ubs ection 760. 02(7) , Florida Statutes. Pepsi manufactures and

distributes snack food and beverages throughout the United

States .

2. Petitioner , a black male originally from Africa , 3 / was

employed by Pepsi as a delivery driver in Jacksonville from

June 15, 2004 , until February 21, 2012, when Pepsi t erminated

his employment.

3. At the time he was hired, Petiti oner received a copy of

Pepsi Bottling Group 's " Employee Handbook" and "General Rules of

Conduct." Petitioner signed acknowledgements of receipt of each

of these documents on June 15, 2004.

4. The G eneral Rules of Conduct provide s an express list

of acti ons that are "prohibited and may result in immediate

termination," including "misrepresentation of facts or

falsification of Company records or other documents."

5. As a delivery driver, Petitioner was responsible for

delivering Pepsi products to designat ed customers on a route

provided to him by Pepsi. During the time of Petitioner's

employment, all driver delivery routes were dispatched from

Orlando.

6. There were approximately 17 routes in the Jacksonville

area. The routes were established and modi fied according to

number of stops, number of cases of product delivered, and the

time it t ook to complete the route. Because the drivers were

paid on a commission basis, the dispatchers did what they could

to keep the routes roughly equal in terms of stop s, cases, and

time. Local Jacksonville supervisors consulted with the Orlando

dispatchers but had no control over route assignments.

7. Delivery drivers must comply with U.S. Department of

Transportation ("DOT) hours of service rules. See 49 C.F.R.

par t 395. Under the rules, drivers such as Petitioner are

allowed to work up to 14 hours in one day and up to 60 hours in

a seven - day period. The DOT rules are reviewed with the

delivery drivers. In 2008, Petitioner signed an acknowledgement

that he was su bject to the DOT hours of service rules.

8. Delivery drivers for Pepsi are responsible for clocking

in and out of work each day by machine to accurately record

their hours of work. They must also manually fill out and

submit a DOT - prescribed grid log of their working and driving

time.

9. Drivers are also required to submit a hand - written time

sheet each week. The driver is not required to manually fill in

the time on the time sheet for days when the driver clocked in

and out by machine. The driver must manually record his time on

the time sheet for those days when the driver failed to clock in

or out for some reason.

10. On Friday, February 3, 2012, Petitioner forgot to

clock in when he began his route in the morning.

11. Delivery drivers carry handhe ld computers that contain

all of their route information and that record the time at which

the driver generates an invoice to the customer at each location

on the route. The driver is not able to tamper with or alter

the information contained in the handh eld computer.

12. According to Petitioner's computer, his last stop on

February 3 , 2012 , was a Pizza Hut on University Boulevard South .

The invoice generated by Petitioner indicated that he made the

Pizza Hut delivery at 4:40 p.m.

13. After completing t he delivery at Pizza Hut, Petitioner

returned to the Pepsi facility, where he checked in at the gate

at 5:14 p.m. Petitioner then unloaded his truck, performed a

post - delivery inspection, and entered the building to do a final

accounting of the money he c ollected on his route that day.

Records indicate that Petitioner generated a final settlement

report for the day at 5:27 p.m.

14. After generating his settlement report, Petitioner

submitted his deposit and weekly paperwork in delivery

supervisor Rich He rrmann's office. 4 / The weekly paperwork

included Petitioner's handwritten time sheet for the week of

January 30 through February 3, 2012, and his DOT grid log.

15. Because he had failed to clock in on the morning of

February 3, Petitioner wrote both his time in and time out for

the day on his time sheet. Petitioner's handwritten time sheet

indicated that he began work at 4:30 a.m. and ended work at 4:30

p.m. Petitioner's DOT grid log also indicated that he worked

twelve hours on February 3 and 60 hours for the week of

January 30 through February 3.

16. Delivery supervisor Christopher Quindoza testified

that he was in his office working when he noticed Petitioner

passing by his open door after dropping off his time sheet at

Mr. Herrmann's office. Mr. Qu indoza testified that it is

customary in the office for the supervisor to work on time

sheets on Friday afternoon so that the materials will be ready

for submission on Monday morning. He had already picked up

several time sheets and was working on them wh en he saw

Petitioner pass. Mr. Quindoza went to Mr. Herrmann's office to

retrieve Petitioner's time sheet.

17. Mr. Quindoza saw that Petitioner's time sheet stated

that he had worked until 4:30 p.m. He knew that this was

incorrect. He stepped into the settlement room to confer with a

few drivers there as to the time, then crossed out "4:30" on

Petitioner's time sheet and wrote in "6:10," the time when

Petitioner actually stopped work. He initialed the amendment

and then signed the time sheet as Petitio ner's approving

supervisor.

18. Mr. Quindoza testified that he amended the time sheet

to ensure that Petitioner would be paid correctly and so that it

would be correct for DOT reporting.

19. If the time had been calculated as Petitioner

submitted it, he would have been recorded as having worked

exactly 60 hours for the week. Petitioner in fact worked more

than 14 hours on February 3, 2012, which pushed his time for the

week over the 60 - hour limit imposed by DOT rule.

20. Mr. Quindoza reported the discre pancies to his

supervisor, S ales O perations M anager Kyle Lowens, who in turn

notified H uman R esources M anager Alex Pullen. Guided by the

General Rules of Conduct and company precedent, Mr. Lowens

instructed Mr. Quindoza to write up the incident as a

termi nation of Petitioner's employment, pending approval from

the human resources department.

21. A meeting was convened on February 10, 2012. Present

at the meeting were Petitioner, Mr. Quindoza, Mr. Lowens, and

Mr. Pullen. Petitioner was presented with the incorrect time

sheet and DOT grid log he submitted and was asked to explain why

he had falsified his time records. Petitioner admitted that he

did so to avoid exceeding the 60 - hour DOT limit. 5 /

22. In 2007, Petitioner had received a written warning for

exceeding the DOT guidelines when he worked 62.25 hours in one

week. At the February 10 meeting, it was explained to

Petitioner that if he had submitted his time correctly, he would

have merely received another written warning or a verbal

coaching for exc eeding the 60 - hour requirement. Petitioner was

told that submitting fraudulent documents was a much more

serious offense.

23. On February 13, 2012, Petitioner was notified that he

was suspended pending further investigation by the Pepsi human

resources d epartment.

24. On February 21, 2012, Petitioner's employment was

terminated for violation of the company's Rules of Conduct.

25. At the hearing, Petitioner contended that he simply

made a mistake on his time sheet and should have been allowed to

correct it. He claimed that other drivers make mistakes "all

the time," and that the practice had always been to give them a

blank time sheet and tell them to fill it out correctly.

26. Mr. Lowens has worked 18 years for Pepsi and has been

sales operations manag er for the last three. He testified that

he was unaware of drivers frequently submitting incorrect time

sheets and that it has never been the practice of Pepsi to do

anything other than terminate employees for turning in false

documents. He personally kn ew of two employees besides

Petitioner who had been fired for submitting false time sheets.

One of the fired employees was a black male , the other a white

male .

27. Petitioner's testimony regarding company practices as

to errors on submitted time sheets was not credible.

Mr. Lowens' testimony on that point is credited.

28. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that Pepsi had

long wanted to fire him. He claimed that a supervisor wanted to

terminate him so that his route could be given to a white

driver. No evidence of this conspiracy was presented beyond

Petitioner's bare assertion.

29. There was no credible evidence that Pepsi had been

seeking a reason to fire Petitioner. To the contrary, in

December 2010, a customer complained to Pepsi about Petition er

and requested that he not be allowed to deliver products to her

place of business again. The customer complained that

Petitioner had indulged in a long, loud rant a gainst the Bush

administration and the Iraq war in the presence of her own

customers.

30. Mr. Lowens testified that it is a terminable offense

for a delivery driver to be banned from a customer's premises.

However, he decided to first visit with the customer and try to

persuade her to allow Petitioner back onto the account.

Mr. Lowens and Mr. Herrmann met with the customer, who

acknowledged that Petitioner did a good job and agreed to let

Petitioner return to her premises provided he stop talking

politics. The fact that Mr. Lowens went out of his way to save

Petitioner's job indicates there was no plan afoot to terminate

his employment.

31 . Petitioner claimed that Pepsi drove down his

commissions by giving him more stops with fewer cases of

products on his route. Also, for some reason, Pepsi did not

want him to attend college, and gav e him more stops to prevent

him from getting off work early to attend class. He claimed

that Pepsi would allow white employees to take off early for

their classes. Again, Petitioner's bare assertions were

unsupported by other testimony or documentary evi dence.

32. Petitioner never complained of discriminatory

treatment or harassment to any supervisor at Pepsi.

3 3 . Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the

legitimate, non - discriminatory reasons given by Pepsi for his

termination. He simply asserted that he made a "mistake" on his

time sheet that he should have been allowed to correct. The

weight of the evidence is consistent with the finding that

Petitioner's false time sheet was not a "mistake" but an

intentional act, an attempt to dodge the disciplinary

consequences of having worked more than 60 hours in one week. 6 /

34 . Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Pepsi 's

stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for race

discrimination , national origin discrimination , or

discr imination because of Petitioner's color .

35 . Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Pepsi

discriminated against him because of his race , color or national

origin in violation of s ection 760.10, Florida Statutes.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

36 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this

proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.

3 7 . The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the " Florida

Civil Rights Act " or the " Act " ), c hapter 760, Florida Sta tutes,

prohibits discrimination in the workplace .

3 8 . Subsection 760.10 , Florida Statutes, states the

following , in relevant part :

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

for an employer:

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

hire any individual , or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with

respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

3 9 . Pepsi is a n "employer" as defined in s ubsection

760.02(7), Florida Statutes, which provides the following:

(7) "Employer" means any person employing

15 or more employees for each working day in

each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the

current or preceding calendar year, and any

agent of such a person.

40 . Florida courts have determined that federal case law

applies to claims arising under the Florida's Civil Rights Act,

and as such, the United States Supreme Court's model for

employment discrimination cases set fo rth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668

(1973), applies to claims arising under s ection 760.10. See

Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc. , 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (S.D.

Fla. 2002); Fla . State Univ . v. Sondel , 68 5 So. 2d 923, 925 n.1

(Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla . Dep Ó t of Cmty . Aff . v. Bryant , 586

So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

41 . Under the McDonnell analysis, in employment

discrimination cases, Petitioner has the burden of establishing

by a preponderance of evide nce a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination. If the prima facie case is established, the

burden shifts to the employer to rebut this preliminary showing

by producing evidence that the adverse action was taken for some

legitimate, non - discriminatory reason. If the employer rebuts

the prima facie case, the burden shifts back to Petitioner to

show by a preponderance of evidence that the employer 's offered

reasons for its adverse employment decision were pretextual.

See Texas Dep Ó t of Cmty . Aff . v. Bur dine , 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.

Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).

42 . In order to prove a prima facie case of unlawful

employment discrimination under c hapter 760, Florida Statutes,

Petitioner must establish that: (1) he is a memb er of the

protected group; ( 2) he was subject to adverse employment

action; (3) Pepsi treated similarly situated employees outside

of h is protected classifications more favorably ; and

(4) Petitioner was qualified to do the job and/or was performing

h is job at a level that met the emp loyerÓs legitimate

expectations . See , e.g. , Jiles v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ,

360 Fed. Appx. 61, 64 (11 th Cir. 2010); Burke - Fowler v. Orange

Cnty . , 447 F. 3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Knight v. Baptist

Hosp . of Miami, Inc. , 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11 t h Cir. 2003);

Williams v. Vitro Servs . Corp . , 144 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir.

1998); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt . Corp. , 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 - 75

(S.D. Fla. 1999).

43 . Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case of

unlawful employment discrimination.

44 . Petitioner established that he is a member of a

protected group, in that he is a black man from Africa .

Petitioner was subject to an adverse employment action in that

he was terminated from his position as delivery driver with

Pepsi . Petitioner was qu alified to perform the job of delivery

driver attendant. The evidence established that Petitioner's

job performance had been generally satisfactory prior to

February 3, 2012 .

45 . As to the question of disparate treatment, the

applicable standard was se t forth in Maniccia v. Brown , 171 F.3d

1364, 1368 - 1369 (11th Cir. 1999):

" In determining whether employees are

similarly situated for purposes of

establishing a prima facie case, it is

necessary to consider whether the employees

are involved in or accused of the same

or similar conduct and are disciplined in

different ways." Jones v. Bessemer Carraway

Med. Ctr ., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th

Cir.), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321

(1998) ( quoting Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d

1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). "The most

important factors in the disciplinary

context are the nature of the offenses

committed and the nature of the punishments

imposed." Id . (internal quotations and

citations omitted). We require that the

quantity and quality of the comparator's

miscond uct be nearly identical to prevent

courts from second - guessing employers'

reasonable decisions and confusing apples

with oranges. See Dartmouth Review

v. Dartmouth College , 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st

Cir.1989) ("Exact correlation is neither

likely nor necessary , but the cases must be

fair congeners. In other words, apples

should be compared to apples.").

(Emphasis added.) [ 7 / ]

46 . Petitioner offered no direct evidence of disparate

treatment. He asserted that he was fired so that his route

could be given to a white driver, but offered no evidence beyond

his bare assertion. He made assertions that some white

employees were allowed to leave work early to attend college

classes while the company purposely prevented him from going to

classes. However , Petitione r offered no specifics regarding the

identities of these white employees or any other evidence to

support his claim . As to the circumstances of Petitioner's

firing, Pepsi demonstrated that it had fired two other

employees, one a black male and one a white male, for the same

offense committed by Petitioner.

4 7 . Having failed to establish this element, Petitioner

has not established a prima facie case of employment

discrimination.

4 8 . Even if Petitioner had met the burden, Pepsi presented

evidence of legi timate, non - discriminatory reasons for

Petitioner's termination. Pe psi Bottling Group's General Rules

of Conduct stated that "misrepresentation of facts or

falsification of Company records or other documents" was

punishable by immediate termination. Peti tioner admitted that

he violated that rule with the express intent to falsify his

hours so as not to run afoul of DOT's 60 - hour rule.

4 9 . The question of Petitioner's race , color or national

origin was never an issue unti l he made his allegations of

dis crimination after the fact.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

issue a final order finding that Pepsi co , Inc. did not commit

any unlawful emplo yment practices and dismissing the Petition

for Relief filed in th is case .

DONE AND ENT ERED this 2nd day of April , 201 3 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of A dministrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of A pril, 2013 .

ENDNOTES

1 / Citations shall be to Florida Statutes (20 12 ) unless

otherwise specified. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, has been

unchanged since 1992.

2 / The Notice of Hearing dated October 18, 20 12 , contained the

following language:

Notwithstanding the requirements of section

120.57(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and Florida

Administrative Code Rule 28 - 106.214, the

Florida Commission on Human Relations has

ceased providing a court reporter to

preserve the testimony at a final hearing.

Although the Judge will use a tape recorder

at the hearing to assist the Judge in

preparation of the recommended order

following the hearing, that recording is not

expected to suffice for preparation of the

transcript req uired for filing exceptions to

the recommended order or for any subsequent

appeal. If any party to this proceeding

intends to provide a certified court

reporter to record the final hearing at that

party's own expense so that there can be an

official trans cript, that party shall advise

all other parties and the Judge no later

than 48 hours prior to the final hearing.

Neither party provided a "certified court reporter to record the

final hearing."

3 / Petitioner did not specify his national origin.

4 / Ri ch Herrmann and Christopher Quindoza were the delivery

supervisors for the Jacksonville Pepsi facility. They would

alternate shifts: one week, Mr . Herrmann would work the early

shift, and the next week Mr. Quindoza would work the early

shift. On February 3, 2012, Mr. Quindoza was on the evening

shift. An inbox on Mr. Herrmann's office door was the drop - off

point for employees' time sheets on Fridays, regardless of which

supervisor was on duty.

5 / Both Mr. Quindoza and Mr. Lowens testified as to this

ex plicit admission. Petitioner made a general assertion that

the testimony of both men contained lies, but he did not

expressly deny having admitted his reason for falsifying the

time sheet.

6 / One might question whether Petitioner's act merited

dismissal , given that he was an eight - year employee with only

one real blemish on his record. However, termination was well

within Pepsi's discretion under its General Rules of Conduct .

The purpose of this proceeding is to determine wither Pepsi

discriminated aga inst Petitioner, not to second guess Pepsi's

legitimate reasons for dismissing him .

7 / The Eleventh Circuit has questioned the "nearly identical"

standard enunciated in Maniccia , but has recently reaffirmed its

adherence to it. Escarra v. Regions Bank , 353 Fed. Appx. 401,

404 (11th Cir. 2009); Burke - Fowler , 447 F. 3d at 1323 n.2.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Jeffrey Mathis, Esquire

Pepsi Cola Bottling

7701 Legacy Drive, 3A - 360

Plano, Texas 75024

Dena H. Sokolow, Esquire

Allen, Norton and Blue, P.A.

906 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Jason Eric Vail, Esquire

Allen, Norton and Blue, P.A.

Suite 100

906 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Anayo Jerry Udenwoke

6728 Powers Avenue

Apt. E

Jacksonville, Florida 32217

Cheyanne Costilla, Interim Gen eral Co unsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Suite 100

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Suite 100

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

M ichelle Wilson, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Suite 100

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the da te of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.