14-004578 Janet D. Mayes vs. Great Southern Cafe Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, June 2, 2015.

Summary: Evidence did not demonstrate Petitioner had disability (OCS, anxiety, etc.) or perceived disability. Evidence did not show sex discrimination. Terminated for a legitimate reason.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

JANET D. MAYES,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 14 - 4578

GREAT SOUTHERN CAFE,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held befor e the Honorable

Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge, Division of

Administrative Hearings , on February 24 , 2015, in Panama City,

Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Robert Thirston II, Esquire

Thirston Law Firm

P os t O ffice Box 19617

Panama City, Florida 324 17

For Respondent: Timothy Tack, Esquire

Kunkel Miller and Hament

3550 Buschwood Park Dr ive, Suit e 135

Tampa, Florida 33618

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent

committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in

violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On December 18, 2013 , Petitioner filed a Complaint of

Employment Discrimination against Respondent, Great Southern

Café (Respondent or Great Southern), with the Florida Commission

on Human Relations (FCHR). The Complaint alleged that

Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of age,

sex , and disability when Respondent terminated her as an

employee.

FCHR investigated the Complaint. On August 25, 2014, it

issued a Notice of Determination finding cause to believe that

an unlawful employment practice had occurred based on disability

discrimination. The Notice also advised Petitioner of her right

to file a Petition for Relief.

On Sept ember 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Relief with FCHR. Thereafter, the Petition for Relief was

forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for

formal hearing. Neith er the Petition for R elief nor the

underlying complaint of Employment Discrimination alleged facts

to support a claim of discrimination based on age and failed to

place Respondent on notice of such a claim. Therefor e , this

action proceeded on the appropri ate ly pled claim s of

discrim ination based on sex and disability.

At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and

presented the testimony of two witnesses. Respondent presented

the testimony of four witnesses. N either party offered any

exhibi ts into evidence.

After the hearing and for unknown reasons, all parties

received copies of the hearing transcript by April 9, 2015, at

the latest, without the original transcript being filed with the

Division. The partiesÓ receipt of the transcript per mitted

sufficient time for each party to prepare and file p roposed

r ecommended o rders by the deadline originally established in

this case. Respondent had earlier filed a Proposed Recommended

Order on April 1, 2015. However, Petitioner did not file a

p rop osed r ecommended order after the transcript was received by

her attorney . During the process of preparing this Recommended

Order and again without explanation for the delayed filing, the

original T ranscript of the hearing was filed with the Division

on Ma y 12, 2015, by the court reporting company.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. Respondent Great Southern Café is a restaurant located

in Seaside, Florida. The restaurant is owned by James Shirley.

As owner, Mr. Shirley did not generally involve himself in

personnel decisions at the Café. Such decisions and the day - to -

day management of the restaurant were the responsibility of the

g eneral m anager , who at the time period relevant to this case

was William ÐBillyÑ McConnell .

2. Petitioner Janet D. Mayes is female. Pet itio ner has

ADD, ADHD , OCD, and general anxiety disorder . S he has been

diagnosed with these conditions for 20 years and they are a ll

controlled through medication . More importantly, the evidence

did not demonstrate that PetitionerÓs disorders interfered w ith

her ability to work or significantly impacted any other major

life activity. Indeed, Petitioner has worked in the restaurant

business for about 30 years and has held a variety of different

positions during that time , often working long hours. Since her

disorders did not interfere with any of PetitionerÓs major life

activities, the evidence did not demonstrate that such disorders

were disabilities or handicaps for purposes of employment

discrimination.

3 . Sometime around March 2012, Petitioner interv iewed for

employment with Respondent. She was initially hired as a

hostess for the restaurant by the then general manager,

Jim Ruby . Shortly thereafter , Mr. McConnell , who was then

assistant manager, replaced Mr. Ruby as general manager . At the

time, M r. McConnell had 35 - 40 years of experience as a

restaurant manager in Alabama and Florida and had managed the

predecessor restaurant to Great Southern Caf known as ÐShades. Ñ

4 . Mr. McConnell Ós manage ment philosophy was t o be patient

with employees, to train them in the right way, and to ask

employees to do their best . He would give employees the benefit

of the doubt, and when disciplinary action was necessary, would

sit down and talk with the employee to build confidence in the m .

Mr. McConnellÓs di sc iplinary style was informal and it was not

his general practice to issue formal written discipline to

employees.

5. Mr. McConnell liked PetitionerÓs work ethic and thought

she did a good job as hostess. Under Mr. McConnellÓs

management, Petitioner was pr omoted by Mr. McConnell to relief

manager in May of 2012. In August 2012, she was again promoted

by Mr. McConnell to full manager.

6 . Mr. McConnell did not know about , nor was he provided

with any documentation regarding , PetitionerÓs disorders.

Indee d, the evidence showed that PetitionerÓs disorders were not

so obvious that anyone who encountered her necessarily would

have known about those disorders. There was no evidence that

Petitioner ever sought any kind of accommodation from Respondent

for her disorders.

7 . Since Mr. McConnell worked only the day shift and

P etitioner usually worked nights, their paths did not often

cross at work. However, the evidence demonstrated that

Mr. McConnell occasionally used the term ÐbitchÑ to refer to

Petitioner. The evidence also demonstrated that he did so not

in a malicious or discriminatory way, but in a joking manner

because of PetitionerÓs actions that he witnessed or that were

described to him. Petitioner conceded that it was Ðlike it was

a jokeÑ when Mr. McConnell referred to her as a Ðbitch. Ñ There

was no testimony that Mr. McConnell used this term on repeated

occasions so that its use rose to the level of harassment or

that he used it to belittle or demean Petitioner.

8 . Sometime in April 2013, the C a fé catered a very large

event known as ÐJazzFest. Ñ Petitioner assisted Mr. McConnell in

the planning and execution of this event for the C afé . Her

husband, William, who had been unemployed, was hired to help in

food preparation at the event.

9 . In gen eral, JazzFest was stressful for all those who

worked the event. Both Mr. McConnell and Petitioner worked many

extra hours at the festival.

10 . During the course of JazzFest, Mr. McConnell, as

manager, permitted the employees to get food from the banqu et

line since they had been working all day without breaks for

nutrition. P etitioner and her husband loudly and

inappropriately berated Mr. McConnell in public and in front of

other employees about allowing employees to get food from the

banquet line. Mr . Shirley witnessed the confrontation and

considered the display to be an inappropriate method by

Petitioner to communicate her disagreement regarding

Mr. McConnellÓs management decision. Mr. McConnell also

observed that during JazzFest , Petitioner was Ð too pushyÑ and

Ðtoo bossyÑ with the staff without having any good reason for

such treatment of employees .

11 . Additionally, Mr. McConnell observed that Petitioner

was Ðnot herselfÑ and Ðwound up a li ttle too tightÑ during

JazzFest. Further , Mr. McConne ll was aware that Petitioner had

some recent personal stressors, such as her husband having

issues with unemployment and one of her sons being arrested and

incarcerated. He believed PetitionerÓs behavior was due to the

pressures in her family life combine d with the pressure from

working Jazzfest. Therefore, Mr. McConnell decided to give

Petitioner a week off, with pay, for rest and relaxation. He

hoped that Petitioner would come back refreshed and ready for

the busy beach season after her break.

1 2 . M r. Shirley knew of and supported the time off for

Petitioner and hoped that PetitionerÓs time away from work would

ease some of the undercurrent of negative feelings that had

built up between Petitioner and some of the employees.

1 3 . After Petitioner re turned from her week off,

Mr. McConnell received reports from some of his employees that

Petitioner was being unreasonable , raising her voice and losing

her temper ÐnumerousÑ times. He also received reports that

Petitioner was Ðhard to work for,Ñ and Ða bully. Ñ In addition,

owner James Shirley received some complaints from employees that

Petitioner was Ðgoing off on people. Ñ Indeed, h er treatment of

the employees had gotten to the point that several employees no

longer wished to work with her. The se em ployees were considered

good employees and were part of the restaurant team. The

evidence showed that it is very important for restaurant staff

to function as a team and that maintaining good working

relationships among team members is one important compo nent of a

good functioning restaurant.

14. Mr. McConnell spoke to Petitioner about the subject of

the complaints and asked why she was pushing the staff so hard

and creating a bad environment. Petitioner said she would try

to do better.

15. During thi s conversation, Mr. McConnell did not

remember asking Petitioner whether her meds were Ðout of whack , Ñ

but he has stated this to other people as a figure of speech in

the manner of Ðget your act together. Ñ The evidence did not

show that Mr. McConnellÓs us e of the phrase was discriminatory,

harassing or demonstrative of any knowledge of PetitionerÓs

alleged disability or perception of the same.

1 6 . After his talk with Petitioner, things improved for a

couple of days. However , Mr . McConnell received more and

similar complaints about Petitioner from the same employees who

previously complained about her , w ith some indicating they wo uld

quit if Petitioner continued to work at the restaurant .

M r . McConnell feared that if something was not done about

Petiti oner some of his good team employees would leave and he

would not be able to run the restaurant.

1 7 . The better evidence demonstrated that Mr. McConnell

met with Petitioner and offered her two weeks Ó severance pay .

He spoke with her about her inability to get along with the

employees and function as a team member at the restaurant . The

meeting lasted about 20 - 30 min utes . Ultimately, Petitioner

refused the severance pay, handed over her keys , and left .

There was no credible or substantial evidence tha t PetitionerÓs

termination was based on disability, perceived or otherwise.

Similarly, there was no credible or substantial evidence that

PetitionerÓs termination was based on her sex.

18 . Although Petition er asserted harassment from

Mr. McConnell, no e vidence to support this claim was adduced at

the h earing. Respondent hired and promoted Petitioner to a

manager position, allowed Petitioner to hire her husband and son

(and at least one of her sonÓs friends), and ga ve her a paid

week off after JazzFest t o refresh and relax from a stressful

event. The evidence showed that Mr. McConnell gave Petitioner

the benefit of the doubt, as he did with all his employees, and

only decided to terminate her after talking with Petitioner and

determining that giving her time off did nothing to eliminate

the negative energy Petitioner was bringing to the job. Based

on these facts, Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent

discriminated against her based on sex or disability when it

terminated her from employment . As such, the Petition for

Relief should be dismissed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

19 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).

2 0 . The Flori da Civil Rights Act (FCRA) in s ection 760.10,

Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part as follows:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

for an employer :

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

hire an individual, or otherwise to

discriminate agai nst any individual with

respect to compensation, terms , conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such

individualÓs race, color, religion, sex,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

2 1 . The Florida Civil Rights Act was patterned af ter Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq .

As such, FCHR and Florida courts have determined federal case

law interpreting Title VII is applicable to cases arising under

FCRA. See Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17

(Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Green v. Burger King Corp. , 728 So. 2d 369,

370 - 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So.

2d 923 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1996); Brand v. Fla. Power Corp. , 633 So.

2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) .

2 2 . Under FCRA, Petitioner has the burden to establish by

a preponderance of the evidence that s he was the subject of

discrimination by Respondent. In order to carry h er burden of

proof, Petitioner can establish a case of discrimination through

direct or circumstantial evidence. See Holifield v. Reno , 115

F.3d 1 555 , 1 562 (11th Cir. 1999).

23 . Direct evidence of discrimination is evidenc e that, if

believed, establishes the existence of discriminatory intent

behind an employment decision without inference or presumption.

Maynard v. B d . o f Regents , 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003 ) .

Direct evidence is composed of Ðonly the most blatant remarks,

whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminateÑ on the

basis of some impermissible factor. Evidence that only suggests

discrimina tion, or that is subject to more than one

interpretation, is not direct evidence. See Schoenf eld v.

Babbitt , 168 F . 3d 1257, 1266 (11 th Cir. 1999) , supra and Carter

v. Three Springs Residential Treatment , 132 F.3d 635, 462 (11 th

Cir. 1998). Direct evidenc e is evidence that, if believed,

would prove the existence of discriminatory intent without

resort to inference or presumption and must in some way relate

to the adverse actions of the employer. Denney v. City of

Albany , 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 200 1); see Jones v. BE&K

EngÓg, Inc. , 146 Fed. Appx. 356, 358 - 359 (11 th Cir. 2005) (ÐIn

order to constitute direct evidence, the evidence must directly

relate in time and subject to the adverse employment action at

issue.Ñ); see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Serv s., Inc. , 161 F.3d

1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the statement ÐweÓll burn

his black a** " was not direct evidence where it was made two -

and - a - half years prior to the employeeÓs termination).

2 4 . Herein, Petitioner presented no direct evidence of

discriminatory intent on the part of the Respondent. Therefore,

Petitioner must establish her case through inferential and

circumstantial proof. Shealy v. City of Albany , 89 F.3d 804,

806 (11th Cir. 1996); Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 128 F.3d 337,

348 ( 6 th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. ,

286 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2002).

2 5 . Where a complainant attempts to prove intentional

discrimination using circumstantial evidence, the shifting

burden analysis established by the United St ates Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981),

is applied. Under this well - established model of proof, the

complainant bears the initial burden of establish ing a prima

facie case of discrimination. When the charging party, i.e.,

Petitioner, is able to make out a prima facie case, the burden

to go forward with the evidence shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, non - discriminatory explanation for t he

employment action. See DepÓt of Corr. v. Chandler , 582 S o . 2d

1183 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1991). Importantly, the employer has the

burden of production, not persuasion, and need only present the

finder of fact with evidence that the decision was non -

discrimina tory. Id. See also Alexander v. Fulton Cnty . , 207

F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000). The employee must then come forward

with specific evidence demonstrating that the reasons given by

the employer are pretexts for discrimination. Schoenfeld v.

Babbitt , supra a t 1267. The employee must satisfy this burden

by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely than not

motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing that the

proffered reason for the employment decision is not worthy of

belief. DepÓt of Corr. v. C handler , supra at 1186; Alexander v.

Fulton Cnty. , supra .

2 6 . Notably, Ðalthough the intermediate burdens of

production shift back and forth, the ultimate burden of

persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally

discriminated against the [Pe titioner] remains at all times with

the [Petitioner]. Ñ EEOC v. JoeÓs Stone Crabs, Inc. , 296 F.3d

1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Byrd v. RT Foods, Inc. ,

948 S o . 2d 921, 927 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2007) (ÐThe ultimate burden of

proving intentional discriminat ion against the plaintiff remains

with the plaintiff at all times.Ñ). Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).

2 7 . O n the other hand, this proceeding was not halted

based on a summary judgment, but was fully tried before th e

Division of Administrative Hearings. Where the administrative

law judge does not halt the proceedings for Ðlack of a prima

facie case and the action has been fully tried, it is no longer

relevant whether the [Petitioner] actually established a prima

fac ie case. At that point, the only relevant inquiry is the

ultimate, factual issue of intentional discrimination . . . .

[W]hether or not [the Petitioner] actually established a prima

facie case is relevant only in the sense that a prima facie case

constit utes some circumstantial evidence of intentional

discrimination.Ñ Green v. Sch. Bd. Of Hillsborough Cnty. , 25

F.3d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1994); Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc. , 200

F. 3d 723, 727 (11 th Cir. 1999). See also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd.

o f Governors v. A ikens , 460 U.S. 711, 713 - 715 :

Because this case was fully tried on the

merits, it is surprising to find the parties

and the Court of Appeals still addressing

the question of whether Aikens made out a

prima facie case. We think that by framing

the issue i n these terms, they have

unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question

of discrimination vel non . . . . [W]hen

the defendant fails to persuade the district

court to dismiss the action for lack of a

prima facie case, and responds to the

plaintiffÓs proof by offering evidence of

the reason for the plaintiffÓs rejection,

the fact - finder must then decide whether the

rejection was discriminatory within the

meaning of Title VII. At this stage, the

McDonnell - Burdine presumption Ð drops from

the case, Ñ and Ð the fact ual inquiry proceeds

to a ne w level of specificity . Ñ

28 . In this case, Petitioner alleged that Respondent

discriminated against her on the basis of sex and disability in

violation of the Florida Civil Rights Acts.

29 . In order to establish a prima fac ie case of disability

discrimination under FCRA, Petitioner must show: 1) that she

was subject to an adverse employment action; 2) that she was

qualified for the job at the time; 3) that her employer knew at

the time of the action that she had a disabilit y; and 4) that

the adverse action took place in circumstances raising a

reasonable inference that the disability was a determining

factor in the decision. Luna v. Walgreen Co. , 347 Fed. Appx.

469, 471 (11th Cir. 2009); Nadler v. Harvey , No. 06 - 12692, 2007

U.S. App. LEXIS 20272, at *17 (11th Cir. 2007).

3 0 . A s a first step in any discrimination claim based on

disability, Petitioner must establish that she has a disability

or that the employer regards her as having a disability.

3 1 . The ADA defines Ð d isa bilityÑ as either Ð(A) a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of

such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

impairment.Ñ 42 U.S.C. § 12102( 1 ). An e mployerÓs mere

knowledge that the Petitioner is suffering or has suffered from

a medical condition of some kind, with out more, does not

establish Petitioner had an impairment that substantially

limited a major life activity, had a record of such an

impairm ent, or that Respondent considered her to be impaired.

See Hilburn v. Murata Electronics, Inc. , 181 F.3d 1220 (11 th

Cir. 1999) (employerÓs approval of four leaves of absence after

employee suffered heart attack did not establish Ðrecord ofÑ

disability); C arruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc. , 357 F.3d 1213

(11 th Cir. 2004) (employerÓs knowledge of the diagnosis and work

restrictions did not prove that it perceived the plaintiff as

substantially limited in her ability to work).

32. In this case, Petitioner failed to establish that her

OCD and other disorders significantly impaired a major life

activity or that her employer regarded her OCD and other

disorders as a disability. Petitioner worked in the restaurant

industry for 30 years despite being on medicat ion for a good

part of that period. Additionally, her disorders were not so

obvious that a person would conclude she had a disability.

Further, there was no substantive evidence that Respondent Ós

termination of Petitioner had any connection to her allege d

disabilities, or that the reason given for such termination was

a pretext for discrimination. Given these facts, the portions

of the Petition for Relief that relate to disability

discrimination should be dismissed.

3 3 . In order to establish a prima fac ie case of

discrimination based on sex under FCRA , Petitioner must

establish that: 1) she is a member of a protected class;

2) she is qualified for the position; 3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and 4) similarly - situated employees outside

the employeeÓs protected class were treated more favorably.

Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22.

3 4 . While Petitioner was a member of a protected class

(female) and suffered an adverse employment action

( termination), Petitioner presented no evidence that she was

treated differently than males who did not m eet RespondentÓs

expectations . Further, Petitioner presented no evidence as to

how sh e was treated differently than other male employees .

3 5 . More importantly , Respondent had a legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason for ending he r employment. Petitioner

engaged in condu ct that threatened to drive employees away and

did not match the team management strategy that Mr. McConnell or

Mr. Shirley wanted for the Restaurant.

3 6 . As in other discrimination settings , once the employer

has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action, the c harging p arty must demonstrate Ðsuch weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employerÓs proffered legitimate reasons

for its action that a reasonable fact finder could find [all of

those reasons] unworthy of credence.Ñ See Standard v. A.B.E.L.

Serv s , Inc. , 161 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11 th Cir. 1998). In

evaluating the plausibility of the employer Ó s explanation, Ðthe

relevant inquiry is not whether [the employerÓs] proffered

reasons were wise, fair , or correct, but whether [the employer]

honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon

those beliefs.Ñ Stover v. Martinez , 382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10 th

Cir. 2004). See a lso Valenzuela , 18 So . 3d at 26 (ÐThe inquiry

into pretext centers upon the employerÓs beliefs, and not the

employeeÓs own perception of [her] performance . Ñ)

3 7 . As the court said in Chapman v. Aansport , 229 F.3d

1012, 1030 (11 th Cir. 2000)(en banc) :

A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an

employerÓs proffered nondiscriminatory

reasons or substitute his business judgment

for that of the employer. Provided that the

proffered reason is one that might motivate

a reasonable employer, an employee must m eet

that reason head on and rebut it, and the

employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling

with the wisdom of that reason.

3 8 . Moreover, absent evidence of intentional

discrimination, it is not the role of administrative agencies or

the courts to micro - m anage internal business decisions. See

Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11 th Cir.

1991) (federal courts do not sit as Ðsuper - personnel departmentÑ

to reexamine an entityÓs business decisions); Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Comm cÓns , 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11 th Cir. 1984)

(Ð[t]he employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad

reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at

all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason .Ñ)

39 . In this case , Respondent promot ed Petitioner to a

management position . Petitioner was terminated only after she

had a very loud and public argument with her boss and after

numerous complaints from other employees. Mr. McConnell

terminated Peti tioner because she was alienating good emp loyees ,

some of whom were threatening to leave if something was not done

about Petitioner. Her management strategy and tactics simply

did not match what Respondent wanted for the C afé. G iven these

facts , Petitioner has failed to establish that she was

di scriminated against on the basis of her sex by Respondent.

Therefore, the Petit i on for Relief should be dismissed .

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relati ons enter an Order dismissing the Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June , 2015 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

DIANE CLEAVINGER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearing s

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of June , 2015 .

COPIES FURNISHED:

R obert L. Thirston, II, Esquire

Thirston Law Firm

Post Office Box 19617

Panama City Beach, Florida 32417

(eServed)

Timothy Nathan Tack, Esquire

Kunkel Miller and Hament

3550 Buschwood Park Drive , Suite 135

Tampa, Florida 33618

(eServed)

Tammy Scott Bart on, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Cheyanne Costilla, Gen eral Co unse l

F lorida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

NOTIC E OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in th is case.