14-004577 Melissa Terrell vs. Properties Group Management, Llc Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, March 23, 2015.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that vulgarity of 70-year-old maintenance man at trailer park constituted sexual harassment under Florida Fair Housing Act.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MELISSA TERRELL ,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No s . 14 - 4577

PROPERTIES GROUP MANAGEMENT,

LLC ; LEE ADAMS; YARON M. DAVID;

AND RAMON PEREZ, JR.,

Respondent s .

__________ _____________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

On January 30, 2015 , Robert E. Meale, Administrative Law

Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH),

conducted the final hearing by videoconference in Tampa and

Tal lahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: C. Martin Lawyer, III, Esquire

Melissa A. Craig, Esquire

Bay Area Legal Services, Inc.

1302 North 19th Street, Suite 400

Tampa, Florida 336 05

For Respondent s (except Respondent Perez):

Rachel K. Beige, Esquire

Joseph F. Valdivia, Esquire

Cole, Scott, & Kissane, P.A.

2nd Floor

1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

For Respondent Perez: no appearance

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether any of the respondents is guilty of

discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of her sex in

connection with her renta l of a lot in the Galaxy Mobile Home

Park , in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, section

760.23(2), Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By Housing Discrimination Complaint dated April 1, 2014,

Petitioner alleged that each of the four respond ents

discriminated against her on the basis of sex in connection with

her rental of mobile home lot 163 at 5810 U.S. Highway 92 , West,

Plant City, Florida. The complaint alleges that Respondent Perez

was a maintenance employee of Respondent Properties Gro up

Management, LLC (PGM), Respondent Adams was the manager of the

mobile home park, and the other respondents owned the mobile home

park.

The complaint alleges that Respondent Perez subjected

Petitioner to continuous sexual harassment, calling her a

"fucki ng prostitute," "bitch," and "whore." Although Petitioner

complained to Respondent Adams about this alleged harassment,

Respondent Adams allegedly took no apparent action against

Respondent Perez.

The Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR)

investi gated the complaint. On September 8, 2014, FCHR

determined that reasonable cause did not exist to believe that a

dis criminatory housing practice had occurred.

On September 26, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Relief (Petition) . The Petition alleges Petitioner initially

rented lot 163 in approximately October 2011, and a "long - lasting

pattern of highly intimidating, hostile and offensive behavior"

began around September 28, 2010, and continued until July 28,

2013. The Petition states that Respondent Adams witnessed

Respondent Perez yell and swear at Petitioner, but took no action

against him. The Petition alleges that Petitioner contacted

Respondent David to speak about the problem, but he refused to do

so outside of the presence of Respondent Perez and failed to

arrange such a meeting. The Petition states that, on July 28,

2013, Respondent Perez drove by Petitioner's lot and swore at

her, Petitioner complained to the sheriff's office, and a deputy

arrived at Galaxy, promising to speak to Respondent Perez. The

Petition abruptly stops at this allegation.

At the hearing, Petitioner called four witnesses and offered

into evidence five exhibits : Petitioner Exhibits 1 through 5.

Respondent s called three witness es and offered into evidence two

exhibits : Respondent s Ó Exhibits 3 and 5 . All exhibits were

admitted.

The court reporter fi led the transcript on February 26 ,

2015 . The parties filed proposed recommended orders by March 9 ,

2015 .

FINDING S OF FACT

1. In September 2010, Petitioner, a 54 - year - old fe male,

moved into Galaxy Mobile Home Park, 5810 U.S. Highway 92 , West,

Plant City, Florida. Since her arrival at the park, Petitioner

has occupied her lot based on a month - to - month rental agreement.

The park consists of 33 mobile home lots, four cabin s, s ix RV

lots, and one house. At present, 27 fe males and 22 males live

there; most residents are 55 years old and older .

2. The park manager is Respondent Adams, an 85 - year - old

female. She and her late husband moved to Galaxy Mobile Home

Park in 1988. Ini tially, she was not the manager, but her

husband performed all of the maintenance and lawn mowing.

Ownership and property - management duties lie with Respondent

David and Respondent PGM; one of them employs Respondent Adams

and pays her $300 per month to s erve as the park manager.

3. In 2002, Respondent Adams moved out of the park and into

a nearby residence. She works mornings in a small office located

at the park, although, if needed, she remains at the park until

as late as 4:00 p.m. or returns to th e park in the afternoon.

Her duties include cleaning the laundromat, collecting rents,

showing prospective tenants available lots, and arranging for

repairs. She is paid $300 per month for her services.

4. Respondent Perez, a male reportedly 68 or 70 ye ars old,

formerly was the maintenance man at the park -- the lawn mowing

responsibilities having been assigned to another person. Using

supplies provided by Respondent David or Respondent PMG,

Respondent Perez performed maintenance work around the park as

n eeded. No one recorded his time, and he did not work according

to a set schedule. At times, he would travel and be gone for

extensive periods, during which minor maintenance duties were

apparently deferred until his return, sometimes months later.

Respo ndent Perez lived in a mobile home at the park, and his sole

compensation was free lot rent of about $300 per month. This

obviously was a part - time job.

5 . When she first moved to Galaxy Mobile Home Park ,

Petitioner owned an RV, so she rented lot 148 , wh ich is an RV

lot. Petitioner first arrived at the park late in the day when

the office was closed, so, the next morning, she and Respondent

Adams were speaking in front of Petitioner's RV. After

Petitioner had paid the first - month's rent, Respondent Adam s was

describing the park amenities to Petitioner when Respondent Perez

approached the two women, cursing loudly.

6. Few incidents involving Respondent Perez acquire d much

clarity in the record , and the first of these is no exception.

As Respondent Per ez approached Petitioner and Respondent Adams,

h e appeared to be concerned about an item of potentially

dangerous maintenance equipment that Petitioner may have lent to

another resident. Pointing a finger at Petitioner, evidently

from some distance from t he two women, Respondent Perez warned

her that if she lent this equipment to someone, "it is on your

fucking ass," implying that she, not he, would be responsible if

the resident injured himself using the equipment. For emphasis,

Respondent Perez then pou nded his chest, shouting, "I'm a fucking

man." Petitioner replied, "and I'm a fucking woman."

7. Later that day, two male residents were helping

Petitioner set up her RV. Driving by, Respondent Perez shouted a

warning to Petitioner from his vehicle, "if you let those fucking

men in your yard, you'll have a yard - full of fucking men."

8. The following morning, Respondent Perez knocked on

Petitioner's door. This appears to have been the only time that

he did so, and he never entered Petitioner's home at any time.

When Petitioner answered the door, Respondent Perez told her that

everyone was "fucking complaining" that she was using too much

toilet paper, plugging up the sewage system at the park.

Petitioner replied that, due to problems with her holding tank,

she did not flush her toilet paper, but disposed of it in her

trash, and invited Respondent Perez to take a look. Respondent

Perez declined, saying, "Well, I don't know. That's what the

fuck they say."

9. In October 2011, when a resident left her mobile home to

move north, Petitioner moved into the m obile home, which was at

lot 163 . The mobile home had a screen porch, where Petitioner

would often sit, enjoying watching television and smoking

cigarettes, which she tried not to smoke inside. From time to

time, Respondent Perez would walk by the screen porch, and

sometimes he would utter unpleasantries to Petitioner, warning

her that no one could do his work.

10. On one occasion, Petitioner complained to Respondent

Adams that Respondent Perez was disturbing her by his use of a

flashlight as he walked through the park at night. Respondent

Adams spoke to Respondent Perez, who replaced the flashlight with

a brighter lantern. The evidence does not establish that

Respondent Perez was walking at night to bother Petitioner; given

the location of their lots, he would have to pass her lot as he

walked or drove toward the front of the mobile home park where

amenities were located. Also, Respondent Perez was in an

intimate relationship with a woman named M rs. Miller , and

Petitioner's lot was between the lots of Respondent Perez and

Mrs. Miller . (" Mrs. Miller " is a pseudonym to protect the

privacy of the resident.)

11. In the spring of 2012, while Petitioner was talking to

a male resident at the picnic are a, Respondent Perez drove up and

began talking to the man, evidently ignoring Petitioner.

Respondent Perez told him that, the prior evening, he had met a

woman in a bar. Professing to be a Christian, she had told him

that she did not believe in sex befor e marriage. But Respondent

Perez loudly proclaimed that he had had sexual intercourse with

the woman that very night. At this point in the story,

Respondent Perez laid face down in the grass and began violently

thrusting, in a pantomime of sexual interco urse, explaining that

"when I get a woman, I can go all night."

12. Other problems arose between Petitioner and Respondent

Perez. When she moved from the RV, Petitioner placed a PVC pipe

from the RV in her new yard, keeping it for the new owner of the

RV . Respondent Perez removed the pipe, likely as part of his

duties in keeping the park clean and thinking that the used pipe

had been discarded . Pet itioner called Respondent Adams, accused

Respondent Perez of stealing the pipe, and threatened to call the

sheriff's office. Respondent Adams told her that would not be

necessary, and she would buy whatever PVC pipe the new owner

required to connect his RV to the park's plumbing.

13. At some point, dissatisfied with Respondent Adams'

handling of her complaint s about Respondent Perez , Petitioner

demanded a meeting with Respondent David. Respondent David,

Respondent Adams, and Petitioner met at the park. T hey were

talking while looking at a repair job that Respondent Perez had

done, suggesting that the focus o f Petitioner's complaints at

least included poor workmanship on Respondent Perez's part. But

when Petitioner tried to talk about Respondent Perez, Respondent

David declined to do so unless Respondent Perez was present.

Respondent David and Petitioner had no further conversations.

14. The final incident coincided with the death of a

neighbor, according to Petitioner, who testified that Respondent

Perez's animosity toward her intensified at this time. The death

seems to have taken place in July 2013. T he record is

insufficiently developed to find any possible connection between

the resident's death and Respondent Perez's increased animosity.

15. However, at some point, Mrs. Miller died, and

Respondent Perez and Respondent Adams believed that Petitione r

and another neighbor entered Mrs. Miller's mobile home after the

ambulance had removed her body to rifle through her medications

in order to steal those that they wanted. Petitioner admitted

that she was in the mobile home going through the medications,

but only to assist the emergency medical technicians in their

effort to identify Mrs. Miller's prescriptions.

16 . The record is poorly developed in other respects.

Petitioner testified to a steady verbal barrage from Respondent

Perez, seemingly on eve ry occasion that the two met, usually

featuring epithets describing Petitioner as a "whore" or

"prostitute." Petitioner called as a witness her brother, who

could recall only that Respondent Perez complained about where he

and his son had parked and that Respondent Perez was always "on"

his sister about something, although he could not recall anything

in specific. The nephew also testified, adding only that

Respondent Perez often told them that they could not "fucking

park" where they had parked, and he g enerally swore a lot.

17 . The neighbor who had joined Petitioner in Mrs. Miller's

mobile home testified that she had once overheard Respondent

Perez say to a male resident that all women are "whores and

prostitutes." On another occasion, she overheard Re spondent

Perez say to Respondent Adams, as he pointed to a woman some

distance away, "there's another one of those whores over there."

And the neighbor overheard Respondent Adams reply, "I told you to

keep that word from your mouth."

18 . A deputy who was called out in response to a complaint

made by Petitioner could not remember a single detail of the

call.

19 . By contrast, Respondent Adams proved to be a memorable

witness . Demonstrating the danger of compound questions posed to

aged witnesses , when a sk ed by her attorney if Respondent Perez

drove by Petitioner's home every day and harassed her, Respondent

Adams answered that he had to -- meaning that he had to drive by

Petitioner's lot . W hen asked by her attorney (twice) if

Respondent Perez harassed Petit ioner, Respondent Adams answered

definitively, yes. She explained that he harassed everyone , but

also denied that he harassed anyone .

20 . As Respondent Adams saw it, the relationship between

Petitioner and Respondent Perez was that of two residents, not a

resident and the park maintenance man. On occasion, though,

Respondent Adams directed Respondent Perez to watch his language.

One such occasion has been noted above; on another occasion, she

said that Petitioner "has a name. It is Lisa. Use it."

Res pondent Perez's reference to Petitioner that prompted this

directive is undisclosed.

21 . Respondent Adams also witnessed occasions during which

Petitioner employed profanity toward Respondent Perez , as well as

at least one other individual . On one such occasion, when a male

tree - trimmer at the park warned Petitioner to keep a safe

distance from his work area, she responded, "You son of a bitch.

Drop a limb on me and I will sue you."

2 2 . It is difficult to characterize Respondent's state of

mind at the time of his vulgar utterances , of which some, it is

safe to assume, were uttered at Petitioner . The present record

supports findings that Petitioner and Respondent Perez had a poor

relationship. It is impossible to determine whether either party

was at fault for this relationship or the degree of any fault

that each party bore . However, from Respondent Perez's point of

view, Petiti oner's behavior was, on one occasion, substantially

unjustified, as in the case of the removed PVC pipe from the

yard, and, on another occasion, open to justifiable suspicion, as

in the handling of the prescription medicines after Mrs. Miller 's

death.

23 . The present record supports a finding of abusive verbal

exchanges between Petitioner and Respondent Perez, but not their

frequency. If Petitioner's recounting of them were fully

credited as all of them, there were very few such exchanges over

the three years in question. Undoubtedly, Respondent Perez's

swear words and other insults were grounded in gender relations

or gend er, as in his use of the word s , "fuck" or "fucking,"

"bitch," and "whore." Respondent Perez was unable to direct a

park visitor to move his car without uttering "fucking," employed

either as an adverb to intensify the verb (i.e., "move") or an

adjective t o intensify the object (i.e., the "car") -- or, of

course, both.

24 . Most importantly, though, t he present record in no way

supports a finding that these exchanges were so frequent or

intense as to deprive Petitioner of the use and enjoyment of her

home and the amenities in the park.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

25 . DOAH has jurisdiction. § 760.35(3)(b) , Fla. Stat .

26 . Section 760.23(2) prohibits discrimination on the basis

of sex, among other things, " in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision

of services or facilities in connection therewith [.] "

Section 760.34(5) imposes the burden of proof on Petitioner, and

section 120.57(1)(j) requires Petitioner to prove the material

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

27 . In construing provisions of the Florida Fair Housing

Act, sections 760.20, et seq. , Florida courts are guided by

decisions of federal courts construing the federal Fair Housing

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq . Dornback v. Holley , 854 So. 2d

211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The federal counterpart to section

760.23(2) is 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

28 . The prohibition contained in section 760.23(2) may

apply to post - acquisition discrimination. Bloch v. Frischolz ,

587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc ); Smith v. Zacco , 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 158386 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Savanna Club Worship

Service, Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. ,

456 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2005).

29 . However, as noted in Bloch , section 3604(b) provides no

relief from isolated acts of discrimination from fellow property

owners. 587 F.3d at 780. The focus in this case is thus limited

to the actions of Responde nt Perez in his capacity as the

maintenance man .

30 . A plaintiff in a 3604(b) case may prove discrimination

by proof of discriminatory intent or under a modified disparate

impact theory. See, e.g. , Bloch at 783. There is no evidence of

disparate impact in this case.

31 . A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent by direct

evidence or inferentially. See, e.g . , U.S. v. Hylton ,

944 F . Supp. 2d 176, 187 (D. Conn. 2013). Proof of

discriminatory intent, as reflected in sexual harassment , to

prove a 360 4 (b) claim may draw upon cases involving sexual

harassment in the workplace . See, e.g. , Butler v. Carrero , 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130838 (N.D. Ga. 2013); Richards v. Bono , 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585 (M.D. Fla. 2005).

32 . In Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc. , 71 F. Supp. 2d

1346 , 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1999), the court stated:

Title VII clearly does not prohibit all

verbal or physical harassment in the

workplace. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Services, Inc. , 523 U.S. 75, 80, 140 L. Ed.

2d 201, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). Indeed,

harassment "is not automatically

discriminatory because of sex merely because

the words used have a sexual content or

connotations." Id. As the Seventh Circuit

has indicated, the concept of sexual

harassment is designed to protect employees

from the kind of attentions that can make

the workplace hellish. Baskerville v.

Culligan Int'l Co. , 50 F.3d 428 , 430 (7th

Cir. 1995). Title VII is not designed to

"purge the workplace of vulgarity." Id. On

the other hand, the court recognizes that

words and actions short of unwanted physical

contact or overt sexual advances can

sometimes cross the line that "sep arates the

merely vulgar and mildly offensive from the

deeply offensive and sexually harassing."

Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. , 32 F.3d

1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994). Because there

is no bright line separating vulgarity from

discriminatory harassment, the inquiry here

concerns the characteristics that

distinguish the two.

On one side of the line falls "the ordinary

tribulations of the workplace, such as the

sporadic use of abusive language, gender -

related jokes, and occasional teasing."

Faragher , 118 S. C t. at 2284. These

tribulations include the "vulgar banter,

tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse and

boorish workers." Baskerville , 50 F.3d at

430. Courts should keep in mind that Title

VII does not create a general civility code

for the American workp lace, see Oncale , 523

U.S. at 80, and it therefore does not

protect workers from the everyday foul

language, off - color humor, and suggestive

repartee found in our society. The statute

was not designed to improve the manners or

transform the social mores o f the American

worker. It does not, in other words,

protect the " [person] of Victorian

delicacy -- a [person] mysteriously aloof from

contemporary American popular culture in all

its sex - saturated vulgarity." Baskerville ,

50 F.3d at 431. See also Indest v . Freeman

Decorating, Inc. , 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th

Cir. 1999) (suggesting that Title VII action

will not lie for remarks and innuendo "no

more offensive than sexual jokes told on

major network television programs").

On the other side of the line, however,

falls that conduct which is actionable as

hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Things such as intimidating words and

actions, obscene gestures, unwelcome

physical contact, and unsolicited sexual

advances, if sufficiently severe or

pervasive, fall o n this side of the line.

See Baskerville , 50 F.3d at 430 .

Additionally, an employee may make out an

actionable claim by showing the existence of

other conduct, not involving touching or

sexual advances, that was intentionally

designed to create an abusive or hostile

work environment for the employee because

someone of his or her gender is not welcome

in the workplace or held in low regard on

account of his or her gender. An employee

might thus demonstrate a hostile work

environment by showing that women (o r men)

were targeted for extensive hazing designed

to demean and denigrate their importance in

the workplace. It is important to remember,

however, that intentional discrimination is

a key element of any sexual harassment

claim, which the plaintiff bears the burden

of proving.

Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc. , 71 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 - 1357,

(N.D. Ga. 1999) .

33 . The Pospicil court noted that the chief executive

officer routinely used the word , , "fuck," and referred often to

"blowjobs." More concerning t o the court, though, was that the

chief executive officer treated men and women differently,

cursing at female, but not male, employees; allowing male, but

not female, employees to leave a function early; using the words

"whore" and "harem"; and making com ments about having sexual

relations with a beauty contestant. Noting that any of these

behaviors "might fall on the [nonactionable] vulgarity side of

the line," the court found that, together, these comments were

enough to present a fact issue for the jur y. Id. at 1357 - 58.

34 . In Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co. , 50 F.3d 428 (7th

Cir. 1995), a male manager made nine suggestive or sexually

inappropriate comments to a female whom he supervised over seven

months. The court noted that the manager never tou ched the

plaintiff, nor had he propositioned her or asked her on a date .

He made no threats, showed her no sexually suggestive materials,

and never said anything that could not be repeated on network

television. The court noted:

The infrequency of the of fensive comments is

relevant to an assessment of their impact.

A handful of comments spread over months is

unlikely to have so great an emotional

impact as a concentrated or incessant

barrage. Dey v. Colt Construction &

Development Co. , 28 F.3d 1446, 145 6 (7th

Cir. 1994); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons

Co. , 42 F.3d 439, 444 and n. 3 (7th Cir.

1994).

We are mindful of the dangers that lurk in

trying to assess the impact of words without

taking account of gesture, inflection, the

physical propinquity of speak er and hearer,

the presence or absence of other persons,

and other aspects of context. Remarks

innocuous or merely mildly offensive when

delivered in a public setting might acquire

a sinister cast when delivered in the

suggestive isolation of a hotel room . So

too remarks accompanied by threatening

gestures or contorted facial features, or

delivered from so short a distance from the

listener's face as to invade the listener's

private space. Cf. Erving Goffman, The

Presentation of Self in Everyday Life

(19 59). Even a gross disparity in size

between speaker and listener, favoring the

former, might ominously magnify the impact

of the speaker's words.

Id. at 431 .

35 . Over a period of nearly three years, Respondent Perez

demonstrated himself to Petitioner an d others to be a man capable

of repulsive crudeness. But h e never touched Petitioner. He

came to her door only once when she first moved into Galaxy, and,

upon learning of Petitioner's practice in disposing of used

toilet paper, seemed, not threatening, but understandably

abashed, as he evidently declined Petitioner's offer to see for

himself.

36 . The present record does not depict the pattern of

demeaning females that was present due to all of the factors

noted by the court in Pospicil . Respondent Pere z's vulgarity was

not reserved for Petitioner or females, judging from his comments

to Peti tioner's brother and nephew . Undoubtedly, given his

fondness for the word, Respondent Perez uttered "fuck" to or at

Petitioner, although the circumstances of such i nteractions are

undeveloped in the record. As noted above, in an early exchange

with Petitioner, Respondent Perez used the word as an adjective

to intensify his reference to his gender, and Petitioner did the

same to intensify her reference to her gender.

37 . Respondent Perez also used the words "bitch" and

"whore." Although the latter word is not a swear word, like

"bitch," "whore" demeans women. Again, though, the circumstances

of these utterances are undeveloped in the record. It is unknown

whether Respondent Perez uttered these words to Pet itioner and,

if so, how often; without this information, it is difficult to

infer discriminatory intent, as distinguished from mere

vulgarity.

38 . Nor can Respondent Perez's intent be inferred from the

impact of any of his vulgarities upon Petitioner , as noted by the

court in Baskerville . The setting was invariably in the common

area of the park, and the impact on Petitioner, who herself

freely engaged in vulgarities, does not seem to have been great.

39 . Seve ral times, Petitioner testified -- at least once

tearfully -- that Respondent Perez's treatment of her deprived her

of her ability to enjoy her home and the amenities of the park.

This testimony was not credible based on Petitioner's demeanor

throughout the h earing and the abruptness from which she

transitioned in her testimony between routine matters and what

was supposed to have been this moving, dramatic testimony. More

basically, the re was never a connection between Petitioner's

recounting of relatively f ew incidents of vulgarities uttered

(or, in one case, pantomimed) by Respondent Perez over three

years and Petitioner's broad claim of a resulting deprivation of

her ability to enjoy the material, emotional, and spiritual

comforts of her home.

40 . Based on the foregoing , Petitioner has failed to prove

that any of the respondents discriminated against her on the

basis of sex in connection with the rental of her lots at Galaxy

Mobile Home Park , or in the provision of services or facilities

in connection th e rental of her lots.

RECOMMENDATION

It is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order dismissing the Petition.

DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March , 2015 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

ROBERT E. MEALE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 23rd day of March , 2015 .

COPIES FURNISHED:

Yaron M. David

Properties Group Management, LLC

5810 U.S. Highway 92 , West

Plant City, Florida 33567

Rachel K. Beige, Esquire

Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A.

2nd Fl oor

1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(eServed)

C. Martin Lawyer, III, Esquire

Bay Area Legal Services, Inc.

1302 North 19th Street , Suite 400

Tampa, Florida 33605 - 5230

(eServed)

Melissa Ann Craig, Esquire

Bay Area Legal Se rvices, Inc.

18238 U.S. Highway 301 , South

Wimauma, Florida 33598

(eServed)

Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommend ed Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.