13-001911 Kelli Lawhead vs. Adams And Reese, Formerly, D/B/A Igler And Dougherty Law Offices, P.A.
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, July 21, 2014.


View Dockets  
Summary: Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was Petitioner's employer on the date of the alleged unlawful termination, or that Respondent was liable to Petitioner under any theory of successor liability.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8KELL I LAWHEAD ,

11Petitioner ,

12vs. Case No. 13 - 1911

18ADAMS AND REESE, FORMERLY d/b/a

23IGLER & DOUGHERTY LAW OFFICES,

28P.A. ,

29Respondent .

31/

32REVISED RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL

37A Motion hearing was conducted in this matter on

46January 10, 2014 , in Tallahassee , Florida, before Suzanne Van

55Wyk , a designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

65Administrative Hearings.

67APPEARANCES

68For Petitioner: Lauren F. Strickland , Esquire

74Marie A. Mattox, P.A.

78310 East Bradford Road

82Tallahassee , Florida 32 303

86For Respondent: Leslie A. Lanusse , Esquire

92Adams and Reese, LLP

96701 Poydras Street

994500 One Shell Square

103New Orleans, Louisiana 70139

107STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

111Whether Respondent was PetitionerÓs employer at the time of

120PetitionerÓs alleged unlawful termination , or is otherwise

127liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination under any

136theory of successor liability .

141PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

143On January 18, 2013 , Petitioner filed a Charge of

152Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

160(FCHR), alleging that Respondent discriminated against h er b ased

170on her disability . The basis for the charge was PetitionerÓs

181dismissal from employment following an extended hospital stay

189for migraine headaches.

192An investigation of the charge was made by FCH R. On

203April 12, 2013 , FCHR issued its Notice of Determination : No

214Cause and Determination: No Cause , wh ich conclud ed that there

225was no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory

234employment practice had occurred.

238Petitioner disagreed with FCHRÓs determination and timely

245filed a Petition for Relief (Petition) on May 17, 2013 . The

257petition was forwarde d to the Division of Administrative

266Hearings for a formal hearing.

271The final hearing was scheduled for August 28, 2013 , but

281was canceled and placed in abeyance upon PetitionerÓs Unopposed

290Motion for Continuance and representation that the parties were

299discussing settlement and that Petitioner would be seeking to

308amend her Petition . The undersigned requested a status report

318on or before September 25, 2013. No status report was filed.

329On October 1, 2013, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition

338naming Ð Igle r & Dougherty Law Offices, P.A.Ñ (Igler &

349Dougherty) , as an additional Respondent. The undersigned sua

357sponte entered an Order to Show Cause why Igler & Dougherty

368should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the

378entity was not named in Petitio nerÓs original charge of

388discrimination. Both parties timely filed a Response thereto,

396and Petitioner requested an evi dentiary hearing on the matter.

406In addition to its Response to the Order to Show Cause,

417Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the

426undersigned to dismiss Adams and Reese because it was not

436PetitionerÓs employer at the time the alleged act of

445discrimination occurred and did not assume any liabilities of

454her employer. The undersigned denied RespondentÓs Motion for

462Summary Judgment and requested available dates from the parties

471for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of w hether Adams and

483Reese was PetitionerÓs employer at the time of her dismissal, or

494otherwise responsible for the alleged discriminatory act.

501A hearing was scheduled for December 4, 2013, but

510rescheduled to January 10, 2014, on PetitionerÓs Unopposed

518Motion for Continuance. The hearing commenced as schedule d.

527At the hearing, the parties offered the testimony of

536Petitioner and Charles P. Adams, Adams and ReeceÓs Managing

545Partner. PetitionerÓs Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted into

554evidence. RespondentÓs Exhibits 1, 3 - 6, and 8 - 10 were admitted.

567At the close of the hearing, the undersigned ruled in the

578negative on the issue of whether Adams and Reese was

588PetitionerÓs employer at the time of her dismissal, or was

598otherwise responsible for the alleged discriminatory employment

605practice. That ruling is memorialized herein. The

612undersignedÓs ruling on the jurisdictional issue is made in an

622Order Striking PetitionerÓs Amended Petition for Relief entered

630on March 20, 2014 .

635The undersigned entered a Recommended Order of Dismissal in

644this case on March 2 0, 2014. On June 11, 2014, the Commission

657entered an Agency Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an

667Unlawful Employment Practice, explaining that the undersigned

674failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to

685support her ruling that Respond ent Ðwas not otherwise liable for

696the alleged discriminatory practice.Ñ The undersigned accepted

703remand by Order dated June 13, 2014, and instructed the parties

714to file proposed recommended orders solely on the issue of

724successor liability within 20 days of the date of the Order.

735Respondent timely filed a Proposed Recommended Order, which

743was considered in the preparation of this Order. Petitioner did

753not file a proposed recommended order.

759FINDINGS OF FACT

7621 . Petitioner was employed as a Legal Assistant by Igler &

774Dougherty Law Offices, P.A. (Igler & Dougherty) , in Tallahassee,

783Florida, for approximately three - and - a - half years.

7942 . Petitioner was terminated by Igler & Dougherty by

804l etter dated February 6, 2012, allegedly for failure to make

815Ðadequate progression to date.Ñ

8193 . Petitioner alleges that she was unlawfully terminated

828after treatment for migraine h eadaches during an extended

837hospital stay.

8394 . Respondent , Adams and Reese, LL P , is a limited

850liability law partnershi p headqua rtered in Louisiana, with

859offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Alabama,

866Florida , and Washington, D.C.

8705 . Charles P. Adams , Jr., is RespondentÓs M anaging

880P artner .

8836 . In mid - summer 2012, Respondent approached George Igler,

894Par t n er in Igler & Dougherty, about the possibility of joining

907Adams and Reese to establish the firmÓs Tallahassee office.

9167 . Mr. Adams was primarily responsible for all discussions

926with Mr. Igler and other members of Igler & Dougherty who

937eventually joined Respondent .

9418 . On October 1, 2012, Respondent announced the official

951open ing of its Tallahassee office . The new office was located

963at 2457 Care Drive, the building that formerly housed Igler &

974Dougherty.

9759 . At no time before October 1, 2012, did Respondent

986maintain a n office or employ individuals in Tallahassee,

995Florida.

99610 . Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty joined Respondent as

1006partner s . Other former Igler & Dougherty lawyers joined

1016Respondent as partners and associates .

10221 1 . Respondent also hired some of the support staff from

1034Igler & Dougherty. Respondent did not hire Petitioner.

10421 2 . Respondent did not merge with Igler & Dougherty, did

1054not acquire the assets of Igler & Dougherty, and did not assume

1066the liabilities of Igler & Dougherty.

10721 3 . Igler & Dougherty retained its accounts receivable and

1083work in progress, and Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty continued to

1094wrap up the business of Igler & Dougherty after joining Adams

1105and Reese.

110714 . Respondent is managed by its Managing Par tner and an

1119Executive Committee comprised of six partners. None of the

1128attorneys or employees of Igler & Dougherty hired by Respondent

1138are Executive Committee members.

114215 . Respondent has two classes of partners, capital

1151partners and income p artners . Only capital p artners have an

1163ownership interest in the firm.

116816 . Only one of the seven attorneys hired by Respondent

1179from Igler & Dougherty, Mr. Igler, is a capital partner. On

1190October 12, 2012, the date Respondent opened its Tallahassee

1199office, Respon dent had 114 additional capital partners, none of

1209whom had worked for Igler & Dougherty.

121617 . At no time did Respondent employ Petitioner.

1225Respondent did not participate in PetitionerÓs termination nor

1233did it have any role in the decision to terminate her .

124518 . At the time Petitioner filed her Charge of

1255Discrimination with the Commission, the Florida Secretary of

1263State website showed that Igler & Dougherty, P.A., was an active

1274Florida registered corporation.

1277CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

128019 . The Division of Adminis trative Hearings has

1289jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

1300proceeding . § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat . (201 3) .

131020 . Section 760.10 , Florida Statutes (2012) , provides, in

1319pertinent part:

1321(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

1328for an employer:

1331(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

1340hire any individual, or otherwise to

1346discriminate against any individual with

1351respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

1356or privileges of employment, because of such

1363individual's race, color, religion, s ex,

1369national origin, age, handicap, or marital

1375status.

137621 . Petitioner maintains that Adams and Reese,

1384particularly Mr. Dougherty, discriminated against her on account

1392of her disability.

139522 . The term ÐemployerÑ is defined in section 760.02(7) as

1406Ðany person employing 15 or more employees for each working day

1417in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding

1430calendar year, and any agent of such person.Ñ Though not

1440explicit in t he statute, the ÐemployerÑ must have an employee -

1452employer relationship with the person alleging discrimination in

1460order to be liable for an unlawful employment practice under

1470section 760.10(1).

147223 . The facts do not support a conclusion that Adams and

1484Rees e was PetitionerÓs employer at the time Petitioner was

1494terminated, or that Adams and Reese was responsible for her

1504termination . Petitioner was neither employed nor terminated by

1513Adams and Reese.

151624 . Nor can Adams and Reese be liab le to Petitioner for

1529alleged unlawful termination of Petitioner under any theory of

1538successor liability . Traditional corporate law holds that the

1547liabilities of a predecessor corporation may not be imposed on

1557the successor corporation unless :

1562The successor expressly or impli edly assumes

1569obligations of the predecessor; (2) t he

1576transaction is a de facto merger; (3) The

1584successor is a mere continuation of the

1591predecessor; or (4) The tr ansaction is a

1599fraudulent effort to avoid the liabilities

1605of the predecessor.

1608Bernard v. Kee M f g. Co. , 409 So. 2d 1047 , 1049 (Fla. 1982);

1622Anders for Anders v. Jacksonville Elec . Auth . , 443 So. 2d 330

1635(Fla. 1 st DCA 1983) .

164125 . Applying this rule in the instant case, the

1651undersigned finds no facts on which liability could be imposed

1661on Respondent for PetitionerÓs alleged unlawful termination.

166826 . It is undisputed that Respondent did not aquire the

1679accounts receivable or work in progress from Igler & Dougherty.

1689There was no merger of the two companies. There is no evidence

1701that Respondent otherwise assumed the assets or liabilities of

1710Igler & Dougherty. Thus, Respondent is not liable to Petitioner

1720under the first theory of suc cessor liability.

172827 . A de facto merger occurs when one corporation is

1739absorbed by another without formal compliance with statutory

1747requirements for a merger. See Lab. Corp. of America v. ProfÓl

1758Recovery Network , 813 So. 2d 266 , 270 (Fla. 5th DCA

17682002) (citations omitted)(de facto merger occurred where the

1776corporations were governed by a sole officer and shareholder,

1785shared the same attorney and registered agent, conducted the

1794same business, ha d substantially the same employees and

1803customers, the same te lephone and fax numbers, and the same

1814accounting system and computerized databases).

1819To determine if a de facto merger has

1827occurred, the finder of fact may look at any

1836factors reasonably indicative of commonality

1841or distinctiveness. ÒThe bottom - line

1847ques tion is whether each entity has run its

1856own race, or whether there has been a relay -

1866style passing of the baton from one to the

1875otherÓ. Id. (citations omitted).

187928 . Ð To find a de facto merger there must be a continuity

1893of the selling corporation evidence d by the same management,

1903personnel, assets and physical location; a continuity of the

1912stockholders, accomplished by paying for the acquired

1919corporation with shares of stock; a dissolution of the selling

1929corporation; and assumption of the liabilities. Ñ Mu nim v. Azar ,

1940648 So. 2d 145, 153 - 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) .

195229 . In Serchay v. NTS Ft . Lauderdale Office Joint Venture ,

1964707 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1998), the court refused to

1978impose successor liability on an entity solely because the

1987successor entity used some of the predecessorÓs equipment and

1996office space and took on former employees of the predecessor.

2006The court also noted that the dissoluti on of the predecessor,

2017the timing of which is a key element in assessing whether a de

2030facto merger occurred, was involuntary. Id .

203730 . In the case at hand, there was no de facto merger of

2051Igler & Dougherty with Respondent. Management of Respondent

2059does n ot include the same management team as that of Igler &

2072Dougherty. Respondent is managed by Charles Adams, Jr. and an

2082Executive Committee, none of whom are former Igler & Dougherty

2092managers. Respondent did not hire all the former employees of

2102Igler & Doug herty. Respondent had Ðrun its own raceÑ with over

2114590 attorney s and staff members prior to hiring attorneys and

2125staff from Igler & Dougherty.

213031 . Finally, there was no evidence that Igler & Dougherty

2141dissolved shortly after Respondent opened its Tallahassee

2148office. In fact, there was no evidence that Igler & Dougherty

2159ever dissolved.

216132 . The evidence did show that Respondent opened its

2171Tallahassee office in the same space formerly occupied by Igler

2181& Dougherty, for which Respondent entered into a lease separate

2191from Igler & Dougherty, and utilized some of the same office

2202equipment and phone lines. However, those facts alone are

2211insufficient for a determination that a de facto merger

2220occurr ed.

222233 . Respondent is not liable to Petitioner for alleged

2232unlawful termination on a de facto merger theory of successor

2242liability.

224334 . A continuation of business that results in liability

2253of the successor corporation is merely a continuation or

2262reincar nation of the predecessor corporation under a different

2271name. Muni m , 648 So. 2d at 154. The Ð purchasing corporation

2283must not merely be a Ò new hat Ó for the seller with the same or

2299similar entity or ownership. Ñ Id . While having common

2309attributes does not automatically impose liability on a

2317successor corporation, merely repainting the sign on the door

2326and using new letterhead certainly gives the appearance that the

2336new corporation is simply a continuation of the predecessor

2345corporation. Lab. Corp. , 813 So . 2d at 270. The key element of

2358a continuation is a common identity of the officers, directors,

2368and stockholders in the two corporations. See Serchay , 707

2377So. 2d at 960; Munim , 648 So. 2d at 154.

238735 . None of the attorneys Respondent hired from Igler &

2398Dougherty serve as either RespondentÓs managing partner or as

2407members of RespondentÓs Executive Committee. While Mr. Igler

2415was hired as cap it al partner, having an ownership interest in

2427the firm, he is one of approximately 140 capital partners . None

2439of t he other capital partners ever worked for Igler & Dougherty.

2451Thus, the Tallahassee office of Adams and Reese was not just a

2463mere continuation of the business of Igler & Dougherty , and

2473cannot be liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination

2482under t his theory of successor liability .

249036 . ÐFlorida has long recognized the principle that a

2500voluntary conveyance by one who is indebted is presumptively

2509fraudulent when attached by a judgment creditor upon a debt

2519existing at the time of the conveyance.Ñ Mun im , 648 So. 2d at

2532152.

253337 . Section 726.105, Florida Statutes (2013), prohibits

2541any transfer of business Ðwith actual intent to hinder, delay,

2551or defraudÑ any present or future creditor. When determining

2560whether there was actual intent, considerations may be given to

2570several factors, including the timing of the transfer.Ñ

2578§ 726.105(2), Fla. Stat . A suit or threatened suit before the

2590transfer is made or obligation incurred would be sugge stive of

2601actual intent. See Id ; Perrot v. Frankie , 605 So. 2d 118, 120

2613(Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(transfer of property to daughter by quitclaim

2623deed during pendency of personal injury litigation against

2631father held to be fraudulent transfer to protect the asset ) .

264338 . In the case at hand, no such fraudulent intent can be

2656inferred. Respondent opened its Tallahassee office and hired

2664Mr. Igler and other lawyers and employees of Igler & Dougherty

2675in October 2012. Petitioner did not file her Charge of

2685Discrimination until January 18, 2013. Petitioner presented no

2693evidence that Igler & Dougherty had knowledge of any possible

2703claim relative to PetitionerÓs previous employment which would

2711prompt a transfer of corporate liability. In fact, Petitioner

2720presented no evide nce that Igler & Dougherty was ever served

2731with her Complaint of Discrimination or had actual or

2740constructive knowledge of her Complaint.

274539 . Petitioner presented no evidence from which the

2754undersigned can infer act ual intent to defraud. Thus,

2763Respondent cannot be liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful

2772termination under this theory of successor liability.

277940 . Chapter 760, Part I, is analogous to Title VII of the

2792Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Cases

2804interpreting Title VII are, therefore, applicable in construing

2812and applying chapter 760. Brand v. Fla . Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d

2825504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also , Valenzuela v.

2835GlobeGround N . A m . , LLC , 18 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009); Fla.

2851State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla.

2864Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA

28771991).

287841 . Petitioner has the burden of proving by a

2888preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed an

2896unlawful employment practice. See St. Louis v. Fla. Int'l

2905Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2011); Fla. Dep't of Transp.

2918v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

292942 . The United States Supreme Court has established the

2939requirements for proving a prima facie case of discriminatio n,

2949which can vary depending on differing factual situations.

2957McDonnell - Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) ;

2969see also , Schwartz v. State of Fla . , 494 F. Supp. 574, 593

2982(N.D. Fla. 1980). In short, those requirements are:

2990[t]hat a Title VII plaintiff carries the

2997initial burden of showing actions taken by

3004the employer from which one can infer, if

3012such actions remain unexplained, that it is

3019more likely than not that such actions were

3027Ð based on a discriminatory criterion illeg al

3035under the Act. Ñ

3039Furn co Const r . Corp. v. Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1977)( citing

3053Teamsters v. U . S . , 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) ) .

306643 . If a Petitioner proves a prima facie case of

3077discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer Ðto articulate

3086some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasonÑ for the adverse

3093employment action. McDonnell - Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.

3103at 802.

310544 . Once the employer succeeds i n carrying its burden of

3117produc ing a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action,

3126the employee must show that the employerÓs reason is pretextual.

3136The final and ultimate burden of persuading the trier - of - fact,

3149by a preponderance of the evidence, remains at all times with

3160the emp loyee. St. MaryÓs Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502,

3172507 - 508 (1993); Tex. DepÓt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S.

3185248, 257 (1981).

318845 . In this case, Petitioner failed to prove that

3198Respondent was her employer, thus failing in her initial prima

3208facie c ase of discrimination. Respondent did not discharge

3217Petitioner, or otherwise discriminate against Petitioner with

3224respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

3232employment, because the evidence is uncontroverted that

3239Respondent was not in an employee - employer relationship with

3249Petitioner.

325046 . Likewise, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent

3259was liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination based

3268on an y theory of successor liability.

327547 . Petitioner simply filed her complaint agai nst the

3285wrong entity. While Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty were members of

3296RespondentÓs law firm at the time Petitioner filed her

3305complain t, Igler & Dougherty remained an independent, legal

3314corporate entity capable of being sued in its own name.

332448 . The hearing in this case was limited to a

3335determination of the employer - employee relationship between

3343Petitioner and Respondent as well as RespondentÓs liability

3351under any theory of successor liability . Based upon the limited

3362scope of the proceeding, the issu e of whether Petitioner was

3373discriminated against or was the subject of an unlawful

3382employment practice by Respondent was not reached. Thus, this

3391order should not be construed as having any stare decisis effect

3402in any subsequent proceeding involving Petit ionerÓs actual

3410employer.

3411RECOMMENDATION

3412Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

3422Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

3432Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief

3442filed by Kelli Lawhead in FCHR No. 201 3 - 00581 .

3454DONE AND ENT ERED this 21st day of July , 2014 , in

3465Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

3469S

3470Suzanne Van Wyk

3473Administrative Law Judge

3476Division of Administrative Hearings

3480The DeSoto Building

34831230 Apalachee Parkway

3486Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

3491(850) 488 - 9675

3495Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

3501www.doah.state.fl.us

3502Filed with the Clerk of the

3508Division of Administrative Hearings

3512this 21st day of July , 2014 .

3519COPIES FURNISHED :

3522Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

3527Florida Commission on Human Relations

35322009 Apalachee Parkway , Suite 100

3537Tallahassee, Florida 32301

3540Lauren F. Strickland, Esquire

3544Marie A. Mattox, P.A.

3548310 East Bradford Road

3552Tallahassee, Florida 32303

3555Leslie A. Lanusse, Esquire

3559Adams and Reese, LLP

3563701 Poydras Street , Suite 4500

3568New Orleans , Louisiana 70139

3572Lauren L. Tafaro, Esquire

3576Adams and Reese, LLP

3580701 Poydras Street

35834500 One Shell Square

3587New Orleans, Louisiana 70139

3591Cheyanne Costilla, General Co unsel

3596Florida Commission of Human Relations

36012009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

3606Tallahasse e, Florida 32301

3610NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

3616All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

362615 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

3637to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

3648will issue the Final Order in this case.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 10/10/2014
Proceedings: Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/09/2014
Proceedings: Second Agency FO
PDF:
Date: 07/21/2014
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 07/21/2014
Proceedings: Order Denying Petitioner`s Motion for Leave to Accept Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order.
PDF:
Date: 07/21/2014
Proceedings: Revised Recommended Order of Dismissal cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 07/21/2014
Proceedings: Revised Recommended Order of Dismissal (hearing held January 10, 2014). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 07/21/2014
Proceedings: Petitioner's Verified Motion for Leave to Accept Proposed Recommended Order as Timely Filed filed.
Date: 07/01/2014
Proceedings: Record transferred to the Administrative Law Judge (Transcript and Exhibits not available for viewing)
PDF:
Date: 06/24/2014
Proceedings: Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2014
Proceedings: Order Accepting Remand.
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Date: 06/11/2014
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 06/11/2014
Proceedings: (Agency) Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practicefiled.
PDF:
Date: 03/20/2014
Proceedings: Recommended Order
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Date: 03/20/2014
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held January 10, 2014). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 03/20/2014
Proceedings: Order Striking Petitioner`s Amended Petition for Relief.
PDF:
Date: 03/20/2014
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
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Date: 02/20/2014
Proceedings: Order Granting Motion to Amend Proposed Recommended Order.
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Date: 02/18/2014
Proceedings: Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend and Accept Amended Proposed Recommended Order as Timely Filed filed.
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Date: 02/17/2014
Proceedings: Petitioner's Amended Proposed Recommended Order filed.
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Date: 02/17/2014
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time.
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Date: 02/17/2014
Proceedings: Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File a Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 02/06/2014
Proceedings: Order on Post-hearing Submissions.
Date: 02/04/2014
Proceedings: Transcript (not available for viewing) filed.
Date: 01/10/2014
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Motion Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 01/06/2014
Proceedings: Order Allowing Testimony via Skype.
PDF:
Date: 12/27/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Leave to Have Witness Appear via Skype for Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/02/2013
Proceedings: Court Reporter Notice filed.
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Date: 12/02/2013
Proceedings: Order Accepting Qualified Representative.
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Date: 12/02/2013
Proceedings: Order Accepting Qualified Representative.
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Date: 12/02/2013
Proceedings: Order Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for January 10, 2014; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 11/27/2013
Proceedings: Notice of Availability for Evidentiary Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/25/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Unopposed Motion for Continuance and Notice of Availability for Evidentiary Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/15/2013
Proceedings: (Proposed) Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/15/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Request for Representation by Qualified Representatives filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/14/2013
Proceedings: Order Denying Respondent`s Motion for Summary Judgment.
PDF:
Date: 11/04/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Order to Show Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/04/2013
Proceedings: Court Reporter Notice filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/01/2013
Proceedings: Order (enclosing rules regarding qualified representatives).
PDF:
Date: 11/01/2013
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for December 4, 2013; 9:00 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 10/31/2013
Proceedings: Joint Notice of Availability for Evidentiary Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/28/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's First Request for Production of Documents to Respondent filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/28/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Appearance by Qualified Representative filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/24/2013
Proceedings: Order to Show Cause.
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Date: 10/24/2013
Proceedings: Order Granting Petitioner`s Request for Hearing.
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Date: 10/22/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Request for Evidentiary Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/16/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Order to Show Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/15/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (with exhibits) filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/15/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (with exhibits) filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/14/2013
Proceedings: Response to Order to Show Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/07/2013
Proceedings: Order to Show Cause.
PDF:
Date: 10/01/2013
Proceedings: Amended Petition for Relief filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/20/2013
Proceedings: Order Canceling Hearing (parties to advise status by September 25, 2013).
PDF:
Date: 08/16/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Unopposed Motion for Continuance filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/13/2013
Proceedings: Order Allowing Testimony by Telephone.
PDF:
Date: 07/11/2013
Proceedings: Motion for Leave to Have Witness Appear Via Telephone filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/07/2013
Proceedings: Court Reporter Notice filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/06/2013
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 06/06/2013
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for August 28, 2013; 9:30 a.m.; Tallahassee, FL).
PDF:
Date: 06/04/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Response to the Amended Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 06/04/2013
Proceedings: Respondent's Answer to Petition for Relief filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/29/2013
Proceedings: Amended Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 05/29/2013
Proceedings: Amended Transmittal of Petition filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/28/2013
Proceedings: Petitioner's Response to Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/28/2013
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance (Kelli Lawhead) filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Employment Charge of Discrimination filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Notice of Determination: No Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Determination: No Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Petition for Relief filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/21/2013
Proceedings: Transmittal of Petition filed by the Agency.

Case Information

Judge:
SUZANNE VAN WYK
Date Filed:
05/21/2013
Date Assignment:
05/21/2013
Last Docket Entry:
10/10/2014
Location:
Tallahassee, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (6):