13-002262 Delores Boatwright vs. Palm Beach Health Department Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, August 1, 2014.

Summary: Respondent provided Petitioner reasonable accomodations for her alleged disabilities. Petitioner failed to prove age discrimination.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DELORES BOATWRIGHT,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 13 - 2262

PALM BEACH HEALTH DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal ad ministrative hearing was

conducted by video teleconference on May 14 and 15, 2014, at

sites in West Palm Beach and Tallahassee, Florida, before

Administrative Law Judge Claude B. Arrington of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: DeLores Boatwright , pro se

504 Fifth Lane

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418

For Respondent: Victoria Coleman - Miller, Esquire

Palm Beach County Health Department

Post Office Box 29

800 Clematis Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33402

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S

Whether the Palm Beach Health Department (Respondent)

committed an unlawful employment practice by failing to

reasonably accommodate the alleged disabilities of DeL ores

Boatwright (Petitioner).

Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice

by discriminating against Petitioner based on PetitionerÓs age.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a Complain t of

Discrimination (Complaint) with the Fl orida Commission on Human

Relations (FCHR) against Respondent, her former employer. The

Complaint alleged that Respondent committed an unlawful

employment practice against her by failing to provide a

reasonable a ccommodation for her disabilities and by

discriminating against her based on her age. Following its

investigation, by documents dated May 21, 2013, the FCHR issued a

ÐNotice of Determination: No CauseÑ and a ÐDetermination: No

Cause.Ñ Thereafter, Petitio ner filed a Petition for Relief that

was dated June 12, 2013, and date - stamped by the FCHR as being

received on June 17. The Petition for Relief framed the issues

set forth in the Statement of the Issues section of this

Recommended Order. On June 17, the FCHR referred the matter to

DOAH, and this proceeding followed.

At the final hearing, Respondent presented its case first to

expedite the proceeding. Respondent presented the testimony of

Robert Scott (PetitionerÓs former supervis or), Andy Walker

(Resp ondentÓs director of general s ervices), Erica Lacker

(RespondentÓs supervisor of human resources), Jean Lansiquot (a

health services r epresentative employed by Respondent), Don na

Maffeo (RespondentÓs acting risk m anager), Yanick Gribkoff (a

nursing consult ant employed by Respondent), Jackie Lester (the

Florida Department of HealthÓs equal opportunity m anager), and

Delores Taylor - Williams (RespondentÓs human resources m anager).

Respondent offered pre - marked E xhibits 1 through 13

and 15 through 16 , each of which was admitted into evidence.

Petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented the

additional testimony of Mit chell Durant (RespondentÓs HIV AIDS

program c oordinator), Shelia Finkley (a clerical employee

employed by Respondent), Jesse Anderson (a clerical employee

employed by Respondent), Kesha Brown (a registered nurse employe d

by Respondent), Lynn Todd (a human services program s pecialist

employed by Respondent), and Juletha Bradley (a friend of

Petitioner). PetitionerÓs Exhibits 1 through 9 an d 13 through 16

were admitted into evidence.

Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to

Florida Statutes (2012). The relevant statutes have not changed

since the date of the events at issue.

A Transcript of the proceedings, consisting of three

volumes, was filed on June 5, 2014. The undersigned extended the

deadline for the filing of proposed orders pursuant to an agreed

motion filed by Respondent. Thereafter, each party timely filed

a Proposed Recommended Order, which has been duly - con sidered by

the undersigned in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent

has been an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to

section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and an employer w ithin t he

meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2012).

2. Petitioner was employed by Respondent between January 3,

2002 , and January 31, 2013. On January 31, 2013, Respondent

terminated PetitionerÓs employment for cause.

3. Petitioner wo rked as an HIV counselor, which required

her to provide both pre - test and post - test counseling to clients

interested in HIV testing. Counseling performed by Petitioner

involved her sitting in an office setting with the door closed to

discuss with clients risks for contracting HIV and methods to

reduce those risks. HIV counseling sessions are typically

conducted face to face. There was a dispute in the record as to

how much computer input is necessary while conducting a

counseling session. The greater we ight of the credible evidence

established that any notes would typically be taken by hand and

that any computer input would typically be made after the

counseling session had been completed. Counseling sessions

typically lasted approximately 15 to 20 minu tes.

4. Due to privacy and HIPPA considerations, counseling

sessions were conducted in a private office with the door closed.

5. Petitioner was directly supervised by Robert Scott from

2005 until December 2011.

6. In October 2009, Petitioner was rear - ended in a car

accident while working. This accident prompted a workersÓ

compensation claim. Petitioner advised Mr. Scott that she had

hurt her neck, upper back, and right shoulder. Initially,

Petitioner had work restrictions of no lifting, no driving f or

the job, and no bending. As of October 27, 2009, PetitionerÓs

work restrictions were lifted, and no other work restrictions

were placed on Petitioner. On January 28, 2010, Petitioner was

referred to Dr. Edward Chung, an orthopedic specialist.

Dr. Ch ung placed no work restrictions on Petitioner. On

February 3, 2010, Dr. Chung determined Petitioner had reached

maximum medical improvement and gave her an impairment rating of

zero percent. During the remainder of her employment, Petitioner

had no on - g oing impairment rating or work restrictions as a

result of her automobile accident.

7. Petitioner worked at the West Palm Beach Health Center,

which is RespondentÓs primary care medical clinic. This clinic,

located on 45th Street in West Palm Beach , is generally known as

the 45th Street Clinic.

8. The majority of the rooms in the 45th Street Clinic are

examination rooms with an examination table, a small sink, and a

small desk for use by the nurse or doctor. The 45th Street

Clinic has a limited numb er of consultation rooms, which are

typically small interior offices with a desk that separates the

counselor and client with counter space behind or to the side of

the counselor for computer work.

9. For a year and a half between 2004 and 2005, Petitio ner

conducted her counseling sessions in Room 104 of the 45th Street

Clinic. Room 104 is a relatively small office with no windows.

10. At the end of 2005, PetitionerÓs office assignment

changed to Room 102, which is also an interior office with no

win dows. This move was at PetitionerÓs request when the room

became available due to the retirement of a colleague. Room 102

is slightly larger than Room 104. Petitioner remained in

Room 102 until the beginning of 2010.

11. While she was assigned Room 102 and Room 104,

Petitioner kept her door closed, even when she was not seeing

clients. This practice was problematic because other staff

members were unable to determine when Petitioner was available to

counsel patients.

12. Mr. Scott discussed with Petitioner on numerous

occasions the need for her to keep her office door open when she

was not with a client. Petitioner informed Mr. Scott that she

kept the door closed because of a sinus problem that felt better

when the door was closed. Petitioner ne ver provided medical

documentation of her alleged sinus problem, and there was no

credible explanation why keeping her office door closed would

improve a sinus condition.

13. In early 2010, PetitionerÓs room assignment was changed

from Room 102 to Room 1 07. This reassignment was necessary

because Respondent needed to make Room 102 available for another,

legitimate business use.

14. Room 107 was an exterior office with a window. Its

furniture was in an ÐLÑ shape attached to a wall. The office

containe d a desk and a counter for a computer. During counseling

sessions, the counselor and client would sit face - to - face on

opposite sides of the desk. The computer was to the counselorÓs

side, which required the counselor to turn or swivel her chair

away from the client to access the computer.

15. In December 2010, Petitioner complained to Mr. Scott

that the furniture arrangement in her office was causing her neck

and back pain. Petitioner attributed that pain to turning to

access her compute r or turning to talk to a client while on the

computer.

16. In response to PetitionerÓs complaint of pain,

Mr. Scott requested th at Michial Swank, RespondentÓs risk

m anager, perform an ergonomic evaluation of the furniture in

Room 107. Such an evaluation is a se rvice that re quires no

medical documentation and is offered by Risk Management to any

employee.

17. Mr. Swank determined that if the furniture could be

reconfigured, it should be so that Petitioner did not have to

twist to look from a clien t to the comp uter or vice versa.

18. Mr. Swank provided his assessment to RespondentÓs

General Services Department to determine whether the furniture

could be reconfigured. RespondentÓs General Services Department

determined the furniture could not be reconfigured because it was

modular furniture custom - made for the office and bolted together.

19. Ar ound March 2011, Dr. Cook, the d irector of the

45th Street Clinic, proposed that Petitioner change rooms with

another HIV counselor located in Room 104.

20. Mr. Swank performed an ergonomic assessment on Room 104

and determined the furniture and computer location to be

ergonomically correct for counseling a patient while on the

computer.

21. Respondent offered Petitioner the option of moving from

Room 107 into Room 10 4, but she refused that offer and opted to

remain in Room 107. Petitioner cited her sinus problems as the

reason she did not want to move back to Room 104.

22. Despite her decision to remain in Room 107, Petitioner

attempted to persuade Helen Bonner, a n urse, to switch offices

with her. This attempt was without the knowledge or permission

of Mr. S cott or any other administrator. Ms. BonnerÓs room was

set up for clinical use for patients with seizure disorders.

When Yankick Gribik off, the nursing superv isor, heard of

PetitionerÓs effort t o have Ms. Bonner swap offices,

Ms. Gribicoff immediately squelched the idea. Ms. BonnerÓs

office had specialized equipment, including specialized telephone

equipment and refrigerators. Ms. Gribicoff had valid reasons to

end PetitionerÓs efforts to swap rooms with Ms. Bonner.

23. In the fall of 2011, two of RespondentÓs clinics were

closed due to budgetary constraints. Certain personnel were

moved from those closed clinics into the 45th Street Clinic.

24. At that t ime, Rooms 104 and 107 were the only two rooms

in the 45th Street Clinic available for HIV counseling. It

became necessary to use Room 107 for both HIV and STD (sexually

transmitted disease) counseling. Because of its location and

proximity to other serv ices, Respondent had a valid reason to

select Room 107 over Room 104 as the room for HIV and STD

counseling.

25. While Petitioner had had some training in STD

counseling, she had difficulty with that type of counseling. An

expert in STD counseling was among the personnel being moved from

one of the closed clinics to the 45th Street Clinic. Respondent

had a valid reason to select the expert to occupy Room 107.

26. Respondent reassigned Petitioner to Room 104.

Petitioner agreed to the reassignment an d moved into Room 104 on

October 3, 2011. Petitioner kept the door to her office closed

even when she was not counseling clients.

27. In early November 2011, Mr. Scott received a complaint

about the physical condition of Room 104 from someone who used

that office while Peti tioner was away. The complaint centered on

the roomÓs lack of cleanliness.

28. On November 18, 2011, Mr. Scott met with Petitioner to

discuss certain concerns he had. It was during that meeting that

Petitioner told Mr. Scott, for t he first time, that she was

claustrophobic in Room 104. Petitioner referred to Room 104 as

being a Ðcloset Ñ and stated that she could not stay in that room.

29. Petitioner brought to Mr. Scott a doctorÓs note dated

November 23, 2011, that reflected tha t Petitioner was

experiencing claustrophobic symptoms and could not stay in a

small, closed space for 15 to 20 minutes.

30. Upon receiving the doctorÓs note, Mr. Scott notified

Human Resources of the doctorÓs note. Arrangements were made to

provide Pet itioner a larger room in another clinic. Due to the

merger of the two closed clinics with the 45th Street Clinic, no

room at the 45th Street Clinic, other than Room 104, was

available for PetitionerÓs use as an HIV counselor.

31. A larger office was foun d in the Lantana Clinic. The

targeted Lantana office was being used by another HIV counselor.

To accommodate Petitioner, Respondent arranged to have the

Lantana counselor transferred to the 45th Street Clinic and

Petitioner transferred to the Lantana Cli nic.

32. Petitioner was advised of this change in location and

agreed to move around December 18, 2011. She never advised or

stated she could not drive to the Lantana Clinic.

33. Petitioner called in sick on December 18, the day she

was scheduled to mov e to the Lantana Clinic.

34. On December 19, 2011, Petitioner reported for work at

the 45th Street Clinic instead of the Lantana Clinic. Petitioner

stayed at work at the 45th Street Clinic for a few hours, but

left because she was not feeling well.

3 5. On December 19, 2011, Petitioner suffered a stroke 1/ and

went on medical leave.

36. In May 2012, Petitioner told Mr. Scott that she was

ready to return to work. For legitimate business reasons, the

Lantana Clinic office was no longer available.

37. Jacqueline Lester is the e qual opportunity m anager for

the Florida Department of Health. Ms. Lester reviews requests

for reasonable accommodations with the authority to approve or

reject a request.

38. Ms. Lester first became aware of Petitioner as a result

of PetitionerÓs accommodation request dated December 15, 2011.

Petitioner asked to stay at the 45th Street Clinic in a larger

office with a furniture arrangement not requiring her to turn her

neck. That request was not processed because Petitione r soon

thereafter went on medical leave for an extended period.

39. On June 19, 2012, a second request for accommodation

was received from Petitioner. In this request, Pe titioner asked

for a reasonably - sized office, which Petitioner described as

being at least 10Ó x 10Ó, with a window. She also asked that the

office be within close distance to her home in Palm Beach Gardens

due to her inability to drive or si t for Ðany great length of

time . Ñ Petitioner also requested that she start back to work on

a par t - time basis. PetitionerÓs request included notes from two

doctors. This medical documentation did not state that

Petitioner could not drive due to a neck and back disability.

40. After reviewing the request and medical documentation,

Ms. Lester, whos e office is in Tallahassee, talked with

RespondentÓs personnel in Palm Beach County. Ms. Lester decided

to accommodate PetitionerÓs request.

41. The accommodation was an office located in RespondentÓs

clinic in Delray Beach. The office was 10Ó x 10Ó wi th a window.

Although the Delray Beach Clinic was a substantial commute from

PetitionerÓs home in Palm Beach Gardens, the accommodation

included permission for Petitioner to stop as needed while

traveling to work without being penalized for late arrival a t

work. 2/ The accommodation also provided that Petitioner could

return to full - time schedule at the Delray Beach Clinic Ðupon

release from her medical providers.Ñ

42. Petitioner refused the offer of the office at the

Delray Beach Clinic.

43. On Januar y 31, 2013, Respondent terminated PetitionerÓs

employment for cause based on PetitionerÓs refusal to return to

work. Petitioner presented no meaningful evidence that

Respondent discriminated against her based on age or because of

her perceived disabilitie s.

44. Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination with

the FCHR on September 5, 2012.

45. FCHR issued its ÐNotice of Determination: No CauseÑ and

ÐDetermination: No CauseÑ on May 21, 2013. Petitioner filed her

Petition for Relief on June 12, 201 3.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

46. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this

case pursuant to sections 760.11(7), 120.569, and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes (2013).

47. The Florida Civil Rights Ac t of 1992 (FCRA) is codified

in sections 760.01 through 760. 11.

48. Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination

against Respondent on Septem ber 5, 2012. Section 760.11(1)

provides that Ð[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of

ss. 760.01 - 760.10 may file a complaint with the [FCHR] within

365 days of the alleged violation . . . .Ñ All claimed

discriminatory acts occurring more than 365 days before

September 5, 2012, are time - barred.

49. Section 760.11(7) provides that upon a determination by

the FCHR that there is no probable cause to believe that a

violation of the FCRA has occurred, Ð[t]he aggrieved person may

request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57,

but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of

determina tion of reasonable cause . . . .Ñ Following the FCHR

determination of no cause, Petitioner timely filed her Petition

for Relief requesting this hearing.

50. Respondent is an employer as that term is defined in

section 760.02(7).

51. Petitioner asser ted in her Petition for Relief that

Respondent discriminated against her based on her age and by

failing to provide a reasonable accommodation of her disability.

52. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that Respondent committed an unlawful employment

practice as alleged in her Petition for Relief. See St. Louis v.

Fla. IntÓl Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2011); Fla. DepÓt

of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

53. Petitioner failed to pre sent any meaningful evidence

that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of her

age. Consequently, no further discussion as to the elements

needed to prove age discrimination is necessary.

54 . 42 U.S.C. § 12102 provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

(1) Disability. The term "disability"

means, with respect to an individual Ï

(A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life

activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an

impairment . . . .

(2) Major life activities.

(A) In general. For purposes of

paragraph (1), major life activities include,

but are not limited to, caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,

eating, sleepin g, walking, standing, lifting,

bending, speaking, breathing, learning,

reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working.

55. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) sets forth the following rules of

construction:

(4) Rules of construction regarding the

definit ion of disability. The definition of

"disability" in paragraph (1) shall be

construed in accordance with the following:

(A) The definition of disability in this Act

shall be construed in favor of broad coverage

of individuals under this Act, to the maxim um

extent permitted by the terms of this Act.

(B) The term "substantially limits" shall be

interpreted consistently with the findings

and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of

2008.

(C) An impairment that substantially limits

one major life activity need not limit other

major life activities in order to be

considered a disability.

(D) An impairment that is episodic or in

remission is a disability if it would

substantially limit a major life activity

when active.

56. It is not necessary to determine whe ther Petitioner has

a disability w ithin the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)

because Respondent regarded her as having a disability w ithin the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). 3/

57. When Mr. Scott received the note pertaining to

claustrophobia, he co ntacted Human Resources, and efforts were

made to move Petitioner to a larger room in another clinic.

Those acts constitute evidence that Respondent regarded

Petitioner as having an impairment within the meaning of

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). Consequently, it is appropriate to

complete the Ðfailure to accommodateÑ analysis.

58. The FCRA does not contain an explicit provision

establishing an employerÓs duty to provide reasonable

accommodations for an employeeÓs handicap, but by application of

the principl es of the A mericans with D isabilities A ct , such a

duty is reasonably implied. Brand v. Fla. Power Corp. , 633 So.

2d 504, 511, n. 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

59. In McCaw Cellular Communicatio ns v. Kwiatek , 763 So. 2d

1063, 1065 - 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), th e court observed that:

The ADA provides that a Ðqualified

individualÑ is an individual with a

disability who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the job. 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 12111(8). If a qualified individual wit h a

disability can perform the essential

functions of the job with reasonable

accommodation, then the employer is required

to provide the accommodation unless doing so

would constitute an undue hardship for the

employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

(foot note omitted).

60. Disability discrimination based upon an employerÓs

failure to provide an employee with a disability a reasonable

accommodation for that disability does not require the employee

to prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory int ent.

The court made the following observation in Wright v. Hosp ital

Auth ority o f Houston C ou nty , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7504 *18 - 19

(M.D. Da. Feb. 2, 2009):

Unlike other types of discrimination claims,

however, a Ðfailure to accommodateÑ claim

under the AD A does not require a showing o f

discriminatory intent. . . . ÐIn other

words, a claim that an employer failed

to . . . provide reasonable accommodations to

qualified employees, does not involve a

determination of whether that employer acted,

or failed to ac t, with discriminatory

intent.Ñ . . . Such claims require only a

showing that the employer failed Ðto fulfill

its affirmative duty to make Òreasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified

applicant or empl oyee with the disabilityÓ

without demonstrating that Òthe accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the

operation of the business.ÓÑ Accordingly,

. . . the McDonnell Douglas [ 4/ ] burden - shifting

framework, Ðwhile appropriate for determining

the exis tence of disability discrimination in

disparate treatment cases, is not necessary

or useful in determining whether a defendant

has discriminated by failing to provide a

reasonable accommodation.Ñ (citations

omitted).

61. As reflected by the Findings of Fact, Respondent

repeatedly made efforts to accommodate Petitioner by switching

room assignments and offering Petitioner various options. T he

conclusion is inescapable that Respondent not only took

reasonable measures to try to accommodate PetitionerÓs n eeds, it

took extraordinary measures.

62. The final office offered to her in the Delray Beach

clinic was the size Petitioner requested and had a window. While

the Delray Beach location involved a substantial commute for

Petitioner, Respondent made a re asonable accommodation for that

commute by authorizing Petitioner to stop as needed while

traveling to work without being penalized for late arrival at

work. Respondent also granted PetitionerÓs request that she

start back to work on a part - time basis.

63. Respondent made an offer of a reasonable accommodation

to Petitioner. Petitioner declined that offer and quit coming to

work. Respondent was justified in terminating PetitionerÓs

employment.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact a nd Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is

further RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss th e Petition for

Relief with prejudice.

DONE AND ENTERED this 1 st day of August , 2014 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Bui lding

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1st day of August , 2014 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ One of PetitionerÓs d octors later referred to the stroke as

being a TIA (transient ischemic attack).

2/ Additionally, the Delray Beach Clinic was very close to a Tri -

Rail stop, so Petitioner could have taken that transportation to

and from work.

3 / If required to do so, the undersigned would conclude that

Petitioner failed to prove that the pain she suffers when she

turns from computer to client, and vice versa, and her symptoms

of claustrophobia constitute Ða physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activitiesÑ

w ithin the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1210(1)(A). Respondent

established that there was no need for Petitioner to turn from

client to computer, and vice versa, in doing the sedentary

counseling work she was required to do. All sh e had to do was

swivel her office chair to face either the client or the

computer. PetitionerÓs alleged symptoms of claustrophobia were

not of sufficient strength to keep Petitioner from closing her

office door when she was not counseling a client. As th e court

observed in Wimberly v. Sec urities Tech nology Group, Inc. , 866

So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004):

For there to be a disability within the

meaning of the ADA, there must be a

substantial limitation on a major life

activity; a ÐdisabledÑ person mu st be

completely unable to perform the activity,

or significantly restricted in performing the

activity as compared to an average

person. . . . Factors to consider when

determining whether an individual is

Ðsubstantially limitedÑ include: 1) Ðthe

natur e and severity of the impairmentÑ; 2)

Ðthe duration of the impairment Ñ ; and 3) Ðthe

permanent or long term impact, or the

expected permanent or long term impact of or

resulting from the impairment.Ñ (citations

omitted).

4/ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gre en , 411 U. S. 792 (1973).

COPIES FURNISHED:

Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

2009 Apalachee Parkway , Suite 100

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Victoria Coleman - Miller, Esquire

Palm Beach County Health Department

Pos t Office Box 29

800 Clematis Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33402

DeLores Boatwright

504 Fif th Lane

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418

Ch eyanne Costilla, Gen eral Counsel

F lorida C ommission on H uman R elations

2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100

Tallahas see, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.