13-001911
Kelli Lawhead vs.
Adams And Reese, Formerly, D/B/A Igler And Dougherty Law Offices, P.A.
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, July 21, 2014.
Recommended Order on Monday, July 21, 2014.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8KELL I LAWHEAD ,
11Petitioner ,
12vs. Case No. 13 - 1911
18ADAMS AND REESE, FORMERLY d/b/a
23IGLER & DOUGHERTY LAW OFFICES,
28P.A. ,
29Respondent .
31/
32REVISED RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL
37A Motion hearing was conducted in this matter on
46January 10, 2014 , in Tallahassee , Florida, before Suzanne Van
55Wyk , a designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of
65Administrative Hearings.
67APPEARANCES
68For Petitioner: Lauren F. Strickland , Esquire
74Marie A. Mattox, P.A.
78310 East Bradford Road
82Tallahassee , Florida 32 303
86For Respondent: Leslie A. Lanusse , Esquire
92Adams and Reese, LLP
96701 Poydras Street
994500 One Shell Square
103New Orleans, Louisiana 70139
107STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
111Whether Respondent was PetitionerÓs employer at the time of
120PetitionerÓs alleged unlawful termination , or is otherwise
127liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination under any
136theory of successor liability .
141PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
143On January 18, 2013 , Petitioner filed a Charge of
152Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations
160(FCHR), alleging that Respondent discriminated against h er b ased
170on her disability . The basis for the charge was PetitionerÓs
181dismissal from employment following an extended hospital stay
189for migraine headaches.
192An investigation of the charge was made by FCH R. On
203April 12, 2013 , FCHR issued its Notice of Determination : No
214Cause and Determination: No Cause , wh ich conclud ed that there
225was no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory
234employment practice had occurred.
238Petitioner disagreed with FCHRÓs determination and timely
245filed a Petition for Relief (Petition) on May 17, 2013 . The
257petition was forwarde d to the Division of Administrative
266Hearings for a formal hearing.
271The final hearing was scheduled for August 28, 2013 , but
281was canceled and placed in abeyance upon PetitionerÓs Unopposed
290Motion for Continuance and representation that the parties were
299discussing settlement and that Petitioner would be seeking to
308amend her Petition . The undersigned requested a status report
318on or before September 25, 2013. No status report was filed.
329On October 1, 2013, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition
338naming Ð Igle r & Dougherty Law Offices, P.A.Ñ (Igler &
349Dougherty) , as an additional Respondent. The undersigned sua
357sponte entered an Order to Show Cause why Igler & Dougherty
368should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
378entity was not named in Petitio nerÓs original charge of
388discrimination. Both parties timely filed a Response thereto,
396and Petitioner requested an evi dentiary hearing on the matter.
406In addition to its Response to the Order to Show Cause,
417Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the
426undersigned to dismiss Adams and Reese because it was not
436PetitionerÓs employer at the time the alleged act of
445discrimination occurred and did not assume any liabilities of
454her employer. The undersigned denied RespondentÓs Motion for
462Summary Judgment and requested available dates from the parties
471for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of w hether Adams and
483Reese was PetitionerÓs employer at the time of her dismissal, or
494otherwise responsible for the alleged discriminatory act.
501A hearing was scheduled for December 4, 2013, but
510rescheduled to January 10, 2014, on PetitionerÓs Unopposed
518Motion for Continuance. The hearing commenced as schedule d.
527At the hearing, the parties offered the testimony of
536Petitioner and Charles P. Adams, Adams and ReeceÓs Managing
545Partner. PetitionerÓs Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted into
554evidence. RespondentÓs Exhibits 1, 3 - 6, and 8 - 10 were admitted.
567At the close of the hearing, the undersigned ruled in the
578negative on the issue of whether Adams and Reese was
588PetitionerÓs employer at the time of her dismissal, or was
598otherwise responsible for the alleged discriminatory employment
605practice. That ruling is memorialized herein. The
612undersignedÓs ruling on the jurisdictional issue is made in an
622Order Striking PetitionerÓs Amended Petition for Relief entered
630on March 20, 2014 .
635The undersigned entered a Recommended Order of Dismissal in
644this case on March 2 0, 2014. On June 11, 2014, the Commission
657entered an Agency Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an
667Unlawful Employment Practice, explaining that the undersigned
674failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to
685support her ruling that Respond ent Ðwas not otherwise liable for
696the alleged discriminatory practice.Ñ The undersigned accepted
703remand by Order dated June 13, 2014, and instructed the parties
714to file proposed recommended orders solely on the issue of
724successor liability within 20 days of the date of the Order.
735Respondent timely filed a Proposed Recommended Order, which
743was considered in the preparation of this Order. Petitioner did
753not file a proposed recommended order.
759FINDINGS OF FACT
7621 . Petitioner was employed as a Legal Assistant by Igler &
774Dougherty Law Offices, P.A. (Igler & Dougherty) , in Tallahassee,
783Florida, for approximately three - and - a - half years.
7942 . Petitioner was terminated by Igler & Dougherty by
804l etter dated February 6, 2012, allegedly for failure to make
815Ðadequate progression to date.Ñ
8193 . Petitioner alleges that she was unlawfully terminated
828after treatment for migraine h eadaches during an extended
837hospital stay.
8394 . Respondent , Adams and Reese, LL P , is a limited
850liability law partnershi p headqua rtered in Louisiana, with
859offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Alabama,
866Florida , and Washington, D.C.
8705 . Charles P. Adams , Jr., is RespondentÓs M anaging
880P artner .
8836 . In mid - summer 2012, Respondent approached George Igler,
894Par t n er in Igler & Dougherty, about the possibility of joining
907Adams and Reese to establish the firmÓs Tallahassee office.
9167 . Mr. Adams was primarily responsible for all discussions
926with Mr. Igler and other members of Igler & Dougherty who
937eventually joined Respondent .
9418 . On October 1, 2012, Respondent announced the official
951open ing of its Tallahassee office . The new office was located
963at 2457 Care Drive, the building that formerly housed Igler &
974Dougherty.
9759 . At no time before October 1, 2012, did Respondent
986maintain a n office or employ individuals in Tallahassee,
995Florida.
99610 . Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty joined Respondent as
1006partner s . Other former Igler & Dougherty lawyers joined
1016Respondent as partners and associates .
10221 1 . Respondent also hired some of the support staff from
1034Igler & Dougherty. Respondent did not hire Petitioner.
10421 2 . Respondent did not merge with Igler & Dougherty, did
1054not acquire the assets of Igler & Dougherty, and did not assume
1066the liabilities of Igler & Dougherty.
10721 3 . Igler & Dougherty retained its accounts receivable and
1083work in progress, and Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty continued to
1094wrap up the business of Igler & Dougherty after joining Adams
1105and Reese.
110714 . Respondent is managed by its Managing Par tner and an
1119Executive Committee comprised of six partners. None of the
1128attorneys or employees of Igler & Dougherty hired by Respondent
1138are Executive Committee members.
114215 . Respondent has two classes of partners, capital
1151partners and income p artners . Only capital p artners have an
1163ownership interest in the firm.
116816 . Only one of the seven attorneys hired by Respondent
1179from Igler & Dougherty, Mr. Igler, is a capital partner. On
1190October 12, 2012, the date Respondent opened its Tallahassee
1199office, Respon dent had 114 additional capital partners, none of
1209whom had worked for Igler & Dougherty.
121617 . At no time did Respondent employ Petitioner.
1225Respondent did not participate in PetitionerÓs termination nor
1233did it have any role in the decision to terminate her .
124518 . At the time Petitioner filed her Charge of
1255Discrimination with the Commission, the Florida Secretary of
1263State website showed that Igler & Dougherty, P.A., was an active
1274Florida registered corporation.
1277CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
128019 . The Division of Adminis trative Hearings has
1289jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this
1300proceeding . § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat . (201 3) .
131020 . Section 760.10 , Florida Statutes (2012) , provides, in
1319pertinent part:
1321(1) It is an unlawful employment practice
1328for an employer:
1331(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to
1340hire any individual, or otherwise to
1346discriminate against any individual with
1351respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
1356or privileges of employment, because of such
1363individual's race, color, religion, s ex,
1369national origin, age, handicap, or marital
1375status.
137621 . Petitioner maintains that Adams and Reese,
1384particularly Mr. Dougherty, discriminated against her on account
1392of her disability.
139522 . The term ÐemployerÑ is defined in section 760.02(7) as
1406Ðany person employing 15 or more employees for each working day
1417in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
1430calendar year, and any agent of such person.Ñ Though not
1440explicit in t he statute, the ÐemployerÑ must have an employee -
1452employer relationship with the person alleging discrimination in
1460order to be liable for an unlawful employment practice under
1470section 760.10(1).
147223 . The facts do not support a conclusion that Adams and
1484Rees e was PetitionerÓs employer at the time Petitioner was
1494terminated, or that Adams and Reese was responsible for her
1504termination . Petitioner was neither employed nor terminated by
1513Adams and Reese.
151624 . Nor can Adams and Reese be liab le to Petitioner for
1529alleged unlawful termination of Petitioner under any theory of
1538successor liability . Traditional corporate law holds that the
1547liabilities of a predecessor corporation may not be imposed on
1557the successor corporation unless :
1562The successor expressly or impli edly assumes
1569obligations of the predecessor; (2) t he
1576transaction is a de facto merger; (3) The
1584successor is a mere continuation of the
1591predecessor; or (4) The tr ansaction is a
1599fraudulent effort to avoid the liabilities
1605of the predecessor.
1608Bernard v. Kee M f g. Co. , 409 So. 2d 1047 , 1049 (Fla. 1982);
1622Anders for Anders v. Jacksonville Elec . Auth . , 443 So. 2d 330
1635(Fla. 1 st DCA 1983) .
164125 . Applying this rule in the instant case, the
1651undersigned finds no facts on which liability could be imposed
1661on Respondent for PetitionerÓs alleged unlawful termination.
166826 . It is undisputed that Respondent did not aquire the
1679accounts receivable or work in progress from Igler & Dougherty.
1689There was no merger of the two companies. There is no evidence
1701that Respondent otherwise assumed the assets or liabilities of
1710Igler & Dougherty. Thus, Respondent is not liable to Petitioner
1720under the first theory of suc cessor liability.
172827 . A de facto merger occurs when one corporation is
1739absorbed by another without formal compliance with statutory
1747requirements for a merger. See Lab. Corp. of America v. ProfÓl
1758Recovery Network , 813 So. 2d 266 , 270 (Fla. 5th DCA
17682002) (citations omitted)(de facto merger occurred where the
1776corporations were governed by a sole officer and shareholder,
1785shared the same attorney and registered agent, conducted the
1794same business, ha d substantially the same employees and
1803customers, the same te lephone and fax numbers, and the same
1814accounting system and computerized databases).
1819To determine if a de facto merger has
1827occurred, the finder of fact may look at any
1836factors reasonably indicative of commonality
1841or distinctiveness. ÒThe bottom - line
1847ques tion is whether each entity has run its
1856own race, or whether there has been a relay -
1866style passing of the baton from one to the
1875otherÓ. Id. (citations omitted).
187928 . Ð To find a de facto merger there must be a continuity
1893of the selling corporation evidence d by the same management,
1903personnel, assets and physical location; a continuity of the
1912stockholders, accomplished by paying for the acquired
1919corporation with shares of stock; a dissolution of the selling
1929corporation; and assumption of the liabilities. Ñ Mu nim v. Azar ,
1940648 So. 2d 145, 153 - 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) .
195229 . In Serchay v. NTS Ft . Lauderdale Office Joint Venture ,
1964707 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1998), the court refused to
1978impose successor liability on an entity solely because the
1987successor entity used some of the predecessorÓs equipment and
1996office space and took on former employees of the predecessor.
2006The court also noted that the dissoluti on of the predecessor,
2017the timing of which is a key element in assessing whether a de
2030facto merger occurred, was involuntary. Id .
203730 . In the case at hand, there was no de facto merger of
2051Igler & Dougherty with Respondent. Management of Respondent
2059does n ot include the same management team as that of Igler &
2072Dougherty. Respondent is managed by Charles Adams, Jr. and an
2082Executive Committee, none of whom are former Igler & Dougherty
2092managers. Respondent did not hire all the former employees of
2102Igler & Doug herty. Respondent had Ðrun its own raceÑ with over
2114590 attorney s and staff members prior to hiring attorneys and
2125staff from Igler & Dougherty.
213031 . Finally, there was no evidence that Igler & Dougherty
2141dissolved shortly after Respondent opened its Tallahassee
2148office. In fact, there was no evidence that Igler & Dougherty
2159ever dissolved.
216132 . The evidence did show that Respondent opened its
2171Tallahassee office in the same space formerly occupied by Igler
2181& Dougherty, for which Respondent entered into a lease separate
2191from Igler & Dougherty, and utilized some of the same office
2202equipment and phone lines. However, those facts alone are
2211insufficient for a determination that a de facto merger
2220occurr ed.
222233 . Respondent is not liable to Petitioner for alleged
2232unlawful termination on a de facto merger theory of successor
2242liability.
224334 . A continuation of business that results in liability
2253of the successor corporation is merely a continuation or
2262reincar nation of the predecessor corporation under a different
2271name. Muni m , 648 So. 2d at 154. The Ð purchasing corporation
2283must not merely be a Ò new hat Ó for the seller with the same or
2299similar entity or ownership. Ñ Id . While having common
2309attributes does not automatically impose liability on a
2317successor corporation, merely repainting the sign on the door
2326and using new letterhead certainly gives the appearance that the
2336new corporation is simply a continuation of the predecessor
2345corporation. Lab. Corp. , 813 So . 2d at 270. The key element of
2358a continuation is a common identity of the officers, directors,
2368and stockholders in the two corporations. See Serchay , 707
2377So. 2d at 960; Munim , 648 So. 2d at 154.
238735 . None of the attorneys Respondent hired from Igler &
2398Dougherty serve as either RespondentÓs managing partner or as
2407members of RespondentÓs Executive Committee. While Mr. Igler
2415was hired as cap it al partner, having an ownership interest in
2427the firm, he is one of approximately 140 capital partners . None
2439of t he other capital partners ever worked for Igler & Dougherty.
2451Thus, the Tallahassee office of Adams and Reese was not just a
2463mere continuation of the business of Igler & Dougherty , and
2473cannot be liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination
2482under t his theory of successor liability .
249036 . ÐFlorida has long recognized the principle that a
2500voluntary conveyance by one who is indebted is presumptively
2509fraudulent when attached by a judgment creditor upon a debt
2519existing at the time of the conveyance.Ñ Mun im , 648 So. 2d at
2532152.
253337 . Section 726.105, Florida Statutes (2013), prohibits
2541any transfer of business Ðwith actual intent to hinder, delay,
2551or defraudÑ any present or future creditor. When determining
2560whether there was actual intent, considerations may be given to
2570several factors, including the timing of the transfer.Ñ
2578§ 726.105(2), Fla. Stat . A suit or threatened suit before the
2590transfer is made or obligation incurred would be sugge stive of
2601actual intent. See Id ; Perrot v. Frankie , 605 So. 2d 118, 120
2613(Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(transfer of property to daughter by quitclaim
2623deed during pendency of personal injury litigation against
2631father held to be fraudulent transfer to protect the asset ) .
264338 . In the case at hand, no such fraudulent intent can be
2656inferred. Respondent opened its Tallahassee office and hired
2664Mr. Igler and other lawyers and employees of Igler & Dougherty
2675in October 2012. Petitioner did not file her Charge of
2685Discrimination until January 18, 2013. Petitioner presented no
2693evidence that Igler & Dougherty had knowledge of any possible
2703claim relative to PetitionerÓs previous employment which would
2711prompt a transfer of corporate liability. In fact, Petitioner
2720presented no evide nce that Igler & Dougherty was ever served
2731with her Complaint of Discrimination or had actual or
2740constructive knowledge of her Complaint.
274539 . Petitioner presented no evidence from which the
2754undersigned can infer act ual intent to defraud. Thus,
2763Respondent cannot be liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful
2772termination under this theory of successor liability.
277940 . Chapter 760, Part I, is analogous to Title VII of the
2792Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Cases
2804interpreting Title VII are, therefore, applicable in construing
2812and applying chapter 760. Brand v. Fla . Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d
2825504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also , Valenzuela v.
2835GlobeGround N . A m . , LLC , 18 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009); Fla.
2851State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla.
2864Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA
28771991).
287841 . Petitioner has the burden of proving by a
2888preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed an
2896unlawful employment practice. See St. Louis v. Fla. Int'l
2905Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2011); Fla. Dep't of Transp.
2918v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
292942 . The United States Supreme Court has established the
2939requirements for proving a prima facie case of discriminatio n,
2949which can vary depending on differing factual situations.
2957McDonnell - Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) ;
2969see also , Schwartz v. State of Fla . , 494 F. Supp. 574, 593
2982(N.D. Fla. 1980). In short, those requirements are:
2990[t]hat a Title VII plaintiff carries the
2997initial burden of showing actions taken by
3004the employer from which one can infer, if
3012such actions remain unexplained, that it is
3019more likely than not that such actions were
3027Ð based on a discriminatory criterion illeg al
3035under the Act. Ñ
3039Furn co Const r . Corp. v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1977)( citing
3053Teamsters v. U . S . , 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) ) .
306643 . If a Petitioner proves a prima facie case of
3077discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer Ðto articulate
3086some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasonÑ for the adverse
3093employment action. McDonnell - Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.
3103at 802.
310544 . Once the employer succeeds i n carrying its burden of
3117produc ing a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action,
3126the employee must show that the employerÓs reason is pretextual.
3136The final and ultimate burden of persuading the trier - of - fact,
3149by a preponderance of the evidence, remains at all times with
3160the emp loyee. St. MaryÓs Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502,
3172507 - 508 (1993); Tex. DepÓt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S.
3185248, 257 (1981).
318845 . In this case, Petitioner failed to prove that
3198Respondent was her employer, thus failing in her initial prima
3208facie c ase of discrimination. Respondent did not discharge
3217Petitioner, or otherwise discriminate against Petitioner with
3224respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
3232employment, because the evidence is uncontroverted that
3239Respondent was not in an employee - employer relationship with
3249Petitioner.
325046 . Likewise, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent
3259was liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination based
3268on an y theory of successor liability.
327547 . Petitioner simply filed her complaint agai nst the
3285wrong entity. While Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty were members of
3296RespondentÓs law firm at the time Petitioner filed her
3305complain t, Igler & Dougherty remained an independent, legal
3314corporate entity capable of being sued in its own name.
332448 . The hearing in this case was limited to a
3335determination of the employer - employee relationship between
3343Petitioner and Respondent as well as RespondentÓs liability
3351under any theory of successor liability . Based upon the limited
3362scope of the proceeding, the issu e of whether Petitioner was
3373discriminated against or was the subject of an unlawful
3382employment practice by Respondent was not reached. Thus, this
3391order should not be construed as having any stare decisis effect
3402in any subsequent proceeding involving Petit ionerÓs actual
3410employer.
3411RECOMMENDATION
3412Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
3422Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human
3432Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief
3442filed by Kelli Lawhead in FCHR No. 201 3 - 00581 .
3454DONE AND ENT ERED this 21st day of July , 2014 , in
3465Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
3469S
3470Suzanne Van Wyk
3473Administrative Law Judge
3476Division of Administrative Hearings
3480The DeSoto Building
34831230 Apalachee Parkway
3486Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
3491(850) 488 - 9675
3495Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
3501www.doah.state.fl.us
3502Filed with the Clerk of the
3508Division of Administrative Hearings
3512this 21st day of July , 2014 .
3519COPIES FURNISHED :
3522Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk
3527Florida Commission on Human Relations
35322009 Apalachee Parkway , Suite 100
3537Tallahassee, Florida 32301
3540Lauren F. Strickland, Esquire
3544Marie A. Mattox, P.A.
3548310 East Bradford Road
3552Tallahassee, Florida 32303
3555Leslie A. Lanusse, Esquire
3559Adams and Reese, LLP
3563701 Poydras Street , Suite 4500
3568New Orleans , Louisiana 70139
3572Lauren L. Tafaro, Esquire
3576Adams and Reese, LLP
3580701 Poydras Street
35834500 One Shell Square
3587New Orleans, Louisiana 70139
3591Cheyanne Costilla, General Co unsel
3596Florida Commission of Human Relations
36012009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
3606Tallahasse e, Florida 32301
3610NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
3616All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
362615 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
3637to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that
3648will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 10/10/2014
- Proceedings: Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/21/2014
- Proceedings: Order Denying Petitioner`s Motion for Leave to Accept Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/21/2014
- Proceedings: Revised Recommended Order of Dismissal cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/21/2014
- Proceedings: Revised Recommended Order of Dismissal (hearing held January 10, 2014). CASE CLOSED.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/21/2014
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Verified Motion for Leave to Accept Proposed Recommended Order as Timely Filed filed.
- Date: 07/01/2014
- Proceedings: Record transferred to the Administrative Law Judge (Transcript and Exhibits not available for viewing)
- PDF:
- Date: 06/11/2014
- Proceedings: (Agency) Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practicefiled.
- PDF:
- Date: 03/20/2014
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/18/2014
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend and Accept Amended Proposed Recommended Order as Timely Filed filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 02/17/2014
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File a Proposed Recommended Order filed.
- Date: 02/04/2014
- Proceedings: Transcript (not available for viewing) filed.
- Date: 01/10/2014
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Motion Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/27/2013
- Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Leave to Have Witness Appear via Skype for Hearing filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 12/02/2013
- Proceedings: Order Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for January 10, 2014; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 11/25/2013
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Unopposed Motion for Continuance and Notice of Availability for Evidentiary Hearing filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 11/15/2013
- Proceedings: Respondent's Request for Representation by Qualified Representatives filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 11/01/2013
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 4, 2013; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/28/2013
- Proceedings: Petitioner's First Request for Production of Documents to Respondent filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/28/2013
- Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Appearance by Qualified Representative filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/15/2013
- Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (with exhibits) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 10/15/2013
- Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (with exhibits) filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/20/2013
- Proceedings: Order Canceling Hearing (parties to advise status by September 25, 2013).
Case Information
- Judge:
- SUZANNE VAN WYK
- Date Filed:
- 05/21/2013
- Date Assignment:
- 05/21/2013
- Last Docket Entry:
- 10/10/2014
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
Counsels
-
Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk
Address of Record -
Leslie A. Lanusse, Esquire
Address of Record -
Marie Mattox, Esquire
Address of Record -
Lauren F. Strickland, Esquire
Address of Record -
Lauren L. Tafaro, Esquire
Address of Record -
Marie A. Mattox, Esquire
Address of Record